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ABSTRACT 
 
This research analyses ´natural´ disaster policies for Mexico. The objective is to demonstrate 
that ´natural´ disaster and the policies oriented to prevent them are socially constructed. It 
adopts  a  constructionist  perspective  because  it  is  concerned  with  the  understanding  of 
collective social constructions of meaning and knowledge that are determined by political 
and social processes. This study focuses on the relation between the discourses of disaster 
causality, policy problem construction and policy responses in Mexico. The central argument 
is that in Mexico when  disaster is conceived as a ´natural´ phenomenon the exposure of 
vulnerable people to disaster risk is concealed therefore inhibiting the emergence of socially 
sensitive responses at policy level.  
Two analytical inter-related frameworks were elaborated. The first framework was set 
up to examine the discursive construction of floods causality as a policy problem and the 
second  one  to  unpack  the  argumentative  construction  of  policy  responses.  The  research 
chooses the case of Chalco Valley‘s  floods that took place  in June 2000  in the State of 
Mexico, Mexico and the institutional responses deployed before, during and after the floods 
as the empirical ground on which the central argument is examined.  
Four different disaster discourses were found at policy level, namely inadvertence by 
´ignorance`, inadvertence by `carelessness`, accidental and structural. These were shaped by 
how  causal  ideas  of  disaster  were  assembled  and  made  persuasive.  In  turn,  these  four 
different discourses construct four different floods policy problems and therefore imply four 
types of policy responses  even though  important connections were  found amongst them. 
These  connections  represent  relevant  policy  coalitions  upon  which  policy  change  can  be 
sought.  It  was  found  that  people‘s  vulnerability  to  floods  is  a  component  in  only  one 
discourse,  namely  structural  causality  discourse,  and  therefore  in  one  group  of  policy 
responses.     
The research approach and the findings suggest areas to improve policy making and 
research in the disaster field in Mexico. The outcome of the research contributes to a better 
understanding of the how scientists, policy makers and people affected by disaster assign 
meanings  and  beliefs,  construct  knowledge  and  use  evidence  to  support  and  legitimise 
disaster  causality  claims  in  different  ways.  These  epistemological  differences  have  to  be 
acknowledged  for  improving  policy  formulation  and  implementation  aimed  at  reducing 
disaster risk of vulnerable people.    17 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis analyses ‗natural‘ disaster policies for Mexico. It is concerned with knowledge 
production of ‗natural‘ disaster at the policy level and how it shapes institutional responses. It 
focuses on the relation between discourses of disaster causality and policy responses with the 
intention to examine the manner in which knowledge claims and evidence are constructed 
and used to portray flooding of the Chalco Valley as a ‗natural‘ disaster. Moreover, the thesis 
explains  how  different  disaster  discourses  imply  different  policy  problems  and  therefore 
different responses. It focuses on city, national and state level administrative actors and is 
methodologically focused on an analysis of surface discourses of the dominant bureaucracy.  
The research provides a detailed analysis of the dominant bureaucratic discourses but 
does not intend to examine in depth the role that power asymmetries and cultural contexts 
play in shaping surface and hidden discourses and their relation to policy, resistance and 
material action, as such an analysis would fall outside the scope of the primary information 
collected for this study. The focus is on dominant bureaucratic discourses, as a means to 
understand the argumentative and discursive dimension of ‗natural‘ disaster in the policy-
making process because this can allow an explanation of how and why disaster is framed as a 
‗natural‘ phenomenon and the implication of this on policy implementation.  
The world is facing disasters on an unprecedented scale. Between 1994 and 2003, on 
average, more than 255 million people were affected by ‗natural‘ disaster globally. During 
the same period, these disasters claimed an average of 58,000 lives annually. In the year 
2003, 1 in 25 people worldwide was affected by ‗natural‘ disaster.  Over the past decade 
disasters caused damage amounting to an average estimated US$67 billion per year, with a 
maximum of $230 and a minimum of US$28 billion. The economic cost associated with 
´natural´ disasters has increased 14-fold since the 1950s. (Guha-Sapir, Hargit, Hoyois, 2004) 
 Mexico  is  one  of  the  most  diverse  countries  in  the  world  in  terms  of  ecology, 
geography, and climate. It is susceptible to a wide range of ´natural´ disasters such as floods, 
droughts,  volcanic  eruptions,  earthquakes,  fires  and  tropical  cyclones.  ´Natural´  disasters 
cause  enormous  economic,  financial,  and  human  losses  each  year.  In  Mexico,  disasters 
occurred at an average of three times annually during 1980–1998. Since 1980, direct damage 
from `natural` disaster totalled some US$ 11.1 billion, and some 8,000 individuals have lost 
their  lives.  Hydro-meteorological  events  accounted  for  30  percent  of  property  damage,   18 
geological events for approximately 40 percent, and forest fires for 35 percent. (Barhma, 
Ahyres and Kreimer, 2001)  
According to the SEGOB (Ministry of Internal Affairs,  the ministerial office that 
coordinates the National System of Civil Protection in Mexico, SINAPROC), between 1980 
and 1999, 75 disasters caused the loss of more than 10,000 lives in Mexico; hundreds of 
thousands of  victims and  material  losses and damages amounted to some US$9.6 billion 
(SEGOB, 2001 a) More recently, from 2005–2007 hydro-meteorological hazards affected 3.5 
million people, and damages amounted to US$ 11.2 billion (CENAPRED, 2006, 2007, 2008)   
 In addition to the direct losses, disaster disrupts the development process because the 
need  for  emergency  and  reconstruction  financing  diverts  budgetary  resources  from  their 
originally  intended uses, disrupting priority  investment programs. For example,  in recent 
years, an estimated 30 percent of funding for World Bank-assisted water projects in Mexico 
was re-channeled for response to emergencies. The need to respond to ´natural´ disasters may 
also undermine financial planning and budgeting as an instrument of economic and social 
development (Barhma, Ahyres and Kreimer, 2001)  
In Mexico, as in other developing countries, the poor are disproportionately affected 
by  ´natural´  disasters.  According  to  assessments  by  the  National  Centre  for  Disaster 
Prevention (CENAPRED), 68 percent of people affected by ´natural´ disasters are the poor 
and the extremely poor: many lower-income families live in substandard housing that is less 
able to withstand natural forces than that of those with greater economic solvency.  Some 
reside near cities in high-density settlements built on steep slopes, which are vulnerable to 
landslides. Others live in low-lying areas and are at risk of flooding (Barhma, Ahyres and 
Kreimer, 2001; CENAPRED, 2000, 2001, 2002,)  
  The Mexican government has taken important steps to reduce the impact of ‗natural‘ 
disasters.  In  1986,  it  established  the  National  System  of  Civil  Protection  (SINAPROC), 
which is the main policy mechanism for inter-agency coordination of disaster preparedness 
and  response;  in  1990,  it  established  CENAPRED  as  a  centre  for  research  on  and 
communication of ‗natural‘ hazards forecasting and monitoring, and mitigation technologies. 
CENAPRED was conceived of to bridge the gap between scientific knowledge and policy 
making. In 1996, SEGOB created the Fund for Natural Disaster (FONDEN) as a source of 
federal  financing  for  reconstruction  of  public  infrastructure,  emergency  response,  and 
disaster  relief  and  more  recently,  in  2003,  established  the  Fund  for  Natural  Disaster   19 
Prevention (FOPREDEN) to promote disaster risk reduction actions at state and community 
levels.  
It can be said that Mexico, as a disaster risk prone country, is rather well equipped 
with institutions, government offices, laws, and norms to protect its inhabitants from natural 
hazards and to prevent disaster as compared with other countries of a similar development 
level.  However, the impact of disaster on the economy and population remains very high. 
For instance, the great socio-economic and environmental impact provoked by the floods of 
2007 in the State of Tabasco (62 percent of the state of Tabasco was flooded, more than 1.2 
million people were affected, and material and infrastructural damages amounted to $US3.1 
billion) revealed, among other things, that the Mexico government‘s approach to ‗natural‘ 
disaster  remains  far  from  being  a  preventive  approach  because  it  is  focused  on  disaster 
preparedness and mitigation. It is, rather, a reactive approach.  
In some manner, the reactive approach indicates the way ‗natural‘ disaster have been 
historically  conceptualised, understood, and tackled. ‘Natural‗  disaster policies  in Mexico 
address the physical causes of disaster and attempt to promote change in people‘s behaviour 
to avoid their being  affected by  ‗natural‘  hazards. This can be conceived of as a rational 
approach that relies upon  ‗objective‘ knowledge of ‗natural‘  hazards. As Garvin remarks 
(2001:448), ―[a] rational approach to policy abstracts knowledge from context and argues for 
public  policy  that  bypasses  spatial,  temporal,  and  cultural  differences  and  becomes 
universally applicable. It is programmatic in nature and trusts in the ability of science and 
technology to manage and control potential problems‖.  Thus, ‗natural‘ disaster policies do 
not in fact engage in social processes that place people at risk and, therefore, are not designed 
in reality to prevent disaster.  
 ‗Natural‘    disaster  policies  form  part of  the    SINAPROC  and  are  guided  by  the 
reactive  approach,  which  encompasses  ‗natural‘  hazards  forecasting  and  monitoring, 
emergency aid, mitigation, and restoration activities. For example, in this regard, FONDEN 
and FOPREDEN were created as policy tools to complement and advance reactive actions 
and to initiate and promote preventive actions, respectively.  
FONDEN  and  FOPREDEN  are  the  two  public  financial  schemes  that  have  been 
providing  resources  to  mitigate  and  prevent  disaster  in  Mexico  since  1996  and  2004, 
respectively. At present, it is nearly impossible to consider SINAPROC without referring to   20 
these  Funds
1. This is due, in part, to the socio -economic benefits that these Funds have 
produced in terms of resources allocation to affected and vulnerable communities throughout 
the Mexican Republic.  For instance, in the 2005 –2008 period, FONDEN channelled a total 
amount of $US3,667 million  to 2,058 municipalities affected by  meteorological  hazards 
such as hurricanes, extreme rainfalls, floods, and droughts in the states of Veracruz, Puebla, 
Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Yucatán, Oaxaca, Hidalgo and Campeche. (Aragón-Durand, 2009)  
In general, it may be stated that these resources contributed to temporary alleviation 
of the suffering of many during mainly emergency episodes. To obtain  access to  FONDEN 
funds, State governments are required  to submit projects to the General Coordination of 
Civil Protection of the SINAPROC (GC-SEGOB), this  justified  by that these projects aim to  
protect  people from  the ‗natural‘  phenomena that eventually cause  ‗natural‘  disaster.  
Evaluations  of  the  implementation  of  FONDEN  (Graizbord,  2007,  2006,  2005) 
indicate  that  the  majority  of  submitted  and  approved  projects  fall  into  the  following 
categories: 1) attention to affected people;  2) monitoring and forecasting  ‗natural‘  hazards 
of a meteorological nature, such as  hurricanes, floods, and extreme rainfalls;  3) construction 
of protection works to counter  the impact of  ‗natural‘  hazards, and 4) reinforcement of 
buildings and infrastructure to withstand potential  ‗natural‘  hazards impacts and to mitigate  
‗natural‘  disaster.  
The  ‗natural‘  in  ‗natural‘  disaster  comprises  an  essential  ingredient  for  framing 
disaster and for projects formulation and implementation. Justification of the project relies 
upon  the  assumption  that  the  causal  agent  responsible  for  the  disaster  is,  ultimately,  a 
‗natural‘  hazard.  In  FONDEN‘s  operation  regulations,  one  of  the  decisive  criteria  that 
determines project approval or rejection is the occurrence and impact of  ‗natural‘ hazards 
such as extreme hydro-meteorological threats, heavy rainfalls, hurricanes, tropical cyclones,  
and floods, and geological hazards such as landslides, to mention a few. ´Naturalness´ in 
disaster has acquired such importance in Mexican policies that emergency aid and allocation 
of financial resources is implemented to address ‗natural‘ hazards and to tackle their impact 
on the population.      
The adjective ‗natural‘ is commonly found in disaster policy jargon in Mexico when 
one refers to disaster causes, and is employed as a very valuable linguistic resource by state 
                                                 
1  FONDEN  has  achieved  such  fame  worldwide  that  in  the  most  recent  United  Nations  Climate  Change 
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governors to ‗naturalise‘ disaster (i.e., to define disaster as ‗natural‘ phenomena), to neglect 
or undermine human intervention or blame, and even to ask for FONDEN and FOPREDEN 
funds to be better prepared for future potentially disastrous events. These examples clearly 
indicate that the idea of ‗naturalness‘ when ascribed to disaster is deeply engrained in the 
policy realm in Mexico. This has had relevant implications not only on the way scientists, 
policy  makers,  and  even  lay  people  conceive  of  disaster,  but  also  in  the  type  of  policy 
responses  adopted,  as  the  case  of  FONDEN  demonstrates.  Two  of  the  most  important 
implications of `naturalising‘ disaster are the following:  
a) By ‗naturalising` disaster, the focus of attention is placed on the ‗natural‘  factors, 
which entail technological actions created to either control or regulate these  ‗natural‘ causes; 
this has driven research and policy focus on tackling the physical forces of nature. It has been 
noted  that  no  control  over  ‗natural‘  hazards  is  possible  or  desirable.  Pelling  (2001:171) 
remarked that ―technological responses that address physical causes alone can prolong, and 
even increase, the losses incurred when disaster strike‖.   
b) By ‘naturalising’ disaster, discourses of disaster causality tend to ignore or conceal 
the socio-economic processes that place  vulnerable populations at risk and consequently, 
such processes are not regarded as policy issues because ‗natural‘ hazards become the policy 
problem to solve. Discourses of disaster causality tend to favour explanations that rely on the 
features of extreme ‗natural‘ hazards or the human capabilities for avoiding them. In fact, 
these  two  implications  can  be  identified  as  essential  traits  of  the  dominant  paradigm  of 
disaster, the Behavioural Paradigm (BP).  
BP is rooted in the assumption that ‗natural‘ disaster is a ‗natural‘ phenomena, and 
that the consequences associated with this can be prevented with better monitoring of the 
sources of danger and improvement of organisational systems for evacuation, response, and 
relief. Researchers in the ‗hard‘ sciences have exerted a great influence on conceptualising 
disaster by labelling these according to their triggers, i.e., the natural hazards, in other words, 
a technocratic view of disaster. For instance, at the SINAPROC, the typology of disaster is 
elaborated according to the type of ‗disturbing agent‘. A hydro-meteorological disaster is 
named after a hydro-meteorological ‗disturbing agent‘; a geologic disaster is named after a 
geologic agent, etc. To Hewitt (1995:118), the mainstream technocratic view of  ‗natural‘ 
hazards ―[]…is indifferent to social and ecological contexts, to the resources of vulnerability 
that are largely social, and the relation with ‗development‘ ‖.    22 
Criticisms of this technocratic view and the BP in general assert that disaster is both a 
natural and social phenomenon. In this respect, a relationship between human development 
and disaster can be identified. Patterns become evident in disaster-related deaths and losses. 
They exert a negative impact on both human and economic development. Such patterns set 
up a clear relationship between the Human Development Index (HDI) and the likelihood of 
the occurrence of  disaster. International Red Cross data compare the  impacts of  extreme 
natural  events  on  countries  with  high,  medium,  and  low  scores  on  the  HDI
2.  The 
International Red Cross contemplated data for 2,557 disaster triggered by natural events that 
occurred from 1991–2000. One-half of these disasters took place in countries with medium 
HDI scores, but two-thirds of deaths occurred in nations achieving low HDI results. Only 2 
percent of deaths were recorded in countries reflecting a high HDI outcome (Aragón and 
Wisner, 2002). According to this contesting view, disaster should be regarded as a social 
process whose origins are to be examined within society-nature relations in the context of 
development and should not be depicted solely or mainly as a ‘natural’ phenomenon. This 
view is, in fact, embedded in the Structural Paradigm (SP) that emerged in the 1980‘s in the 
academic world and that is more recently permeating the world of policy.   
In  contrast  to  the  BP,  which  approaches  disaster  either  emphasising  the  natural 
processes  of  causation  (hazards  analysis)  or  community  behaviour  and  social  responses 
(social disruption analyses), SP explains  disaster  in terms of  vulnerability. Contemporary 
views ascribed to SP suggest that disaster is never ‗natural‘, but always involve both natural 
and social processes. For instance, the vulnerability perspective on disaster analysis led by 
Blaikie and colleagues (1994, 2003) states that to understand disaster, it is necessary to focus 
on social processes such as vulnerability rather than exclusively on the natural hazards.  
  In  order  to  understand  how  disaster  is  framed  and  tackled  at  the  policy  level  in 
Mexico, this thesis proposes that conception of disaster as ‗natural‘ is, in itself, not  ‗natural‘, 
but  a  socially  constructed  frame  rather  than  one  that  occurs  naturally  in  the  world.  On 
following  this  constructionist  statement,  one  can  argue  that  prevailing  ‗natural‘  disaster 
policies are, in fact, social products in terms of their discursive construction. Moreover, the 
concepts  of  ‗natural‘  disaster  and  ‗natural‘  hazards  that  form  the  underpinning  of  such 
policies can be examined as ‗social natures‘ (Castree and Braun, 2001).   
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To understand the construction of  ‗social natures‘, one can look at the role that public 
institutions, policy makers, and scientists play in the discourse  of ‗natural‘  disaster because 
public policies can be perceived as sites where causal agents of disaster, their images, and 
meanings  are  constantly  ‗re-constructed‘  and  contested  by  diverse  social  actors  and 
institutions. Focusing on the case of the Chalco Valley floods, the central argument of this 
thesis is that policies, programmes, and institutional responses aimed at preventing  ‗natural‘  
disaster  have overlooked  the vulnerability of populations to floods because, among other 
reasons, the knowledge upon these  are based emphasises the scientific and technical side of  
‗natural‘ causes.  
 
i. The focus of the research.  
 
This  study  focuses  on  the  relation  between  ‗natural‘  disaster  causality  discourses,  policy 
problem construction, and policy responses in Mexico. The objective of this research is to 
demonstrate that ‗natural‘ disaster and the policies oriented toward preventing the former are 
socially constructed. It intends to show how ‗images‘ and representations of disaster causal 
agents,  their  interactions,  and  consequences  are  constructed.  It  argues  that  the  different 
disaster discourses found at the policy level are shaped by the manner in which causal ideas 
of disaster are assembled and rendered persuasive in three social domains of disaster and 
risk: international science and disaster management; disaster governance, and local coping 
strategies. 
This thesis claims that  
―In Mexico when disaster is framed as a natural phenomenon, the 
exposure  of  vulnerable  people  to  disaster  risk  is  concealed, 
therefore inhibiting the emergence of socially sensitive responses at 
the policy level‖.  
 
Socially sensitive policy responses are those that acknowledge the existence of people 
who are vulnerable to floods, and that therefore are formulated and implemented to reduce 
floods risk.  
 
The central questions considered throughout the thesis are as follows:   24 
1.  How and why are certain processes of environmental change framed as a ‗natural‘ 
disaster in the decision-making sphere? 
2.  How do these framings shape and condition the emergence and nature of responses at 
the policy level? 
3.  How are people vulnerable to floods framed in both disaster discourses and policy 
responses? 
 
This thesis adopts the social constructionist approach (Gergen and Gergen, 1991; Schwandt, 
1994; Hannigan, 1995; Denzin, 2000) that concerns the world of inter-subjectively shared, 
collective social constructions of meaning and knowledge that are determined by political, 
social,  and  cultural  processes.  According  to  this  approach,  ‗reality‘  is  created  by  social 
interaction that involves history, language, and action. 
This thesis contributes to the understanding of ‗natural‘ disaster as policy problems.  
Social  constructionist  comprises  the  approach  and  methodology  employed  to  unpack  the 
social construction of ‗natural‘ disaster through policy discourses and institutional responses 
in  Mexico.  It  is  important  to  understand  the  argumentative  and  discursive  dimension  of 
‗natural‘ disaster within the confines of the policy-making process because this can permit 
explanation  of  how  and  why  disaster  are  framed  as  ´natural´  phenomena  and  of  the 
implication of this on policy implementation. 
To  explore  the  central  hypothesis,  this  research  focuses  on  the  SINAPROC  and 
considers as a case study the Chalco Valley floods (in the south-eastern periphery of Mexico 
City)  that  took  place  in  June  2000.  The  basic  units  of  analysis  are  the  arguments  and 
discourses of scientists, policy  makers, and  implementers, and the  institutional responses 
deployed  to  tackle  the  inundations  and  to  assist  the  affected  people.  Five  bodies  of 
knowledge  are  important  for  this  research.  The  first  body  of  knowledge  concerns  the 
theoretical bases of natural disaster policies. Review of the literature allowed for explanation 
of  how  the  concepts  of  natural  hazard,  vulnerability,  disaster,  and  risk  shape  the  core 
theoretical clusters of the disaster field. The analysis concludes that explanations of disaster 
causality are shifting from natural to social factors. 
The  second  body  of  knowledge  relates  to  constructionist  epistemology  and  its 
application to nature and to ‗natural‘ disaster. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that 
deals with the theory of knowledge. It attempts to provide answers to the question, ‗How, and   25 
what, can we know?‘ This involves thinking about the nature of knowledge itself, about its 
scope, and about the validity and reliability of claims to knowledge. Social constructionism 
draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  human  experience,  including  perception,  is  mediated 
historically, culturally, and linguistically, that is, what we perceive and experience is never a 
direct  reflection  of  environmental  conditions,  but  must  be  understood                                                                                                 
as a specific reading of these conditions. This does not imply that we can never really know 
anything; rather, it suggests that there are ‗knowledges‘ rather than ‗knowledge‘. Language is 
an important aspect of socially constructed knowledge. The intention here is to discuss how 
the knowledge production of disaster and risk can take place in the three different social 
domains referred previously.   
One strand of this second body of knowledge is the application of constructionist 
epistemology to the policy process and it clusters around the argumentative and discursive 
perspective  of  policy.  It  emphasises  the  value-laden  nature  of  the  policy  process  by 
recognising how values, meanings, and beliefs are embodied in each subject‘s  interpretations 
of  the ‗facts‘ in the claim-making process, which itself to some degree is shaped by the 
position the subject holds on the institution and his/her professional and personal experience.  
The third body of knowledge is drawn from the sociology of social problems, which 
is also of a constructionist nature. Social problems, according to Spector and Kitsuse (1973: 
146), ―are not static conditions but rather ‗sequences of events‘   that develop on the basis of 
collective  definitions.  Social  problems  are  ‗the  activities  of  groups  making  assertions  of 
grievances  and  claims  to  organizations,  agencies,  and  institutions  about  some  putative 
conditions‘‖.  Thus,  understanding  ‗social  problems‘  as  collective  and  institutional
3 
accomplishments  allows  explaining  the  contested  construction  of  the  ‗natural‘  disaster 
problem at the policy level.   
 The fourth body of knowledge makes use of the sociology of the environment, which 
is the result of the application of constructionist epistemology and the sociology of social 
problems to the environment. It is asserted that environmental problems are similar to other 
social problems, the outcome of a claim-making process, and the struggle of the meanings of 
                                                 
3According to Fischer and Hajer (1999), institutions and actors determine the political meaning and implications 
of the environmental ‗problematic‘ by framing the issues, determining the language of the debate, and pre-
defining the solutions to problems. In the 1960s, Berger and Luckmann pointed out that, ―institutions by the 
very fact of their existence, control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct, which channel 
it in one direction as against the many other directions that would theoretically be possible‖ (1967: 58).  
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certain  social conditions. Hannigan (1995: 2) notes that ―environmental problems do  not 
materialised by themselves; rather, they must be ‗constructed‘ by individuals or organizations 
who define pollution or another objective condition as worrisome and seek to do something 
about it‖.  Finally, the fifth body of knowledge derives from the political theories of causal 
stories.  To  analyse  disaster  causality  as  a  policy  problem,  one  is  able  to  draw  from  the 
theories of causality developed in political science proposed by Stone (1989). The author 
provides a practical typology of causal theories  based on a  matrix resulting  from related 
actions (unguided and purposeful) with consequences (intended and unintended). According 
to  Stone  (1989),  difficult  conditions  become  policy  problems  when  individuals  come  to 
regard these as amenable to human action.  
This thesis intends to make a contribution to the existing knowledge and debate on 
disaster  policies  in  the  following  way.  It  contributes  to  the  epistemological  analysis  of 
‗natural‘ disaster by specifying the manner in which knowledge claims of disaster causality 
are constructed. It relates knowledge to its social producers and users which reflects the 
interest and culture of the disaster policy-relevant actors that conform the SINAPROC  in 
Mexico. It also contributes to the growing  body of knowledge of the  interpretive policy 
analysis because it intends to establish concrete ways to develop a methodology that can be 
used to focus on meanings, beliefs and metaphors of policy arguments of causal events which 
are typical in the policy and politics arenas. This thesis is a contribution to the understanding 
and  analysis  of  ‗natural‘  disaster  as  social  process  in  terms  of  their  argumentative  and 
discourse construction because it provides a methodology, and in particular two frameworks, 
to  study  a  disaster  not  as  a  fixed  event  but  as  social  construct  that  is  liable  to  change 
according to institutional structure. The need to do research from this angle has been pointed 
out by several disaster experts at the international level (Alexander, 2005; Quarantelli, 1993, 
2005; Perry, 2005) 
 
ii. The research case study 
 
The Chalco Valley floods that took place in June 2000 and the disaster prevention policy 
system in Mexico were chosen as a case study.  On June 1, 2000, 80 hectares of Chalco 
Valley territory were inundated with wastewaters. Floods were caused by the rupture and 
discharge of La Compañía Canal (LCC), an open-air sewage canal that collects domestic   27 
water from two municipalities in the State of Mexico: Chalco Valley-Solidarity, and Chalco.  
The members of more than 6,700 households were affected with gastrointestinal, skin, and 
water-borne diseases, in addition to electricity and piped water suspension and the lack of 
food supplies.  
 The five most severely affected colonias
4 were Avándaro, El Triunfo, San Isidro, 
Unión de Guadalupe, and El Molino. A segment of the Mexico-Puebla highway between 
kilometres 26 and 28 was submerged, and many passenger buses, trucks, and automobiles 
became stranded.  Transportation of goods and services from Mexico City to Veracruz was 
interrupted. Chalco Valley inhabitants, mainly low-income families, were severely affected 
and unable to cope with the disaster. Emergency aid and assistance were rapidly provided by 
the  army,  the  Red  Cross,  and  the  fire  departments  of  both  local  and  neighbouring 
municipalities.  
Rapid assessment of the canal  walls was undertaken, and a prompt response was 
provided  to  prevent  the  water  from  flowing  out  of  the  canal.  On  the  third  day  of  the 
aftermath, former President Ernesto Zedillo declared the area a disaster zone. The Ministry 
of Social Development and the Ministry of Public Health joined forces and provided food, 
clothing, and other basic goods and implemented a sanitary programme to avoid epidemics 
and outbreaks of contagious diseases.  
Explanations concerning what occurred were broadcast on radio and television, and 
appeared in newspapers.  But at the time, no one was certain about what caused the canal to 
collapse. A few hours after the tragedy, the National Water Commission (CNA) carried out 
an investigation to ascertain what had happened.  The official evaluation soon established 
that the canal rupture was due to the impact of heavy rains on the canal walls; in effect, 
nature was blamed for the tragedy. However, according to some of the affected inhabitants 
that I interviewed, the Chalco Valley ‗environmental disaster‘ was human-induced. Some 
said that canal-wall fissures posed a risk for many years, but authorities paid insufficient 
attention  to  complaints.  Local  inhabitants  previously  voiced  warnings  of  the  potential 
tragedy, and in their view, authorities did not act to prevent this.   
The case study is analysed within the context of the SINAPROC in Mexico, because 
SINAPROC is the national system that formulates and implements policies regarding disaster 
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prevention.  Therefore, the  study  of  SINAPROC‘s  view  of  the  Chalco  Valley  floods  and 
responses to these provides relevant knowledge for enquiring into the politics of ´natural´ 
disaster discourses. It is  important to highlight that the focus  is placed not only on civil 
protection  agencies,  but  also  on  the  prevention  system,  this  is  in  order  to  cover  all  the 
institutional dimensions I propose to address in this research.   
    This  case  study  possesses  both  an  instrumental  and  an  intrinsic  value.  To  Stake 
(1995), quoted in Creswell (1998), an instrumental case study focuses on a specific issue 
rather than on the case itself, which becomes a vehicle to understand the issue to a greater 
degree. An intrinsic case study concentrates on the case because it holds intrinsic or unusual 
interest. This case study can be considered an instrumental case study because it can provide 
insights on the discursive construction of ‗natural‘ disaster causality within policies. But it 
also has intrinsic value because it seeks a better understanding of floods vulnerability within 
the context of late urbanisation in the eastern periphery of Mexico City and of the manner in 
which Mexican policies address these questions. 
 
iii. The research methodology.  
 
The  objective  of  the  fieldwork  was  to obtain  primary  and  secondary  information  on  the 
policy system with regard to ‗natural‘ disaster prevention and civil protection in Mexico, in 
particular concerning the inundations in the Chalco Valley and the interpretations and claims 
of the affected people.  The fieldwork took place in two stages: the exploratory fieldwork– 
between November and December 2001– which helped me to design the methodology for the 
final fieldwork, while the final fieldwork was carried out from January to May 2003– for a 
total  of  seven  months  in  the  field.  The  final  fieldwork  methodology  comprised  several 
interviews  applied  to  policy-relevant  actors  and  to  affected  residents  of  El  Triunfo,  San 
Isidro, Avándaro, and Unión de Guadalupe. The main purposes of the preliminary fieldwork 
were the following: to refine the main argument; to test the methodology; to gain a better 
understanding of the relevant institutions dealing with various aspects of disaster prevention 
and civil protection  in Mexico; to acquire additional knowledge on the  case selected  for 
study, and to explore the experience and views of local people.  
With  regard  to  local  people‘s  views  of  floods,  four  unstructured  interviews  were 
conducted  with  residents  of  the  municipality  of  Valle  de  Chalco-Solidarity.  Preliminary   29 
findings indicated that the local population was aware of floods hazards, foresaw the canal 
fracture,  and  addressed  their  claims  to  the  relevant  municipal  authorities  prior  to  the 
occurrence of the inundations. According to local people interviewed, authorities did little to 
prevent  the  canal  breakage.  These  local  people  directed  blame  on  the  water  and  on  the 
sanitation operators for the ‗tragedy‘.  
Institutional analysis was conducted by means of semi-structured interviews to policy 
makers and government officials, and to local operators in Mexico City and in the Naucalpan 
municipality,  where  some  Ministries  of  the  State  of  Mexico  government  are  located. 
Interviews revealed that, in general terms, policy makers frame ‗natural‘ disaster in terms of 
the  physical  features  of  the  threats.  Within  SINAPROC  and  CENAPRED,  scientific  and 
technical knowledge is employed to measure the magnitude and frequency of such ‗natural‘ 
hazards, and the information is intended to make populations aware of the characteristics of 
natural phenomena in order for them to act ‗adequately‘. I ascertained that in the view of 
CENAPRED,  communication  of  scientific  knowledge  is  the  means  by  which  to  educate 
people  to  prevent  disaster;  technical  solutions  and  government  central  tasks  comprise 
forecasting hazards and assisting victims after the occurrence of disaster. ‗Good‘ engineering 
can decrease infrastructure vulnerability and the risk to which populations are exposed.  
During the final fieldwork, I conducted several interviews at policy and local levels to 
people affected by the floods. The general purpose of the interviews was to investigate the 
discursive dimension of ‗natural‘ disaster causality within policies.  It was essential to obtain 
primary and secondary data in order to refine the main argument.  The first and second parts 
of the main argument were addressed by conducting semi-structured interviews to policy and 
decision-makers, while semi-structured interviews to people affected by floods in the Chalco 
Valley  covered  the  second  part.  Gathering  secondary  information  on  the  plans  and 
programmes for disaster and civil protection issues, water management and sanitation, and 
urbanisation and  land use was central to examine the  first and second parts of the  main 
argument. These interviews provided rich primary information for the development of an in-
depth  analysis  employing  argumentative  and  discourse  analysis  of  disaster  causality  and 
policy responses. Interviews were intended to include all of the different policy actors, such 
as policy makers, implementers, and operators, and other policy-relevant subjects such as 
scientists, who are directly related with the topic and specifically with the type of disaster 
relevant to this study.     30 
Interviewees  from  SINAPROC  included  personnel  from  the  sectors  of  disaster 
prevention, civil protection, environment and natural resources, water and sanitation issues, 
and  urban  planning.  The  interviewees  selected  were  those  who  could  provide  detailed 
accounts on the issue. This is because within the policy system, these are the individuals who 
make  policies,  design  programmes,  and  coordinate  responses  concerning  inundations 
prevention  and  mitigation,  water  provision  and  sanitation,  and  emergencies  attention. 
Therefore, this situation permitted me to explore the posit ions of a number of subjects within 
the SINAPROC regarding the causality of the Chalco Valley floods and the meanings and 
beliefs that these people attributed to the floods.  At the local level, I applied semi-structured 
interviews to residents living in the colonias that were most affected by the Chalco Valley 
wastewater  floods:  Avándaro,  San  Isidro,  El  Triunfo,  and  Unión  de  Guadalupe.  A 
characterisation of the individuals affected is provided in Chapter Three.  
In  order  to  draw  a  more  detailed  picture  of  the  case  study  and  to  complete  the 
analytical framework, secondary information and relevant literature on the theoretical issues 
on  disaster,  risk,  and  policy  were  researched  and  analysed.  Documents  and  newspaper 
accounts were also obtained to complete the elaboration of the contextual Chapter Four on 
the case study of the Chalco Valley floods and of Chapter Five on the disaster policy context 
in Mexico. Analysis of content was performed to identify the main issues that arose as a 
result of the inundations, such as socio-environmental change and urbanisation in the Chalco 
Valley region.  
 
iv. The structure and content of the thesis.  
 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter One analyses the theoretical bases of 
‗natural‘ disaster policies and explains  how the concepts of natural  hazard, vulnerability, 
disaster, and risk form the core theoretical clusters of the  disaster field. It argues that in 
practice,  the  meanings  of  these  concepts  reflect  the  particular  views  of  the  relationship 
between nature and society. This chapter is made up of three sections. In the first section, the 
behavioural (BP) and structural paradigms (SP) are reviewed to characterise the different 
interpretations of nature-society relations. Focusing on these two paradigms allows for an 
understanding of how interpretations of ‗disaster causality‘ shift from nature to society.  In 
addition, these paradigms offer a variety of ways to conceive of human action within the   31 
context of disaster. This is a necessary first step toward later explanation of why the core 
concepts of the disaster field, namely  ‗natural‘ disaster,  ‗hazards‘,  and  ‗vulnerability‘,  can 
have different connotations.  
The  second  section  focuses  on  risk,  because  analysis  of  the  contested  social 
construction  of  disaster  risk  can  provide  valuable  information  for  understanding  how 
different agents are claimed to be causal factors of inundations. This section compares, in 
epistemological terms, the  naturalist and the constructionist perspectives of risk analysis, 
which is necessary to explain how knowledge production of disaster risk is carried out with 
regard to the two previously mentioned paradigms. The ultimate intent of this section is to 
link the interpretations of risk found in the literature on disaster with the broader discussion 
of two epistemologies of risk. These comparisons will arguably permit me to make clear the 
existence of different disaster policy implications and responses. The third section explains 
how the application of a social constructionist perspective to the analysis of disaster policies 
contributes to the disaster field. There is a social construction process at the institutional level 
that determines the  manner  in which  disaster are defined and  framed, and that there are 
several social subjects and conceptions of nature and social actors underpinning the policy 
process.  
Building upon the previous chapter, Chapter Two establishes the relation between 
disaster causality, policy problem construction, and institutional responses. For this purpose, 
this  chapter  develops  two  inter-related  frameworks:  the  first  framework  analyses  the 
discursive construction of disaster causality as a policy problem, and the second framework 
explains the argumentative construction of a public remedy, known in the research as the 
‗policy response‘. Chapter Two comprises of three sections. In section one, the theoretical 
underpinnings and the epistemological implications of social constructionism are reviewed. 
This is with the intention of  exhibiting  its analytical scope for this research by delimiting 
the  ‗object‘  of analysis and the components of the process that construct  ‗natural‘  disaster. 
This section explains  how the  ‗social  nature‘ debate can contribute to the constructionist 
analysis of ‗natural‘ disaster within policies.  
Section two provides an explanation of how knowledge production occurs within the 
social  domains  of  disaster.  This  is  included  to  examine  how  knowledge  claims  may  be 
similar or different amongst disaster-relevant subjects, that is, scientists, disaster managers, 
policy makers, implementers, and local operators, as well as local people. And in section   32 
three,  the  two  analytical  frameworks  are  developed.  These  will  be  used  to  perform  the 
analysis in Chapters Six and Seven. 
Chapter  Three  details  the  qualitative  methodology  and  is  divided  into  eight  short 
sections:  the approach;  the hypothesis and   research questions;  methods;   justification of 
the case study; study populations and interviewees selection;  policy institutions according to 
the  social  domains  of  risk  and  disaster;    the  time  scale  and  research  sites,  and  study  
limitations  and issues of bias. The social constructionist approach is adopted because, as 
stated  in  reference  to  Chapter  Two  and  as  presented  in  the  methodology  section  of  this 
introduction,  this  thesis  researches  the  collective  constructions  of  the  meaning  and 
knowledge of ‗natural‘ disaster causality.  
Chapter Four presents the case study of the Chalco Valley  floods of 2000 and  is 
divided into three sections. The first  gives an account of the floods that took place in the 
Chalco Valley in June 2000 and highlights  the policy responses deployed during and after 
the    ‗disaster‘    and  the    interpretations  of    the  affected  individuals.  The  second  section 
explains  in  detail  the  relationship  between  the  parallel  evolution  of  urbanisation  trends, 
former policies, and floods risk in Chalco Valley. The aim is to provide an explanation of 
how the progression of vulnerability unfolded between the XIX and XX Centuries. In the 
third section, an explanation of the relationship of current hazards, people‘s vulnerability, and 
current  policy  responses  is  discussed  in  order  to  emphasise  the  unsafe  conditions  under 
which  the  local  people  currently  live.  This  information  is  necessary  for  explaining  that 
vulnerability to floods is a chronic social condition that must be integrated into the disaster 
prevention policy-making process.  
Chapter Five provides an overview of the  disaster policy context in Mexico. It is 
made up of three sections. Section one presents a brief historical background and discusses 
the  conceptual  origins  and  foundational  framework  of  the  SINAPROC.  This  section  is 
relevant because it explains the reasons why the prevailing model (‗Fundamental Paradigm 
of  Disaster‘)  has  permeated  the  SINAPROC  since  its  inception.  The  second  section 
characterises the SINAPROC by specifying its public institutions at the federal level and the 
institutional  structure  of  the  entire  SINAPROC.    And  last,  section  three  describes  the 
National Programme of Civil Protection 2000–2006 and the Civil Protection Programme of 
the  State  of  Mexico  1999–2005,  which  are  part  of  SINAPROC.  Descriptions  of  these   33 
programmes are important because they are analysed later in Chapter Seven as rhetorical 
tools that convey policy meanings and beliefs.  
Chapter Six analyses the discursive construction of the Chalco Valley floods as a 
disaster policy problem. The analytical framework developed in Chapter Two is employed in 
Chapter Six to examine ‗natural‘ disaster causality as a policy problem. This chapter explains 
how disaster causality in Mexico is framed by policy-relevant subjects and made persuasive 
to the interviewer. It examines the language mechanisms and type of discourses utilised to 
portray Chalco Valley flooding as a ‗natural‘ disaster. It argues that the tendency to define 
and explain disaster as ‗natural‘ has several policy implications, notably that of disregarding 
the  vulnerability  of  the  inhabitants.  This  examination  allows  clarifying  how  and  why 
arguments that give accounts of the same phenomenon vary– depending on the source, the 
nature of the evidence, and the warrants employed to support the claim and the intended 
objective of the claim. The ultimate  intention of this chapter  is two-fold: to explain  and 
highlight the rhetorical and discursive power of  disaster causal stories in constructing the 
reality of the Chalco Valley floods, and to understand inundations causality as a contested 
policy problem.  
Chapter  Six  is  structured  in  three  sections.  After  setting  forth  the  conceptual  and 
methodological considerations, the chapter examines in detailed fashion, in section two, four 
types  of  disaster  causality  discourses,  namely,  discourse  of  inadvertent  causality  by 
ignorance,  by  carelessness,  discourse  of  accidental  causality,  and  discourse  of  structural 
causality.  It  is  argued  that the  different  disaster  discourses  found  at the  policy  level  are 
shaped by how causal ideas of disaster are assembled and made persuasive in the three social 
domains of disaster and risk. The four discourses differ in the way the system of statements 
and meanings are utilised to characterise the images of the entire Chalco Valley inundations 
scenario. From this characterisation, four different constructions of the Chalco Valley floods 
problem were identified. Thus, in section three, the four floods problem constructions are 
unpacked  and  five  rhetorical  elements  are  taken  into  consideration:  type  of  knowledge 
evidence;  appeals  and  warrants;  images  of  Chalco  Valley  inhabitants;  the  image  of  the 
Government, and the image of hazards.   
  Chapter Seven unpacks the argumentative construction of policy responses oriented 
toward addressing and solving the four Chalco Valley floods problem constructions. The 
second framework elaborated in Chapter Two is employed in this chapter to conduct the   34 
analysis and as such takes into consideration the following four policy-analytic elements: 1) 
policy objectives; 2) type of intervention; 3) policy instrument, and 4) implementation. The 
main goal of this chapter is to understand how discourses and floods problem constructions at 
the policy level shape institutional responses. In particular, this chapter aims at demonstrating 
that the vulnerability of the population is not a relevant policy objective for  consideration  
within the entire range of disaster policy responses in Mexico because the their vulnerability 
was not constructed as  ‗a problem‘  within disaster causality discourses.  
Chapter Seven is structured in four sections that correspond to the analysis of the 
policy elements of each of the four problems constructions analysed in Chapter Six, namely 
1) Ignorance of hazards and unsafe conditions, 2) Failure of infrastructure and inadequate 
monitoring  of  risk  object,  3)  Accidents  of  nature  and  of  man-made  systems  that  disrupt 
‗normal‘  social  functioning,  and  4)  Exposure  of  vulnerable  people  to  hazards  as  a 
consequence of socio-economic inequalities.  Chapter Eight presents the thesis conclusions 
and recommendations for further research. The research concludes with the importance of 
including values, meanings, and beliefs in the study of the policy process.  
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CHAPTER ONE. THEORETICAL BASES OF NATURAL DISASTER POLICIES 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the theoretical bases of natural disaster policies. It aims to define and 
explain how the concepts of disaster, natural hazard, vulnerability, and risk form the core 
theoretical clusters of the ‗disaster field‘. Most importantly, this chapter will argue that in 
practice,  the  meanings  of  these  concepts  reflect  particular  views  of  the  relation  between 
nature and society. Indeed, the ‗disaster field‘ is as ‗social‘ as it is ‗scientific‘ and ‗technical‘. 
This means that social knowledge of disaster has to be taken into consideration as a central 
issue to understand disasters causalities. What is more, variations in the interpretations of the 
relation  between  nature  and  society  ultimately  underpin  specific  policy  responses,  from 
organisational to technical measures 
 This chapter is made up of three sections. The first section looks at the behavioural 
and  structural  paradigms  that  characterise  the  different  interpretations  of  nature-society 
relations.  Focusing  on  these  two  paradigms  allows  for  an  understanding  of  how 
interpretations of ‗disaster causality‘ shift from nature to society and the type of knowledge 
observed as ‗adequate‘ to understand disaster. Moreover, they offer a variety of ways of 
conceiving human action within the context of disaster. This is a necessary first step toward 
the explanation further ahead of why the core concepts of the disaster field, namely ‗natural‘ 
disaster,  ‗hazards‘,  and  ‗vulnerability‘  can  have  different  connotations.  Section  one, 
therefore, I will review the two basic conceptual paradigms of the ‗disaster field‘ and will 
show how and why ‗disaster causality‘ differs from one paradigm to the other.  
The  second  section  focuses  on  risk.  It  compares,  in  epistemological  terms,  the 
naturalist and the constructionist perspectives of risk analysis, which is necessary to explain 
how knowledge production of disaster risk is done with regard to the two paradigms. The 
ultimate intention of this section is to link the interpretations of risk found in the disaster 
literature with the broader discussion of two epistemologies of risk, namely the naturalist and 
the constructionist. These comparisons will arguably allow me to make clear the existence of 
different disaster policy implications and responses. And the third section reviews previous   36 
constructionist ‗readings‘ of disaster and justifies the need to develop a social constructionist 
framework for analysing ‗natural‘ disaster at the policy level. At the end of this chapter, 
conclusions are presented.  
 
1.  The conceptual bases of the disaster field 
 
It  is  generally  admitted  that  two  competing  epistemological  perspectives  have 
dominated the disaster field, the so-called ‗behavioural‘ and ‗structural‘ paradigms (Smith, 
1999,  1996;  Oliver-Smith,  1996;  Quarantelli,  1978,  1998;  Hilhorst,  2004).  Oliver-Smith 
(1996), Quarantelli (2005), and Calderón (2001) noted that the behavioural paradigm (BP) 
dominated disaster studies during the 1950s and continues to exert its influence on research 
and policymaking. The main assumption of BP is that scientific knowledge and information 
on natural hazards can make people and decision-making systems aware of the severity of 
‗real risk‘, therefore furthering rational decisions to change people‘s behaviour in order to 
avoid disaster. Under BP, the origin of  ‗disaster causality‘  can be sought in the intrinsic 
characteristics of the natural hazard, namely, wind speed in hurricanes, Richter grades in 
seismic activity, pluvial intensity, and frequency of heavy rainfalls and floods, to mention 
some. Disaster impact is measured in terms of human and material losses, affected people, 
and damages to infrastructure and lifelines.   
Between the 1950s and the 1970s, the BP field focused on the geophysical processes 
underlying disaster on the assumption that people and institutions had to be taught how to 
anticipate these  and, notably, on people‘s and institutions‘ reactions and responses to them. 
Within BP two specific approaches can be identified: the ‗hazard-based‘ approach, and the 
‗disaster-based‘ approach. The ‗hazard-based‘ approach, as Smith (1999) remarks, relies on 
the notion of mitigating losses by adding various human adjustments, such as better hazard 
perception  and  land  use  planning  for  physical  control  structures.  The  ‗disaster-based‘ 
approach, as Quarantelli (1998) mentions, emphasises the importance of understanding the 
role of collective human behaviour at times of community crisis and the need to improve 
preparedness for mass emergencies. Consequently, since that time disaster policies have been 
mainly  based  on  early  warning  mechanisms,  disaster  preparedness  schemes,  and  relief 
operations. This has had relevant policy implications, as discussed later.    37 
By the mid-1980s signs of failure concerning the implementation of disaster policy 
measures and interventions in the field were observed because disaster continued to increase 
and, as it was argued, disaster root causes were not addressed. A report elaborated in 1984 by 
the Swedish Red Cross entitled Prevention Better than Cure pointed to the need to address 
basic causes rather than the symptoms of disaster. In this sense, desertification, soil erosion, 
and deforestation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America should be seen along with poverty as 
the root processes of disaster. With regard to this, Prince Aga Khan, who wrote the prologue 
to Wijkman and Timberlake‘s book, stated that: 
―...we can only tackle root causes if disaster prevention and response 
are designed as to incorporate both developmental and environmental 
strategies‖.  
(Quoted in Wijkman and Timberlake, 1984: 9) 
 
In  their  book  Natural  Disaster:  Acts  of  God  or  Acts  of  Man?,  Wijkman  and 
Timberlake  noted  (1984)  that  relief  organisations  such  as  the  Red  Cross  realised  that 
traditional  relief  operations  were  not  sufficient  to  alleviate  the  suffering  of  the  affected 
people  even  though  many    efforts  (financial  and  human  resources)  were  invested.  A 
declaration of Henrik Beer, who served during the 1980s as Secretary General of both the 
Swedish Red Cross and of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies –and who up to that time had signed more disaster relief appeals than any other 
human being– illustrates this fact:  
 
 ―I have felt a growing frustration over the fact that what has been done 
has had, in many cases, only superficial effects, more cosmetic than 
profound‖.  
(Henrik Beer, quoted in Wijkman and Timberlake, 1984: 16) 
 
 
Four reasons can explain the prevalence of BP in the research and policy realms to the 
early  1980s.  First, the  definition  of  disaster  coined  in  1961  by  Fritz  can  be  seen  as  the 
conceptual ‗force‘ of BP.  
 
―A disaster is an event concentrated in time and space, in which a 
society or one of its subdivisions undergoes physical harm and social 
disruption, such that all or some essential functions of the society or 
subdivision are impaired‖.  
(Fritz quoted in Kreps, 1998: 32) 
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The conceptual simplicity of this interpretation may explain its popularity and uptake. 
Fritz‘s  definition  is,  in  fact,  a  simple  expression  that  reduces  the  complexity  of  the 
phenomenon to social impacts; thus, it was easy for all to understand. This definition frames 
the disaster as an event that involves physical harm and social disruption and emphasises 
aspects of impact on social functions in a broad sense, and, notably, no reference is made to 
other components such as causal or triggering factors. 
Second,  according  to  Gilbert  (1995),  the  theoretical  underpinnings  of  BP  that 
conceives of external agents as the disaster‘ causes have similarities with war models. The 
strategic bombing studies of World War II and peacetime studies undertaken by the National 
Opinion  Research  Centre  and  other  institutions  in  U.S.  influenced  the  development  of 
disaster studies. Therefore, it can be said there was a clear parallelism between disaster‘s 
impact and the fatal consequences of air raid attacks, and that made disaster easy to explain 
even to lay people. It can be understood that a population damaged by air bombs during war 
is affected to the same extent as by floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes. The population is 
seen as  ‗victims‘ of these air attacks, which  may explain  bureaucratic  intervention as an 
administrator  of  war.  Calderón  (2001)  noted  that  this  context  strongly  conditioned  this 
disaster conceptualisation.  
Third, as Wijkman and Timberlake (1984) acknowledged, this paradigm successfully 
permeated the disaster field for so many years because research was mainly channelled to 
understanding the physical aspects of  disaster and the  majority of  funds was  invested  in 
studying climatological and geological triggers. Thus, governments were lured into placing 
their trust in grand physical prevention and mitigation measures such as dams, early warning 
systems, and satellite monitoring.  Fourth, Hewitt (1983) asserted  that the strength of such a  
‗dominant view‘ and one  that has resisted attacks over the years, depended less upon its 
logic and internal sophistications than on its being a convenient productive worldview for 
certain dominant institutions and academic spokesmen.  It is argued that groups of power 
such  as  international  organisations,  governments,  scientists,  technicians,  and  bureaucrats 
adhere to this ‗dominant view‘ because on the one hand, it is the view exposed from the top 
of the ‗scientific pedestal‘, and on the other, because it is in the name of scientific knowledge 
that these groups intervene in and benefit from disaster situations because they are able to act 
in behalf of their own interests.     39 
This  ‗dominant view‘ holds that as long as science advances as the result of the 
application  of  scientific-technical  devices  such  as  satellites  and  monitoring  apparatus, 
knowledge of natural phenomena will increase and improve to the extent that phenomena 
will  be  accurately  and  completely  understood  and  controlled,  therefore  diminishing  the 
impact and consequences of natural phenomena on society (Calderón, 2001). 
  Moreover, under this ‗dominant view‘ disaster is isolated in ‗quarantine‘ both in 
thought and in practice. In order to intervene, when a disaster takes place a wall is built to 
encircle the impacted area with army personnel and public civil servants who isolate the area 
from daily  life. To Hewitt (1983), these considerations promote the encapsulation of the 
problem whereby parameters, properties, data, solutions, and options are constructed in a 
technical monologue in which abnormal situations are confined and disconnected from their 
context.      
Radical criticisms of BP began to consolidate in the early 1980s with the setting up of 
a different research and policy agenda that eventually would conform to a new paradigm:  the 
Structural Paradigm (SP). But it is important to mention here that SP had its origins back in 
the  mid-1940s  with  Gilbert  White‘s  works  (1945,  1974)  on  natural  hazards  and  human 
adjustments.  The human geographer Gilbert White questioned the view that hazards are 
isolated geophysical events that can be controlled with engineering works such as dams and 
levees, by asserting that river control schemes were not necessarily the best nor the only 
option to tackle flood problems in the U.S. White introduced a social perspective that casts 
natural hazards into a human ecology framework  operating at the interface of both natural 
and human systems, which allowed for other solutions than the ‗structural‘ schemes then 
currently being implemented by civil engineers (Smith, 2001). 
White‘s analysis in 1945 of technological responses to control floods that were put 
into place in the U.S. during 10 years concluded that damage provoked by floods had in fact 
increased despite huge amounts of money invested by the U.S. government to tackle them; 
this led White to shift the focus into human adjustments for flooding, namely, assessment of 
human settlements with regard to natural extreme events, evaluation of people‘s perception 
of extreme events and disaster, examination of choices to reduce losses and damages, and 
analysis of implementation of policy changes vis à vis disaster (Calderón, 2001).  
The book edited in 1983 by Kenneth Hewitt, Interpretations of Calamity, constituted 
perhaps  the  most  important  radical  interpretation  that  challenged  BP.  This  radical   40 
interpretation conceives natural phenomena solely as ‗the triggers‘ of disaster (and not the 
disaster‘ causes) within concrete social contexts. Hewitt argued that research and policies in 
BP had exhibited limits in tackling and preventing the ‗real‘ disaster‘ causes, namely, the 
social, economic, and political factors, as discussed previously.   
At  this  time,  Hewitt  (1983:  13)  had  expressed  that  natural  disaster  research  had 
become ―the single greatest impediment to improvement in both understanding of natural 
calamities and the strategies to alleviate them‖, because ―…in practice, then, natural hazards 
have been carefully roped off from the rest of man-environment relations...‖ so, ―there is no 
place for any sort of grass roots input; no way for any but the experts to break into the 
technical monologue‖. In other words, what Hewitt emphasised with regard to BP was the 
following: 1) the strong influence of scientific and technical knowledge on disaster framing 
voided disaster of their social content, and 2) that the scientific framing of  ‗natural‘ hazards 
as    ‗isolated‘    entities  hindered  other  possible  interpretations  of  disaster.  Westgate  and 
O‘Keefe (1976), Hewitt et al. (1983), Wijkman and Timberlake (1984), Blaikie, Cannon, 
Davis, and Wisner (1994), and Comfort et al. (1999) became champion advocates of SP. The 
common basic idea they proposed is that disaster, everyday life, and development are all 
linked. Thus, in a few words to understand disaster, one must look at the interaction between 
extreme natural phenomena and vulnerable human groups.  
In Latin America, the group of LA RED endorsed this view (Lavell, 1993, 1994, 
1996; Maskrey, 1989, 1993, 1994; Macías Medrano, 1993, 1999; García Acosta, 1993, 1994, 
1996;  Cardona,  1993;  Wilches-Chaux,  1993,  1998;  Mansilla,  1996,  2000;  Herzer  1993, 
among others). LA RED was founded in 1992 to promote and strengthen the social analysis 
of risk and disaster within the Latin America context. Some of the basic ideas that spurred SP 
in the Latin American context were that:  
 Disaster is not natural, which means that there is a ―…intrinsic relation between risk, 
development,  and  environment  (that)  underpins  disaster‖.  Processes  that  generate 
socio-economic inequalities are closely linked to the social distribution of risk; 
 Small- and medium-sized  disasters are very important to address because they occur 
more  often  than  the  great  disasters  and  have  provoked  many  human  and  material 
losses, and    41 
 Risk management should begin at the local level because it is at the local level that 
new  emerging  social  actors  such  as  Non-Governmental  Organizations  (NGOs)  and 
private agents are increasingly concerned with reducing vulnerability.  
 
Therefore, LA RED continued to challenge the dominance of the natural sciences and 
engineering approaches and the implementation of aid-oriented emergency interventions that 
were put into place in a centralised manner at the national level to tackle ‗grand disaster‘ in 
Latin America.
5 Under SP, disaster is not the outcome of  just geographical processes, but 
rather of structural social factors such as poverty, marginality, and lack of political power, to 
mention some important aspects. Therefore, SP was in novative and groundbreaking in that 
disaster were understood as the result of a more complex interaction between nature and the 
economic, social, and political processes that make people vulnerable to specific hazards. 
Therefore, ‗disaster causality‘ is embedded in the socio-economic processes.  
As I will argue in greater depth further on, differences between the two paradigms 
have  radical  implications  in  terms  of  policy  making.  Framing  disaster  in  specific  ways 
determines  policy  choices.  When  disaster  is  conceptualised  as  the  result  of  a  ‗natural‘ 
phenomenon,  measures to address  disaster are  mainly  based on  so-called  ‗scientific‘ and 
‗technical‘  knowledge.  ‗The  hazard‘,  ‗the  disaster  event‘,  and  their  consequences  are 
therefore, the target of policies. Under BP, policy implementation for disaster‘ prevention 
means  the  forecasting  of  threats,  physical  works  for  containing  hazards  and  human 
organizational  strategies  for  avoiding  fatal  losses  and  providing  humanitarian  aid  to  the 
affected people. Disaster risk is conceived of in terms of exposure to natural hazards; thus, 
reducing disaster risk means minimising or avoiding exposure to threats.  
In  contrast,  within  SP,  the  design  and  implementation  of  policies  that  integrate 
vulnerability  as  the  central  concern  turn  the  attention  to  political,  social,  and  economic 
factors. Disaster causality is sought in the interface of natural and social processes. Particular 
emphasis is placed on how these factors put people at risk in varying ways and to varying 
degrees, and in their relation to potential hazards. Under SP, and compared with BP, disaster 
policies are more a socio-political endeavour than a technical task. For SP, the recognition of 
people‘s capacities and vulnerabilities in the face of potential natural threats is relevant to 
disaster framing and prevention. Society is regarded as varying social groups that possess 
                                                 
5 http://www.desenredando.org/lared/antecedentes.html accessed in March 2006.   42 
inherent  properties  and  differences  depending  on  class,  race,  ethnic  origin,  and  gender 
composition. Thus, policy responses must be oriented toward tackling the vulnerability root 
causes of social groups. In other words, under SP, disaster risk reduction means vulnerability 
reduction. The difference between risk and vulnerability is discussed ahead in section 1.2.   
Having reviewed the main characteristics of these two competing paradigms and their 
differences, the following examination of the core concepts of the disaster field will highlight 
the relevance of the differing conceptualisations of nature and society embedded in them and 
their  implication  in  policy  making.  The  focus  of  the  discussion  now  shifts  to  the 
conceptualisation of disaster, because the explanation of disaster causality is a central issue 
for this thesis and because the concepts of natural hazards and vulnerability have different 
weights according to the various disaster definitions embedded either in BP or in SP. In 
Chapters 6 and 7, I will explain how and why differing  disaster causalities are taken for 
granted at the policy level in Mexico, as the disaster per se becomes the focus, which in turn 
determines the policy responses adopted. 
 
1.1 Disaster 
  
This section presents the origins of the disaster concept and the conceptual structure of the 
prevailing definition and its influencing character on the development of the disaster field. It 
identifies  the  object  of  study  by  focusing  on  ‗disaster  causality‘  factors.  A  distinction 
between disaster and disaster risk is also made with the aid of the notion of time. Disaster 
policies are aimed at addressing the causal factors and impacts and take into consideration 
past  processes  and  events,  while  disaster  risk  policies  concern  something  that  could  be 
planned  to  be  done  in  the  future  considering  current  situations  and  expected  and 
unforeseeable changes.  
  The ‗disaster‘ concept has provoked much contested debate and disagreement since 
its inception at the beginning of the XX Century. It has been used by experts, policy makers, 
and lay people  to characterise different kinds of situations: sometimes to label conflicts such 
as ethnic clashes; at other times to refer to sudden situations provoked either by ‗natural‘ or 
‗anthropogenic‘  causes,  and  moreover,  to  invoke  chronic  long-term  happenings  such  as 
droughts. It has been the object of study of various disciplines, from physical geography to 
sociology  depending  on  the  dimensions  emphasized,  whether  natural  or  social.  It  is  a   43 
contested concept because it involves disputes of its use, different meanings, interpretations, 
and the complexity of the processes of causation coupled with it.  
Sociology has been one of the first disciplines concerned with the understanding of 
disaster.  According  to  Scanlon  (1998),  the  sociology  of  disaster  originated  with  Samuel 
Prince‘s research in 1920 on the Halifax, Nova Scotia, Harbour shipwreck explosion in 1917 
that resulted in massive detonations of TNT. This is generally considered as the first social 
science study of disaster. Prince‘s work, a doctoral thesis, concerns social change
6 at the 
community level derived from the impact of the catastrophe. The catastrophe is understood 
as a precipitating agent for social change. The thesis‘ focus was placed  on ―a community as 
it  reacts  under  the  stimulus  [sic]  of  catastrophe  and  proceeds  to  adjust  itself  to  the 
circumstantial pressure of new conditions‖ (Prince, 1920:141).  
For  Prince,  a  catastrophe  is  a  determinant  force  that  could  either  halt  or  further 
progress. A disaster to be considered as such must meet two conditions: a) it had to be an 
event that triggered social change, and 2) that these changes, whether minor or major, could 
deter or further the socio-economic progress of the community or the nation. A few years 
after the catastrophe, Prince witnessed social amelioration in Halifax that, to him, resulted 
from the catastrophe and in turn promoted unexpected progress in such a specific socio-
historical context of growing industrialisation and trade at the beginning of the XX Century 
in Canada. 
Systematic research on disaster dates back to the 1950s. According to Quarantelli 
(1982, 1998), since that time there has been a ―move from the use of a label with a referent to 
primarily a physical agent to one which mostly emphasized social features of the occasion‖. 
As  discussed  previously,  in  fact,  the  disaster  concept  has  evolved  between  the  hazards-
centred approach and the vulnerability approach.  From the sociological perspective, two 
books edited by Quarantelli (1998, and more recently, 2005) are of paramount importance to 
understand how disaster framing has been evolving. These publications gathered relevant 
                                                 
6 For Prince, social change represented the main focus of the emerging field of disaster analysis and the flux 
(italics mine) as the driving force. He was interested in explaining the social consequences of the explosion of a 
ship in Halifax, Canada. He constructed social indicators to measure the positive and negative repercussions at 
different levels: ―In Halifax, the shock resulted in the disintegration of social institutions, the dislocation of the 
usual  methods  of  social  control  and  the  dissolution  of  the  customary;  that  through  the  catastrophe  the 
community was thrown into the state of flux which, as was suggested in the introduction, is the logical and 
natural  prerequisite  for  social  change;  and  finally  that the  shock  was  of  a  character  such as  ‗to  affect  all 
individuals alike at the same time‘, and to induce that degree of fluidity most favourable to social change‖ 
(Prince, 1920:34). 
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contributions to explaining the changing field of disaster and to seek common features and 
differences when defining the (italics mine) disaster object and the scope of study. Perry 
(1998, 2005: 313) notes that the  common characteristics shared by the books‘ contributors 
comprised three issues: ―the definition of disasters as social events, acknowledgment that 
disasters are disruptive to social  intercourse, and that  disaster should  be understood in a 
context of social change/human and institutional adaptability)‖.   
However, Perry also points out the existing differences amongst the experts (Dynes, 
Stallings,  Rosenthal,  Oliver-Smith,  Kroll-Smith,  and  Gunter,  as  well  as  Gilbert, 
Dombrowsky, Kreps, Profiriev, and Hewitt) and concludes that some differences rested on 
―1) the view of the context of the phenomena as disasters or hazards, 2) questions of whose 
perspective  (author‘s  italics)  is  used  as  a  definitional  referent;  3)  the  public,  the  victim, 
researchers,  policy  makers,  and  the  definer‘s  vision  of  social  science,  and  4)  issues  that 
should be addressed in terms of taxonomy and classification.   
Despite the progress of the disaster field, Quarantelli states that no practical definition 
for social research purposes has been elaborated and that there is no conceptual clarity. To 
this author, there is an urgent need to formulate a basic definition, to obtain a minimum 
consensus, and to agree on the ―defining features of the basic concept of the field‖ (1998: 4). 
He remarks that this situation has implications on data-gathering and analysis. Quarantelli 
asserts, for instance, ―that the disagreement on the mental health effects of disaster stems 
from the different conceptions of ‗disaster‘ that several parties of the argument take‖ (2005: 
332).  Nevertheless,  unlike  Quarantelli‘s  claim,  some  specialists  and  policy  makers  have 
continuously, over the past three decades, adopted and quoted Fritz‘s influential definition 
coined in 1961: 
―A disaster is an event concentrated in time and space, in which a 
society or one of its subdivisions undergoes physical harm and social 
disruption, such that all or some essential functions of the society or 
subdivision are impaired‖.  
(Fritz quoted in Kreps, 1998: 32) 
  
In Barton‘s  view, Fritz‘s definition– grounded  in the strategic bombing studies of 
World War II and in peacetime disaster studies undertaken by the National Opinion Research 
Centre and other institutions in the U.S. – continues to be the prevailing view that, in fact, 
illustrates the behaviour paradigm. Here, the object of study is the event labelled as disaster, 
the fatal consequences, and not the trigger, as in the case of natural hazards-based approach.   45 
Since that time, similar definitions have been proposed, like that of Smith (2001:7), who 
states that disaster is:  
 ―… an event, concentrated in time and space, in which a community 
experiences severe danger and disruption of its essential functions, 
accompanied  by  widespread  human,  material  or  environmental 
losses,  which  often  exceed  the  ability  of  the  community  to  cope 
without external assistance‖.  
Smith (2001:7) 
From  the  1990s,  the  notion  of  disaster  became  associated  with  its  probability  of 
occurrence; thus, the concept of disaster risk was coined (Blaikie et al., 1994; Cardona et al., 
2003). Such probability is related to the several risk factors that are intrinsic to society‘s 
development as previously mentioned, in particular to vulnerability to hazards. For Cardona 
et  al.  (2003),  development  and  disaster  risk  are  inter-linked;  however,  it  is  important  to 
distinguish between disaster
7 and disaster risk in terms of policy -making. The former is a 
given situation, tangible, and one that can be measured, whereas the latter does not exist, but 
rather implies its future probability of occurrence. In this respect, to Stallings (199 7) the 
social meaning of time is pivotal in the distinction between  disaster and disaster risk and to 
the understanding of risk itself. Disaster is concerned with past, whereas risk pertains to the 
future, to the threat that is yet to come. Moreover, there are substantial differences when one 
acquires knowledge of these. When one studies  disaster, one inquires of people what they 
did, whereas when one examines risk, one requests from people what they are doing at 
present with regard to an uncertain future.  
Risk–  and  in  extension,  disaster  risk–  can  only  be  inferred  from  past  events  and 
projected onto the future by considering current contextual factors, such as those embedded 
in the society-State relationship, in people‘s  perception  of the State‘s role in providing 
protection, the trust they  have in the government, and the type of information available. The 
probability  of  disaster  risk  is  determined  by  the  community‘s  vulnerability  to  natural, 
technological,  or  anthropogenic  phenomena.  Under  this  view,  on  the  one  hand,  disaster 
demands assistance and recovering actions; on the other, disaster risk implies a community‘s 
                                                 
7 To Cardona et al. (2003:4), ―disaster is a social process, triggered by hazards, which on interaction with a 
vulnerable medium causes intense alterations in the normal functioning of the community. These alterations 
may be expressed, amongst other things, as loss of life, serious health problems, damage or destruction of 
individual  and  collective  goods,  or  severe  damage  to  the  environment.  For  that reason,  rapid  response  is 
required by the authorities and the population in order to restore the well-being of affected persons and to re-
establish adequate levels of normalcy‖.  
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common perception of current and future dangers and of society‘s capacity to modify these 
risk factors, which are part of the society‘s characteristics. In this regard, it is argued that risk 
can  be  managed  by  intervening  upon  physical  and  social  processes,  e.g.,  by  restoring 
ecologically  degraded  areas  and  by  transforming  people‘s  perceptions  and  the  structural 
conditions that make some populations potentially more vulnerable and exposed to disaster 
than others.  
Cardona  et  al.  (2003)  assume  that  collective  action  cannot  be  stimulated  unless 
‗sufficient  and  common‘  perception  of  danger  is  achieved  within  the  entire  community.  
Thus, within this context it can be assumed that there may be shared common meanings of 
risk according to the social and cultural values of the human groups in triggering responses. 
This latter statement lies at the centre of this research and it will be discussed in Chapter 
Two. This means that the social and cultural differences of the groups entail different ways of 
constructing and interpreting risk. In fact, this idea is linked to the concept of vulnerability. 
By observing disaster from the vulnerability point of view, causal factors are transferred from 
nature to society. In terms of policy making, tackling vulnerability root causes and dynamic 
pressures would be an adequate response to reduce risk and prevent disaster.  
In  sum,  according  to  this  view  of  disaster,  understanding  and  tackling  people‘s 
vulnerability in terms of research and policy making have become important to achieving 
true disaster risk reduction goals. This definition of a disaster, in fact, focuses on the internal 
dynamics  of  people‘s  livelihoods  of  and  their  ability  to  develop  coping  and  protection 
strategies in the light of interaction with hazards. Research oriented toward understanding 
this  social  framework  may  provide  knowledge  of  the  socio-historical,  ideological  and 
political factors that over the time have rendered certain groups vulnerable. Research that 
unpacks and examines the structural factors explaining the vulnerability of groups would 
consequently improve policy decisions.        
 
1.2 Natural hazard 
 
Hazards, natural hazards, and environmental hazards are three terms frequently found 
in the disaster terminology. They usually refer to a diverse set of ‗natural‘ threats to humans, 
to natural and man-made resources that sustain human reproduction and well-being, such as 
hurricanes, heavy rainfalls, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, droughts, etc.  The terms hazard   47 
and natural hazard are often used as synonyms,  even if– as I will argue throughout  this 
thesis– hazards are not always (necessarily or entirely) natural, even when they may appear 
to be.  What is a natural hazard, then? What are –according to the literature– the necessary 
components for a hazard to qualify as natural?  
Chapman (1999: 3) defines a  natural  hazard as  ‗the  interaction  between a  human 
community with a certain level of vulnerability and an extreme natural phenomenon, which 
may be geophysical, atmospheric, or biological in origin, resulting in major human hardship 
with significant material damage to infrastructure and/or loss of life or disease‘. Similarly, for 
Alexander  (2000)  a  natural  hazard  is  an  extreme  geophysical  event,  originating  in  the 
biosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere, or atmosphere, which is capable of causing disaster to 
humans.  
In general, a natural hazard is defined in relation to its potential danger to humans. 
When arguing about natural hazards, three main components are customarily identified: 1) 
the origin of the phenomenon; 2) its ‗extremeness‘, and 3) the damage it can wreak, above all 
upon human populations. Regarding the  first component, ‗nature‘  is contemplated as the 
main causal agent of the disaster because it originally generates the impact. For Alexander 
(2000), nature is outside of society, whereas for Chapman, it is the interaction between nature 
and society that determines the origin and the character of the hazard. Under the former 
definition, the origin of the natural agent is independent from human action, although it is 
widely acknowledged that global hazards such as climate change and ozone layer depletion 
result from the combination of meteorological dynamics and ecological change driven by 
human activities.  
Regarding the second component, not all natural phenomena are hazards, but only 
those defined as ‗extreme‘.  But what is the meaning of ‗extreme?  Extremeness involves two 
aspects. First, it is related with the ‗intrinsic‘ physical characteristics of the phenomenon in 
terms  of  magnitude  and  frequency,  which  are  defined  in  relation  to  thresholds.  Once  a 
phenomenon  exceeds  thresholds,  it  becomes  a  hazard.  Second,  it  is  associated  with  its 
potential  impact on  society,  which  in  turn  can  be  moderated  depending  on  the  society‘s 
coping capacity, either individually or collectively.  With regard to natural disaster, Chapman 
(1999) defines the interaction between humans and nature in terms of the society‘s capacity 
to cope with ‗extreme‘ natural phenomena. Populations unable to cope with such phenomena 
are defined as vulnerable. Vulnerability is thus defined with respect to society‘s abilities to   48 
cope with natural hazards, and considers, among other factors, the following: a) possession of 
information of the  likely  magnitudes of  hazard events and their potential  impact, and  b) 
willingness and ability of people to act upon that information. It is expected that human 
actors react rationally to avoid exposure to hazards and thus reduce their vulnerability.   
In Chapman‘s view (1999), scientific information and knowledge are determinant in 
defining the hazard, the ‗natural‘ disaster, the severity, extent, and impact in terms of lives 
lost and property damaged. It is assumed that scientific-technical information is sufficient to 
frame the hazard. The hazard is constructed as an ‗extreme‘ event. Extreme events are those 
that  fall  outside  of  the  control  of  the  society.    Society  is  regarded  as  either  capable  or 
incapable in relation to its capacity to respond to the natural phenomenon. Under this view, 
what  appears  to  be  important  is  to  know  the  physical  characteristics  that  qualify  a 
phenomenon as extreme; thereafter, the capacity of a society can be measured or qualified as 
compared to this.  Specifically, what Chapman points out is the importance of producing and 
communicating scientific and technical knowledge of the hazard to vulnerable people for 
them to be able to respond; for instance, by evacuating the site that would be affected by the 
hazard. 
According to Alexander, the word ‗extreme‘ signifies a substantial departure from a 
mean  or  trend,  and  the  fundamental  determinants  of  hazards  comprise  location,  timing, 
magnitude, and frequency. He also defines ‗extreme‘ in relation to the idea of threshold. 
Threshold is determined by the combination of the lowest limit at which physical forces can 
cause  a  disaster  and  people‘s  vulnerability.  To  Chapman  and  Alexander,  the  concept  of 
natural hazard is logical only in reference to a social and geographic context. It is noteworthy 
that  in  the  Alexander  and  Chapman  definitions,  that  which  initially  triggers  the 
environmental change and the likely damage is the so-called, natural phenomenon. In short, 
the sense of causality shifts from nature to society; for this reason, the measures developed to 
prevent the disaster address ‗the causes‘, namely, natural hazards. ‗Experts‘ are capable of 
diagnosing and communicating the hazardousness of natural phenomenon to lay people who 
have to be ‗taught‘ about the hazard‘s characteristics and its impact.     
This conceptual shift from nature to society while examining hazard origins that may 
lead  to  a  disaster  can  be  identified  in  Smith‘s  book (2001),  Environmental  Hazards.  He 
rejects  the  idea  of  truly  ‗natural‘  hazards,  and  emphasizes  that  all  disaster  arise  from  a 
combination of physical exposure and human vulnerability. To the author, hazards are hybrid   49 
events  (italics  are  the  author‘s)  resulting  from  an  overlap  of  natural  (geophysical), 
technological (man-made), and social (human behaviour) processes.  Thus, Smith prefers to 
label these as ‗environmental hazards‘.  
For Smith, the human ecology perspective on natural hazards highlights the central 
role that human populations play in constructing hazards by transforming ecosystems and 
climate. The same natural event can be regarded as a resource or as a hazard depending upon 
human  location,  needs,  and  perceptions.  Humans  utilise  nature  and  can  transform 
geophysical conditions to the extent that the latter become hazards; once hazards, these can 
come  to  be  extreme  events.  Extreme  changes  in  the  magnitude  and  frequency  of  these 
extreme events beyond damage thresholds may lead to disaster. Human vulnerability (italics 
are the  author‘s)  is  defined  in  terms  of  the  breadth  of  social  and  economic  tolerance  of 
hazards (Smith, 2001).  
 In Smith‘s view, disaster causality is not as accidental as proposed by Chapman and 
Alexander; it is framed as a type of inadvertent causality in which well-intended uses of 
nature and policies may cause unforeseen negative consequences. Once again, extremeness is 
a  main  feature  of  the  hazard.  Therefore,  for  Smith,  the  environmental  hazard  is  mainly 
restricted to rapid-onset events that directly threaten human life and property on a community 
scale. For Smith, environmental hazards are: 
 
‖Extreme  geophysical  events,  biological  processes  and  major 
technological  accidents,  characterised  by  concentrated  releases  of 
energy or materials, which pose a largely unexpected threat to human 
life and can cause significant damage to goods and the environment‖. 
(2001: 17) 
 
One  can  say  that  the  difference  between  Smith‘s  and  the  previous  authors‘ 
conceptualisations is the influence exerted by humans on the transformation of nature  and on 
the weight placed  on different causal factors, i.e., the interrelationship between nature and 
society, whether  it  be of accidental or inadvertent causality. However,  in all cases, what 
determines the occurrence of the disaster is the natural hazard in varying degrees, and human 
vulnerability  is  conditioned  by  natural  phenomena  and  is  not  conceived  of  as  a  centred 
political and socio-economic process. This issue is discussed at great length ahead in the 
section on vulnerability.     50 
 Up to this point, I have addressed hazards, with debate focused either on natural 
causal agents or on their impact. It is now worth mentioning that from a constructionist view, 
one can state that it is humans –through knowledge and policy making– who construct the 
very  idea  of  hazard  and  its  qualities  such  as  ‗extremeness‘,  and  who  assign  the  causal 
explanation of disaster to  hazards or to the combination of  the actions of humans and of 
natural forces. In brief, ‗the natural‘ is conceived of as an external source of danger and as a 
geophysical extreme event or force that provokes disaster. 
 
1.3 Vulnerability 
 
A major conceptual shift emerged with the idea that disaster is more a function of 
vulnerability than natural hazards (Wisner et.al, 2004; Quarantelli, 1998; White, Kates and 
Burton, 2001). In  fact, this shift represents the  central distinction  between the two  main 
paradigms of disaster studies discussed in section one: the behavioural and the structural 
paradigms (Smith, 1999, 1996; Oliver-Smith, 1996, quoted in Hilhorst, 2004). The former, as 
explained previously, coupled a hazard-centred interest in the geophysical process underlying 
the disaster with the conviction that society must improve its means for prediction. For BP, 
(human)  vulnerability  is  mainly  conditioned  by  the  hazard  and  is  reduced  to  a  minor 
component, whereas SP frames disaster not as an outcome of geographical processes, but 
rather of structural factors such as poverty, which is one of the social conditions that result in 
vulnerability; under this view, vulnerability is placed in the centre of the disaster‘ causal 
explanation.   
Hewitt (1997), one of the pioneer defenders of the structural paradigm, states that the 
majorities  of  hazards  studies,  which  have  constituted  the  hazard  perspective  (BP),  treat 
hazards as objective conditions or agents in our environment or as thresholds, and construct 
risk in terms of their attributes of danger. He notes that although physical objective agents are 
necessary, other on-going societal conditions of risk are involved, i.e., vulnerability.  
  
―Whereas  hazards  perspective  tends  to  explain  risk  and  disaster  in 
terms of external agents and their impact, vulnerability looks to the 
internal state of a society and what governs that‖.  
(Hewitt, 1997: 28) 
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The  recognition  of  people  and  institutions  as  active  players  conditions  the 
vulnerability  perspective  and  its  development.  Hewitt  speaks  about  differential 
vulnerabilities (italics are the author‘s) within and among societies. In his work Regions of 
Risk, vulnerabilities are defined  in terms of people‘s  lives and  history and  in relation to 
environmental and social change. In this author‘s view, a time dimension is connected with 
the present and past and not only the future, as proposed by the hazards perspective (Hewitt, 
1997).  
Within  the  structural  paradigm,  Blaikie  and  colleagues  (1994)  further  extend  the 
scope of the vulnerability perspective. They argue that to understand the causes of ‗natural‘ 
disaster, one is required to examine the social, economic, and political processes that place  
people at risk and make them vulnerable, instead of focusing  such great attention on  natural 
hazards. Here, risk is a function of the combination of natural hazards and vulnerability. As 
in Hewitt‘s work, Blaikie et al. (1994) propose that disaster‘ main causes are to be examined 
within  the  society,  and  to  do  so,  the  concept  of  vulnerability  becomes  theoretically  and 
analytically relevant. This meaning of the vulnerability that underpins the structural paradigm 
permeates disaster literature
8 to the extent that at present, vulnerability analysis and models 
have gained more and more acceptance in the academic and policy spheres, in NGOs, and in 
international sectors of donors. It has been regarded as an alternative and a more radica l way 
to address disaster causes, and also as a critique of the failure of the hazard-based approach in 
designing and implementing disaster prevention policies.  
To Wisner et al. (2004), the origins of the vulnerability perspective can be traced to 
the 1970s when authors began to question the ‗naturalness‘ of natural disaster. Additional 
vulnerability  conceptualisations  contributed  to  the  structural  paradigm  by  considering 
people‘s attributes, capacities, and responses to hazards (Smith, 2001; Hewitt, 1997; Word 
Disaster Report, 1998) and their connection with a much wider and diverse set of socio-
economic, political, and institutional influences (Twigg, 2001). Specifically, Smith relates 
vulnerability to the concept of human resilience and reliability. The former is a measure of 
                                                 
8 For instance, the World Disaster Report (1998) adopts the Blaikie et al. definition of vulnerability in terms of 
the capacities possessed by households and communities to cope with and recover from disaster consequences. 
―People can be vulnerable by living in places at risk,;  by being more affected by the hazards (older people are 
less  able  to  move  when  flood  happens);  more  affected  by  the  lack  of  rapid  response  from,  say,  slow  or 
ineffective emergency services; and being less able to cope with the consequences, such as losing all capital 
assets.  Usually  vulnerability  is  linked  to  people‘s  income  level  in  the  light  of  potential  hazards.  Such 
distinctions show why low-income households are generally the most affected by disasters‖ (p. 4) 
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the rate of recovery from the occurrence of a hazardous event, while the latter reflects the 
frequency with which protective devices against hazards fail.  
According to Hewitt (1997), vulnerability is a potential situation and is connected 
with people‘s everyday lives and involves their capacities to avoid, resist, and recover from 
harm. For Hewitt, vulnerability in modern societies mainly concerns the legal, political, and 
moral frameworks. For instance, people can be labelled as vulnerable because they are not 
considered as the target populations of policy for, among other reasons, they are portrayed as 
negative  and  undeserving  groups.  Politicians  and  policy  makers  often  neglect  vulnerable 
people‘s  interpretations  and  demands  despite  the  fact  that  empirical  evidence  states 
otherwise; this is partly because vulnerable people very often lack the political power to 
make their demands heard and their needs met. 
It is not unjustifiable to say that it is Wisner
9 et al (1994) who brought vulnerability 
analysis into the centre of the disaster debate and research because their contribution effected 
a significant change in the conceptualisation of risk as a function of vulnerability by placing 
emphasis on structural causes. According to these authors, first, risk depends not only on the 
occurrence of natural hazards, but also on the internal processes that render specific groups in 
society more vulnerable than others to specific hazards. And second, because vulnerability is 
a social product, disaster risk and disaster are also.  
This has important consequences for the very notions of causes, time, and space 
dimensions;  it  additionally  has  other  implications  in  the  policy  sphere.  Unlike  the 
technocratic view linked to   the  behavioural  paradigm,  disaster  risk  associated  with  the 
structural paradigm is deeply ingrained in everyday life, and to explain it, one must look back 
to the socio-historical root causes and dynamic pressures that place people at risk. In this 
view,  the  time  dimension  expands  back  to  the  past,  whereas  in  the  hazards  approach, 
causality  is  projected  into  the  future,  as  discussed  earlier.  In  terms  of  space  dimension, 
vulnerability analysis is sensitive to the differing risk geographies of disadvantaged social 
groups.  
For Wisner et al. (1994), vulnerability is  
 
―… the characteristics of a person, or group  in terms of their capacity to 
anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural hazard. 
                                                 
9 In the first edition of At Risk (1994), the author order is Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, and Wisner; while in the 
second edition (2004), this is Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, and Davis.    53 
It involves the combination of  factors that determine the degree to which 
someone‘s life and livelihood
10 is put at risk by a discrete and identifiable 
event in nature or in society‖.  
(Wisner, 2004: 9)  
 
Thus, vulnerability is a changing process because it entails:  
  The degree to which certain groups in society are more prone than others to damage, 
loss, and suffering within the context of differing hazards. 
  A time dimension, because it is damage to livelihood, and not just life and property, 
which is at issue (Wisner et al., 2004).  
 
Thus, this particular conceptualisation of vulnerability has radical policy implications. In 
order to reduce risk and prevent disaster, vulnerability must be reduced; attention to hazards 
ranks in second place and is subordinated to human preparedness and emergency responses. 
Vulnerability  reduction  has,  then,  to  be  the  policies‘  main  goal,  but  always  taking  into 
consideration  the  likelihood  of  natural  hazards  occurrence  in  specific  social  and  cultural 
settings. Moreover, class relations and social structures need to be addressed  in order to 
explain the manner in which vulnerable people might become affected people. For instance, 
lower-class  people  are  marginalised  from  policy  makers‘  priorities  when  they  set  policy 
objectives and delimit criteria for defining target populations.  
From this particular  vulnerability perspective, Blaikie and colleagues propose two 
inter-related models for explaining natural disaster. The Pressure and Release Model (PAR) 
and the ‗Access Model‘ (AM). PAR is intended to explain the progression of vulnerability, 
how its origins can be traced from unsafe conditions through economic and social dynamic 
pressures to the root causes. AM explains how the different components such as household 
budget,  income  opportunities,  class  relations,  and  structures  of  domination  change  in 
different ways over time after the disaster. 
―The basis for the PAR idea is that disaster is the intersection of two 
opposing forces: those processes generating vulnerability on one side, 
and the natural hazard event (or sometimes a slowly unfolding natural 
process) on the other‖.  
(Wisner et al., 2004:50) 
 
                                                 
10 ―Livelihood is the command an individual, family, or other social group has over an income and/or bundles of 
resources that can be used or exchanged to satisfy its needs. This may involve information, cultural knowledge, 
social networks, legal rights as well as tools, land or other physical resources‖ (Blaikie et al., 1994:  9).   54 
The explanation of vulnerability
11– which is linked to the notion of environmental 
justice– has three sets of links: root causes; dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions, whose 
connections are often difficult to disentangle. Root causes are the socio-economic, political, 
historical, and ideological processes ingrained in society, are connected with the function of 
the state, and reflect the exercise and distribution of power in a society. According to Wisner 
et al. (2004: 53) ―people who are economically marginal (such as urban squatters) or who 
live in an environmentally ‗marginal‘ ecosystem (flood-prone urban locations) are also of 
marginal  importance  to  those  who  hold  economic  and  political  power‖.  For  these 
populations, ―this creates three often mutually reinforcing sources of vulnerability. First, if 
people only have access to livelihoods and resources that are insecure and unrewarding, their 
activities tend to generate higher levels of vulnerability. Second, these people are likely to be 
of low priority for government interventions intended to deal with hazard mitigation. And 
third, people who are economically and politically marginal are more likely to stop trusting 
their  own  methods  for  self-protection  and  to  lose  confidence  in  their  local  knowledge‖ 
(Wisner et al., 2004: 53).  
Dynamic  pressures  are  processes  and  activities  that  ‗translate‘  the  effects  of  root 
causes  both  temporally  and  spatially  into  unsafe  conditions.  These  can  be,  for  instance, 
structural adjustment policies implemented during a certain period, rapid urbanisation on the 
outskirts of cities, and rural-urban  migration that arises  in  many developing countries  in 
response to the economic and social inequalities inherent in root causes. These causes are 
present in the case study under investigation, as discussed in Chapter Four.  
Unsafe conditions are the specific forms in which the vulnerability of a population is 
expressed in time and space in conjunction with a hazard. Examples include people having to 
live in hazardous locations, being unable to afford safe buildings, lacking effective protection 
by the state, or having entitlements that are prone to rapid and severe disruption. Also, unsafe 
                                                 
11 For the Environmental Justice Movement (EJ), people‘s vulnerability is not a random consequence, but a 
phenomenon rooted in the socio-economic structures of society and connected with ideological and political 
interests. Environmental justice advocates recognition that minorities and poor people are more exposed to 
environmental threats and hazards posed by modern technology, such as environmental pollution and resources 
depletion. Several analysts of the EJ in the U.S. (Shrader-Frechette, 2002; Cole and Foster, 2001; Camacho, 
1998, White 1998, Pulido, 1996) have identified linkages between Black people and Latinos and fatal illness 
and severe health problems with the locations of toxic and domestic wastes landfills, other treatment facilities 
such as toxic wastes incinerators, and the application of dangerous agricultural techniques. Black and Latinos 
communities suffer environmental injustice because of their race, ethnicity, and social class. In this research, I 
will address a certain type of environmental injustice experienced by poor people who happened to belong to 
various indigenous groups that migrated to Chalco in the early stages of urbanisation at the end of the 1970s.   55 
conditions are dependent upon the initial level of well-being of the people, the pattern of 
access to tangible (e.g., cash, shelter,  food stocks, agricultural equipment) and  intangible 
resources (networks of support, knowledge on  survival, and sources of assistance, morale, 
and  the  ability  to  function  in  a  crisis).  The  majority  of  these  individuals  are  vulnerable 
because they have inadequate livelihoods, which are not resilient in the face of shocks, and 
they are often poor. They are poor because they suffer from specific relations of exploitation, 
discrimination within the political economy, and there may also be historical reasons for why 
their  homes and sources of  livelihoods are  located  in resource-poor areas (Wisner et al., 
2004).  To  examine  specifically  the  interaction  between  hazards  and  vulnerability,  these 
authors postulated the Access Model (AM). AM focuses on the process by which the natural 
event impacts upon people and their responses and is  
―…  designed  to  understand  complex  and  varied  sets  of  social  and 
environmental  events  and  longer-term  processes  that  may  be 
associated with a specific event that is called a disaster‖.  
(p. 88) 
 
  This view of vulnerability illustrates the radical criticism of the dominant paradigm 
that, as mentioned earlier, is the behavioural paradigm. According to Clarke Guarnizo (1991: 
25)  and  Pelling  (2001),  the  critical  perspective  links  disaster  with  the  ‗development  of 
underdevelopment‘  theory,  and  argues  that  the  marginalisation  process  is  what  directly 
increases the vulnerability of human populations; marginalisation shapes who in society are 
vulnerable  to  risk  and  whether  risk  turns  into  disaster.  As  set  forth  by  Pelling,  this 
consideration raises important questions concerning the influence of social, economic, and 
political power and inequality on analyses of natural hazard. For Susman et al. (1983: 279-
80) and Smith (2001: 51-52) quoted in Mitchell (2006), this ‗radical perspective‘, aligned 
with what has been termed previously the structural paradigm, bases its criticisms on the 
following postulates: 
1.  The severity of disaster impact is related to a greater degree with the scale of human 
exploitation than with the stress imposed by nature. 
2.  In less developed countries, disaster will increase as socio-economic conditions and 
the  physical  environment  deteriorate.  Disaster  regularly  occurs  in  poor  countries 
because preparedness and responses are hampered by lack of resources.   56 
3.  A ‗misinformed risk perception‘ cannot be used to blame disaster-affected people for 
their  own  affliction.  In  many  less  developed  countries,  the  poorest  members  of 
society have no option but to live in the most hazardous environments. 
4.  Given  that  disaster  is  part  of  the  ‗quotidian‘,  mitigation  of  disaster  depends  on 
changing structures and institutions within the society. 
5.  The  only  way  to  reduce  vulnerability  is  to  concentrate  disaster  planning  within 
development planning, and that ―development planning must be, broadly speaking, 
socialist‖.   
(Susman et al., 1983) 
  It can be said that one of the main theoretical contributions of this conception is the 
possibility  of  linking  macro  socio-economic  processes,  such  as  urbanisation,  that  lead  to 
measurable  social  (unsafe)  conditions  with  specific  potential  hazards.  Differential 
vulnerabilities  depend  on  root  causes,  several    social  factors  such  as  gender,  class,  and 
ethnicity, among others, which  in certain specific situations place  vulnerable people at risk 
by  their  being  exposed  to  particular  extreme  natural  hazards.  Therefore,  prevention  and 
preparedness could be better achieved if these interactions are taken into consideration; all of 
this  would  entail  a  socially  sensitive  policy.  To  this  point,  this  thesis  has  analysed  the 
concepts of ‗disaster‘, ‗natural hazards‘, and vulnerability in terms of disaster causal factors 
and their policy  implications. It focused on discussing the different conceptualisations of 
disaster  embedded  in  the  two  paradigms,  the  behavioural  and  the  structural,  and  on 
explaining the extent to which disaster casual factors are attributed either to hazards or to 
vulnerability.  
 
2. Risk   
 
In  this  section,  an  epistemological  and  policy  comparison  between  the  naturalist  and 
constructionist perspectives of risk is developed. This comparison is performed  because one 
of the core  concerns of this thesis is to analyse  the importance of the knowledge production 
of risk at the policy level and to explain how prevailing notions of nature and  ‗natural‘  
hazards    promoted  insightful  connotations  when  framing  disaster  risk  and  implementing 
institutional responses. Thus, the intention here is to link the interpretations of risk found in   57 
the  disaster  literature  with  the  broader  discussion  of  two  epistemologies  of  risk:    the 
naturalist, and the constructionist.  
 
2.1 The naturalist perspective of risk 
 
The naturalist perspective represents the most common and widely known way to address 
risk. It is also frequently known as the scientific-technical or technocratic perspective. As for 
disaster  analyses  belonging  to  the  behaviour  paradigm,  risk  is  conceived  as  a  singular, 
neutral, and objective entity. In ontological terms, risk is the real, quantifiable product of 
nature‘s impact on society; it is ‗out there‘, disembedded from society and culture. Risk is a 
direct function of physical, natural, and technological hazards, which can become threats to 
society and its values. It is commonly gauged in terms of economic costs to human life and 
health.  
As mentioned previously, several authors in the disaster debate defined risk as the 
probability of suffering damage. To Chapman (1999), risk is the probability of defined loss. 
Risk analysis specifies the probability of loss of any magnitude as a result of the specified 
hazard within a defined area. To Smith (2001: 6), ―risk is the actual exposure of something of 
human value to a hazard and is often regarded as the product of probability and loss‖. And as 
stated by Short (1994), this paradigm of risk analysis is driven by hazards and risk associated 
with advances in science and technology.  
  Within the SP, Blaikie et al. (1994), Wisner (2002), and Wisner (2004) conceive of 
risk as the chance or probability that specific people will be exposed to a hazard. But in this 
case, risk is not solely defined by the occurrence of a hazard event such as an earthquake, 
flood,  or storm–  as  framed in the behaviour paradigm; risk  also depends upon there being 
‗elements  at  risk‘,  which  can  be  either  people  or  man-made  systems  such  as  the 
infrastructure.  Normally,  this  side  of  the  risk  equation  is  referred  to  as  vulnerability–  as 
previously discussed.  Risk is a probability of damage that can be estimated and prevented if 
these elements at risk are managed, i.e., these factors that are linked with the progression of 
vulnerability. Risk is expressed in the following equation:   
Risk = hazard × vulnerability 
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  This naturalist interpretation of risk found in disaster literature and analysed here has 
linkages with the broader discussion on the impact of modern technology on society and on 
the  policy  debate.  In  the  contemporary  world,  technological  developments  have  brought 
benefits, but also dangers and risks. According to Fischer (2003b), the proponents of large-
scale technological progress such as industrial development and corporate and government 
leaders, have been forced to regulate technological activities and their impacts due to the 
pressure  exerted  by  environmentalist  movements.  In  many  countries,  environmental 
regulation  has  become  stricter,  and  technological  developments  are  increasingly  taking 
ecological restraints  into consideration. But in parallel, another relevant phenomenon  has 
occurred.  The  impact  of  technology  on  the  policy  debate  has  influenced  the  discourse. 
Fischer (2003b) discusses the several ways the defenders of technology have responded in 
terms of re-shaping their discourse as follows: 
1.  Attempts to shift the political discourse to the search for ‗acceptable risk‘ (inverted 
commas are the author‘s) Supporters of this idea argue that risk produces both danger 
and opportunity. They claim that:  
―Risk  taking  must  be  seen  as  necessary  for  successful 
technological change and economic growth as well as the overall 
resilience and health of modern society‖.  
(Fischer, 2003b: 421) 
 
2.  Industrial and scientific leaders focused the risk debate on technical factors. The main 
assumption  is  that  risk  can  be  known  and  even  managed.  Risk  assessment  and 
management  are  the  responsibility  of  scientific  experts  and  government  decision-
makers. 
3.  The general public  is  ignorant and  lacks  information and scientific knowledge on 
technological risks. Therefore, lay people entertain irrational beliefs and exaggerate 
dangers.  
―The  answer  is  to  supply  the  public  with  more  objective 
(technical) information about the levels of risks themselves. That 
is, the ‗irrationality‘ of contemporary political arguments must be 
countered with rationally demonstrable scientific data‖.  
(Fischer, 2003b: 421)  
 
  Therefore,  the  argument  is  that  only  trained  individuals,  ‗scientific  experts‘  with 
sufficient expertise and knowledge are socially entitled to define what risk is and what is not; 
and how it can be reduced. Risk professionals such as natural scientists, epidemiologists,   59 
engineers,  and  economists  form  the  group  of  specialists  traditionally  acknowledged  by 
society  to  carry  on  ‗objective‘  environmental  risk  assessments.  In  practical  terms, 
quantitative, ‗neutral‘, and ‗objective‘ methodologies are employed to carry out risk analysis. 
Risk assessments are conducted as a combination of the probability and frequency of the 
occurrence of a defined hazard and the magnitude of the consequence of the occurrence. It is 
said that science and technology are sufficiently reliable to forecast the origin of harm and 
the occurrence of disaster, and to manage risk. Planning and policy making are important to 
regulate risk activities with the aid of the market and the administrative state. According to 
Fischer (2003b), the practice of risk assessment that first emerged to deal with geological 
risks and the probabilities of earthquakes and their damage is seriously criticised by social 
constructionists due to its failure in considering the social dimension. The author criticizes 
the  technocratic  framing  of  the  risk  problem  and  the  utility  of  risk  assessment  as  an 
appropriate methodology for decision-making.  
In  relation  to  the  former,  Fischer  criticises  the  assumption  that  social  factors  are 
irrelevant, i.e., the social context in which the methodology operates; people‘s subjective 
perceptions;  large-scale  technological  systems  as  socio-institutional  phenomena;  the 
recognition that the sources of technological hazards and  disaster have been the result of 
institutional failures. This set of issues is relevant for consideration in this research, as will be 
observed  later  in  the  analytical  chapters.  The  analytical  frameworks  I  develop  for  this 
research intend to unpack one of the social dimensions from which disaster can be analysed. I 
refer here to the importance of disaster discourses, arguments, and language mechanisms in 
constructing knowledge of ´reality´ and policy responses. 
  Another  issue  of  importance  closely  related  to  this  is  the  conceptual 
frameworks within which experts and public opinions are formed. Due to its own nature, the 
technical approach to risk privileges these scientific framings and, consequently, focuses on 
natural  hazards  and  the  technical  measures  to  control  them  and  reduce  risk.  Conflicts 
between experts and the public may arise because they have different conceptual frameworks 
in which their opinions are formed. Trust is difficult to build and easy to destroy; it becomes 
of  vital  importance  with  respect  to  perceptions  of  environmental  risk.  According  to this 
approach,  science  and  technology  will  always  be  appropriate  for  addressing  and  solving 
environmental problems and therefore, to prevent disaster. Authors such as Hewitt (1983), 
Redclift and Benton (1994), Lash, Szerszynski and Wynne (1996), and Beck (1992) criticize   60 
the  dominant  response    (that  is  aligned  with  the  naturalist  perspective)  to  contemporary 
environmental risk for being a technical, functional, and positivistic endeavour to establish 
‗the status of current threats‘. These previously mentioned considerations bring to the fore 
the question of the social definition and certification of risk, and also reveal the subjective 
and socially constructed character of the naturalist (scientific-technical) conception of risk 
and  its  theoretical  and  practical  limitations  for  considering  the  social  and  institutional 
dimension of disaster framing and policy making.  
 
2.2 The constructionist perspective of risk 
 
2.2.1 Risk as a perceived reality 
 
The first approach to risk labelled as constructionist is that concerned with the psychology of 
risk perceptions. It is linked mainly to the technological risks of modern societies. The field 
of risk perceptions is a response to the technological approach by means of demonstrating the 
relevance of integrating the social dimension as the site where risk  ‗enters‘ the  daily lives of 
human  groups.  Over  fifteen  years  have  passed  since  Slovic,  Kasperson,  and  colleagues 
published the first studies on risk perception and the individual‘s responses. According to 
Pidgeon et al. (2003), the field of risk perception and risk communication is not homogenous, 
but  fragmented,  and  includes  the  psychometric  paradigm  and  cultural  theories  of  risk 
perception, embodying the following:  postmodernist and discourse-centred approaches and 
behavioural  studies;  economic/utility  maximization  and  economic-justice  approaches,  and 
communications  and  empowerment  strategies  for  risk  communications.  The  fundamental 
idea is that risk can only be grasped through perception, which is shaped by psychological 
and social factors.  
―Risk  perception  researchers  have  investigated  in  depth  how 
judgements  about  perceived  risks  and  their  acceptability  arise,  and 
how  such  judgements  are  related  to  risk    ‗heuristics‘    (e.g.,  the 
memorability,  representativeness,  and  affective  qualities  of  risk 
events) and the qualitative characteristics of risk (e.g., voluntariness or 
catastrophic potential)‖.  
(Pidgeon et al., 2003: 1) 
 
For  instance, according to Slovic (quoted  in  Burchell, 1998), the psychometric approach 
assumes  that  risk  perception  is  largely  based  upon  people‘s  cognitive  responses  to  the   61 
characteristics of the risk  itself. Behavioural researchers seek to determine how and why 
people attach social meaning to specific technologies. To Burchell (p. 42), Slovic‘s work 
―suggests that greater perception of risk is associated with risk characteristics such as low 
familiarity, low control, and high catastrophic potential, low voluntariness of exposure, high 
inequity  and  low  perceived  benefits‖.  Burchell  (1998)  proposes the  ‗recent  psychometric 
approach‘, and affirms that risk construction is mainly based upon demographic attributes, 
individualized cultural worldviews, and attitudinal factors.  
Psychometric  tools  to  measure  individuals  in  relation  to  the  four  worldviews  of 
cultural  theory  are  incorporated.  Population  differences  and  characteristics  that  mediate 
environmental risk perception are related with the dynamics of socio-political factors, such as 
power, status, alienation, and trust. Perception of greatest risk is demonstrated to correlate 
with the lowest levels of trust in experts. Attitudinal concepts are associated with gender, 
race, and worldviews. Greatest perceptions of risk and  lowest  levels of trust are directly 
related to the least power and the lowest status that women and disadvantaged ‗racial‘ groups 
possess in U.S. society.  
The Social Amplification and Attenuation of Risk Framework (SARF) serves as the 
theoretical  basis  for  research.  It  aims  to  examine  how  risk  and  risk  events  interact  with 
psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes in ways that amplify or attenuate 
risk  perceptions  and  concerns,  and  thereby  shape  risk  behaviour,  influence  institutional 
processes, and affect risk consequences (Pidgeon et al 2003). Ontologically, there is nothing 
such  as  ―real  risk  or  objective  risk‖.  The  difference  with  the  cultural  and  sociological 
approaches  lies  in  that  the  emphasis  is  assigned  to  individual  agency  and  psychological 
processes  in  risk  construction.  Psychometric  questionnaires  comprise  some  methods 
employed, as previously mentioned.  Geographers, sociologists, and psychologists resort to 
this perspective. Although this approach acknowledges that risk cannot be objective, it also 
assumes that, based on the given risk characteristics, cultural context, and level of media 
coverage, risk perception will be to a greater or lesser extent a homogeneous phenomenon.    62 
 
2.2.2 Risk as a cultural process 
 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) are the defenders of the idea that risk is a cultural construct 
that shape the way people perceive risk. There is no a single perception of risk. Moreover, 
risk should be seen as a joint product of knowledge about the future and consent about the 
most desired prospects (author‘s italics). Perceptions of risk are collective constructs closely 
related to cultural worldviews and ‗myths of human nature‘: the fatalist; the hierarchic; the 
individualist, and the egalitarian. In this way, according to Adams (1995), all four myths are 
anthropocentric; they represent beliefs not only about nature, but also on humankind‘s place 
in nature. In the fatalist view, nature is capricious and cannot be governed, one can only hope 
for the best; in the individualist view, nature is benign and provides supportive context for 
the  individualist‘s  enterprise;  in  the  egalitarian  view,  nature  is  ephemeral  and  demands 
human  caution,  while  in  the  hierarchic  view,  nature  is  perverse/tolerant  and  research  is 
needed to identify the limits of nature‘s tolerance and regulation is required to ensure that the 
limits are not exceeded. These four distinctive worldviews form the bases of four different 
rationalities. 
For Adams (1995), disagreements and disputes on risk arise because people argue 
from  different  premises,  different  paradigms,  different  worldviews–  different  myths  of 
nature, both physical and human. These in turn frame the manner in which risk is defined. As 
mentioned within the risk perception paradigm  and also according to this  view, there  is, 
ontologically,  ´real´  risk  and  ´objective´  risk  do  not  exist.  Risk  is  a  cultural  construct. 
Following this argument, one can say that (disaster) risk is determined by social and cultural 
factors, not by nature, and that it possesses three characteristics: 1) its controversial character, 
2) the fact that people differ in terms of the kind of risk about which to worry, and 3) that 
there is not always a direct link between knowledge of risks and the actions taken to cope 
with them. 
Opposing worldviews and ‗myths of nature‘ rooted in the culture influence debates 
over risk between risk professionals and the general public. Perceptions of risks are collective 
constructs.  This  approach  has  been  criticised  for  being  culturally  deterministic  and 
stereotyping and for stating that cultural bias is ´unavoidable‘. Worldviews provide powerful 
lenses  that  magnify  one  danger  and  obscure  another.    Cultural  anthropologists,  political   63 
scientists,  and  geographers  who  are  representatives  of  this  approach  include  Douglass, 
Wildavsky, and Adams. 
 
2.2.3 Risk as a social process  
 
Under this approach, nature and risk are  both ontologically and  epistemologically 
subjective; they are part of, interrelated with, and interdependent on society. They are the 
result of a social construction in which several actors are engaged in socio-political arenas in 
the  definition  of  environmental  problems,  from  local  to  global.  A  problem  can  be 
conceptualised and valorised in different ways depending on cultural contexts and power 
relations. Thus, social understanding and knowledge of risk are shaped and constructed by 
cultural, social, economic, and political factors.  
Problems are not conceived of as given  in the ‗real‘ natural world, but constitute 
social  accomplishments  and  are  context-specific.  This  approach  places  emphasis  on  the 
historical and social contexts in which individual and institutional decisions on risk are made. 
It focuses on the processes  by which  issues are  ―assembled, presented, and  contested as 
problems‖.  Risk  is  politically  negotiated  and  constitutes  an  exercise  of  power.  Political 
incentives  are  important  to  take  positive  action  for  successful  risk  construction.  Lay 
rationality and knowledge are as important in policy making as the ―expert‘s‖ knowledge. 
For the lay public –as put forth by Adams, (1995)–  it is concerned with  balancing risk and 
rewards; thus, the lay public‘s framework is based on personal and collective experiences, 
whereas  for  ―experts‖,  the  risk  framework  is  constructed  with  scientific  and  technical 
information and is oriented toward reducing risk. 
The  processes  of  social  construction  in  which  several  subjects  (including  social 
nature) are involved define and frame the environment and the natural disaster problem. A 
problem can be constructed and evaluated in different ways according to diverse cultural and 
discursive contexts; for example, the way in which it can be examined prior to  and after the 
occurrence of a natural disaster.  But it is noteworthy that, as mentioned by Burchell (1998), 
constructionists  appear  to  acknowledge  that  risk  is  real  and  that  one  should  better 
contemplate this issue as an ontological paradox, that is, risk is socially constructed within 
the human realm and also has empirical correlations with the real world.     64 
In  order  to  distinguish  this  perspective  theoretically  from  the  naturalist  and  to 
understand the social character of risk construction, the analysis of risk‘s conceptual structure 
is proposed. Hannigan (1997), based on the principles of the sociology of social problems 
proposed  in  the  late  1970s  by  Best  (1989)  and  Spector  and  Kitsuse  (2001),  posits  the 
conceptual structure of the social definition of risk as follows: a) the object deemed to pose 
risk; b) putative harm, and c) a linkage alleging some causal relationship between the risk 
object and the potential harm.  Hannigan affirms that much of the discourse on the social 
construction of risk takes place on the causal relationship.  
The situation is complicated by the existence of multiple conflicting layers of proof, 
such as the legal, scientific, and moral. Hannigan (1997: 99,100) remarks that ―the legal 
proof  is  more  onerous,  since  it  cannot  leave  any  room  for  reasonable  doubt,      whereas 
scientific proof is easier to acquire, but is, nevertheless, a slave to statistical significance 
levels. Its authority remains until new disconfirming studies appear, and moral proofs are the 
most easily manufactured, but are heavily dependent upon the mobilization of public opinion 
to make an impact‖.  Political action, discourses, re-allocation of power; conflict resolution 
processes are key issues. For risk to be socially defined and accepted, it has to be negotiated. 
Societies have different ways of choosing and negotiating specific types of risk and exclude 
others according to their norms and values, which are embedded in specific socio-historical 
contexts and worldviews                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
3. Constructionist analyses of natural disaster 
 
Drawing from the previous discussion, we now shift to recapitulating the arguments 
due to the need to elaborate a  framework for analysing  disaster from the constructionist 
perspective. A brief review of certain contextual, historic, and institutional factors aids in 
identifying potential and novel ways of researching disaster that take into account a social 
dimension that is meaningful to all social actors involved in disaster policies, i.e., the social 
dimension that conceives of risk as a social product of discourses and language.   
  Some contributions can be considered as ‗constructionist readings‘ of disaster. Fowles 
and Miller‘s (1982) work on the famous catastrophe of the Love Canal in Niagara Falls, New 
York, is a precedent. The authors‘ study focuses on factors related with the beliefs of both 
relocated and remaining residents concerning the risk posed by the Love Canal landfill and   65 
residents‘ reactions to the management of the situation. A more recent study carried out by 
Homan (2003) on the perceptions and meanings of natural disaster in Cairo and in the U.K. 
reveals that environmental meaning remains culturally and ethnically constructed. The author 
argues that social constructionism has made an important contribution through fostering an 
acceptance  of  the  validity  of  all  forms  of  knowledge.  Deep-rooted  beliefs  determine 
perception  of  the  natural  world.  Bankoff  (2001)  assumes  a  more  critical  constructionist 
stance. He accepts the occurrence of disaster and their effects, but emphasises that disaster 
and hazards are cultural constructs and part of a historical discourse that is embedded within 
a distinctly Western construction of knowledge:  
―‗Tropicality‘,  ‗development‘,  and  ‗vulnerability‘  form  part  of  one 
and the same essentialising and generalising cultural discourse: one 
that denigrates large regions of world as dangerous– disease-ridden, 
poverty stricken and disaster-prone‖.  
(Bankoff, 2001: 29) 
 
  Other authors, such as Quarantelli (1998), Dombrowky (1998), Hewitt (1983, 1995), 
and Pelling (2001), acknowledge that disaster are, in the final analysis, socially constructed. 
But  it  is  Hewitt  who  has  attempted  to  scrutinise  the  dominant  view–  the  techno-centric 
approach– from this sociological perspective. To this author, science, institutional practices, 
and power comprise the key elements (which are unpacked later) that determine knowledge 
production and the policy process. 
  The turning point in disaster and natural hazards research can be considered in the 
criticisms found in the book edited by Hewitt (1983) entitled Interpretations of Calamity, 
which is concerned with the understanding and applications of natural hazards research. The 
authors‘  contributions  in  this  book  showed  that  substantial  changes  of  perspective  and 
practice were needed in order to reduce world‘s damages caused by disaster. This could be 
done by looking at disaster as social processes that are determined by inherent factors of the 
structure of society, such as poverty,  marginality,  and the unequal distribution of power. 
While searching for explanations of calamities in rural settings, the authors advocated the 
importance  of  the  role  of  socio-cultural  conditions  in  shaping  the  form  and  severity  of 
damages from natural processes. Hewitt and colleagues‘ main criticisms pointed out that:  
―…  a  narrow  focus  upon  ‗the  hazard‘  as  an  occasion  of  natural 
extremes,  and  upon  the  loss,  crisis,  relief,  and  rehabilitation  in 
disaster,  can  mislead  us  as  to  the  decisive  human  ingredients  of 
natural  hazards‖  and  that  ―[…]  we  tend  to  disregard  important   66 
constraints upon effective  social response to risks  from  nature that 
depend upon the ‗normal‘ socio-economic order‖.  
(Hewitt, 1983: viii)  
 
  According to Hewitt, contemporary natural disaster research depends on dominant 
institutions  and  academic  spokesmen  and  is  developed  within  the  dominant  view,  which 
impedes the improvement of the understanding of natural calamities. In the dominant view 
(the  technocratic  approach  under  the  behaviour  paradigm),  disaster  itself  is  attributed  to 
nature (a sense of causality, direction of explanation ranges from the physical environment to 
its  social  impacts, as discussed previously)  and conceives of risk  in geographical terms 
according  to  the  distribution  of  natural  extremes.  Public  policy  is  backed  by  the  most 
advanced geophysical, geo-technical, and managerial capabilities.  Even hazards work by 
social scientists reinforces the ‗geo-physical‘ and technological reductionism of the dominant 
view.   
  With regard  to this issue, Wisner et al. (2004: 335) state that the goal of prevailing 
disaster responses ―is to alleviate immediate suffering and bring things back to normal as 
before the disaster event  […] Disaster responses consist of a sequential series of actions to 
gain control over disaster, before, during, and after the emergency period (disaster cycle 
model) […] People affected by disaster are helpless victims and passive recipients of external 
aid; stress is placed on emergency response, relief, and technological and scientific solutions 
to address physical  vulnerability. Donors decide what victims  need‖. The dominant view 
constitutes a technocratic approach that subordinates other modes and bases of understanding 
or action to those utilising technical procedures. Hewitt‘s main argument is: 
 
―that the ‗natural science-technological  fix‘ approach to hazards  is 
itself,  essentially,  a  socio-cultural  construct  reflecting  a  distinct, 
institution-centred and ethnocentric view of man and nature‖.  
(Hewitt, 1983: 8) 
 
  In Hewitt‘s  interpretation,  facts and reality are  produced at the  institutional  level. 
Centrally-governed institutions are involved in channelling scientific research into distinctive 
approach  to  ‗facts‘  and  to  deciding  what  reality  should  be.  By  analysing  the  language 
employed in the dominant view discourse, Hewitt notes that one can examine how: 
  Within institutions, disaster complexity is reduced to a partial problem to be rendered 
manageable by the narrowing of the range of interpretation and acceptable evidence.   67 
Disasters are dealt with as  a separate problem,  as discrete events, temporally  and 
spatially limited. ‗Reality‘ is constructed to be measured. 
  The  occurrence  of  ‗rare‘,  severe  events  directs  people‘s  attention  and  become 
symbolic of the entire scenario. By framing disasters as accidental and isolated events 
that are from their socio-historical context, policy makers, scientists, and the media 
tend to portray the impact of nature on society as the issue. Disaster is reified. 
  Natural disasters are conceptualised as pertaining to society-environment relations; 
they are isolated events. They are materially ‗translated‘ into actions and public works 
to isolate the problem (e.g., dams for controlling floods).  
  ―Hazards  are  simulated  with  models  that  are  managerial  devices  (italics  are  the 
author‘s).  They  are  prescriptions  for  showing  where  academic  and  managerial 
categories fit together‖ (Ibid: 13). 
  Mainstream  hazards  research  has  invented  its  problem  to  suit  its  convenience.  It 
gathers data on people at risk, but may not engage in dialogue with them. 
 
The contemporary reality of shrinking states and the role of non-state actors including the 
media and international actors in shaping discourse could be taken into consideration when 
assessing  the  role  played  by  government  in  controlling  discourse.  However,  this 
consideration is beyond the scope of this thesis because this study focuses on the central 
institutions  that  are  currently  in  charge  of  designing  and  implementing  policy  and 
government actors that in fact shape ideas and actions for development planning which are in 
turn  reflections  of  society.  Hewitt  concludes  that  the  majority  of  natural  disasters  are 
characteristics of societies, and that risks are not accidents, but are rooted in ‗ordinary life‘. 
In  a  more  recent  contribution  (Hewitt,  1998),  the  author  reinforces  his  criticisms, 
underscoring the need to consider risk production shaped  by social conditions within the 
context of development. Policy makers and experts are obliged to reveal hidden risks, risks 
that  are  not  commonly  integrated  as  relevant  issues  for  the  policy  process,  such  as  the 
consideration of the risk to which vulnerable people are exposed.  Hewitt claims that ‗expert‘ 
disaster  research  and  management  possess  the  same  top-heavy  structure  of  the  military 
systems, and that the most sophisticated and effective technical work is socially constructed 
around institutions and viewpoints of power and its master geographies.    68 
  In this way and in relation to the economic power implications of the dominant view, 
Pelling  (2001)  recalls  why  the  latter  continues  to  be  dominant.  Key  international  and 
governmental agencies that continue to support a physical- and engineering-based orientation 
in disaster policy fit very well with the multibillion-dollar disaster industry. The majority of 
engineering companies that benefit from disaster are based in the North, whilst the majority 
of natural disasters occur in the South. 
  In  relation  to  the  conceptual  models  already  presented,  another  aspect  must  be 
highlighted. Gilbert (1998) mentions that disaster theoretical productions have been strongly 
influenced by their institutional context and historical time. For instance, as discussed at the 
beginning  of  this  chapter,  hazards  research  adapted  a  model  that  was  coined  during  the 
Second World War to explain how air raids struck communities, triggering conflict. In this 
approach, the causes of disaster are placed outside the community. Natural hazards resemble 
air attacks. To Gilbert, this paradigm has been widely accepted for many years because it is 
clear and simple and because it reflects the circumstances and the place it first emerged, in 
the U.S. at the height of the Cold War. 
  
―The  scientific  approach  to  disaster  is  therefore  a  reflection  of  the 
nature  of  the  market  for  which  disaster  became  an  institutional 
demand.  Bombs  fitted  easily  with  the  notion  of  an  external  agent, 
while people  harmed by  floods, hurricanes, or earthquakes bore an 
extraordinary resemblance to affected people of air raids‖.  
(Gilbert, 1998: 13) 
 
In countries other than the U.S. aspects of institutional demand were also determinants in 
defining the conceptual structure of disaster. For instance, in France, Gilbert affirms, the 
institutional demand derives from the successors of civil defence or civil security agencies 
created during the two World Wars. In short, conceptualisation is linked to the institutional 
demand that is constrained or determined by  institutions that provide  funds  for scientific 
research. Thus, it might appear that scientific research on ‗disaster‘ has also responded to 
other purposes and interests beyond those that are ‗scientific‘.   
  To Dombrowsky (1998), the problem of disaster‘ conceptualisation involves the lack 
of  epistemology  (it  can  be  inferred  that  the  author  calls  for  a  common  positivist 
epistemology), which causes difficulties in defining the object of study. This is reflected in 
the fact that many definitions of disaster are solely programmatic declarations. This means 
that  those  defining  disaster  declare  what  they  intend  to  do  with  the  social  process   69 
denominated  disaster.  Thus,  the  Red  Cross  defines  disaster  in  terms  of  aid  needed;  the 
National Guard observes riots as disaster; the General Physician, epidemics, and the Special 
Forces  and  Bomb  Squads,  terrorism.  As  discussed  by  Dombrowsky,  there  is  another 
important  circumstance  to  consider.  Disaster  definitions  are  constructed  according  to the 
internal logic of organisations. Organisations define problems in relation to the solutions they 
have at hand, to their capabilities for handling them.
12 Therefore, root causes and affected 
people are unlikely to be taken into consideration when providing the assistance that is truly 
needed. 
  For Wisner et al. (2004), issues of knowledge production are of a different nature. 
They acknowledge that their vulnerability analysis has limits in identifying reliable evidence 
for causal connections among root causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe conditions. These 
limits exist because there are uncertainty and gaps in knowledge. To these authors, this has 
had  policy  consequences.  Policy  makers  and  decision  takers  have  failed  to  address  the 
connections adequately and have, in the end, neglected the causes of disaster‘s social roots.    
 
―Problems  will  recur  again  and  again  in  different  and  increasingly 
costly forms unless underlying causes are tackled‖. 
(Wisner, 2004: 61) 
 
According to this stance, once policy makers aware of the ‗real‘ root causes, vulnerability 
will be addressed and eventually reduced. I argue, however, that this is not because of policy 
makers‘ lack of knowledge for making appropriate decisions to tackle the ‗real‘ root causes, 
but that we should take other issues into consideration when researching the relationship 
between knowledge production and policy making:  
  The process of knowledge production within the policy sphere (that is governed by 
other factors, as it has been illustrated previously).  
  The employment and consequences of the prevailing scientific-technical knowledge 
for voiding the social content of explanations of disaster‘ causes.  
  The use and consequences of other knowledge in disaster and disaster risk problem 
construction by all actors involved, including affected people. 
 
                                                 
12 ―The cases where warm clothing was sent to African famines, or thousands of tons of contraceptives or cough 
mixtures were sent to mass casualty situations are not only mistakes, but the logical outcome of the internal 
dynamics of self-preserving organizations‖ (Dombrowsky, 1998:22).   70 
Conclusions: Disaster policies, risk, and knowledge.  
 
As a matter of conclusion, disaster causality is a fundamental issue to be taken into 
consideration  when  proposing  differing  explanations  of  disaster  and  risk.  The  sense  of 
causality and the weight placed either on nature or on society as the determining factors for 
explaining  disaster  have  dominated  the  disaster  debate  over  the  years  when  it  comes  to 
conceptualising  and  designing  policy  responses.  The  behaviour  paradigm  that  privileged 
natural hazards research and scientific knowledge frames disaster as the impact of natural 
phenomena on society. From this perspective, scientific knowledge of disaster can reveal the 
nature of the event, and the society is assigned the task of acting accordingly to cope with it.  
On the other hand, the structural paradigm  expressed  in the  vulnerability  concept 
explains disaster as a result of social processes in relation to hazards. In this case, knowledge 
of disaster is knowledge of hazards vulnerability within society. However, in both paradigms 
and the prevailing definition of  disaster coined  by  Fritz, nature is conceived of as  being 
outside of society regardless of whether one is explaining disaster in terms of natural hazards 
or in those of vulnerability. This means that both paradigms share a naturalist perspective of 
risk.   
Compared  with  the  naturalist  perspective  that  privileges  scientific-technical 
knowledge and rationality when framing risk, the constructionist perspective also recognizes 
other knowledge in problem construction. Policy makers, bureaucrats, and lay people possess 
other rationalities; therefore, their consideration of public policy analysis is important from 
the  proposed  constructionist  analysis.  It  is  understood  that  current  policies  privileges 
scientific  knowledge  while  undermining  other  knowledge.  Thus,  marginality  can  also  be 
conceived  of  in  terms  of  being  negligible  in  knowledge  production  and  the  framing  of 
disaster. Knowledge regarding disaster risk with regard to daily life and survival strategies is 
not taken into consideration in the dominant disaster policies.  
This research adopts this view of risk because it is concerned with the understanding 
of collective social  constructions of  meanings and the knowledge that are determined  by 
political and social processes. It focuses on the varying ways scientists, policy makers, and 
implementers make interpretations and discourses of floods causality and floods risk, how 
these  construct  policy  issues  as  problems,  and  consequently,  how  all  of  this  determines 
policy objectives, types of intervention, and implementation.    71 
Thus,  at  the  theoretical  level,  the  purpose  of  this  thesis  is  to  contribute  to  the 
understanding  of  disaster,  risk,  and  policies  as  social  products.  The  two  analytical 
frameworks  presented  in  the  following  chapter  elaborate  on  these  issues.    Key  to  this 
framework is the assumption that there is a social construction process at the institutional 
level that determines the manner in which disaster are defined and framed, and that there are 
various social subjects and conceptions of nature and social actors underpinning the policy 
process.  In  addition,  knowledge  and  the  framing  of  natural  disaster  conceal  the  social 
dimension, which is understood as the processes that generate the vulnerability of people to 
disaster.  
   72 
CHAPTER  TWO.  DISCURSIVE  CONSTRUCTION  OF  „NATURAL‟  DISASTER  AT 
POLICY LEVEL  
 
 
Introduction  
 
The objective of this chapter is to develop two interrelated frameworks to analyse a social 
construction of ‗natural‘ disaster and risk at the policy level. In particular, the focus is placed 
on  the  relation  among  arguments  and  discourses  of  disaster  causality,  policy  problem 
construction, and  institutional responses. Therefore, the  first  framework  is to analyse the 
discursive construction of disaster causality as a policy problem, and the second framework 
is to explain the argumentative construction of a public remedy, known in the research as 
‗policy responses‘.   
The main theoretical sources of this chapter derive from various bodies of knowledge, 
including: social constructionism (Hacking, 2000; Sismondo, 1996; Berger and Luckmann, 
1966);  social construction of nature and the environment and social nature (Barry 1999; 
Demeritt, 1998; Castree and Braun, 2001; Braun and Castree, 1998; Cronon et al., 1995);  the 
sociology of social problems applied to  environmental and  disaster policy analysis (Linder, 
1995; Fischer, 2003,a ; Stallings, 1997); sociology of knowledge (Irwin, 2001; Garvin, 2001, 
Hilhorst, 2004); sociology of the environment (Hannigan, 1995), and political theories of 
causal stories (Stone, 1989)   
In  section  one,  I  review  the  theoretical  underpinnings  and  the  epistemological 
implications of social constructionism. This is with the intention to show its analytical scope 
for this research by delimiting the  ‗object‘ of analysis and the components of the process that 
construct ‗natural‘ disaster. I also suggest that the concept of ‗natural‘ disaster should be 
conceived of as ‗social nature‘ in the sense that ‗natural‘ disaster is intrinsically social in 
terms of its discursive construction. To do this, I compare two epistemological traditions –the 
naturalist and the constructionist– in the understanding of nature, with the aim of applying 
the basic assumptions of social constructionism to ‗natural‘ disaster. I explain how the ‗social 
nature‘  debate  can  contribute  to  the  constructionist  analysis  of  ‗natural‘  disaster  within 
policies. The socially constructed character of the policy process does not occur in a vacuum; 
it emerges within a specific context in which individuals, institutions, groups, technology, 
and nature interact.    73 
In section two, I explore and explain the specific ways knowledge is produced within 
the social domains of disaster and risk. This is to examine how knowledge claims may be 
similar or different among disaster-relevant subjects, namely scientists, disaster managers, 
policy makers, implementers, and local operators, as well as local people. And finally, in 
section three, I elaborate the two analytical frameworks that will be used later to develop the 
analysis in Chapters Six and Seven. One framework is to explain the discursive construction 
of disaster causality as a policy problem based on the argumentative structure of discourse, 
and the other is developed to examine policy responses  from an argumentative approach. 
These  two  frameworks  are  related  in  the  sense  that  floods  causality  discourses  and  the 
consequent problem constructions determine the manner in which specific policy responses 
are believed to be valid and adequate to solve inundations problems.  In short, the floods 
policy problem determines the policy objective. 
 
 
1. Social constructionism and „natural‟ disaster  
 
1.1 The nature and scope of social constructionism. 
 
A necessary task to carry out while selecting the main aspects  of a social constructionist 
analysis is that of identifying the ‗object‘ or ‗process‘ that are said to be socially constructed. 
From the outset, the latter  is important to bear in mind for the development of this chapter 
because, as I discussed in Chapter One, natural disaster and risk are contingent sites in which 
causal factors of different kind are invoked when defining the  ‗natural disaster problem‘. 
This, in turn, has implied a number of interpretations and even differences regarding the type 
of  knowledge  employed  when  framing  ‗natural‘  disaster,  their  causal  factors  and 
consequences, and the policy implications. 
  In the book, ―The Social Construction of What?‖ Hacking (2000) warns the reader 
concerning the fact that, before thinking about definitions and meanings, one is required to 
identify the object of analysis. Hacking inquires, what is to be socially constructed? And he 
replies: ideas, types of, and the matrix in which they are embedded constitute a guideline to 
‗arrive at‘ a constructionist approach of ‗the reality‘ under study. The purpose of studying the 
social construction of ‗things‘ is to reveal interactions that occur among concepts, language, 
discourses, practices, and institutions.    74 
For Hacking, social constructionism
13 includes:  
―various sociological, historical, and philosophical projects that aim 
at  displaying  or  analysing  actual,  historically  situated,  social 
interactions  or  casual  routes  that  led  to,  or  were  involved  in,  the 
coming into being or establishing of some present entity or fact‖. 
(1999: 48) 
 
The social constructionism perspective  has  been applied to various human affairs.  
According  to  Hacking  (2000),  this  perspective  has  been  utilised  to  analyse  the  social 
construction of objects, ideas, facts, i.e., danger, emotions, gender, literacy, technological 
systems,  female  refugees,  to  mention  a  few.  In  some  cases,  as  Hacking  notes,  social 
constructionist analyses have afforded important insights on historical events, social forces, 
and ideology, on precisely the  factors that give rise to  the constitution of the ‗objects‘, 
‗ideas‘, ‗problems‘, and ‗facts‘.  For Sismondo (1996), the metaphor of constructivism has 
been  employed  when  implying  a  broad  range  of  issues:  construction  of  epistemologies; 
theories; social problems, and objects, or things. It can be an ontological programme with the 
focus on social objects or laboratory artefacts, or one with the focus on the natural world. It 
can also be primarily an epistemological programme, when the focus is on a particular social 
object, namely scientific knowledge.  
During  mid-Sixties  the  epistemological  dimension  of  the  social  construction  of 
‗reality‘ was systematically addressed by Berger and Luckmann. Berger and Luckmann‘s 
(1966) seminal work ―The Social Construction of Reality‖ broke the ground for analysing the 
way individuals and society produce knowledge on reality in their daily interaction and how 
institutions are formed and maintained through legitimisation and socialisation. It is at the 
interplay  of  subjects-institutions-society  that  knowledge  of  ‗reality‘  is  produced  and 
validated.  The  theoretical  underpinnings  of  Berger  and  Luckman‘s  book  were  in  some 
fashion influenced by the work of Mannheim. For Mannheim (quoted in Delanty, 1997), the 
founder of sociology of knowledge, constructivism is one of the key methodological issues in 
social  science.  When  constructing  reality,  the  knowledge  production  process  plays  a 
fundamental role. The author relates knowledge to its social producers. Knowledge is always 
produced from a specific social and historical standpoint and reflects the interest and culture 
of the groups in question. Mannheim‘s interest was in ideology as a form of knowledge that 
                                                 
13 According to Knorr-Cetina, 1993 and Sismondo, 1993 (quoted in Delanty, 1997), ―constructivism has been 
the social scientific methodology of the 1980s and there is little sign of abating it‖. 
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expresses the thought of a dominant group.   In this regard, the policy analyst Frank Fischer 
(2003, a:  124) notes that social constructionism: 
 
 ―…starts with the recognition of the theoretical ladenness of facts. 
The  interpretivist  position  holds  that  social  reality  and  empirical 
observations of it only exist in the context of a mental framework (a 
construct) for thinking about them. Social constructs are grounded in 
values that determine our perceptions of reality. The findings of an 
inquiry are, as such, not a report of that which is out there but rather 
part of a process that creates the particular version of reality‖. 
 
  As Schwandt (1994) states, for constructivists, knowledge and truth are created, not 
discovered by mind. They argue that what we take to be self-evident kinds is actually the 
product of complicated discursive practices. At stake, then, are systems of representations, 
social and material practices, laws of discourses and ideological effects. In order to ground 
analytically the previously mentioned epistemological considerations of constructionism, I 
bring to the fore the following key assumptions of social constructionism, proposed by Burr 
(1995: 3–5), because these will be examined in the remainder of the chapter to inform my 
analytical frameworks: 
1.  A  critical  stance  toward  the  taken-for-granted  knowledge.  There  is  no  objective 
world; our observations of the world are not the world itself. The categories with 
which we apprehend the world do not necessarily refer to real divisions.  
2.  The categories and concepts we use are history-and culture-specific. All the ways of 
understanding are historically and culturally relative and are considered  as products 
of this  culture and history, and are dependent upon the particular social and economic 
arrangements prevailing in that culture at that time. 
3.  Knowledge is sustained by social processes. People construct knowledge among them 
through daily interactions in the course of social life. Social interactions of all kinds 
and particularly language are of interest. What we regard as ‗truth‘ is a product not of 
the objective observation of the world, but of the social processes and interactions in 
which people are constantly engaged with each other. 
4.  Knowledge and social action go together. ‗Negotiated‘ understandings could take a 
wide variety of different forms; thus, we can speak of the numerous possible ‗social 
constructions‘  of  the  world.  But  each  different  social  construction  also  is   76 
accompanied by, or invites, a different of action from human beings. Descriptions of 
the world sustain some patterns of social action and exclude others. 
 
All four assumptions relate in one manner or another to the ‗subjects‘ and precisely to 
the ´subjects´‘ abilities to perceive of and know ‗reality‘ and to act according to the ‗reality‘ 
the subject constructs. In this research, the four assumptions are applied to the analysis of 
‗natural‘ disaster in the following statements, which I will take into consideration to elaborate 
my analytical frameworks: 
  ‗Natural‘ disaster is a concept that is the result of a complex combination of 
subjects‘ interpretations of causal factors.   
  Knowing ‗natural‘ disaster is unavoidably biased and value-laden, and can be 
understood as a social accomplishment that is collectively negotiated.  
  A subject‘s interpretations of ‗natural‘ disaster are embedded in and to some 
extent determined by science and policy institutions. 
  Various  discourses  of  ‗natural‘  disaster  causality  compete  with  each  other 
concerning the ‗truthful‘ accounts of disaster.  
  Different interpretations of ‗natural‘ disaster causalities imply different policy 
responses.      
 
The discussion in Chapter One highlighted how ‗natural‘ disaster framing depends on 
the  casual  factors  and  how  these  are  observed  as  a  ‗problem‘  to  be  tackled  by  policy. 
Therefore, I propose ‗disaster causality‘ as an ‗object‘ that implies a ‗policy problem‘; in 
particular, I focus on the knowledge claims that construct the ‗object‘, the ‗policy problem‘, 
and the ‗policy responses‘. For the elaboration of this chapter, in addition to the ‗object and 
the ‗policy problem‘ and of utmost importance, social constructionism analysis takes into 
consideration the ‗subjects‘ involved in creating the ‗object‘ and the ‗policy problem‘.  This 
analytical exigency aids in refining the scope of this perspective by explicitly relating the 
„what‟ (the ‗object‘ and ‗problem‘) to the „who‟ (the ‗subject‘).   
It does not suffice to say what ‗reality‘ is about, but also who ‗creates‘ it, through 
which  means  and  to  what  purposes.  In  other  words,  under  this  perspective  the  subject‘s 
position within an institution, his/her identity, and values are as important as the  ‗objects‘  in 
question and how the relationship between the two can be established and evaluated. This   77 
latter  consideration  conditions  the  researcher  to study  also  the  „process  of  construction‟, 
namely the knowledge production of the ‗objects‘ and ‗policy problem‘.  
Therefore, the process of knowledge production of ‗natural‘ disaster includes, on the 
one hand, policy makers, scientists, implementers, and other policy-relevant subjects, and on 
the other hand, the knowledge claims of ‗natural‘ disaster causality and the policy problem. 
The  study  of  knowledge  claims  that  make  possible  the  ‗existence‘  of  ‗natural‘  disaster 
causality  as  ‗objects‘  and  ‗policy  problems‘  can  be  undertaken  by  deconstructing  these 
knowledge claims. In this respect, Castree (2001: 13) asserts that: 
 
 ―Deconstructing  these  knowledges  (of  nature)  therefore  entails 
denaturalizing  them:  that  is,  showing  them  to  be  social  products 
arising in particular contexts and serving specific social or ecological 
ends that ought to be questioned‖.   
 
In sum, I set forth the first four components of the process of construction for the 
development of my analytical framework:  
 
1)  ‗Natural‘ disaster causality as an ‗object‘,   
2) A ‗policy problem‘ and ‗policy responses‘ determined by 1)  
3) A subject who constructs/reproduces knowledge  
 (Policy makers, implementers, scientists, affected people)  
4) Making of knowledge claims of 1) and 2) by 3). 
 
The following section applies the bases of the social constructionism to nature and 
environment in order to frame ´natural´ disaster as social nature and to flesh out in section 
three of this chapter the four components enlisted above and thus continue detailing the scope 
of my analytical framework.       
 
1.2. Nature and environment as social products 
 
In the previous section, I discussed the nature and scope of the social constructionism and I 
proposed to analyse ´natural´ disaster causality as a social object in particular with regard to 
knowledge production.  For that reason, in this  section I  suggest the concept of  ‗natural‘ 
disaster to be conceived of as a social  nature and therefore suitable  for a constructionist   78 
examination. Thus, the following discussion shifts to the constructionist perspective of the 
concept of ‗nature‘. The concept of ´nature´ is of paramount importance for this research 
because it underpins particular understandings of ‗natural‘ hazards, ´natural´ disaster and risk 
found in scientific descriptions and policy measures, as discussed in Chapter One.   
Under the constructionist perspective, it is stated that these understandings not only 
concern the material world or physical conditions, but mainly ideas, social meanings, and 
discourses  and  their  implications  in  policy  making,  in  that    they  prescribe  and  indicate 
courses  of  action.  In  this  respect  and  as  Feindt  and  Oels  note  (2005:  163),  a  discursive 
perspective of nature ―(…) allows one to understand how nature and the environment are 
continuously  produced  through  environmental  policy  making,  planning,  research,  and 
development, as well as through every day practices‖.  
But prior to reflecting on the discursive perspective of nature in order to conceive of  
‗natural‘  disaster as a social nature, it is necessary to recall the difference between the two 
general  approaches  to  nature:  the  naturalist,  and  the  constructionist,  because  they  have 
different  epistemological  implications  that  eventually  shape  different  policy  responses. 
Generally,  in  social theorising about nature  –according to Barry (1999) – one  is able to 
identify  two  general  approaches:  the  naturalist,  and  the  constructionist.  In  the  naturalist, 
‗nature‘ is external to society and exists as an independent natural order outside of society, 
whereas in the constructionist, ‗nature‘ is observed as a construction of society and focuses 
on analysing the internal relations within society.  
Therefore, to Barry (1999) the expression ‗social construction of the nature has two 
connotations. The  first of these, denominated ‗naturalist‘, refers to the  material, physical 
production  and  transformation  of  the  environment  by  humans  (ecological  deterioration, 
agriculture, forestry, landscaping, biotechnology, genetic manipulation, etc.). This is the most 
commonly  known  connotation  of  nature  and  environment  and  has  been  the  object  of 
numerous  sciences  such  as  ecology,  economy  and  political  sciences.  The  naturalist  view 
conceives nature as something that just is regardless of who is involved in describing it and 
for whose interests it is described; the environment is objective which means that is a factual 
reality independent of subjective value judgements. The role of the positivist sciences is to 
approach nature in order to unveil its internal dynamics. Thus, there is a clear separation 
between the observer and the object that is ‗observed‘. The ‗naturalist‘ approach to nature, in   79 
fact, underpins the ´naturalist‘ perspective of risk, discussed in Chapter One, in the sense that 
risk is a direct function of physical or ‗natural‘ hazards.     
In contrast, the social constructionist approach deals with the power and function of 
language  and  discourses  in  constructing  the  socio-natural  ‗reality‘.    In  addition  to  the 
materiality of ‗reality‘, the environmental dimension of human life is also determined by how 
social groups interact through the language and narratives of science, policy, mass media, 
and daily interaction. Empirically, this can be contemplated and researched in the scientific 
and policy knowledge. For this reason, this connotation of ‗social construction of the nature‘ 
is  adopted  in  this  research.  The  social  constructionist  view  conceives  of  ‗nature‘  as  a 
contested ‗site‘, and no agreeable and singular meaning or definition can be reached because 
contexts  and  subjects  differ.  This  signifies  that  knowledges  and  conceptualisations  are 
context-specific and depend upon who is defining them and for what purposes. As Barry 
states:  
―[…] nature and the environment mean different things and are given 
different  evaluation  in  different  social  and  cultural  settings  and  in 
different historical periods. The point of social theory is to make us 
aware of these evaluative distinctions, to try to understand them, and 
if possible suggest explanations for them. In this way we can say that 
there are no ‗value-neutral‘ readings of the environment and nature‖.  
(Barry, 1999: 19) 
 
Under  the  constructionist  view,  one  cannot  separate  facts  from  values;  when  one 
analyses nature, implicit in these descriptions are certain value-judgements and normative 
positions.  I  apply  this  assumption  to  those  ‗objects‘  and  ‗concepts‘  that  are  labelled  as 
‗natural‘, such as ‗natural‘ hazards, ‗natural‘ disaster, and ‗natural‘ disaster risk, as discussed 
in the following section. The ‗constructionist‘ approach to nature in fact underpins the social 
constructionist perspective of risk, discussed in Chapter One, with regard to that risk is not a 
‗real‘  division  of  nature,  but  instead  the  result  of  a  political  negotiation,  constituting  an 
exercise of power. Knowing risk focuses on the processes by which issues and claims are 
assembled, presented, and contested as ‗problems‘.  
  Several  authors  (Demeritt,  1998;  Castree  and  Braun,  1998,  2001;  Hewitt,  1995; 
Cronon,  1995)  discussed  the  failure  of  the  naturalist  notions  of  ´nature‘  and  society  as 
distinct and separate analytical categories when producing knowledge on the environment 
and  ‗natural‘  systems  to  address  ecological  problems.  Solutions  proposed  for  ecological 
problems very often disregard the social and institutional contexts in which they are meant to   80 
be applied. For instance, solutions might become meaningless to people when applied to 
calling for public participation. Thus, in this research, I propose that ‗nature‘ and ‘society‘ 
are no longer to be  observed as separated, but rather as forming a complex fabric that is 
constituted of and assembled by social representations, system of meanings, language, and 
discourses. This is discussed later in the sub-section on the social nature of ‗natural‘ disaster.   
Therefore, it is at this ‗social‘ level, which includes the complex fabric of system of 
meanings, language, and discourses of the ‗natural-social‘ relation, that research of ‗natural‘ 
disaster within the policy sphere is undertaken in this thesis. Accordingly, a constructionist 
epistemology of ‗natural‘ disaster is required for building an analytical framework to study 
‗natural‘ disaster within the policy sphere. Under this constructionist epistemology, the ideas 
of ‗natural‘ disaster, ‗natural‘ hazards, and risk and their varying interpretations are shaped, 
on the one hand, by conceptualisations and meanings the subject entertains of ‗nature‘, and 
on the other, by  the subject‘s position on  State-society relations and  the purposes of the 
institution.   
The general underlying assumption adopted in this chapter  is that  ‗nature‘  can  be 
regarded as the outcome of discourses, power relations, interests, and, in particular, of ideas 
concerning how society is and ought to be. In other words, in this research, that which is at 
stake is not only the idea of ‗natural‘ disaster in itself, but the values that specific subjects 
defend through the discourses that they elaborate. This means that any conceptualisation of 
‗natural‘ disaster is mediated by the subject‘s beliefs and values. ‗Natural‘ disaster can be 
apprehended through the  meanings and  beliefs that the subject assigns to specific causal 
factors, such as   ‗natural‘ hazards (hurricanes, heavy rain falls, and floods) and man-made 
hazards  such  as  infrastructure  failures.  According  to  Yanow
14  and  again  Yanow (1996, 
2000), it is through the making of meaning that we come to approach the world and construct 
knowledge on it.                                                                                                                                                       
  The issue of ‗nature‘ as a contingent site that involves multiple meanings has been a 
topic in disciplines such as environmental sociology and environmental history. One of the 
most  quoted  books  on  the  different  meanings  of  nature  in  the  modern  world  from  the 
environmental  history  perspective  is  Cronon‘s  edition  (1995)  of  ―Uncommon  Ground. 
Towards Reinventing Nature‖. This work highlights the importance of explicitly recognising 
‗natures‘ as human products that are under constant re-constitution. ´Natures´ are historic 
                                                 
14 Personal communication, February, 2004.   81 
human constructions. In rethinking the meaning of nature in the modern world, Cronon and 
colleagues (1995) brought to the fore two key insights that have emerged from the work of 
scholars and scientists over the past quarter century. First, the ‗natural‘ world is far more 
dynamic and entangled with human history than popular beliefs on ‗the balance of nature‘ 
have typically acknowledged. Second,  ‗nature‘  is not, to a great extent,  ‗natural‘; it is a 
human construction comprising the way we describe and understand the natural world that is 
entangled to such a degree with our own values and assumptions that the two worlds can 
never be fully separated.  
  Other authors have built on this discussion from the same perspective. Among them, 
there is agreement regarding the fact that nature is a human construction that is socially and 
culturally bound (Cronon, 1995; Di Chiro, 1995; Haraway, 1995; Castree, 2001; Demeritt, 
2001; Braun and Wainwright, 2001). In sum, I argue that by treating ‗natural‘ disaster as 
conforming a social nature, meanings, beliefs, and discourses that construct ‗natural‘ disaster 
causality  must  be  analysed  through  and  at  the  same  time  connected  to  the  institutional 
context in which the subjects are positioned. Thus, in section 1.3, I present a brief review of 
the  social  nature  conception,  placing  emphasis  on  the  manner  in  which  production  of 
knowledge claims of ‗natural‘ disaster causality can be approached and evaluated. But before 
doing that I present some criticisms to the application of social constructionism to ´nature´ 
that eventually should be considered for the scope of this research.   
 
1.2.1 Criticisms to social constructionism of nature 
 
Having explained the theoretical underpinnings of social constructionism and in particular 
how  it approaches `nature`,  it is  important to refer to its criticisms  and  limitations when 
establishing the relationship between the social and the natural in the analysis of  ‗natural‘ 
disaster  as  a  social  product. This  research  intends  to  explore  how  bridging  ‗nature‘  and 
society can be possible in the policy realm. In doing so, it seeks to place the concept of 
‗natural‘ disaster within sociology of the environment. In this regard, what is relevant to 
question is the process whereby epistemological claims of ‗natural‘ disaster causality is done.   
  Because  this  thesis  seeks  to  explain  how  ‗natural‘  disaster  causality  claims  are 
constructed,  it  aims  at  explaining  what  ‗nature‘  is  and  how  it  can  be  conceptually 
differentiated  between  the  various  referents  made  by  the  subjects.  Nevertheless,  some   82 
criticisms can  be identified while establishing the tension between ‗reality‘ and its social 
construction,  between  `natural`  disaster  and  the  discourses  and  arguments  that  can  make 
possible for it to emerge as an issue of social concern within policy.      
  Drawing from critical realism and according to Carolan (2005: 396), one can say that 
―there  is  distinction  between  the  way  things  are  and  our  knowledge  claims  about  those 
objects  of  knowledge.  To  conflate  the  two—to  reduce  ontology  to  epistemology—is  to 
succumb to Bhaskar‘s (1978) epistemic fallacy. This allows, and here is the crux of critical 
realism  (and,  thus,  what  makes  critical  realism  critical),  for the  fallibility  of  knowledge 
claims; to open knowledge claims to criticism, testing, and further improvement‖. In this 
sense, the reader might get the impression at times that the knowledge claims of ´natural´ 
disasters are portrayed as the `natural` disasters themselves.  It is important to bear in mind 
this criticism and  for this reason the two frameworks that are to be constructed for this 
research  will  be  used  only  to  explain  the  argumentation  process  of  the  most  dominant 
discourses of disaster at the policy level; in other words, discourses that refer to causal agents 
that are part of this ´reality´ 
  There is another important point to consider when discussing the social construction 
of  ´natural´  disaster.  It  relates  to  the  manner  in  which  scientific  accounts  constructs 
knowledge of nature as a social process. From the perspective of the sociology of science, it 
can be understood that science constructs ´nature´ and ´natural´´ artefacts without referring to 
an  ´external  objective  natural´  condition  that  can  be  used  to  compare  the  diversity  and 
validity of scientific claims (i.e. the ecological  processes of environmental deterioration). 
Under this view, scientific knowledge of nature may be conceived as relative as any other 
account,  for  example  that  of  policy  makers  and  lay  people.  Prevailing  descriptions  of 
´natural´ disaster causality are of scientific nature so in this sense it might be useful to bring 
to the discussion the criticisms made, for instance, by Murphy (1994) who scrutinises the 
sociology of science and exposes its internal contradictions. Murphy warns about the fact that 
sociology,  in  particular  the  sociology  of  science  studies,  has  fabricated  science  without 
nature. He calls for the re-framing of sociology of science within natural processes. In this 
regard Murphy states that:  
―the  sociological  representation  of  science  as  a  social 
construction  has  tended  to  obscure  the  discovery  of  the 
properties of nature and the effect that discovery has on social 
action; to ignore that nature itself is a crucial element in the   83 
scientific development of factual knowledge; to gloss over the 
manipulation  of  nature  (and  attendant  environmental 
catastrophes),  and  therefore,  to  muddle  one  of  the  most 
significant features of the contemporary world‖  
(1994: 970 
 
Following Murphy‘s caveats, it is important to bear in mind throughout this thesis that the 
analyses of the scientific facts of ´natural´ disaster correspond to descriptions of material 
and ecological changes that have occurred and that have brought concrete damages and 
serious alterations. For this reason, it is necessary here to develop a narrative that invokes 
the material and natural construction of an specific case study in order to understand the 
severity of floods- this is done in Chapter Four. However the focus of the research is put, 
as mentioned above, in arguments and discourses of disaster causality. Murphy‘s criticism 
can be considered to develop further research in the future.   
 
 
1.3 The social nature of „natural‟ disaster  
 
The social nature debate represents a contemporary growing open debate and an important 
effort oriented toward addressing the topic of nature as re-constructed by society. Castree and 
Braun  (2001)  and  Braun  and  Castree  (1998)  edited  valuable  works  on  what  is  currently 
denominated as the social nature debate. Experts (such as Cronon, 1995, Demeritt, 1998, 
2001; Pelling, 2001, 2003;  Castree and Braun 1998, 2001) in different social disciplines 
(anthropology, geography, environmental history, cultural studies, political economy, and the 
science  studies)  have contributed to this debate. The  latter is  not concerning with  single 
unified perspective, but involves several existing perspectives that seek to explain how social 
natures are being known, re-made, and transformed and  by which actors, for whose benefit, 
and with what social and ecological consequences. In general, the contributions of Castree 
and Braun and colleagues (1998, 2001) on social natures are aimed at  responding to the 
following central questions:  
  Who is currently empowered to define what counts as ‗nature‘ –discursively 
and materially? 
  What are the implications of accepted or hegemonic definitions?     84 
  Which counter-hegemonic definitions are available to us at present, and what 
kind of a world– socially, economically, politically and culturally– do these allow 
us to envisage? 
 
According to Castree and Braun (1998: 5), two common important points are shared among 
authors who advocate the social nature approach to ‗nature‘:  
1)  In Haraway‘s words (cited in Castree and Braun, 1998), ―nature cannot pre-exist its 
construction‖: it is figure, construction, artefact, and displacement. It is something 
made, materially and semiotically.  
2)  ―Its making is about much more than just nature. It is impossible to separate nature 
into its own ontological space. Thus, the remaking of nature(s) has wider implications 
– it becomes, quite simply, a focal point for a nexus of political-economic relations, 
social identities, cultural orderings, and political aspirations of all kinds‖.  
 
Social natures are defined as the sites at which social production of ´nature‘ occurs 
and is contested. Different theoretical positions are currently engaged in this task with no 
apparent predominance of one over the others. For instance, authors of the Marxist tradition 
recognise the importance of political economy, but suggest that the material transformation 
of nature in capitalist production underplays other aspects of nature‘s re-making, namely, that 
of its representation. That is why new re-interpretations of the Marxist‘s reflection on the 
nature of ‗nature‘ are being made, and these may provide insightful ideas on the interplay 
between the material and discursive production of nature. In this respect, the  origins of these 
ideas can be traced back to Schmidt‘s (1971) ―The Concept of Nature in Marx‖ (quoted in 
Castree  and  Braun,  1998),  which  presents  two  sides  of  Marx‘s  account  of  the  capitalist 
nature: a critique of representations of ‗nature‘ within bourgeois societies and the fragmented 
theory of nature‘s creative destruction under capitalism.  
Schmidt‘s (1971) accounts of the bourgeois concept of nature as external to society 
has been criticised because it underplays the role of social relations in constituting nature and 
society. As noted by Castree and Braun (1998), Neil Smith‘s work
15 is relevant regarding the 
production of nature under capitalism. Smith‘s thesis‘s main points emphasise the following: 
                                                 
15 For a detailed explanation, see Smith, Neil (1984) Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production 
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a)  the  internal  relations  between  society  and  nature;  b)  that  capitalism  constructs  and 
reconstructs  entire  landscapes  as  exchange  values,  and  c)  capitalism  historicizes  human 
relations with nature and society. His central idea of the production of nature contemplates 
the way in which ‗first nature‘ is replaced by a different, man-produced ‗natural‘ landscape.  
 
 ―The competitive and accumulative imperatives of capitalism bring 
all  manner  of  natural  environments  and  concrete  labour  processes 
upon  them  together  in  an  abstract  framework of  market  exchange 
which, literally, produces nature(s) anew‖.  
(Castree and Braun 1998: 9) 
 
 At  a  time  when  capitalism  is  causing  unprecedented  great  environmental 
transformations and because  Smith‘s reconstruction of Marx underplays the  materiality of 
produced  nature‘,  the  arrival  of  eco-Marxist‘s  contributions  such  as  those  of  O‘Connor 
(1998), i.e., the ―second contradiction of capital‖; Altvater‘s (1993)  ―discounting the future 
and  resource  overexploitation‖;  Benton‘s  (1989)  ―naturally  mediated  unintended 
consequences  of  production‖,  and  Harvey‘s  (1996)  ―anti-ecological  capitalist  valuation‖ 
(Castree and Braun, 1998) has never before commanded such importance. According to these 
re-interpretations of the Marxist tradition, nature‘s representation becomes a very important 
avenue to explore. The main discussion among Eco-Marxists concerns the tension between 
materiality and its representation in the process of knowing and remaking ‗reality‘ and the 
functions executed between human agency and structure.  
In fact, this changing tension between materiality and representation in the process of 
re-making  ‗reality‘  can  be  mirrored  in  the  constructionist  versions  of  social  problems 
proposed by Stallings (1997). According to Stallings (1997: 8), there are four constructionist 
versions of social problems. The first group comprises the strict constructionists represented 
by Spector and Kitsuse, who equated social problems with process of claims making and 
claims  in response to putative conditions. Theses authors set forth no assumptions about 
‗objective reality‘   
The second group includes the contextual constructionists represented in the area of 
risk by Gene Rosa‘s ―reconstructed realism‖. Contextual constructionists retain the focus on 
processes  of  claims  making  and  responding.  However,  they  are  willing  to  make  certain 
assumptions with respect to the ‗objective reality‘, especially to explain why some claims are 
easier to promote than others. The third group is the ‗debunkers‘ group. These social problem   86 
theorists assume knowledge of objective reality in order to use this ‗knowledge‘ to evaluate 
claims being made on conditions. Thus, they are able to support claims that are consistent 
with ‗knowledge‘ and to discredit, deny or debunk those that are not. And finally, there is the 
fourth group represented by Armand Mauss, which holds that the problem is the process and 
pays scant attention to the outcomes of the process. Stallings (1997) states that ―the social 
problem  status  of  a  given  issue  is  a  function  of  what  members  of  organisations  and 
representatives of institutions say and do about some condition, not of the objective features 
of the condition itself (whatever they   may be). And second, the consequence of what they 
say  and  do  is  simultaneously  facilitated  and  constrained  by  the  characteristics  of  the 
organisations in which they participate.‖ (1997: 8). 
Aspects  of  representation  or  ‗enframing  nature‘  are  therefore  central  to  Post-
structuralist accounts and involve more than only capital and commodities. From the post-
structuralist position, the general concern lies in the relation between material changes and 
the  process  of  cultural  intelligibility,  in  which  language  is  a  main  activity.  This  is  very 
important  to  consider  when  analysing  the  manner  in  which  ‗natural‘  disaster  are 
conceptualised,  as  well  as  by  whom,  and  for  which  purposes.  ‗Natural‘  disaster  is  not 
understood  as  a  mechanical  and  neutral  activity  as  the  positivist  tradition  suggests  and 
illustrates by the  naturalist approach to  ‗natural‘ hazards. ‗Natural‘ disaster infiltrate  into 
‗society‘ through representation and discourses.  In this regard, Castree and Braun state that: 
 
―Our  relation  with  things  is  always  already  a  sign  relation;  discursive 
relations and representational practices are constitutive of the very ways 
that nature is available to forms of economic and political calculation and 
the ways in which our intervention in nature are socially organized‖.   
(Castree and Braun, 1998: 16) 
 
At least two interpretations can be identified with this post-structuralist position. The 
first focuses attention on the novel ways that capitalism is re-making nature. Capitalising and 
enframing nature is simultaneous and ineffable. Production and consumption are intertwined 
with discursive practices and representation (e.g., the commodification of the human body 
and  nature  by  corporations).  In  the  second  interpretation,  ‗actors‘  are  not    ‗nature‘    and 
society  as  separate  things,  but  imbroglios  composed  of    mixed  relations  among  science, 
politics,  organisms,  religion,  law,  economy,  and  technology.  The  challenge  would  be  to   87 
identify  and  analyse  ‗networks‘  and  ‗mediations‘  rather  than  of  ‗pure‘  entities  and 
‗interactions‘ (Castree and Braun, 1998). 
However, the danger of locating agency at the level of ‗culture‘ or ‗discourse‘ has 
been  identified  since organisms and physical  systems play  in  nature‘s re-making. Nature 
materially changes, indeed. The established field of  ‗science studies‘ with focus on science-
as-practice, shows that what counts as nature and nature‘s re-making  occur within networks 
that include social, technical, discursive and organic elements simultaneously (Castree and 
Braun, 1998; Biagioli, 1999; Ziman, 2002) 
  In sum, the constructionist epistemology I propose for this research implies that:  
  Understanding  ‗natural‘  disaster as social nature entails the roles played by ‗active‘ 
subjects  (policy  makers,  implementers,  scientists,  and  affected  people)  who  are 
involved in nature‘s constitution;  therefore, 
  Understanding ‗natural‘ disaster as social nature entails the process of construction of 
‗natural‘ disaster causality through knowledge claims; and in this, 
   ‗Nature‘  has  a  rhetorical  place  in  the  politics  of  ‗natural‘  disaster  discourses  as 
instruments of power and control, e.g., ‗heavy rain falls‘.   
 
The  above  discussion  is  an  effort  in  trying  to  transfer  theory  on  social  nature  from 
environment to disasters and this is why the object of analysis is disaster causality and not the 
consequences or impact. The examination of ´natural´ disasters as part of social nature calls 
for an analysis of actors´ claims in the shaping of causal factors and their interaction. This 
discussion explores the possibility of engaging disaster scholars with social theory in order 
analyse  the  influence  institutions  and  actors  have  in  shaping  the  discourse  and  then  in 
constructing  disaster  ´realities´.  This  new  research  avenue  may  be  important  to  design 
policies  oriented  to reduce  disasters  risk  causes  and  therefore  prevent  consequences.  So, 
through this intellectual task one might be in the position of linking disaster discourses to 
material conditions and consequences.    88 
2. Knowledge production of „natural‟ disaster and risk  
 
In the previous section, I proposed approaching ‗natural‘ disaster as social nature by stating 
that ‗natural‘ disaster are the outcome of knowledge claims and discourses. In this regard, I 
established the importance of the active ‗subject‘ in the knowledge production process of 
´disaster causality´ (‗object‘) and the ‗policy problem‘. I mentioned that knowledge claim of 
disaster causality depends upon the subject‘s values and beliefs, which are conditioned, in a 
manner  of  speaking,  by  the  subject‘s  position  within  an  institution.    At  the  same  time, 
institutional discourses  shape the way subjects talk about things by determining the language 
and the relevant issues used to frame the ‗object‘ or ‗process‘.  Moreover, institutions shape 
and are shaped by the type of knowledge claims the subjects make and how these knowledge 
claims construct  specific discourses on and  meanings –in this case– of  ‗natural disaster 
causality‘ and ‗policy problem‘.    
 In  a  constructionist  epistemology,  knowledge  production  is  not  a  homogeneous 
process. Constructionist epistemology holds that knowledge is sustained by social processes 
and that ‗negotiated‘ understandings embrace a wide variety of forms and therefore, views of 
the world. Therefore, to understand how knowledge claims are similar or different, whether 
they converge or diverge among disaster-relevant subjects, I opted for the concept of ‗social 
domain‘ (see the definition of ‗social domain‘  later). This  is because, as Hilhorst (2004) 
notes, the concept of  ‗social domain‘ is sensitive to diversity and human agency, to the fact 
that actors can integrate and re-work knowledge derived from different systems and domains, 
and that the movement of ideas among domains can be identified. Therefore, the objective of 
this section is to explore and understand the specific ways knowledge is produced within the 
social domains of disaster and risk. Hence, I link the constructionist analysis of scientific, 
policy  and  lay knowledge of risk (Irwin, 2001; Fischer,  b 2003; Garvin, 2001) with the 
notion of social domains of disaster and risk (Hilhorst, 2004).  
According to Long (2002) and Villarreal (1994) quoted in Hilhorst, 2004: 57), social 
domains can be defined as follows: 
―(…) as areas of social life that are organized by reference to a central 
cluster of values, which are recognized as a locus of certain norms, 
rules and values implying a degree of social commitment‖.  
(Long, 2002; Villarreal, 1994 quoted in Hilhorst, 2004:   57) 
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It is assumed that subjects construct and employ knowledge depending on the social 
domain  to  which  they  belong  and  the  position  they  enjoy  within  a  specific  domain.  In 
addition, knowledge construction is co-determined by the subjects‘ interests and intentions, 
which are, however, embedded in their social domains. For instance, on the one hand, it is 
generally admitted that scientists generate information on hurricanes to alert populations and 
to  predict  future  impacts  by  means  of  forecasting,  the  elaboration  of  ‗risk‘  maps,  and 
emergency  responses.  Research  outcomes  are  meant  to  be  the  basis  for  technical  and 
engineering interventions that are in turn meant to control the  impact of the heavy rains, 
whereas  on  the  other  hand  policy  makers  negotiate  the  meanings  of  disaster  both  with 
scientists and affected people by utilising scientific and non-scientific evidence with the aid 
of rhetorical tools to justify the validity of their claims and actions. Their concerns are not to 
predict  hazards,  but  to  respond  to  emergency  situations  and  to  alert  populations  on  the 
importance of evacuating risk-prone areas.  
Thus,  the  knowledge  construction  process  of  disaster  causality  between  the  two 
groups is of a different type and origin, recurs to different evidence, and has different uses. 
Nevertheless,  inter-connections  between  the  two  can  be  identified.  With  respect  to  the 
disaster  context,  Hilhorst  (2004)  proposes  three  domains  of  knowledge  and  action  that 
represent notions of nature-society interaction, vulnerability, risk, and response: 1) domain of 
international  science and disaster management;  2) domain of disaster governance, and 3) 
domain  of  local  knowledge  and  coping  practices.  These  domains  are  classified  with  the 
assumption that people belonging to one of these share common values and ideas within that 
specific domain and differ from the other domains:  
 
―In social domains of response to risk and disaster, ideas and practices 
concerning risk and disaster are exchanged, shared and more or less, 
organized because of certain proximity (physical or discursive) in the 
ways people refer to disaster and risk‖.  
(Hilhorst, 2004: 57) 
 
  Hilhorst (2004), however, does not elaborate on the elements that may constitute the 
domains,  but  only  assumes  that  there  might  be  central  ‗ideas‘  and  ‗practices‘  being 
constructed as part of particular discourses. But in a certain manner, Hilhorst is suggesting a 
new avenue that is yet to be explored by empirical research on how central ideas, core values,   90 
and  beliefs  characterise  and  sustain  discourses  of  disaster. Therefore,  I  use  the  Hilhorst 
classification and for the purposes of this research, I propose that:  
 
Knowledge  claims  of  disaster  causality  and  the  origin  and  use  of 
evidence and warrants constitute the core argumentative elements of 
a given discourse that may at the same time characterise a particular 
social domain within the context of disaster.  
 
  These  components  can  allow  me  to  acknowledge  the  discursive  ‗proximity‘  or 
‗remoteness‘ of the subject vis-à-vis other subjects within a domain and among domains. 
Thus, the boundaries of each domain are given both by the content and meaning of the claims 
and  by  the  subject‘s  values  and  beliefs  with  regard  the  discourse  in  which  he/she  is 
positioned. It is important to acknowledge that there may be competing claims and discourses 
within a social domain. Therefore, in following areas of this section, I characterise the three 
domains  of  disaster  and  risk  that  Hilhorst  proposes  (2004)  by  elaborating  on  types  of 
knowledge, and the origins, recognition, and uses of evidence.   
 
2.1  Knowledge  production  in  the  domain  of  International  Science  and  Disaster 
Management 
 
To Hilhorst (2004), scientists and disaster managers belong to this domain. This domain is 
embedded in a modern discourse that frames nature and society as separate entities. Nature is 
considered  a  ‗commodity‘  that  can  be  appropriated  and  controlled  through  ‗expert‘ 
knowledge and modern administration. The intention of disaster management is to control 
hazards through rational planning and engineering measures. As I discussed in Chapter One 
of  this  thesis,  the  central  focus  and  action  of  the  dominant  paradigm  (BP)  –  where  this 
domain can be situated– are the geophysical processes of disaster and the development of 
technology  for  monitoring  and  predicting  these  processes  to  provide  information  for  the 
elaboration of disaster plans and emergency responses as the means for governing disaster. 
For  Hilhorst  (2004),  intervention  in  a  linear  fashion,  in  which  empirical  complexity  is 
divided into a series of independently given realities, is the basis for modern administration 
of disaster.  
  As  Garvin  asserts  (2001),  (positivist)  scientific  knowledge  is  rationalist  and 
compartmentalised.  It  is  rationalistic  because  it  is  generally  conducted  according  to  an   91 
accepted set of methodological rules. The explanation of complex issues –such as, I would 
argue, disaster and risk issues–is compartmental and the resulting knowledge is specific and 
limited. The origin of evidence derives from scientific studies that tend to describe causal 
factors  and  events  as  objective  and  ‗real‘.  The  legitimisation  of  the  supporting  evidence 
depends on the extent to which the latter adheres to the scientific method. In this sense, the 
dismissal  of  conflicting  evidence  is  conducted  according  to  adherence  to  the  scientific 
method and to the standards the scientific community establishes for what can be considered 
a valid account of things. The final use of this type of knowledge comprises the cumulative 
body of scientific knowledge (Garvin, 2001).  
   Within  the  context  of  disaster  in  Mexico,  the  body  of  scientific  knowledge  of 
‗natural‘ hazards is meant to inform policies. In Mexico, the central research offices devoted 
to hazards (CENAPRED) and the federal public administration (SEGOB) embody this way 
of viewing and acting upon disaster and risk. For example, in Mexico at the federal level, on 
the one hand, the geophysical features of disaster are embodied by the conceptual basis of the 
SINAPROC  and  by  the  scientific  characterisation  of  ‗natural‘  hazards  delineated  by 
CENAPRED;  on  the  other  hand,  the  General  Coordination  of  Civil  Protection  and  the 
General  Direction  of  Civil  Protection  (both  of  SEGOB)  orient  their  actions  toward 
emergency responses. Thus, these two groups of public  institutions can  be placed  in the 
domain of international science and management and  constitute, since the mid-1980s, the 
institutional backbone of civil protection and disaster prevention in Mexico. However, the 
constructionist epistemological position regarding scientific knowledge adopted in this thesis 
(proposed by Latour, 1987, advocated by Hilhorst, 2004) argues that scientific ‗rationality‘ is 
not always the sole explanatory framework employed by scientists to approach ‗reality‘. A 
number of other factors, such as social relations and the status of the institutions involved, 
may play a fundamental role in determining the truthful status of scientific knowledge.   
  Irwin (2001) and Garvin (2001) conceive of the scientific production of information 
and knowledge of risk as a social process shaped by the positions of various subjects. The 
authors advance the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) as the discipline to be oriented 
toward explaining how scientific knowledge is generated and legitimated in social contexts. 
In particular, Irwin (2001) indicates the need of knowing how scientific accounts relate to the 
social circumstances of their development and how scientific claims come to be considered 
as valid statements on the natural world. Garvin (2001: 446) states that although scientific   92 
knowledge construction is conducted according to an accepted set of methodological rules, 
―(…) these rules and any other criteria for judging the value of knowledge are themselves 
socially  constructed  and  granted  credibility  through  social  processes  such  as  accepted 
practice, group research, and peer review‖.   
 
2.2 Knowledge production in the domain of Disaster Governance 
 
Bureaucrats, politicians, and implementers are placed in this domain. This is the domain of 
disaster response in which society‘s priorities regarding risk and vulnerability are defined. In 
this domain, knowledge derives from the disaster science domain, but in actual decisions and 
practices,  these  acquire  a  different  nature;  it  is  mediated  by  political  and  bureaucratic 
governance  practice  and  institutions.  Politicians  and  civil  servants  weave  their  own 
narratives, selecting tidbits from science as they deem fit and according to their own beliefs. 
These  narratives  reflect  political  interest  and  motivations,  but  are  also  informed  by  the 
governance of risk, which is culturally shaped (Hilhorst, 2004). The nature-society divide is 
not as clearly established as it is in the scientific domain.  ‗Natural‘ hazards are commonly 
used as rhetorical tools to advance policy claims and to justify governmental actions. The 
evidence for driving action is generated in a complex set of discourses and arguments that 
reflect the value-laden nature of facts and truth.  
 
―(…)  Policy  is  a  moral  endeavour.  By  choosing  to  use,  refuse  or 
discard  evidence  along  with  the  use  of  persuasion  and  argument, 
values are imbued at all levels of policy making. (…) policy making is 
a  negotiated  process  taking  place  in  an  area  or  policy  space  that 
defines a set of relationships between individuals and institutions‖.    
(Garvin, 2001: 449)  
 
  In particular with respect to the type of knowledge and evidence, it can be said that 
policy is the realm in which knowledge is acquired, adapted, and applied within a highly 
political context. The decisions of policy makers are incremental and are arrived at on the 
basis of an implicit institutional context. Policy makers make short-term decisions, but fail to 
address the long-term implications of decision making. ‗Scientific facts‘ are the justification 
for policy decision. The majority of policy issues are an interrelated set of problems defined 
by  different  groups  or  coalitions  that  adopt  and  adapt  knowledge  to  satisfy  personal, 
institutional, and structural imperatives. The legitimisation of supporting evidence depends   93 
on political, social, and economic implications. The final use of this type of knowledge is 
applied to current situations and context only (Garvin, 2001). 
 
2.3 Knowledge production in the domain of Local Knowledge and Coping Practices 
 
Unlike the remaining two domains, the subjects who make up this domain –local operators of 
the water and sanitation system in Chalco Valley Municipality, fire-fighters,  civil protection 
agents working at the municipal level, and vulnerable people–  can be directly affected by 
disaster and supposedly represent the target of public policies. These considerations are of 
relevance because vulnerable people are those who make sense both of the disaster and of the 
policy measures aimed at preventing these.  Local people‘s interpretation of disaster risk 
takes  place  within  a  dynamic  context  of  daily  activities  and  survival  strategies,  but  also 
within the political context where policies operate.  
  This is the domain of local disaster response and it comprises the ways in which local 
people  cope  with  emergencies,  maximizing  their  own  capacities,  resources,  and  social 
networks. In this domain, local knowledge can be utilitarian and also a resource of political-
economic empowerment (Hilhorst, 2004). Hilhorst points to the high diversity of discourses 
on nature, vulnerability, and disaster that can be found in this domain.  
 
―Local knowledge is shaped at the interfaces with other domains of 
knowledge  such  as  scientific  and  bureaucratic  knowledge.  Local 
knowledge is made up of a blend of bits and pieces of information and 
insights  from  different  perspectives.  (…)  Local  knowledge  is 
produced by experimenting and improvising‖.  
(Arce and Long, 1993, 2000)  (Quoted in Hilhorst, 2004: 63)  
 
  Within the local knowledge domain, not all individuals are equally equipped to view 
situations in the same way due to their position; some are better positioned than others. For 
example, there are residents who can become part of the local bureaucracy and have access to 
information and control resources not possessed by other residents.  In addition to scientific 
evaluations  and  accounts,  local  people  obtain  evidence  from  other  sources  such  as  oral 
stories,  common  sense,  personal  experience,  and  information  disseminated  by  the  mass 
media. People believe and trust to a greater degree in non-formal sources than in scientific 
ones. As mentioned by Wynne (1998), people‘s reactions and responses depend on the trust   94 
they  have  in  institutions  regardless  of  the  understanding  they  have  of  the  technical 
information.  
The  origin  of  evidence  lies  in  popular  sources.  The  legitimisation  of  supporting 
evidence  depends  on  the  wisdom  received.  In  this  respect,  the  dismissal  of  conflicting 
evidence is accomplished according to ‗common sense. The understanding of complex issues 
(such as  issues concerning  ‗natural‘  disaster risk) is  limited  by  sources and the resulting 
knowledge is tacit, experiential, and individual. The final use of this type of knowledge is 
added to body of personal experience. Vulnerable people legitimise risk evidence when it is 
connected to their social and cultural realities, which are in turn linked to ‗popular wisdom‘ 
rooted in a social rationality. Conflicting evidence is dismissed on the grounds of common 
sense, and is accepted when it makes sense within people‘s worldviews and their own beliefs 
(Garvin, 2001).  
Local  people‘s  discourses  and  narratives  of  risk  and  disaster  differ  from  those  of 
scientists and policy makers in that they are both concerned with nature and state-society 
relations. This is important because it shapes the people‘s interpretations of events regardless 
of whether the events are thought to be true or false. Thus far, the three domains of disaster 
knowledge and action were characterised. However, to carry out analysis of disaster causality 
and policy responses, I will attempt to establish the linkages among disaster causality, the 
policy  problem,  and  policy  responses  by  focusing  on  the  knowledge  production  process 
within the three domains of disaster. This can be effected by analysing the arguments and 
discourses of the policy-relevant subjects. Therefore, in the following section, I develop two 
frameworks that will be employed to undertake empirical analysis of the primary information 
drawn from the interviews.  
 
 
3.  Disaster  causality  as  a  policy  problem  and  policy  responses:  two  frameworks  to 
analyse a discursive construction.  
 
 
In this part, I develop two frameworks. The  first framework  is to explain the discursive 
construction of disaster causality as a policy problem based on the argumentative structure. 
In  particular,  the  purpose  of  this  framework  is  to  aid  in  explaining  how  ‗images‘  and 
representations of causal agents and  their interactions  and consequences are constructed 
within the social domains of disaster. This is implemented with the intention of examining   95 
how knowledge claims and warrants of scientific and policy arguments are constructed and 
used to portray Chalco Valley flooding as a disaster. The second framework is to explain 
how different disaster discourses construct certain policy problems responses. In particular, it 
analyses  the  argumentative  relationship  between  the  policy  intervention  and  the  policy 
objective.  
 
3.1 Disaster causality, risk definition, and the policy problem 
 
In section 1.3, I proposed that understanding  ‗natural‘  disaster as social  nature  implies a 
process  of  knowledge  claim  making  of  disaster  causality.  Therefore,  I  assume  here  that 
‗natural‘  disaster  become  social  problems–  that  is,  collective  accomplishments–  through 
argumentation.  This  view  concentrates  on  the  processes  by  which  issues  are  assembled, 
presented, and contested as problems. How problems come to be observed as real depend not 
on  their  supposed  objective  existence,  but  on  the  varying  ways  subjects  construct  these 
during social  interaction and political struggle. Individuals and groups negotiate risk and 
disaster causality claims. According to Stone (1989), difficult conditions become problems 
when  people  come  to  regard them  as  amenable  to  human  action.  This  statement  can  be 
applied to the analysis of ‗natural‘ disaster causality claims and policy problem construction.  
  As reviewed in Chapter One, the social nature of disaster problem has shifted over 
time because disaster became an issue of policy relevance. Disaster causality shifting from 
nature to society is expected to be found among the three social domains of disaster to be 
researched in this thesis. To identify and analyse disaster causality, one can draw from the 
theories of causality developed in political science proposed by Stone (1989). The author 
provides a practical typology of causal theories based on a matrix resulting from relating 
actions (unguided and purposeful) with consequences (intended and unintended) (see Box 1):  
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Box 1 
Types of Causal Theories 
 
                       Consequences 
Actions             Intended         Unintended 
 
Unguided 
 
Mechanical cause 
Intervening agent 
Machines 
 ‗Brainwashed‘  people 
Accidental cause 
Nature 
Weather 
Earthquakes 
Machines that run 
amok 
 
Guided 
Intentional cause 
Assault 
Oppression 
Conspiracies that work 
Programs that work 
Inadvertent cause 
Intervening 
conditions 
Unforeseen  side 
effects 
Neglect 
Carelessness 
Omission 
      Source: Stone (1989: 285) 
 
A cause is considered mechanical when action is unguided or guided indirectly and 
consequences are intended. Mechanical cause can be things that have no will of their own, 
but that are designed, programmed, or trained by humans to produce certain consequences. 
An  accidental  cause  comprises  an  action  that  is  unguided  and  consequences  that  are 
unintended. This is the realm of ‗fate‘ and accident. There is no wilful intention behind the 
occurrences, at least not without invoking a purposeful God (Stone, 1989). 
A cause is intentional if the action is purposeful and consequences are intended and 
the  inadvertent  cause  is  the  result  of  an  unintended  action  that  provokes  purposeful 
consequences.  Additionally, under this classification it is acknowledged that causality also 
can be the result of a complex interaction of various interdependent actions with no clear 
distinctions of whether they are unguided or purposeful; this has serious implications when 
attributing blame or responsibility. In this case, the cause could be considered as complex. 
But, as stated by Stone (1989), complex causal explanations are not very useful in politics 
because they do not offer a single locus of control, nor a candidate to take responsibility for 
the problem. The use of this typology can aid in identifying the variety of causal stories,   97 
knowledge claims, arguments, and therefore the discourses that may exist, the manner in 
which the latter are constructed within each of the disaster domains, and how these interact.  
In  any  case,  disaster  problem  definition  incorporates  blame  attribution  and 
responsibility and how evidence originates and is legitimised within the three domains of 
disaster. It may be expected that causal narratives or discourses are composed of a mixture of 
the  causal  factors.  This  is  due  in  part  by  the  way  subjects  within  domains  construct 
knowledge  and  evidence,  as  explained  in  the  previous  section,  by  choosing  pieces    of 
knowledge from other domains, and also by the communication they have with these other 
domains.  For instance, Stone (1989) posits that political actors do not simply accept  the 
causal  models  afforded  by  science  or the  popular  culture;  they  compose  the  stories  that 
describe the damage and difficulties, and attribute to these the actions of other individuals or 
organizations. Causal stories are important in the formulation and selection of alternative 
policy responses due to their rhetorical power. 
On the other hand, analysis of disaster risk  can be conducted with a sociological 
theory of social problems. Public policies are designed to address social problems, so in 
many ways parallels social problems. It is propose here that policy analysis of disaster risk 
can  be  conducted  as  a  type  of  constructionist  risk  analysis.  This  can  be  carried  out  by 
examining the claim making process, the claims themselves, and the conceptual structure of 
the social definition of risk, as suggested by Hilgartner (1992, quoted in Hannigan, 1995).  
  Social definitions of risk include three major conceptual elements: an object deemed 
to pose the risk; a putative harm, and a linkage alleging some causal relationship between the 
object and the harm. Thus, analysis entails the explanation of the processes of what constitute 
the object of the primary source of risk, the definition of harm (that sparks a variety of claims 
and counterclaims), and the explanation of an alleged form of causation between the risk 
object  and  the  potential  harm.  Constructing  these  linkages  can  be  attributed  to  multiple 
objects through multiple layers of proof and evidence (Hannigan, 1995). 
    To this point, I have proposed how and why disaster causality can be approached as 
social problems using Stone‘s causality typology and the conceptual structure of disaster risk. 
Now I shift the elaboration of this chapter to the argumentation components of discourses 
that will be taken into consideration while carrying out the empirical analysis of interviews 
and secondary information in Chapters Six and Seven.     
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3.2 Discursive elements of disaster causality   
   
Because  I  analyse  in  this  research  how  policy  makers,  implementers,  and  other  policy-
relevant actors attempt to persuade the interviewer of the truthfulness of their accounts, I 
opted for the argumentation analysis. Fischer (2003: 181) states that ―…argumentation is the 
form  employed  to  persuade  an  audience  that  something  ought  to  be  the  case:  that  is,  a 
particular action should –or should not– take place, that an event should be interpreted in one 
way rather than another, and so on‖; thus, ―(…) it is the argument that constitutes the basic 
unit of the real world policy analysis‖.  
For analytical purposes, there are two kinds of discursive elements in the analysis of 
‗Chalco Valley floods causality‘, namely, the argumentative and the rhetorical elements.  
I.  The first group is the argumentative part of the discourse and includes the 
following:  
1)  Claim  content,  which  includes  the  knowledge  claims,  warrants,  and 
evidence. Warrants may consist of reasons, guarantees, or rules employed to 
assert that evidence is legitimately utilised to support the inundations claim. 
To Liakopoulos (2005), evidence is the data at the disposal of the creator of 
the argument. Data might refer to past events or to a current situation, action, 
or opinion, but in any case they refer to information that is related to the main 
claim of the argument.  
2)  Claim  making  context  that  refers  to  the  institutional  context  from 
where the subject makes his/her claims along with his/her position within the 
institution.   
 
II.  The second group refers to the rhetoric part of the argument and considers the 
following: 
1)  Claim  maker‘s ethos and pathos, which  includes  his/her  values  and 
beliefs. Leach (2005) states that ethos is concerned with the establishment of 
the credibility of the author or speaker. For instance, scientists have the „ethos‟ 
to  make  stronger  claims  than  other  authors.  Pathos  is  another  form  of 
persuasive argument and is the appeal to the emotion of the speaker.    99 
2)  Images of natural and man-made hazards or risk objects, such as heavy 
rain falls and La Compañía Canal. These images serve as the ‗sites‘ where 
blame for the floods can be placed. Images of causal objects are constructed in 
a simple way to make an argument understandable for all. Frequently, images 
of  natural  agents  or  risk  objects  serve  as  backings  for  the  claims.  To 
Liakopoulos (2005: 159), backing ―…is a premise used as a means to support 
the warrant in the argument. It is the source that guarantees the acceptability 
and truthfulness of the reason or rule the warrant refers to. Similar in the style 
of the data, it usually offers explicit information‖. In terms of image making, 
the  difference  between  the  ‗natural‘  and  the  man-made  hazard  is  very 
important  because  it  implies  the  shift  from  the  unintended  to the  intended 
action and therefore, the attribution of blame.  
3)  Images of causal agents such as policy  makers,  implementers, local 
operators. Images of the causal agents are the symbolic representation of the 
subjects who are in some manner blamed for the floods and are responsible for 
action  taking  (or  non-action  taking).  Images  of  causal  agents  and  the 
consequences can be found and examined in the backing and evidence that 
refer to past events or to the current situation or action related to the main 
claim of the Chalco Valley floods argument. 
4)  Images of Chalco Valley‘s people or intended ‗target‘ populations. In 
both  cases,  these  images  refer  to  the  characteristics  and  stereotypes  of 
particular  groups  of  people  who  are  said  to  be  the  beneficiaries  of  civil 
protection  policies.  These  images  are  also  used  as  backing  of  the  disaster 
causality claims and of policy responses arguments, because affected people 
are constructed both as the culprits and the victims of their own actions.  
 
The framework for analysing the discursive construction of ‗Chalco Valley Floods Causality 
as a Policy Problem‘ is represented graphically in Figure 1 and is employed in Chapter Six.   
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Policy makers, 
bureaucrats, 
politicians, and  
Implementers 
 (values, beliefs, 
and meanings) 
Local 
operators and 
vulnerable 
people 
(values, beliefs, 
and meanings) 
 
 
Scientists and  
Disaster 
Managers 
(values, beliefs, 
and meanings) 
 
Argumentative 
elements: 
Knowledge claims 
Evidence 
Warrants 
Backings 
 
Domain of International Science and  
Disaster Management 
Domain of Disaster Governance 
Domain of Local Knowledge and   
Coping Practices 
Floods causality as a  
policy problem 
Argumentative elements: 
Knowledge claims, evidence,  
warrants, and backings of 
images, of causal agents. and 
risk objects 
 
Figure 1. Framework for analysing the discursive construction of „Floods Causality as a 
Policy Problem‟ in the social domains of disaster.   
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3.3 Policy responses of floods discourses: from objectives to implementation  
   
In this part, I develop a framework to explain the argumentative construction of a public 
remedy, known in the research as  ‗policy responses‘,  with regard  to the Chalco Valley  
floods.  I  considered  four  policy-analytic  elements:  1)  policy  objectives;  2)  type  of 
intervention; 3) policy instrument, and 4) implementation. These elements are shaped by the 
problem constructions explained in part 3.2 of this chapter. From the outset, I assume that the 
policy objective (the principles guiding the ‗best‘ course of action) is closely related to the 
main claim that constructs the problem. For instance, if the ignorance of the residents and 
migrants of Chalco Valley is believed to be the main factor that conditioned the floods, then 
the main policy objective is oriented toward making ‗ignorant‘ people aware of the risks and 
to ‗educate‘ them in order to change their behaviour and to avoid their being stricken by 
inundations or heavy storms. In the same vein, the type of intervention relies on the belief or 
evidence  of  how  to  address  the  main  claim,  in  other  words,  how  to  achieve  the  policy 
objective. For example, according to this objective, the ‗ideal‘ intervention favoured by some 
CENAPRED  and  CNA  policy  makers  is  top-down  risk  communication,  which  ideally 
requires coupling with adequate regulatory control of land use to avoid the settling of people 
in unsafe places.  
I take here John‘s definitions of policy instrument and implementation (2002: 204, 5), 
according to whom this is a tool governments use to implement public decisions, and for 
whom implementation refers to the stage in the policy process concerned with turning policy 
intentions into actions. For instance, a policy instrument can be a programme that specifies 
the scope of public participation in emergency actions, and the changes that result from these 
actions refer to the implementation stage, i.e., the evacuation of affected people from flooded 
streets.   
I argue that floods causality discourses  and the consequent problem  constructions 
determine how specific policy responses are believed to be valid and adequate for solving 
inundations problems. In particular, I also argue that ‗adequate‘ policy responses to prevent 
disaster should set up objectives and actions meant to address the people‘s vulnerability to 
floods,  and  not  only  the  natural  hazards  or  the  damage  provoked  in  populations  and 
infrastructure by the disaster impact. Therefore, this framework serves to analyse later in 
Chapter Seven how different disaster causality discourses and floods problem constructions 
implied and shaped different groups of policy responses, which may show inter-relations.   102 
The  issue  of  inter-relations  is  extremely  important  because  as  it  helps  to  understand  the 
emerging ´advocacy coalitions´ (Sabatier (1993) across the four discourses that may reinforce 
complementary policy responses.  
Policy solutions may vary depending on how casual agents are portrayed in relation to 
the floods causes. In some cases, the policy response is meant to be a technical task oriented 
to forecast and control heavy rainfalls, whereas in others it is an institutional communication 
activity to evacuate people from flood-prone places  or to improve building codes and law 
enforcement, in order to withstand the impact of earthquakes and hurricanes, to mention a 
few. For analytical purposes, I adapted the causal theory framework (Stone, 1989), explained 
in previous section 2.3.1, to examine the policy responses, and in particular, the intended 
relation between objective and intervention. To do this, I purposely select the intentional 
cause type because disaster prevention implementation is ‗believed‘ to be the outcome of 
human will.  
It is noteworthy that an intentional cause is when action is wilfully taken to bring 
about desired positive consequences. Therefore in this case, consequences parallel outcomes 
that could  be the ‗accepted‘ proof that objectives are achieved, while causes parallel the 
needed intervention. This is what in terms of Hambrick‘s model (quoted in Gasper, 2000) is 
known as the normative inputs of the argument: turning cause-and-effect into means-and-
end.  The  argumentative  analysis  of  the  ‗policy  intervention-policy  objective‘  relation  is 
aimed at responding to the following questions:  
 
  What is/are the right course(s) of action for each problem construction?  
  What justifies the specific objective? What are the proposed interventions?  
  How do beliefs and warrants support and legitimise the intervention to achieve the 
desired policy objective?  
 
It is important to note that I do not intend  to prove a ‗factual relation‘ of the impact of a 
policy, but only to explain the previously mentioned argumentative relation, which might be 
connected with  the rhetorical construction of the problem  already elaborated in section 3.2 
of  this  chapter.  The  framework  for  analysing  the  argumentative  relation  between  policy 
interventions and policy objectives is represented in Figure 2 and is employed in Chapter 
Seven to conduct interpretive analysis:   103 
  
     
Figure  2.  Framework  of  an  argumentative  relation  of  policy  responses:  Policy 
Intervention--Policy Objective 
 
                                                                       Policy    Responses 
    Floods Causality 
   Policy Problem             Policy Objective             Policy Outcome              Policy Intervention/ 
  (Main claim)    (Main claim)             ―Solution‖                
                  (claim)            (Evidence/belief) 
 
 
    Floods Discourses            Policy beliefs and values 
                                                           (Warrants and backings) 
                 
                I  m  p  l  e  m  e  n  t  a  t  i  o  n 
                   
With regard to the interpretive analysis, I refer to the examination of policy objectives 
and  outcomes,  instruments,  and  implementation  and  in  particular,  to  the  examination  of 
meanings (values and beliefs) and metaphors embedded in and reproduced by the concrete 
policy arguments found  in  interviews, texts, and rhetorical tools, such as civil protection 
plans and programmes. Risk Atlas was created to convert policy intentions into actions. It is 
assumed  that  ‗ideal‘  policy  intervention  is  the  ‗correct‘  way  to  target  objectives  and 
populations and also, to convey shared meanings of events in order to promote change. For 
example,  information  campaigns  coupled  with  adequate  regulation  of  land  use  to  limit 
exposure to risk are the instruments  ‗selected‘  by some CNA policy makers as the ‗correct‘  
tools to promote change in the behaviour of the people of the Chalco Valley. It is important 
to  underline  that  these  analytical  frameworks  focus  on  city,  national  and  state  level 
administrative actors because they are key informants and represent the most relevant policy 
actors in creating arguments and implementing responses.. Finally it is necessary to mention 
that I do not pretend to provide theory (institutional or organisation theory) to help explain 
the reproduction of discourses or their competitive interaction. This is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  
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CHAPTER THREE. METHODOLOGY  
 
 
Introduction 
 
This  chapter  presents  the  methodology  and  includes  the  approach,  central  and  research 
questions,  methods  and  the  justification  of  the  case  study.  It  also  describes  the  study 
populations,  and  selection  of  interviewees,  the  policy  institutions  according  to the  social 
domains of risk and disaster, the time scale, the research sites, and the limitations of the 
study. Because this research is concerned with the understanding of the social construction of 
‗natural‘ disaster causality and policy responses in Mexico, the purpose of the fieldwork was 
to obtain primary and secondary information of the policy system regarding ‗natural‘ disaster 
prevention and civil protection in Mexico, in particular with regard to the Chalco Valley 
inundations and affected people‘ interpretations. The fieldwork took place in two stages: the 
exploratory  fieldwork  –between  November  and  December  2001–  which  aided  me  in 
designing the methodology for the final fieldwork. The final fieldwork was carried out from 
January to May 2003 –seven months in total. The final fieldwork methodology comprised 36 
interviews applied to policy-relevant actors and to 23 affected residents of El Triunfo, San 
Isidro, Avándaro, and Unión de Guadalupe.  
 
1. The Approach 
 
This thesis adopts the social constructionist approach (Gergen and Gergen, 1991; Schwandt, 
1994; Hannigan, 1995; Denzin, 2000) that is concerned with the world of inter-subjectively 
shared, collective social  constructions of  meaning and knowledge that are determined by 
political, social, and cultural processes. According to this approach, ‗reality‘ is created by 
social interaction that involves history, language, and action. Schwandt (1994: 125) states 
that reality is expressible in a variety of symbols and language systems and is stretched and 
shaped to fit purposeful acts of intentional human agents. (Thus), theory construction and 
knowing possesses an instrumental and a practical function. To Fuss (1989), ―…what is at 
stake for the constructionist are systems of representations, social and  material practices, 
laws of discourses, and ideological effects. In short, constructionists are concerned above all 
with the production and organization of differences, and they therefore reject the idea that   105 
any  essential  or  natural  givens  precede  the  process  of  social  determination‖  (quoted  in 
Schwandt, 1994: 125).  
  In  Chapter  Two,  I  discussed  in  particular  the  nature  and  scope  of  the  social 
constructionism approach and its analytical applications to this thesis. The analysis is focused 
on  the  subjects‘  interpretations  and  discourses  of  ‗natural‘  disaster  causality  and  policy 
responses. More specifically, the units of analysis are the knowledge claims that construct the 
object  of  ‗natural  disaster  causality‘,  the  ‗policy  problem‘,  and  the  ‗policy  responses‘. 
Therefore, the methodological implications of this approach to the thesis are the following:  
 
1.  Because  the  research  intends  to  explain  the  processes  of  construction  of  ‗natural 
disaster causality‘, then how and why research questions are adequate for obtaining 
information. To respond to the questions, a qualitative  methodology  for obtaining 
primary information was employed.   
2.  The responses provide rich and detailed information of the interviewee‘s position on 
the topic at hand and how the subject regards it. For these reasons, the tool selected is 
the semi-structured interview. 
3.  No ‗objectivity‘ is pursued; thus, the qualitative methodology adopted is not meant to 
prove ‗objective‘ knowledge concerning the ‗objects‘ and ‗processes‘, but rather is 
intended to explore the ways in which the subjects construct these objects through 
discourses, arguments, and meanings.   
4.  Qualitative analysis allows the researcher to establish and understand the relations 
among the subjects, the objects, the context, the system of meanings, and the system 
of statements that this thesis researches. According to Denzin (2000: 8), qualitative 
researchers ―... seek answers to questions that stress how experience is created and 
given meaning‖.  
5.  Because  language  is  crucial  for  understanding  the  representations  and  social 
constructions of ‗natural‘ disaster within policies, arguments and discourses are the 
analytical units of this research. Therefore, argumentation and discourse analysis is 
chosen as the best way to analyse the information.   
6.  Because  ‗disaster  causality  is  the  central  ‗process‘  to  be  analysed,  exploring  all 
arguments that the subjects expressed give rich material to ‗arrive‘ at the discursive 
level.    106 
 
2.  The Research Questions  
 
2.1 Central Questions 
 
1.  How  and  why  are  certain  processes  of  environmental  change  framed  as  ‗natural‘ 
disaster in the decision-making sphere? 
2.  How do these framings shape and condition the emergence and nature of responses at 
the policy level? 
3.  How are people vulnerable to floods framed both in disaster discourses and policy 
responses? 
 
2.2 Secondary Questions 
 
1.  How is ‗disaster causality‘ framed by policy-relevant subjects?  
 
2.  What are the main causal discourses of the Chalco Valley floods? How are these 
constructed? 
 
3.  How are ‗images‘ of causal agents and their interactions constructed to depict Chalco 
Valley‘s floods as a policy problem? 
 
4.  What are the main rhetorical elements of the Chalco Valley‘s floods problem? How 
do these operate in depicting ‗reality‘?  
 
5.  How do disaster causality policy problems shape policy responses? 
 
6.  What are the policy elements of the Chalco Valley‘s floods problem? 
 
7.  How do these operate in constructing the ‗desired‘ policy responses? 
 
8.  How  do  meanings,  beliefs,  and  warrants  support  and  legitimise  interventions  to 
achieve the ‗desired‘ policy objectives and outcomes?  
 
9.  How do policies portray those who are most at risk?  
 
 
   107 
All nine questions are framed within the two analytical frameworks developed in Chapter 
Two. Questions one to five address the issue of the ‗floods causality policy problem‘, which 
is at the core of framework No. 1 (―Framework for analysing the discursive construction of 
‗Floods Causality  as a Policy Problem‘  in the  social domains of  disaster‖ (see Figure 1, 
section 2.3.2) With regard to question number one (‗disaster causality‘ framing), I seek to 
explore the process by which policy-relevant subjects relate actions to consequences, in other 
words, how ‗causality‘ is constructed. Question two maps the main ‗causality discourses‘ and 
explores, with the aid of empirical information, the manner in which this was carried out for 
the case of the Chalco Valley floods. The third question aims at explaining how claims of 
‗natural‘ disaster causality construct disaster as a policy problem. This is important because 
answers to this question provide explanations on  how claims evidence,  in a certain way, 
determine causality shifting from nature to society and in this sense, the possibility of human 
intervention. 
As explained by analytical Framework 1, policy arguments are frequently replete with 
metaphors  and  other  symbolic  images  to  convince  the  audience  and  to  make  arguments 
compelling  and  understandable  for  all.  Therefore,  question  four  explores  the  weighty 
influence  of  the  rhetorical  elements  in  the  argumentation.  Question  five  links  ‗natural‘ 
disaster  causality  to  policy  responses.  This  linkage  lies  at  the  centre  of  the  hypothesis, 
because it is argued that policy objective and intervention are closely related to the main 
claim  that  constructs  the  policy  problem.  As  stated  in  Framework  2  -  section  2.3.3 
(Argumentative  relation  of  policy  responses)  -  policy  responses  are  shaped  by  problem 
constructions.  In  this  regard,  questions  six  to  nine  explore  in  detail  the  argumentative 
construction of policy responses, which is conceptually explained in Framework 2 as ‗policy 
implementation‘. 
By answering question six, I am able to explore the diversity of policy objectives 
(main claim), policy outcomes (‗solution‘), and policy interventions (evidence) found in the 
interviewees‘  arguments.  It  is  important  to  examine  how  the  policy  elements  operate 
according to the problem construction in order to identify similarities and differences among 
all  interviewees.  Question  eight  is  at  the  core  of  the  argumentation  analysis  of  policy 
responses  because  it  unpacks  the  process  by  which  policy  intervention  is  legitimised 
depending on the types of evidence employed (beliefs and meanings). Finally, on answering 
question nine, I can explore whether some policy responses, previously unpacked, take into   108 
consideration people‘s vulnerability to floods. This addresses the last part of the hypothesis 
and  may provide explanations  for how policy responses claims prevail  in Mexico‘s civil 
protection and disaster prevention systems.    
 
3. Methods 
 
3.1 Secondary Information 
 
As the majority of the secondary information collection and review preceded the collection of 
primary information, the following is a brief discussion on how the secondary information 
was  utilised  to  support  the  final  fieldwork.  Prior  to  initiating  this  research,  I  had  little 
knowledge and information regarding the disaster policy system in Mexico. I was only aware 
that there was a governmental body that is in charge of tackling disaster, assisting victims, 
and co-ordinating the activities of other ministries in case of emergency, namely, the General 
Coordination of Civil Protection of SEGOB. I also knew that there was a scientific research 
centre  responsible  for  providing  information  for  policy  making,  the  CENAPRED.  In 
addition, the information I had concerning Chalco‘s inundations, the context, and the socio-
demographic composition of communities was scarce and fragmented.  
In  order  to  draw  a  more  detailed  picture  of  the  case  study  and  to  complete  the 
analytical framework, secondary information and relevant literature on theoretical issues on 
disaster, risk, and policy were sought and analysed. Documents and  newspaper clippings 
were also obtained to complete the elaboration of the contextual Chapter Four on the case 
study of Chalco Valley floods and of Chapter Five, which is concerned with the  disaster 
policy context in Mexico. Analysis of content was performed to identify the main issues that 
arose as a result of the inundations, such as socio-environmental change and urbanisation in 
the  Chalco  Valley  region,  the  Chalco  Valley  floods  of  2000,  and  the  socio-economic 
consequences  that  affected  people‘s  interpretations  of  the  floods  and  the  claim  making 
process, emergency aid actions and responses, and civil protection programmes at the federal 
and  State  of  Mexico  levels,  among  others.  The  search  for  and  collection  of  secondary 
information was conducted through exploring official and non-official resources. 
Official  sources  included  publications  and  policy  documents  of  the  Institute  of 
Geography and Information Systems (INEGI), the National Centre for Disaster Prevention   109 
(CENAPRED), the National Institute of Ecology (INE), the State of Mexico‘s Ministry of the 
Environment, the General Direction of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico, the Federal 
Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT), the General Coordination of 
Civil Protection of SEGOB, and the General Direction of Civil Protection of SEGOB. 
  In  order to  understand  the  structure  and  functioning  of  the  Civil  Protection  Policy 
System  in  Mexico  and  to  explore  the  natural  disaster  policy  process,  a  number  of  policy 
documents  were  reviewed.  These  included  policy  reports  on  assessments  of  the  socio-
economic impact of disaster in Mexico between 1980 and 1999 (CENAPRED and SEGOB, 
2001; CENAPRED, SEGOB, and CEPAL, 2000; Bitrán, 1999; CENAPRED, 1999; Gelman, 
1996),  Programmes  of  Civil  Protection  of  the  State  of  Mexico  (Gobierno  del  Estado  de 
Mexico, 2002, 2001), and the National Programme of Civil Protection (SEGOB; 2001 a, 2001 
b). On arriving at the analysis of the literature obtained, I would have a general idea of the 
relationship between knowledge and policy making, especially in relation to the manner in 
which the disaster scientific body (CENAPRED) informs public policies at national and state 
levels.  
  Regarding  understanding  of  La  Compañía  Canal  (LCC)  problematic,  several 
documents (CENAPRED, 1994; CNA, 2001 a, 2001 b) were consulted because there was a 
need to obtain a detailed view of the failures and malfunctioning of LCC and the institutional 
responses that were deployed during and after the floods. In relation to the Chalco Valley 
floods  of  2000,  newspapers  were  obtained  to  re-construct  the  main  moments  of  socio-
environmental change in Chalco Valley, in particular during the floods of June 2000, the key 
actors, and their main arguments in framing the phenomenon. The press office of Regional 
Administration  of  Valley  of  Mexico  (GRAVAMEX)  that  belongs  to the  National  Water 
Commission (CNA) kindly provided me with newspapers clippings.  
 
3.2 Primary Information 
 
Because this research is concerned with the understandings, discourses, and interpretations 
policy makers have within specific contexts with respect to ‗natural‘ disaster causality and 
policy responses, I employed a qualitative methodology. Qualitative methodology allowed 
me to gain information on the interviewee‘s world and the meanings of and beliefs on certain 
social problems to which the interviewee is attached.     110 
  The  method  employed  was  the  interview.  By  interviewing  people,  one  is  able  to 
explore differences, inconsistencies, meanings, and arguments. To Stroh (2000), interviews 
provide answers to ‗how‘ and ‗why‘ questions. Interviews aim at being conversations that 
explore an issue with participants, rather than to test knowledge or simply categorize. As  
presented previously, the central questions of this research concern  understanding how and 
why certain type of ‗disaster causality‘ are framed as ‗natural‘ phenomena, and how ways of 
framing  exert  particular  influences  on  policy  responses  to  the  extent  that  exposure  of 
vulnerable people to floods risk is concealed, that is, specific institutional responses that are 
not socially sensitive. This explains the selection of this method.  
  It is noteworthy that selection of this method was determined to a certain extent while 
I was engaged in the preliminary fieldwork. During this fieldwork, I applied a few semi-
structured interviews to policy  makers and government officials  by  using an open-ended 
questionnaire.  Testing  involved  formulating  and  wording  the  questions,  examining  the 
inclusion  of  the  relevant  issues  in  question  such  as  ‗natural‘  disaster  and  risk 
conceptualisations, existing policies, the emergency measures provided, to mention a few of 
these. Testing also entailed discarding questions that at the end of the research were found to 
be  unimportant.  Also  during  the  preliminary  fieldwork  and  with  regard  to  local  people, 
unstructured interviews were undertaken because the objective was to develop an informal 
talk with  local people that could  shed some  light on their personal  interpretations of the 
floods of June 2000 and of the government‘s responses. This piloting exercise proved useful 
for developing the semi-structured interviews that were applied during the final fieldwork.  
Because  the  interviewees  were  policy-relevant  actors,  such  as  scientists,  policy 
makers, and civil servants, I chose in particular the ‗semi-structured‘ interview. Esterberg 
(2002) states that the goal of the semi-structured interview is to explore a topic in detail and 
in a more open fashion than the structured interview, and to allow interviewees to express 
their opinions and ideas in their own words, from their own points of view. According to 
Russell (2000: 210, 211), semi-structured interviews are based on the use of an interview 
guide. This is a written list of questions and topics that need to be covered in a particular 
order. Semi-structured interviews works very well in projects in which one  are dealing with 
managers, bureaucrats, and elite members of a community, people who are accustomed to 
using their time efficiently. It demonstrates that one is in full control of what one desires to 
obtain from an interview, but at the same time this interview type leaves both interviewer and   111 
informant  to  follow  new  leads.  It  demonstrates  that  the  interviewer  is  prepared  and 
competent, but that he/she is not attempting to exert excessive control over the informant.  
Semi-structured interviews evidenced certain particular  limitations  for this type of 
research,  which  is  aimed  at  delving  into  the  social  meanings  of  events  that  comprise  a 
beginning, middle, and an end, such as ‗floods causality‘. More unstructured talks afford 
richer information in terms of storylines or narratives that, as in this case, could have arisen 
had a narrative interview been conducted. To a certain extent, this shortcoming was resolved, 
because sections of the questionnaire were related specifically to narration of floods causal 
factors, agents, and scenarios. An in-depth analysis of questionnaire responses, such as the 
argumentation analysis that I undertook, permitted me to arrive at the ‗core‘ of the meanings 
and beliefs.      
Another limitation can be related to the control exerted by the interviewer over the 
interviewee.  When  attempting to lead the conversation, some  important aspects from the 
interviewee‘s point of view may have not been expressed, due to the fact that some policy 
makers may have been observed as, in some way, responsible for the inundations. Thus, it 
was expected that some information would not emerge. This shortcoming was overcome by 
attempting to open the discussion toward apparently ‗less important‘ issues that might not 
have been related to the inundations. Once this was accomplished, additional information 
was set forth and, in a way, filled the gap.  
  In this thesis, the general purpose of the interviews was to investigate the discursive 
dimension of ‗natural‘ disaster, risk, and policies. Gathering secondary information of plans 
and programmes on disaster and civil protection issues, water management and sanitation, 
and  urbanisation  and  land  use  was  central  to  cover  the  first  and  second  parts  of  the 
hypothesis. Obtaining additional information on the Chalco Valley region and its ecological 
and socio-historical transformation was required as well, as explained previously. 
  Interviewees selected at the policy level possess very good quality information due to 
their involvement with the problem; thus, they are seen as key informants. Therefore, the 
interviews were not designed for the general public, but rather for a group linked directly to 
the topic. These interviews provided primary information to develop an in-depth analysis 
employing argumentative and discourse analysis. This was intended to cover all the different 
policy  makers,  implementers, operators, and other policy-relevant actors who are directly 
related to the topic, and specifically to the type of disaster relevant to this study, i.e., water   112 
management officials who deal with inundations. The selection was also made on the basis of 
reflecting the balance in the construction and reproduction of the discourses. In this way, an 
ex-policymaker  who  was  involved  in  the  past  in  coordinating  civil  protection  actions  at 
federal level was interviewed as well.  
For this purpose, the interviewees were from the sectors of disaster prevention, civil 
protection, environment and natural resources, water issues, and urban planning, as well as 
NGOs. The research participants were not meant to be a representative, typical sample, but 
were those who could provide rich and detailed accounts about the issue.  Thus, they were 
selected on the basis of their relevance to the topic. Within the policy system, these are the 
individuals who make policies, design programmes, and coordinate responses with regard to 
inundations  prevention  and  mitigation,  water  provision  and  sanitation,  and  attention  to 
emergencies.  
Therefore, this permitted me to explore a number of subjects‘ position regarding the 
causality of the Chalco Valley floods within the policy system and according to the meanings 
that the interviewees attached to it. Thirty six semi-structured interviews were conducted. A 
few informants, such as the Army colonel responsible for Plan DN-III, the Undersecretary of 
Urban Development of Mexico, and the Minister of Ecology of the State of Mexico, refused 
to be interviewed. A list of all interviewees is presented in Appendix III.  
  At the local level, twenty three semi-structured interviews were applied to people who 
live  in  the  most  affected  colonias  and  who  were  most  affected  by  the  Chalco  Valley 
wastewater  floods:  Avándaro;  San  Isidro;  El  Triunfo,  and  Unión  de  Guadalupe. 
Characterisation of the affected people who were interviewed is provided in Chapter Four. 
First contacts were established in Unión de Guadalupe, and this was made possible thanks to 
the help of a Catholic priest who lives and works in a parish located in the neighbouring 
colonia La Providencia. A snowballing technique allowed me to contact and interview people 
in the remaining three colonias: Avándaro; San Isidro, and El Triunfo. Interpretations and 
experiences of floods causality and floods risk expressed by affected people were gathered 
using purposive sampling. As shown by Hiernaux (2000) Hiernaux et al (2000) and informed 
by the preliminary fieldwork that I conducted in December 2001, Chalco Valley has been 
evolving from an homogeneous community to more heterogeneous communities that vary in 
terms of income, ethnic origin, gender, and age. See Chapter Four to gain an appreciation of 
this fact.     113 
Because two different target populations were selected, two different semi-structured 
questionnaires were designed and applied; one questionnaire type was addressed to scientists, 
policy makers, implementers, operators, and other policy-relevant subjects, while the second 
was designed for and applied to people affected by the Chalco Valley floods of June 2000. 
The  questionnaire  applied  to  policy  makers  was  intended  to  reflect  the  political  and 
instrumental  nature  of  knowledge  that  characterises  the  policy  process.  It  covered  the 
following  aspects:  a)  policy  makers‘  and  implementers‘  conceptualisations  of  natural 
disaster,  disaster  risk,  and  vulnerability;  b)  policy  formulation  and  implementation;  c) 
evaluation of natural disaster policies, and d) policy makers‘ interpretations of the Chalco 
Valley  floods  and  of  the  people  affected.  These  aspects  are  linked  to  the  analytical 
frameworks as follows:  
Aspect a) of the questionnaire addressed the issue of ‗Floods causality as a policy 
problem‘ by exploring the argumentative elements of discourses including images of causal 
agents and risk objects. Aspects b), c), and d) addressed the issue of ‗policy implementation‘ 
by exploring the argumentative elements of policy objective, outcome, and intervention. The 
questionnaire applied to affected people reflects the tacit and experiential knowledge of risk 
and  natural  disaster  that  is  embedded  in  people‘s  daily-life  interactions.  It  included  the 
following aspects: a) Affected people‘s interpretations of the floods; b) the impact of the 
disaster  on  the  household  and  at  the  colonia  level;  c)  affected  people‘s  evaluation  of 
governmental responses deployed prior to and after the floods; d) the claim making process 
of the affected people, and e) the coping strategies of the people affected. Aspect a) was 
considered for the issue of ‗policy implementation‘, and aspects b), c), and d) provided very 
valuable information for re-constructing the case study as a whole. (See complete versions of 
the questionnaires in Appendix II.)  
  All  interviews  were  tape-recorded.  Recorded  interviews  possess  advantages  over 
note-taking. As documented by Lezama (2000) and according to Heritage (1984) quoted in 
Silverman  (1994),  the  use  of  recorded  information  facilitates  data  collection  and  makes 
possible a repeated and detailed examination of what was said within the context of which it 
was said. Transcripts allow other researchers to possess direct access to the sources of what is 
being claimed to serve as an appropriate analysis of a particular problem. This renders the 
analysis,  as  Heritage  (1984)  affirms,  subject  to public  scrutiny,  and  minimises  biases  in   114 
interpretation  of  the  data.  Then,  transcriptions  were  coded  using  IN  VIVO  qualitative 
analysis software to facilitate management and analysis of the information.    
 
4. The Justification of the Case Study  
 
Analysis  of  open-ended  interviews,  policy  reports,  and  documents  related  to  the  Chalco 
Valley  floods  and  the  civil  protection  responses,  which  that  was  carried  out  during  the 
preliminary  fieldwork,  were  of  great  value  because  they  provided  me  with  insights 
concerning justification of the case study. Civil Protection and the disaster prevention policy 
system in Mexico and in the Chalco Valley colonias affected by the June 2000 floods were 
chosen as a suitable case study for proving the hypothesis for the following reasons: 
1. In Mexico, the majority of policies and programmes conceptualise and frame disaster 
as ´natural´ events that are void of social content. This fact has had an impact on 
institutional responses, i.e., remedial responses, engineering works to control hazards, 
to mention only a few. 
2. Scientific and technical information on natural hazards is dominant, and information 
feeds policy making to the extent that structural causes, dynamic pressures and unsafe 
conditions that render poor people vulnerable to risks are not considered as a disaster 
policy issue.  
3. The Chalco Valley floods are a good example to demonstrate that disaster issues at 
the  policy  level  are  socially  constructed  and  in  which  discursive  and  political 
elements play a key role. Local people addressed claims to authorities regarding the 
physical  conditions  of  LCC  canal;  authorities  advanced  their  views,  labelled  the 
disaster as ´natural´, and blamed inhabitants for having relocated in the zone and for 
not being risk-avoiders. 
4. ‗Naturalising‘  disaster  is  a  way  of  excluding  other  possible  perspectives  and 
interpretations that could take the social and political dimensions into consideration.  
5.  Although  the  Chalco  Valley  floods  could  be  considered  as  a  ‗low-impact‘  event 
compared to the great disaster that have provoked thousand of human and material 
losses, this case illustrates that which is expected to occur most frequently in Mexico 
due to urbanisation trends in the peri-urban interface of Mexican cities, where floods 
vulnerability increases.       115 
6.  Some research had been conducted in the region prior to my preliminary fieldwork. 
The majority comprised anthropological and cultural studies on ethnicity and social 
identity  (Comboni,  2000;  Ramírez,  2000;  Aguilar,  2000;  Hiernaux,  1991,  2000) 
Hiernaux  et  al  (2000),  urbanisation  and  households  demographic  composition 
(Lindón,  1999),  urban  sociology  (Lindón,2000),  history  (Tortolero,  2000;  Huerta, 
2000), and town planning (Banzo, 2000). Nevertheless, no research on disaster (from 
the social constructionism approach) had been conducted either at the policy or at the 
community level. Social and political processes appear to be relevant if one desires to 
understand why disaster prevention policies  have been as they  have to date. This 
research aimed at producing knowledge in this respect. 
 
This case study has both an instrumental and an intrinsic value. It can be an instrumental 
case
16  study because it can provide insights into the  discursive  construction  of  ‗natural‘ 
disaster causality within policies. But it also has an intrinsic value, because I seek a better 
understanding of floods vulnerability within the context of late urbanisation in the eastern 
periphery of Mexico City and of the way Mexican policies address these questions. 
 
5. Study Populations and the Selection of Interviewees 
 
At the policy level 
Chapter  Four  describes  the  policy  system  that  deals  with  civil  protection  and  ‗natural‘ 
disaster  prevention  issues.  It  provides  an  institutional  map  that  identifies  SINAPROC 
institutions, their functions and linkages, and the selection of the public sectors relevant for 
this research and the equivalent interviewees. The justification of why these policy sectors 
and individuals were selected follows here.  
 
I. Civil protection and disaster prevention sector 
 
Civil  protection  officials  are  responsible  for  dealing  with  disaster  prevention,  mitigation, 
emergency  aid,  and  restoration.  By  law,  they  are  entitled  to  design  and  implement 
                                                 
16 To Stake (1995), quoted in Creswell (1998), an instrumental case study focuses on a specific issue rather than 
on the case itself, which becomes a vehicle for better understanding of the issue. An intrinsic case study focuses 
on the case because the latter holds intrinsic or unusual interest.   116 
programmes and projects, coordinate emergency responses, and promote the articulation of 
public institutions. Within the policy system, they are considered as the central actors for 
promoting the so-called ‗culture‘ of disaster prevention. The three levels of the government 
were included, and three different kinds of groups within these three levels were identified. 
Public officials who make policies and are involved in the politics either at the federal or the 
state level constituted the first group. Operators who are responsible for emergency responses 
in case of disaster comprised the second group. They work at the state and municipal levels. 
And finally, the CENAPRED and UNAM scientists made up the third group. These people 
produce and communicate knowledge that is meant to be for the use of policy makers and 
operators. CENAPRED and UNAM scientists (civil and geophysical engineers and hydro-
meteorological specialists) were chosen because of the influence they may exert both in the 
Civil Protection sector and in other public sectors as the producers of the knowledge needed 
to prevent disaster.  
 
II. Environment 
 
The  second  sector  includes  the  environment  sector.  This  sector  deals  with,  among  other 
scenarios,  problems  related  to  natural  resources  and  the  ecological  conservation  and 
processes of  natural origin whose consequences  may exert environmental  impacts on the 
society, such as forest fires. Thus, the purpose here is to examine the role that this sector has 
played  in  the  policy  process,  particularly  with  regard  to  its  relationship  with  the  Civil 
Protection sector in terms of disaster conceptualisations and institutional responses. Federal 
public officials were interviewed due to their influence on policy making and environmental 
politics.  At  the  State  level,  officials  involved  in  ecological  problems  that  occur  in  the 
Metropolitan area of  Mexico City where Chalco Valley  is  located were also chosen.  An 
equivalent relationship to that of the federal level was pursued.  
 
III. Water issues and sanitation 
 
For obvious reasons, the water sector is included because it has to do with sanitation, sewage 
systems,  hydraulic  infrastructure  provision  and  protection,  and  inundations  attention  and 
emergency actions. As mentioned throughout this document, the inundations were caused by   117 
the  rupture  of  a  sewage  canal  managed  by  the  CNA  in  coordination  with  the  CAEM. 
Information given  by policy  makers on the  floods was crucial  in order to examine their 
interpretations, evaluations of the event, and therefore the type of responses they provided as 
the best course of action. In terms of policy making, it was relevant to understand how these 
individuals related problems of water management to  disaster risk, disaster, and land use 
planning.  
 
IV. Urban development and planning 
 
This sector was included to understand to what extent urban planners‘ conceptualisations and 
framings  of  natural  disaster  and  disaster  risk  are  linked  to  urbanisation,  ecological 
deterioration,  and  land  use  planning.  It  is  necessary  to  examine,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
relationship between urbanisation roots causes and the increase in people‘s vulnerability to 
disaster risk, and on the other, the policy makers‘ conceptualisations of natural disaster and 
the responses deployed before and after the floods.  
 
V. The Mexican Oil Agency (PEMEX) 
 
PEMEX was selected because its workers usually assist the civil protection system in case of 
disaster and emergencies by providing equipment and specialised personnel either to rescue 
people or to repair the damaged infrastructure. In addition, PEMEX has embarked on public 
programmes aimed at improving the protection of people in face of the risk posed by the 
dangerous activities and facilities associated with PEMEX. 
 
VI. Non-governmental organisations 
 
Very frequently, NGOs assist affected people in a number of ways. They participate once the 
disaster has taken place. In this case study, Caritas México sent personnel and equipment to 
the affected colonias. Thus, the Caritas México coordinator was interviewed. With regard to 
other NGOs, no other references and contacts were found, although it is assumed that other 
NGOs might have participated in assistance and emergency tasks. 
VII. Others   118 
 
The Director of Cultural Affairs of Chalco Valley is also a key informant. He participated in 
the coordination of foreign aid in the aftermath of the floods. He channelled domestic aid and 
linked local people and affected people to national and international media. Therefore, his 
interpretations  were  relevant.  The  Civil  Protection  expert  of  the  National  Autonomous 
University of Mexico (UNAM) was one of the most important scientists and had formulated 
the conceptual and methodological bases for the establishment of the Civil Protection System 
in 1986. His accounts are crucial to understanding the origin and evolution of the system. 
 
At the community level 
 
Following the justification of the case study presented previously, the people affected by the 
floods are the target population at the community level. The goals of interviewing floods-
affected people were the following: 1) to prove that vulnerable people are not constructed as 
target populations of  civil protection and  disaster prevention policy; 2) to prove that the 
specific vulnerability of those affected was not factored into the design and implementation 
of policy responses, and 3) to demonstrate that the construction of ‗disaster causality‘ is a 
social process in which the claims of both policy makers and the affected people interact 
through discourses and arguments in seeking truthful accounts of the floods. A purposive 
sample was also employed. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000), with this sampling 
strategy the researcher seeks out groups to whom the processes being studied are most likely 
to occur. Therefore, the interviewees chosen were required to be vulnerable people exposed 
to floods risk.  
  The preliminary fieldwork had previously indicated that the Avándaro, El Triunfo, 
and San Isidro colonias were those that would be flooded. Subsequent visits during the final 
fieldwork showed that Unión de Guadalupe was inundated as well. Approaching potential 
interviewees was not an easy task even though previous contacts were made. After several 
attempts, the previously mentioned Catholic priest accepted to help and introduced me to the 
first affected person, who happened to live in the colonia Union de Guadalupe (that belongs 
to the municipality of Chalco) and to a resident of the  colonia El Triunfo. Thereafter, to 
approach  additional  individuals,  I  employed  a  snowballing  technique,  as  previously 
explained. The first interviewee introduced me to her neighbours, who in turn indicated to me   119 
those who would be possibly willing to be interviewed, etc. In the end, affected people from 
all colonias, except for El Molino, were contacted. Despite the fact that several attempts were 
made to approach people in El Molino, no success was achieved. Thus, bearing this in mind 
but not pursuing any type of representativeness, the following considerations were also taken 
into account on selecting interviewees for the final fieldwork: 
 
I.  Vulnerable  people  currently  living  under  the  unsafe  conditions  of  the  colonias 
affected by the floods in the Chalco Valley and Chalco municipalities. The variables  
considered  to  characterise  Chalco  Valley  residents  as  vulnerable  are  discussed  in 
Chapter Four, section 4.3.2, and comprise the following: a)  Physical environment: 
Unsafe housing, risk-prone location, and erosion or damage of housing materials; b) 
Fragile  economy:  Capital,  assets,  and  savings  lost  or  damaged  jeopardising 
livelihoods, and job losses or unsalaried people, and c) Policy responses: Unequal 
distribution of emergency aid and goods according to damage, increase of insecurity 
and social protection mechanisms, inadequate warning and claim making of affected 
people. 
 
II.  Diversity  of  interpretations  of  the  floods  in  the  affected  households.  When 
possible,  at  least  two  people  per  household  were  interviewed,  including  elderly 
people;  15  households  were  visited.  It  is  argued  that  interpretations  of  ‗floods 
causality‘  and  floods  impact  within  the  same  colonia  and  among  households  of 
different  colonias  may  vary  according  to  age,  ethnicity,  and  gender.  Moreover, 
interpretations of floods risk and floods also may depend on the experience of the 
people  with  floods.  People‘s  experience  of  floods  may  be  influenced  by  house 
location and floods risk proneness, the damage inflicted, and the type of emergency 
aid and government response received. Not all affected residents received the same 
provisions  and  attention  from  the  Federal  and  State  governments.  For  a  detailed 
explanation  of  the  ‗unsafe  conditions‘  that  characterise  the  vulnerability  of 
interviewees  and  their  coping  capacities  for  all  four  colonias,  see  Chapter  Four, 
section 3.2. 
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6. Grouping of Science and Policy Institutions according to the Three Social Domains of 
Response to Risk and Disaster in Mexico  
 
The following grouping of policy institutions was achieved after the final fieldwork was 
conducted and after having begun an in-depth analysis of interviewees‘ claims of floods 
causality  and  risk.  Thus,  grouping  of  policy  institutions  was  carried  out  taking  into 
consideration  the  concept  of  social  domain  applied  to  risk  and  disaster  knowledge  and 
responses (Hilhorst, 2004) as reviewed in Chapter Two. In Chapter Two, I mentioned that 
knowledge claim of disaster causality depends on the subject‘s values and beliefs, which are 
conditioned to a degree by the subject‘s position within an institution. At the same time, 
institutional discourses shape the way subjects talk about things by determining the language 
and  the  relevant  issues  used  to  frame  the  ‗object‘  or  ‗process‘.  Thus,  by  performing 
argumentative analysis of the interviews, I intended to examine empirically similarities and 
differences  among  interviewees‘  claims.  In  other  words,  I  wanted  to  know  whether 
knowledge claims of ‗disaster causality´ and evidence may constitute the core argumentative 
elements of a specific discourse that may, at the same time, characterise a particular social 
domain of disaster in Mexico.  
 
6.1 Domain of Disaster Science and Management 
This domain includes scientists and disaster managers. The following interviewees were 
included in this domain: 
Civil Protection and Disaster Prevention Sector 
  General Director of CENAPRED 
  Research Director of the CENAPRED 
  Researcher on socio-economic issues of CENAPRED  
  Director of Capacity Building and Training of CENAPRED 
  Director of Information and Communication of CENAPRED 
  Civil Protection expert of UNAM 
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6.2  Domain of Disaster Governance 
 
This domain includes bureaucrats and politicians of various sectors, such as Civil Protection, 
Environment, Water, and PEMEX. 
Civil Protection and Disaster Prevention Sector 
  General Coordinator of Civil Protection 
  General Director of Civil Protection 
  Former General Coordinator of Civil Protection 
  General General Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico 
  Director of Risk Atlas of the State of Mexico 
  Coordinator of the Metropolitan Programme of Civil Protection 
  General Director of Civil Protection of Mexico City 
 
Environment Sector 
 
  Minister of Environment and Natural Resources of SEMARNAT 
  General Attorney of Natural Resources of SEMARNAT 
  General Director of Public Policies of SEMARNAT 
  Delegate of SEMARNAT in the State of Mexico 
  Undersecretary of Ecology of the State of Mexico 
  Coordinator of the Metropolitan Environmental Programme 
 
Water Sector 
  General Manager of Gravamex of CNA  
  General Coordinator of Water Provision and Sanitation projects of Mexico Valley of 
CNA 
  Manager of Hydraulic Infrastructure of CNA 
  Director of Hydraulic Operations of Gravamex 
  Manager of Infrastructure Protection and Emergencies Assistance of CNA 
  Director of the Hydraulic Programme of CAEM 
  Head of Social Participation Unit of Gravamex 
 
Urban Sector 
  General Director of Land Use Planning of SEDESOL 
  General Director of Urban Management of the State of Mexico 
 
 
Mexican Oil Company (PEMEX) 
  General Director of Environmental Protection 
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6.3 Domain of Local Coping Strategies  
 
  Director of ODAPAS of the Chalco Valley Municipality 
  Emergency Coordinator and Disaster Attention, Caritas-México 
  Director of Cultural Affairs of Chalco Valley-Solidarity 
  Affected residents of El Triunfo, San Isidro, Avándaro, and Unión de Guadalupe 
 
 
 
7. Time Scale and Research Sites  
 
From January to June 2003, the final fieldwork took place in Mexico City and in the State of 
Mexico.  Public  institutions  and  governmental  bodies  at the  federal  level  were  located  in 
Mexico  City.  Federal  policies  and  programmes  of  SINAPROC  constituted  the  national 
framework  for  states  and  municipalities  to  elaborate  their  own  policies.  Thus,  several 
interviews were carried out in Mexico City. With regard to the State of Mexico, a number of 
interviews  were  applied  in  Toluca  City  (the  State  capital)  and  in  the  municipality  of 
Naucalpan. The majority of Ministries and public institutions are based in Toluca because it 
is  the  capital  city  of  the  State  of  Mexico.  Other  interviews  were  undertaken  in  the 
municipality of Naucalpan, where the Ministry of Ecology and the CAEM are situated. The 
affected people interviewed live in colonias Avándaro, San Isidro, and El Triunfo, which 
belong to the municipality of Chalco Valley-Solidarity, and also in Unión de Guadalupe, 
which pertains to the municipality of Chalco (see PHOTO 4 in section 3.2, Chapter Four). 
 
8. Limitations of the Study and Issues of Bias 
 
Besides the methodological limitations mentioned earlier regarding the scope of the interview 
and  to  what  extent  the  semi-structured  interview  allowed  the  interviewee  to  feel  free  to 
express  his/her views about the causal  narrative of  floods, some other  limitations can be 
mentioned at this moment. The constructionist approach of this research assumes that the 
interpretive analysis is, in itself, a subjective process. One‘s own values and beliefs in certain 
ways  are  also  present  in  the  interpretation  of  the  interviewee‘s  interpretations.  My  own 
positionality as a male professional may have influenced the dialogue with the interviewees. 
Regarding female poor residents of the affected colonias, these may have been hesitant and 
little defensive because they did not know exactly what role they were supposed to take in   123 
the conversation of ´unequals´ where sometimes male ´ideas´ and ´voices´ tend to dominate 
female‘s.  Moreover,  even  though  I  introduced  myself  and  explained  the  purpose  of  my 
research project at the beginning of the interview, there might be some interviewees who 
were not clear enough about my precedence and the final use of the information.  
  One  of  the  issues  that  I  deliberately  wanted  to  emphasise  while  applying  the 
questionnaire was the rhetorical influence of the adjective ´natural´ in qualifying disaster. By 
´naturalising´ disaster I expected to find common meanings within respondents´ answers that 
may allude to accidental factors of natural forces. At the same time, by applying this term I 
expected to identify the existence (or not) of hidden ideas that alluded to social processes like 
poverty and ecological degradation in respondents´ discourses. I acknowledged that I ran the 
risk of purposively leading the respondents to pre-given answers. This risk was overcome by 
asking  other  related-questions  to  allow  interviewees  to  further  explain  the  meaning  of 
´natural´ disaster and the components they thought to be important as the triggering factors.              
Due to the nature of this approach, my analysis cannot be considered as objective, the 
opposite, it is about one analysis out of several that can be done. I am also part of and share 
meanings  with  the  different  communities  that  in  turn  influence  my  analysis.  Thus,  the 
theoretical  and  methodological  imperatives  of  this  research  are  to  understand  the  social 
situations in a specific historical moment in a specific society. Extrapolation is not applicable 
to similar situations; this means that the results found in this research are not expected to be 
found in other similar situations, although some generalisations and descriptions might be 
considered  as  useful  for  other  research.  However,  the  theoretical  and  methodological 
proposals found in this thesis can be contemplated as a way to undertake a novel analysis of 
public  policies.  I  am  able  to  say  that  I  covered  nearly  all  of  the  policy-relevant-actors 
involved in this policy problem.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CASE STUDY OF CHALCO VALLEY´S FLOODS  
 
Introduction 
 
Chronic flooding in the Chalco Valley, State of Mexico, is the outcome of past and present 
socio-environmental changes which have taken place in Mexico City‘s South-Eastern peri-
urban interface. This flooding is the result of a complex interaction between urbanisation in 
an  ex-lacustrine  area,  permanent  ecological  deterioration  and  ground  subsidence,  poor 
sanitation and inadequate policy responses. Far from solving the flooding problematic, short-
term policy responses have increasingly created unsafe conditions for current residents. A 
socio-historical  analysis  of  disaster  reveals  the  importance  of  taking  into  consideration 
particular  social  actors  and  institutions  in  hazard  generation  and  flood  vulnerability  over 
time.  
This chapter analyses four aspects of this flooding problematic: 1) Chalco Valley‘s 
floods of June 2000; 2) urbanisation, former policies and floods risk generation in Chalco 
Valley region from a socio-historical perspective; 3) current policy responses and the failure 
of risk management of La Compañía Canal (LCC) and 4) people‘s vulnerability to floods in 
the four worst affected colonias of Chalco Valley-Solidarity and Chalco, namely Avándaro, 
El Triunfo, Providencia, San Isidro and Unión  de Guadalupe. Information analysed was 
drawn from interviews to policy makers and affected people by the floods of 2000 and from 
newspaper articles, policy reports and geo-statistical data.  
  To analyse the floods of waste waters that took place in Chalco Valley in June 2000, I 
put the case study into historic and socio-environmental context in order to identify the root 
causes and dynamic pressures that led to unsafe conditions under which vulnerable people 
currently live. Unsafe conditions are characterised in particular with regards to the chronic 
hazardousness  of  the  physical  environment,  LCC  problematic,  the  sanitation  system,  the 
fragile economy of affected people and their coping mechanisms. Civil protection measures 
and disaster prevention policy responses implemented before and after the floods are also 
examined.  
Finally  vulnerable people of the  colonias Avándaro, El Triunfo, Providencia, San 
Isidro and Unión de Guadalupe are characterised in terms of housing location and damage; 
capital and assets loss and inability to replace assets, unequal distribution of emergency aid   125 
and social protection mechanisms such as coping strategies, reconstruction of livelihoods and 
claim making power of residents.  At the end of this chapter, I use the PAR model (Blaikie 
et.al. 1994, 2003) to draw the chain of causation that resulted in Chalco Valley‘s floods of 
2000.  
 
1. Chalco Valley‟s floods of June 2000  
 
The South Eastern peri-urban interface of Mexico City has become a flood prone area. In 
June 1
st 2000, 80 hectares of the territory of Chalco Valley were inundated with wastewaters. 
Floods were caused by the rupture and discharge of  LCC, an open-air sewage canal that 
collects  domestic  water  from  two  municipalities  in  the  State of  Mexico:  Chalco  Valley-
Solidarity and Chalco. More than 6,700 households were affected with gastrointestinal, skin 
and water-borne diseases, in addition to electricity and piped water being cut-off and lack of 
food  supplies.  Five  colonias  were  the  worst  affected:  Avándaro,  El  Triunfo,  San  Isidro, 
Unión de Guadalupe and El Molino.  A segment of the Mexico-Puebla  highway  between 
kilometres 26 and 28 was submerged and many coaches, trucks and automobiles got stuck. 
Transportation of goods and services from Mexico City to Veracruz was interrupted. The 
Chalco Valley‘s inhabitants, mainly low-income families, were severely affected and unable 
to cope with the disaster. Emergency aid and assistance were rapidly provided by the army, 
Red Cross and the firemen department of both local and neighbouring municipalities.  
Rapid assessments of the canal walls were undertaken and a prompt response was 
provided to stop the water from flowing out of the canal. In the third day of the aftermath, the 
former  President  Zedillo  declared  the  area  a  disaster  zone.  The  Ministry  of  Social 
Development and the Ministry of Public Health joined efforts and provided food, clothes and 
other basic goods, and implemented a sanitary programme to avoid epidemic outbreaks and 
contagious diseases. Explanations about what happened were broadcast on radio, TV and in 
newspapers, but at that time nobody was certain about what caused the canal to collapse. A 
few  hours  after  the  tragedy,  the  National  Water  Commission  (CNA)  carried  out  an 
investigation to find out what happened. The official evaluation soon established that the 
canal rupture was due to the impact of heavy rain on the canal walls; in effect, nature was 
blamed for the tragedy. However, according to some of the affected inhabitants interviewed 
by  the  author  of  this  thesis,  the  Chalco  Valley‘s  ‗environmental  disaster‘  was  human-  126 
induced. Some said that canal wall fissures posed a risk for many years, but authorities did 
not pay enough attention. Local inhabitants had previously warned of the potential tragedy; 
and in their view, authorities did not act in order to prevent it.  
Federal and State authorities labelled it an emergency or ‗serious‘ inundation, but not 
a  disaster.  Amongst  them,  there  was  little  agreement  about  the  ‗real‘  causes.  They  had 
different  opinions  about  the  flood‘s  origin.  On  one  hand,  some  said  that  regional 
transformations  of  the  basin,  such  as  aquifer  depletion,  subsidence  of  the  terrain  and 
urbanisation were the ‗real‘ causes of the canal breakage; on the other, some blamed the lack 
of adequate maintenance of the canal as the main cause. State of Mexico governor viewed 
such environmental transformation as a ‘normal‘ outcome of the changes which have been 
taking place in the geo-hydrological dynamics of the Chalco Valley over many years. It took 
7 days for the Army and technicians from the CNA to block the hole and repair the canal 
wall. Services, infrastructure and lifelines were only completely restored after two months.  
LCC  has  turned  into  an  environmental  hazard  which  poses  a  constant  threat  to 
inhabitants. CNA has responded by reinforcing and heightening the canal walls and dredging 
the canal bed. Paradoxically, that has created unsafe conditions and increased risk over the 
years. The Chalco Valley floods in June 2000 represent the worst and most recent episode of 
a series of past recurrent flooding events which have been taking place in the region for the 
last 30 years, since urbanisation began in the 70 s in the South Eastern peri-urban interface of 
Mexico  City.  Thus  chronic  flooding  is  the  result  of  a  complex  interaction  between 
urbanisation in an ex-lacustrine area, permanent ecological deterioration, ground subsidence, 
poor sanitation and inadequate policy responses. Far from solving the flooding problematic, 
short-term policy responses have increasingly created unsafe conditions where vulnerable 
residents currently live. There are two main explanations for this: the fact that floods have 
been  mainly regarded as  natural and physical  phenomena that are tackled with technical 
solutions,  and  the  particular,  distinctive  features  of  the  Mexico  City  peri-urban  interface 
where floods occur.  
Contemporary critical analyses of disaster (Maskrey et.al. 1993; Wisner et.al. 2003, 
Bankoff, Frerks and Hilhorst et.al. 2004) emphasise the role played by human agency and 
institutions  in  constructing  risk  and  disaster  vulnerability  over  time.  A  more  adequate 
approach  to  disaster  should  then  consider  the  socio-historical  context  of  environmental 
transformation and risk construction, and particularly  institutions, actors and programmes   127 
operating  within  the  landscape,  in  this  case  the  South-Eastern  limits  of  Mexico  City 
bordering the State of Mexico. The following sections  examine the progression of floods 
vulnerability in the Chalco Valley region using the PAR model proposed by Blaikie et al 
(1994). Unsafe conditions under which vulnerable people live are traced back to their root 
causes in order to understand the socio-historical context of the inundations.   
 
2. Urbanisation, former policies and floods risk generation in Chalco Valley 
 
As explained  in Chapter One the PAR  model proposed by  Blaikie et.al. (1994, 2003) is 
oriented to identify the processes involved in the progression of disaster vulnerability. It has 
been chosen to develop this chapter for the following reasons. Flood risk and the Chalco 
Valley‘s  chronic  inundations  should  be  explained  not  only  as  a  function  of  the  existing 
hazards, such as the LCC and the rainfalls, but more generally in relation to historic, urban, 
social and political processes occurring in the south-eastern peri-urban interface of Mexico 
City.  
The  analysis  of  political  decisions  and  social  change,  productive  and  water  and 
sanitation management projects implemented in the Chalco Valley region since the end of 
XIX Century, and of the urban-economic system in Mexico since 1940‘s, helps explain how 
the  socio-environmental  deterioration  of  the  former  lake  of  Chalco  and  subsequent 
urbanisation increased hazard generation and flood vulnerability. This perspective of flood 
analysis  is  important  because  it  frames  disaster  as  social  processes;  it  puts  disaster 
vulnerability  into a socio-historical context and  allows us to explain the social  nature of 
flooding and the reasons why it has been a chronic risk to residents in Chalco Valley. It also 
gives inputs to understand the permanent failure of policy responses which fail to address the 
social and political dimensions of disaster. In the following sections, vulnerability root causes 
and dynamic pressures are examined.  
 
2.1 Socio-environmental change in Chalco Valley between the Spanish Conquest and 
the beginning of XX Century 
 
The  Chalco  Valley  Region  is  composed  by  the  municipalities  of  Chalco,  Chalco 
Valley-Solidarity and Ixtapaluca and is located in the South-Eastern peri-urban interface of 
Mexico City. In ecological terms the Chalco Valley region is considered part of the central   128 
basin of  Mexico since the  former Chalco Lake  and rivers  system were  connected to the 
Mexico‘s central valley (see PHOTO 1). The National Population and Housing Census 2000 
reports  that  the  Chalco  Valley  region  housed  1,620,048  inhabitants,  of  which  the  vast 
majority  are  low-income  families  whose  income  was  below  two  minimum  wages  per 
working person per day (INEGI, 2001). 
 
PHOTO 1. Mexico City and Chalco Valley Region 
 
Source: Google Earth, 2008; edited by Fernando Aragón (2008) 
 
The Metropolitan Area of Mexico City is located in the central basin of Mexico and 
represents the centre of the economic, social and cultural life of the country. It occupies 
0.03% of the nation‘s territory; houses 20% of its population i.e. 19 million people (INEGI, 
2001) and represents 35 percent of the gross domestic product. Since the beginning of the 
20
th Century, after the Mexican Revolution, it became the main urban settlement due to a 
range  of  factors:  (1)  great  immigration  flows  from  the  countryside  and  other  cities,  (2) 
increase of industrial activities, (3) concentration of infrastructure and means of production, 
(4) centralisation of political power and administrative functions.  
The development of Mexico City has been closely related to the dynamics of the 
hydrological basin over which it sprawls. Since ancient times, its ecosystems played a key   129 
role  for  settlers  in  terms  of  use  of  natural  resources  and  rich  biodiversity,  ecological 
productivity and availability of water for consumption and production purposes. The basin of 
Mexico‘s Valley is a closed hydrological watershed of approximately 7, 000 square km. Its 
lowest part, a lacustrine plain, has an elevation of 2,250 m above sea level. The basin is 
enclosed on three of its sides by a succession of magnificent volcanic ranges of more than 
3,500m and a series of hills. These circumscribing mountains represent an important physical 
boundary limiting the expansion of urbanised areas (Ezcurra, E, et al 1999) 
The Mexico Valley was populated by pre-Hispanic dwellings under the dominion of 
Tenochtitlán Empire, which housed almost 2 million people before the Spanish Conquest in 
1519. Agriculture provided the majority of consumption goods. The  chinampas
17 was the 
main agricultural system that sustained the households and promoted the trade amongst the 
settlements, from Tlatelolco village in the Northern zone to Xochimilco and Chalco in the 
South-Eastern zone.  
It  is  said  that  during  the  Spanish  Conquest  period the  first  great  socio-ecological 
process  of  environmental  change  took  place  within  the  basin,  just  when  the  modes  of 
production became unsustainable due to alternations in the hydrological cycle and disruption 
of pre-Hispanic management of ecosystems (Huerta, 2000). It is important to mention that 
environmental degradation did not commence with urbanisation under the Spaniards; there 
were  in  fact  severe  ecological  problems  associated  to  resources  depletion  during  pre-
Hispanic  times,  although  some  authors  agree,  the  increase  in  magnitude,  velocity  and 
intensity of such environmental change was more noticeable after the Conquest. Thus, in the 
16
th  Century,  Spaniards  chose  to  battle  against  the  water  rather  than  live  with  it.  The 
desiccation of the Mexico Valley lake and the decrease of its ecological productivity were the 
result of a process which began when the Spaniards imposed a totally different way of life; a 
European urbanism in a fragile ecosystem. 
Mexico City‘s population grew drastically throughout the 20
th  Century during the 
long  post-war  period  of  rapid  economic  growth  based  on  import-substitution 
industrialisation.  Investment  was  particularly  drawn  to  the  agglomeration  economies 
                                                 
2 Chinampas is an intensive and highly productive agricultural system formed by a succession of raised fields 
within a network of canals dredged on the lakebed (Ezcurra, E. et.al, 1999: 7). For a more detailed explanation 
about the ecological and economic role of Chinampas in the development of human settlements in the Basin of 
Mexico, see Chapter 4 in Pezzoli, Keith, 1998. 
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provided by Mexico City. Immigrants were also attracted. This does not mean that the city 
provided adequate living and working conditions for all its inhabitants. Quite the opposite: 
the lack of housing provision is reflected in the fact that as much as 60 per cent of city‘s 
growth is the result of people  building their own dwellings on unserved peripheral  land, 
while  informal  subsistence  work  has  always  accounted  for  a  large  proportion  of  total 
employment (Connolly, P., 1999:56) 
Having briefly reviewed some aspects of the socio-environmental change which took 
place in the Mexico Valley as a whole, let us now focus on the Chalco Valley region, in order 
to understand both  its  inner transformations and  its articulations with the Mexico Valley 
dynamics.  Explanations  about recent  urbanisation  in  Chalco  Valley  region  do  not  solely 
explain its present situation regarding hazard generation and the risk faced by vulnerable 
groups. Prior to the urbanisation boom that took place between late 1970s and 1980s the 
region underwent radical  socio-environmental changes which, to some extent, resulted in 
changes  in  the  hydrologic  dynamic  of  the  Valley  and  therefore  its  chronic  proneness  to 
flooding. Radical changes can be traced back to the end of 19
th Century and the beginning of 
the 20
th. The Chalco Valley region as we know it today cannot be completely understood 
unless  we  look  at  the  environmental  history  of  the  Chalco  Lake,  its  irreversible 
transformations and the social institutions and actors involved.  
Rich biological diversity and high ecological productivity characterised the Chalco 
Lake  since  ancient  times.  According  to  Huerta  (2000)  this  was  the  result  of  ecological 
dynamics  among  three  different  landscapes:  the  lacustrine  ecosystem,  the  valley  and  the 
mountains  and  volcanoes  of  the  Sierra  Nevada. Rich  soils,  rivers  and  aquifers  formed  a 
complex hydrological system that created conditions for sustainable production. What Huerta 
proposes is a ´symbiosis´ hypothesis which underlines the symbiotic nature of landscapes in 
regulating  the  Chalco  Valley  basin  and  the  ecological  basis  for  sustaining  the  regional 
economy.  
High ecological productivity  fostered economic  development, based on a complex 
integration  of  lacustrine,  agriculture,  cattle  ranching  and  forestry  activities  organised  in 
different modes of production from haciendas and ranchos to factories and community-based 
systems.  Plenty  of  resources  were  exploited  and  several  agricultural  goods  were  traded   131 
between the Chalco Valley and Mexico City. Haciendas produced grains and cereals
18, wood 
and charcoal; local communities by the riverbank collected animals and plants and the 
mountain villagers carried out forestry and agricultural activities. By the end of 19
th Century 
the Chalco Valley was considered the main grain supplier to Mexico City.  
Rivers played a crucial role not only in the maintenance of the hydrologic system of 
the  whole  Chalco  Valley  but  also  were  of  fundamental  importance  for  other  economic 
activities. In addition to irrigation and transportation, the rivers Acuautla, La Compañía and 
Tenango provided  hydraulic energy  for  mills and textile  factories. Nevertheless, conflicts 
over natural resources between the haciendas, ranchos and villages were not the exception. 
For instance, by the end of 19
th Century the paper factories San Rafael and San Antonio 
Abad disputed the use of La Compañía River. According to Huerta (2000), it was not until 
the ‗arrival‘ of capitalism between the end of 19
th and the beginning of the 20
th Century that 
conflicts notoriously aggravated and the lake of Chalco underwent a radical transformation. 
Irrigation schemes, an extensive canal network, as well as the management of water for the 
promotion of commercial agriculture and a lake drainage project implemented during the last 
administration of President Porfirio Diaz (1884-1911) radically transformed the region. 
As  analysed  by  Connolly  (1991)  and  Perló  (1999)  during  the  administration  of 
President Porfirio Díaz the most ambitious hydraulic infrastructure work ever done at that 
time  in  Mexico‘s  history took place. Mexico Valley  Hydraulic Plan  implemented during 
President Díaz second administration (1884-1888) had the main objective to prevent chronic 
inundations that were occurring in Mexico City. The Plan comprised the construction of the 
Mexico City sewage system and an open canal that would channel rain and waste waters out 
of the Mexico Valley. It took 14 years the Federal Government, through the Junta Directiva 
del Desagüe (Sewage Corporate Commission), to build  El Gran Canal del Desagüe which, 
at the time of the opening in March 1900, was considered the most important and costly 
engineering work in Latin America. In this regard, the desiccation of Chalco Lake was the 
last stage of this long-term Plan even though since 1856 the Federal Government had already 
contemplated  to  drain  Chalco  Lake.  In  fact,  preliminary  engineering  and  technical 
assessments  done  by  the  Federal  Government,  Chalco  Lake  was  considered  to  be  an 
                                                 
3 ―During the second half of the XVIII Century and the first decade of the XIX, 50 large and medium sized 
Haciendas of Chalco produced, just in one harvest, the total volume of maize that was consumed in Mexico 
City per year, the equivalent to 200,000 fanegas”  (Huerta, 2000: 70). 
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important  water  body  to  be  controlled  in  order  to  reduce  flood  risk  in  Mexico  City 
surroundings. Regarding this, La Compañía Canal got diverted and connected to El Gran 
Canal del Desagüe to discharge the waste-waters of Chalco Valley´s colonias.  
A more detailed description helps explain how specific actors, institutions, political 
relations  and  modernization  projects  provoked  a  major  environmental  impact  and 
development in the region. Drawing from the accounts of Huerta (2000), Tortolero (1996) 
and Beltrán (1998), three moments of change can be identified. Firstly the construction of the 
Morelos railway in 1878 promoted commercial agriculture in the Chalco Valley region. The 
construction  of  railway  infrastructure  facilitated  private  capital  investment.  The  Spanish 
brothers Remigio and Íñigo Noriega –who migrated from Asturias, Spain in  late 1860‘s- 
founded  the  enterprise  Negociación  Agrícola  y  Anexas,  acquiring  several  haciendas  and 
ranchos,  developing  high  scale  agriculture  and  controlling  the  whole  economy  of  the 
region
19. This was possible thanks to the modernisation of agriculture, innovation methods 
(new  seeds,  tools  and  mechanization),  capital  investments,  high  levels  of  fertility  in  the 
Valley and, most importantly, to the close friendship the Noriega brothers had with the then 
President Porfirio Diaz.  
Secondly,  deforestation  in  the  surrounding  forests  triggered  soil  erosion.  Vast 
amounts of soil and organic matter ended up in the rivers and lake beds, reducing both their 
capacity and ecological productivity. This emerging situation was perceived by the Noriega 
brothers to be negative for the region‘s development and the perfect opportunity for them to 
put into practice the long awaited lake drainage project
20. The Noriega brothers had planned 
to drain the lake in order to reclaim 10 ,000 hectares of fertile soil for agricultural purposes. 
This move also reflected growing concerns about the water quality of La Compañía river 
which was  being constantly polluted with chemicals  and  inorganic and organic  matter 
dumped by the San Rafael paper mill.  
                                                 
 
 
4 Noriega brothers acquired haciendas like Zoquiapan of 8,582 has; Rio Frio of 5,400 has; San Geronimo and 
Texconuxco ranch of 842 has; La Compañía of 5,043 has and the hacienda Xico (Tortolero, 1996; Beltrán, 
1998). 
5 It is worth mentioning that plans for draining Chalco Lake dated back to 1827-1833. The government of the 
State of Mexico issued two decrees in which the cost of constructing a canal for diverting the lake waters to the 
Lake of Texcoco was estimated (Beltrán, 1998:3). 
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By 1894 the Noriega brothers, who at that time were also owners of the hacienda 
Xico  (with  an  extension  of  78  has.)  which  included  the  entire  Chalco  Lake,  asked  for 
permission  from  the  Mexican  government  –specifically  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  and 
Communications and Transport- to construct a canal to discharge waters from Chalco lake 
into the Texcoco lake. They acknowledged that Chalco lake drainage would allow them to 
have larger extensions of highly productive land. They managed to convince the authorities 
that it was more productive to keep agriculture land dedicated to commercial corn rather than 
maintaining local fisheries, which were seen as an ‗out-dated‘ economic activity linked to 
marginal indigenous groups. As observed by Tortolero (1996), during the draining process 
the government stepped back and left the hacendados-empresarios [entrepreneur landlords] 
in charge of all the hydraulic works
21. 
And thirdly, a network of canals was constructed to develop commercial agriculture. 
However, social problems emerged during the desiccation and construction of the hydraulic 
system. For instance, floods occurred in the Chalco village and San Juan de Dios  hacienda 
during  the  deviation  of  the  La  Compañía  River  and  construction  of  the  network.  This 
provoked social protests by Chalco villagers and, as a flood prevention strategy, the affected 
population  responded  by  destroying  the  canal  walls  in  different  up-stream  sections,  thus 
preventing their land from being flooded again. It was not until 1908 that  Íñigo Noriega 
finally declared drainage works completed (Beltrán, 1998), although they were rehabilitated 
during the 1960‘s by the federal hydraulic authorities.  
The  ecological  and  economic  landscape  of  Chalco  Valley  that  had  remained 
‗untouched‘  for several centuries changed dramatically over the  last 30 years of the 19
th 
Century.  In  short,  the  following  transformations  were  observed:  the  introduction  of  the 
railway system, the construction of canals and dikes for agriculture, the operation of paper 
and  textile  mills,  deforestation  to obtain  wood, the  establishment  of  modern  commercial 
agriculture companies and the lake drainage.   
The  business  rationale  (as  exemplified  by  the  Noriega  brothers‘  case)  produced 
efficient strategies to take control of the natural resources. As Tortolero explained, on the one 
                                                 
6 ―... 203 kms of canals were built; one canal of 16 kms length carried waters from lake of Chalco to the lake of 
Texcoco. ..[A]nother canal located in the north side of the Xico hacienda carried waters coming down from the 
hills of Tlalmanalco, Gonzalez, La Compañía, Zoquiapan straight to the lake of Texcoco. And the rest of the 
canals  (154  kms.)  were  for  the  sewage  system,  irrigation  and  the  transportation  of  harvests  (Tortolero, 
1996:125) 
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hand they would benefit from the existing natural resources to set up a big company and, on 
the other, they prevented local inhabitants and fishermen from accessing and exploiting the 
lake under an auto-subsistence rationale, which made them dependent on such companies. 
According to Tutino (quoted in Tortolero, 1996) between 1870  and 1910  Chalco Valley 
underwent an economic expansion that benefited the landlord elites, who put pressure on the 
vast majority of peasants. As such, the Chalco Valley inhabitants played a marginal role in 
the modernization of the region. That was one of the main reasons why they felt harmed and 
were encouraged to participate in the Mexican Revolution, demanding the restitution of their 
land, their productive assets, resources and livelihoods.  
From the accounts presented above, it becomes clear that Chalco Valley‘s proneness to 
flooding  should  be  framed  as  an  outcome  of  a  socio-historic-environmental  process 
developed in the South-Eastern peri-urban interface of Mexico City with the involvement of 
specific  social  actors  and  modernization  projects.  Even  though  heavy  rains  have  been  a 
permanent natural phenomenon throughout the region due to the presence of the mountain 
ranges and their climatologic functions, their hazardousness is a man-made product. The area 
where people settled in the Chalco Valley is an extended plain territory whose topography 
results in water flowing down from higher elevations such as the mountains ranges, besides 
the infiltration capacity of the terrain is diminished because of the fact that the groundwater 
is near the surface. Problems associated with flooding are becoming more frequent, as more 
and more settlements are established in the high risk zones, i.e. near the La Compañía Canal. 
It is in this socio-environmental context that illegal urbanisation occurred in late 1970s. In 
this research, illegal urbanisation is understood as the process whereby the selling-buying of 
plots for housing development takes place out of the legal framework and market. In Mexico, 
commonly,  clandestine  sellers,  ejido  owners,  representatives  of  the  Revolutionary 
Institutional Party (PRI) and local authorities have acted together to allow poor people to get 
affordable land even despite the ecological unsuitability and risk proneness environment.  
  
2.2 Political economy of the urbanisation in Chalco Valley after the Mexican Revolution 
 
In  1910  the  Mexican  Revolution  took  place.  Social  uprising  spread  across  the  whole 
Republic and particularly in the central region. One of the goals of the Mexican Revolution 
was to put into practice an agrarian reform which would give indigenous communities back 
their  land and the right to benefit  from  natural  resources. It was thought that this social   135 
movement  would  ultimately  create  conditions  necessary  for  peasants  to  claim  the  basic 
means to develop their own communities. The most significant achievement is considered to 
be the creation of the ejido
22. The ejido is a state-owned parcel of land given to peasant 
communities for agricultural use. The ejidatarios are those who manage and benefit from the 
ejido. In order to create  ejidos, land  formerly owned  by  hacendados and  rancheros was 
expropriated and returned to the agrarian groups who were labelled the ‗original‘ owners.  
By  1958  the  vast  majority  of  ejidos  were  constituted  in  the  Chalco-Amecameca 
region. In the central region of the Republic, however, agrarian redistribution did not solve 
the  production  problems  of  ejidatarios.  According  to  Banzo  (2000)  land  distribution 
modalities and the high population density prevented the newly created ejidos from receiving 
extensive pieces of land. In the Chalco Valley, the ejidos extend to between 0.5 and 5 has. 
Under  these  circumstances,  rural  population  could  not  make  a  decent  living  out  of 
agriculture. For example, Banzo reckons that in the 1940‘s, 150 days of work per year were 
needed in order to get sufficient benefits from an ejido of 3.5 has. This labour product was 
not sufficient for the ejido‟s reproduction.  
Impoverishment, low economic and ecological productivity, the establishment of a 
corridor of factories along the Mexico City-Puebla axis (1940-1960‘s), and the fact that the 
region  has  always  been  geographically  close  to  Mexico  City,  encouraged  peasants  to 
emigrate from the Chalco Valley. Only a few remaining ejidatarios maintained this mode of 
production until mid 1970‘s when the demand for peri-urban land for popular settlements 
notoriously increased. To understand the economic and territorial trends that followed it is 
important to describe the national urban dynamics during the 1940-1970 period in which the 
whole of the Chalco Valley‘s transformation can be re-framed. 
Since 1940 the national policy of import substitution supported industrial and urban 
development to the detriment of agriculture. This policy reinforced the polarising role of big 
cities. Political and administrative centralisation and the supply of various kinds of services 
determined the location of industrial firms. Salaried work and its inherent social advantages 
attracted large  flows of rural workers to the  main urban centres. The attraction of  cities 
translated  into  high  demographic  growth.  Between  1940  and  1960  annual  growth  rates 
reached 5%. The population of Mexico City‘s Metropolitan Zone (ZCMC) tripled its size 
                                                 
22 Before the creation of the ejidos, communal land (tierras comunales) existed in Mexico; communal land was 
owned by peasants before the arrival of Spaniards.     136 
during that period,  from 1.9  million  in  1940 to 5.4  million  in  1960. This type of urban 
development promoted the expansion of popular settlements in the cities periphery. Low-
income groups unable to afford renting or buying houses within the central city ended-up 
settling in the peri-urban interface of the main Mexican cities.  
According  to  Banzo  (2000)  this  was  due  to  a  combination  of  various  processes: 
industrialization; the development of the service sector in the economy of the central city, 
reducing  the  space  and  promoting  land  speculation;  demographic  growth  resulting  in  a 
housing deficit the state could not tackle; and finally the extension of transportation that led 
to the dissociation between living and working place. This growth of low-income settlements 
in  the  cities‘  periphery  represented  the  prevailing  phenomenon  of  urban  space 
transformation. In the Chalco Valley between the mid 70‘s and 80‘s, ejidatarios abandoned 
their ejidos and sold them to illegal land promoters, who in turn divided them into lots of 200 
square  metres. Few pieces of  land were allocated  for environmental  and urban  facilities. 
Housing development in the Chalco Valley begun in the mid-seventies and spread between 
the  Mexico-Puebla  highway  (reaching  Iztapalapa  delegation,  La  Paz-Los  Reyes  and 
Chimalhuacán municipalities) and the Xico hill. (Hiernaux, 1991:185; Hiernaux, 2000: 35, 
39). 
According to Hiernaux (2000), urbanisation in the Chalco Valley constituted a very 
orderly process of clandestine plotting, organized by local politicians and professional illegal 
land promoters, who made a huge profit from selling the ejidos. It was not until 1989 that the 
State
23  intervened, legalising the selling -buying operations, handing out deed titles a nd, 
years  later,  providing  services.  The  population‘s  quality  of  life  in  the  emerging  illegal 
settlements of the Chalco Valley was very poor. Basic urban services were lacking as were 
social  equipment  and  infrastructure.  In  1988,  just  a  few  months  after  taking  over  the 
presidential office, the former President Carlos Salinas used the Chalco Valley case to launch 
his new social policy programme called Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL - 
the  National  Programme  of  Solidarity).  The  Chalco  Valley  became  synonymous  with 
PRONASOL; the  ―cradle of Solidarity‖ (Varley, 1996). It is a commonplace to say that 
                                                 
7 CORETT, Comisión Nacional de Regularización de la Tenencia de la Tierra, the National Commission for 
the Regularization of the Land Tenure is the federal agency in charge of legalising rural land. 
8 The municipality of Chalco Valley-Solidarity was officially formed in November 1994. Before that time that 
area was part of Chalco municipality. 
 
   137 
PRONASOL radically transformed the Chalco Valley; however, in the following section a 
brief analysis of the impact of PRONASOL in the Chalco Valley will helps explain how its 
implementation in the medium term created the material and social conditions for hazard 
generation and floods vulnerability.  
 
 
2.3 PRONASOL in Chalco Valley and local environmental deterioration 
 
In December 1988 the former President Carlos Salinas announced the national launching of 
PRONASOL in the Chalco municipality. Thus Chalco became the symbol of PRONASOL; 
the political marketing images and social propaganda depicted Chalco as the cradle of a new 
social policy. During the 1980s Chalco municipality underwent the second highest growth 
rate at state level after the Chimalhuacán municipality. In 1980 its population was 78,393 
inhabitants, a figure that increased up to 282,940 in 1990, representing an average annual 
growth rate of 14 percent. By 1995 Chalco municipality had 175,430 inhabitants and the 
Chalco  Valley-Solidarity  municipality  alone,  286,906.  This  meant  that  at  the  end  of  the 
1990s Chalco Valley-Solidarity reached an annual growth rate of 10 percent, ranking 10
th 
amongst all 122 municipalities in the State of Mexico as far as population size is concerned 
and  represented  2%  of  the  total  population  of  the  Metropolitan  Zone  of  Mexico  City 
(Sobrino, 1996).  
As an illegal settlement of Mexico City periphery, Chalco municipality lacked basic 
services. According to Sobrino (1996) in 1990 there were 53,980 houses with an average of 
5.24 members per household; but only 29.9 percent of them had access to drinking water. 
This figure represented the lowest percentage in the whole State of Mexico. The sewage 
system covered only 25.3 percent of houses while 94.7 percent had electric energy but over 
half was supplied by clandestine methods, connected to high voltage lines along the Mexico-
Puebla highway. Only one inhabitant out of three had access to health services. Given the 
lack of basic services and poor quality of solutions (septic tanks, open sewers) Chalco was 
considered to have been the ‗lost city‘ (la ciudad perdida) Under these social circumstances 
PRONASOL was ‗born and grew‘.  
 PRONASOL‘s main goal was to attack poverty by raising the living standards of the 
most impoverished and promoting social participation at base community level (Sandoval,   138 
1993). But according to some authors other implicit goals were pursued: social investment 
and political control (Sandoval, 1993); political strategies for securing the necessary support 
to  continue  in  a  neo-liberal  direction  (Dresser,  1991);  and  in  a  more  conventional  way, 
addressing poor people‘s basic needs (Sobrino, 1996).  
At this moment it is worth discussing the `political culture of clientelism` that has 
permeated in some manner the implementation of development policies in Mexico and had 
an impact in disaster prevention measures. The ´political culture of clientelism` is a central 
issue  in  Mexican politics  because  it  has conditioned the allocation of resources to meet 
people‘s needs. One example of this situation is the process of land tenure regularisation that 
has  been  the  object  of  political  struggles.  Varley  (1993  and  1996)  has  documented  the 
importance  of  land  tenure  regularisation  in  maintaining  political  stability  in  urban  areas 
between 1970´s and 1990´s in Mexico. She calls for bringing into the analysis of ´squatter 
settlements´ the political implications of regularisation of the ejido land. This is important 
since Chalco Valley‘s urbanisation occurred on ejido land.  Varley showed that ejido land 
regularisation is ―an element in the state‘s repertory of responses to demand-making by the 
urban  poor.  It  has  helped  to  maintain  political  stability  by  demobilizing  independent 
organization in low-income areas and by remobilising the urban poor within the limits of 
political activity prescribed by the existing regime (the then PRI regime)‖ (1993:268) 
Even though it is important to recognise the politics underlying this policy and its 
broader implications, in the following the focus is put on the impact PRONASOL had in 
meeting  poor  people‘s  basic  needs  and  its  relation  with  hazards  generation.  It  is  at  this 
collective level - drinking water and sewage system provision, paved roads- that conditions 
for  hazards  creation  and  risk  construction  can  be  analysed.  The  implementation  of 
PRONASOL in the region represents another very important moment of change. But, to what 
extent did services and public works carried out during PRONASOL implementation really 
provided solutions to such collective problems? Did PRONASOL meet social needs in the 
short run by increasing hazardous conditions and the likelihood of chronic flooding?  
PRONASOL  programmes  were  classified  in  three  categories:  Social  well-being, 
productive  projects  and  regional  development.  Here  the  focus  is  put  on  those  issues 
belonging  to  the  social-well  being  category,  i.e.  drinking  water,  sewage  systems,  street 
rehabilitation, improvement and paving, environmental projects and housing. These are the 
aspects that have collectively determined flooding proneness and disaster vulnerability but   139 
which were intended to fulfil basic needs. Up to now, chronic flooding has been the result of 
the poor functioning of the sewage system (being LCC a central part of it) and its connection 
to the terrain sinking, according to affected residents and experts. In addition, the pollution of 
water pipelines has permanently prevented Chalco‘s inhabitants from having access to safe 
drinking water.  
According to Sobrino (1996) despite the fact that Chalco‘s population was poor, the 
main challenge it faced was not that relating to private conditions, such as minimum wages, 
but to the lack of collective basic services. By analysing the relationship between expenditure 
per project and population needs, the most severe problems identified were those associated 
to  the  lack  of  sewage  system  and  drains,  drinking  water  and  health  services.  Sobrino 
observed that the majority of economic resources were actually channelled to social well-
being and productive projects. Spatially speaking, the colonias urbano populares (popular 
urban neighbourhoods) of the Chalco Valley region benefited in particular from drinking 
water pipelines, sewage, electrification, sidewalks and in some cases pavement.  
PRONASOL expenditure in Chalco on these projects amounted to 221.8 millions of 
new  pesos,  the  equivalent  to  54.4  percent  of  the  total  amount  invested  in  the  whole 
municipality  and  equal  to  the  total  amount  invested  in  all  PRONASOL  projects  in  the 
Ecatepec municipality, the municipality with the second highest expenditure at state level. 
The drinking water project cost 41.4 millions of new pesos, providing benefits to 14,995 
houses.  The  expenditure  in  the  sewage  system  was  the  highest  in  absolute  terms  and 
amounted 102 millions of new pesos (Sobrino, 1996).  
Despite  these  improvements  (between  1989  and  1991,  46,000  water  outlets  were 
installed under PRONASOL [Schteingart and Torres, 1997:161]), Sobrino reported that the 
quality of life of Chalco‘s population after PRONASOL was precarious because 50 percent 
of the houses still lacked sewage and drains and 4 out of 10 did not have drinking water. 
Other assessments agree with this statement. Schteingart and Torres reported that in 1990 the 
water  consumption  in  Chalco  averaged  82  litres/inhabitant/day,  which  was  the  lowest 
consumption level in all the 122 State of Mexico municipalities. Chalco was also ranked the 
lowest in terms of volume coverage; the demand averaged 0.8 m3/sec whereas the supply 
was 0.3 m3/sec, thus representing a deficit of 0.5 m3/sec. It is worth mentioning that between   140 
1989  and  1993  Chalco  was  the  municipality  that  received  and  used  more  PRONASOL 
resources
24 than any other municipality in the State of Mexico and the rest of the country.  
Despite all the public works carried out, health problems continued. Drinking water 
and sewage projects did not diminish the incidence of gastrointestinal diseases because the 
water was polluted either by underground or above ground sources. The quality of piped 
water was so bad that inhabitants continued to buy drinking water supplied by trucks, a 
situation that represented a heavy economic burden
25. The supply frequency was another 
problem. More than  half of the houses were supplied only few hours a day and in some 
houses the volume of vital liquid provided was insufficient. Another important issue is 
related to the instalment and maintenance of the sewage system. Although Chalco was better 
serviced since 1991, due to the nature of the terrain and that the groundwater is near the 
surface, it has proved difficult to widen and maintain the network.  
As mentioned in the previous sections of this chapter, La Compañía River performed 
a fundamental ecological and economic role during the time of the haciendas and the factory 
boom. However, it is important to underline the process of environmental degradation that it 
has undergone after PRONASOL, in particular how the river turned into an open sewage 
canal. In the last twenty years it became part of the sanitation system, used as the main open 
dumping stream of the  colonias  both  in Chalco, Chalco Valley-Solidarity  and Ixtapaluca 
municipalities. The  sewage  network channels untreated domestic wastewaters and  human 
excrement  to  LCC.  Eight  pumping  stations  are  continuously  discharging  highly  polluted 
water, which constitutes a permanent threat to the adjacent colonias. For that reason LCC has 
become a matter of concern for both the inhabitants and municipal, state and federal water 
authorities. However, at the time of writing this chapter (December 2006) no final solution 
has been provided yet.  
Less  than  fifteen  years  after  the  implementation  of  PRONASOL,  environmental 
problems are far from being tackled and solved. PRONASOL not only failed to solve the 
sanitation  problematic  but  actually  increased  the  hazardousness  of  the  canal  and  the 
probability of flooding. A time bomb was set up ready to explode, and it did! In the next part 
                                                 
9 For the State of Mexico municipalities the pool of PRONASOL resources was compounded by federal and 
state sources (from 20 to 30 percent) and by international credit managed by the National Bank for Public 
Works (50 percent) 
 
25 Analysis of interviews to affected people undertaken in Avándaro and San Isidro colonias in the Municipality 
of Chalco Valley-Solidarity during the first semester of 2003.    141 
of this section, LCC problematic is examined in order to explain its hazardousness and its 
relation to chronic risk and flooding. 
 
3. Hazards, people‟s vulnerability and recent policy responses.  
 
3.1 Recent policy responses and the failure of risk management of La Compañía Canal.   
 
La Compañía River originates in the side of the Ixtlaccíhuatl volcano and flows down 
towards the North-East discharging into the Canal General in the former lake of Texcoco. It 
is 30 km long and is formed by the tributaries San Rafael, Santo Domingo and San Francisco 
rivers. It crosses the plateau of the former Chalco Lake, the Mexico-Puebla highway and the 
federal road (see PHOTO 2).  
 
PHOTO 2. Municipalities of Chalco Valley-Solidarity, Chalco and Ixtapaluca 
 
Source: Google Earth, 2008; edited by Fernando Aragón (2008) 
 
When the river enters the municipalities of Chalco Valley-Solidarity and Chalco it is 
used  as  an  open  sewage  canal  (labelled  ´La  Compañía  Canal´)  that  receives  domestic   142 
wastewater pumped up from the sewage system and hazardous wastes from industries located 
along  the  canal.  In  Chalco  Valley-Solidarity,  ODAPAS  [the  water  management  and 
sanitation body of the Chalco Valley] operates four pumps serving each one an average of 
13, 000 m3/day of domestic wastes, while CAEM [the water and sanitation body of the State 
of  Mexico]  operates  another  four.  There  are  also  seven  factories  which  dump  industrial 
wastes downstream in the segment that crosses the Ixtapaluca and La Paz municipalities
26. 
The water content is primarily compounded of eroded soil that accumu lates and reduces the 
canal capacity, domestic wastes like excrement, and other organic matter and toxic waste. 
Garbage and dead bodies of dogs and other animals have also been found. All this obstructs 
the water flow.  
As it was mentioned earlier, floods have been a recurrent phenomenon in the Chalco 
Valley since the beginning of the XX century and they should be regarded as the outcome of 
an historical process in which natural and social factors have intervened. As reviewed above 
in section 2, due to chan ges in modes of production and land use inhabitants‘ relationship 
with floods have changed over time; and after being used as a vital resource, they turned into 
a  threat  to  settlers.  Flood  hazardousness  is,  in  this  particular  case,  the  result  of  the 
combination  of  rainfall  (especially  during  rainy  season  between  May  and  September), 
urbanisation on flat land, ground subsidence due to overexploitation of groundwater and a 
malfunctioning sewage system and LCC. They constitute what is commonly called ‗known 
threats‘ because of their repetitive behaviour patterns. Known threats in the region are old 
phenomena and have been primarily related to river and canal overflows
27. As observed by 
comparative studies on vulnerability and risk mapping (Trujillo et  al 2000), flooding cases 
like this one are becoming more frequent. More and more settlements are precariously built 
in high risk-zones such as in the peri-urban interfaces of cities in the developing world.  
                                                 
10 Paper mill ‗San Jose‘, smelting factory ‗Volcanes‘, Chemical Akzo Nobel, carton paper mill ‗Los Reyes‘ 
paper mill Heda, slaughterhouses ‗La Paz‘ and ‗ABC Los Reyes‘ and Yakult (CAEM, 2003) 
 
11 Reports found in the Water Historical Archive show that, for instance, in August 1937 a group of Chalco‘s 
peasants (Sociedad Local de Crédito Ejidal de „Uni￳n Progreso de Chalco‟) demanded to the Agriculture  
Minister a prompt solution to the floods caused by the overflow of the Ameca river that wrock havoc in their 
cultivation, jeopardizing 2,000 ejidatarios households livelihoods. As solution authorities proposed to control 
the peak river flows by constructing a deviation canal to discharge in idle zones and thus reducing the water 
volume. (SHCP, 1937; SAF, 1938) 
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Official reports and affected residents‘ accounts of past events point to the failure of 
the sewage system and LCC overflowing when explaining the occurrence of floods. In this 
context LCC is regarded today by the local people as a severe chronic hazard that poses a 
permanent threat to them. In fact, it has overflowed several times since late 1980‘s. Experts‘ 
findings agree. In 1994 the National Centre for  Disaster Prevention (CENAPRED, 1994) 
carried out an analysis of the La Compañía River functioning and concluded that between the 
upstream  hydrometric  stations  of  San  Marcos  and  San  Lucas  and  the  downstream 
hydrometric station of Los Reyes there was a high volume gradient of 28 m3/sec, which 
meant that overflowing was occurring. Fissures of the canal walls and consequent leakages 
may also help explain that.    
Moreover,  local  people  are  able  to  distinguish  between  different  types  of  flood 
hazards according to the flow origin, the extent of the damaged area and the composition of 
the water. When interviewed, Avándaro residents adjacent to La Compañía Canal referred to 
collective memories of past floods caused by the canal overflow and the upward filtration of 
groundwater.  A  male  resident  of  that  colonia  says  that,  for  many  years  inhabitants  of 
Avándaro had to tackle those two kinds of hazards which sometimes are seen as separated 
threats. Actually they complained to local authorities about the „unexplained floods that used 
to spring up from underground‟. In response, in 1992 the CNA provided a water pump to 
cope with that specific hazard, disregarding the whole sewage system. That became a routine 
situation and a person was even hired to operate the machine on a daily basis. Another source 
of concern to inhabitants is the walls cracking. As mentioned by a resident „[…] through the 
cracks  the  canal  cries  and  we  get  worried‟  (Fieldwork  interview,  February  2003).  In 
response to this threat, CNA has been carrying out a monitoring scheme in order to identify 
potential wall collapses.  
Groundwater  extraction  has  caused  serious  subsidence  and  is  interfering  with 
drainage  systems  increasing  flood  risk.  According  to  Mosser  (2002)  12  m3/sec  of 
underground water is extracted whereas only 8 m3/sec is naturally recharged. The plateau is 
sinking  40  cm  per  year  and  undergoing  a  racking  process.  The  sinking  is  permanently 
modifying  the  topography  to  the  extent  that  a  6  km  segment  of  the  canal,  between  the 
Tlapacoya Hills and the La Caldera volcano, ‗rose‘ 3 to 4 meters higher than the plain and 
has no slope so water frequently stagnates (CNA, 2000 b; Gravamex, 2001; Bitrán, et. al.,   144 
2000). According to Hernandez Lastiri (2001)
28, in that segment the ‗soft‘ terrain is made of 
clay and it ‗crashes‘ against the hard geology of the hills. As a result, cracks on the canal 
walls have been observed since 30 years ago. To Hernández Lastiri it is a common known 
process that is getting worse with the urbanisation of the zone. The CNA‘s response to the 
problem  has  consisted  in  the  reinforcement  and  heightening  of  the  canal  walls  and  the 
dredging of the canal bed, as seen in Photo 3.     
 
PHOTO 3. Maintenance works of La Compañía Canal 
 
Source: CENAPRED (2000) 
Edited by Fernando Aragón (2006) 
 
Nevertheless, according to CENAPRED experts, despite these public works being carried out 
there is uncertainty about the canal condition and its operation. As stated by CENAPRED it 
is an impossible task to predict either the appearance of the wall cracks or their magnitude 
and  timeframe:  “This  phenomenon  suddenly  and  unexpectedly  happens”  (Bitrán,  et.  al. 
2000:75). Another problem associated with the operation of the canal is that related to the 
malfunctioning  of  the  sewage  system  which  was  installed  under  PRONASOL.  Affected 
residents constantly referred to waste waters springing up through the drains. This situation 
                                                 
12  Personal  communication  during  an  interview  carried  out  in  November  2001.  Samuel  Hernandez  is  the 
resident engineer of CNA in charge of coordinating maintenance works to La Compañía Canal. 
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gets worse during the rainy  season. It is assumed that pumps cannot cope with the high 
volumes of storm water and the network and sewers get blocked.  
  In this context one can say that there are different flood hazards. Some of them are 
perceived as known, common events whereas others are seen as unexpected inundations. In 
fact one can assume that they make reference to different causes and effects of different 
magnitude.  As a consequence of the above, the risk situation linked to the LCC is a complex 
system created both by material transformations and differing interpretations of flood causes. 
LCC problematic is a good example of how a problem is socially constructed depending on 
the various actors involved. Therefore, there is no single conclusion of the whole problematic 
but  several  interpretations.  For  instance,  policy  makers  and  water  officials  affirm 
groundwater extraction and therefore ground subsidence is the main determining factor for 
LCC to crack. Others like affected people say that the lack of adequate maintenance is the 
main cause.     
The previous description of LCC situation shows that it is the result and combination 
of past physical transformations of the environment driven by human action. LCC is a man-
made hazard, but still there are different interpretations about flood causes and consequences. 
Experts  refer  to  uncertainty  and  natural  forces  like  storms  and  geo-hydrological 
transformations  to  admit  that  something  dangerous  might  happen;  whereas  inhabitants‘ 
hazard awareness allows them to distinguish various sources of risk flooding, being LCC the 
most important.  
As observed by Wisner et al (2003) hazards are intertwined with human systems, in 
affecting the pattern of assets and livelihood among people. It has already been seen how 
poor people migrated to a high risk zone and how settlements and policies have influenced 
the transformation of environmental conditions such as soil, topography, water availability 
and sanitation systems, all of which increased hazard and flood risk. In the next section of 
this part, vulnerable people in Chalco Valley are characterised in the light of the flood events. 
This is done in order to understand both unsafe conditions that resulted from the inundations 
and the way  in which people coped with the disaster and advanced their claims to local 
authorities, and how the latter responded. This characterisation is not meant to represent a 
complete description of the flood vulnerability of the affected region, but is a qualitative 
analysis of some affected residents, their vulnerability, their interpretations of the event, of 
their flood risk exposure, and of the government‘s responses.     146 
 
3.2 People‟s vulnerability and floods impact in four colonias of Chalco Valley: the chain 
of causation 
 
In this last part, I characterise people‘s vulnerability to floods in four colonias of 
Chalco Valley. To do this, I draw from the PAR model explained in Chapter One (Wisner et 
al 2004), placing particular attention on what the authors referred as the ‗unsafe conditions‘, 
that is, the ―… specific forms in which the vulnerability of a population is expressed in time 
and space in conjunction with hazard‖ (p. 55) The geographical areas considered for this 
research include four of the colonias most affected by the floods of June 2000; three of these 
are part of the municipality of Chalco Valley-Solidarity, including Avándaro, El Triunfo, and 
San Isidro, and one pertains to the  Chalco municipality,  Unión de Guadalupe (see later 
PHOTO 4). Until 1999, the area of what is now known today as El Triunfo was formerly part 
of Unión de Guadalupe. Avándaro is adjacent to La Compañía Canal and is on the north side 
of the Mexico City-Puebla highway. The remaining three colonias are in the south side of the 
highway. In 2000, the  Chalco Valley-Solidarity municipality had 323,461 inhabitants (49 
percent males, 51 percent females), and Chalco 217, 972 inhabitants (49 percent males and 
51  percent  females)  (INEGI,  2000).  In  order  to  analyse  the  ‗unsafe  conditions‘  of  the 
vulnerable people in the affected colonias, I first describe some socio-economic factors that 
contribute to shape people‘s proneness to floods, and afterward I move on to examine three 
‗unsafe  conditions‘,  namely  ‗physical  environment‘  ‗fragile  economy‘,  and  ‗policy 
responses‘. In particular, I focus on housing location and damage; capital and assets loss and 
the inability to replace these;  unequal distribution of emergency aid and social protection 
mechanisms such as coping strategies, and the claim making power of residents. 
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PHOTO  4.  Location  of  the  Colonias  Avándaro,  El  Triunfo,  San  Isidro,  and  Unión  de 
Guadalupe with regard to La Compañía Canal and the Mexico-Puebla highway. 
 
 
Source: Google Earth, 2008; edited by Fernando Aragón (2008). 
 
Table 1 compares socio-demographic data among the affected colonias. Data are taken from 
SCINCE  (Sistema  para  la  Consulta  de  Información  Censal),  INEGI  (2000).  In terms  of 
population size, San Isidro is the largest colonia, it quadruples the other three and it is the 
one that houses the most economically active population, that reaches almost 3,000 people. 
In contrast, San Isidro houses the majority of economically inactive population of more than 
2,500 people. In all four cases, the ratio between economically active/inactive populations is 
50/50. Working population earning between 1 and 2 minimum wages reaches 43 percent in 
El Triunfo, 42 percent in Avándaro, 44 percent in Unión de Guadalupe and 42 percent in San 
Isidro. Working population that earns between 2 and 5 minimum wages is as follows: 34 
percent in El Triunfo, 35 percent in Avándaro, 34 percent in Unión de Guadalupe and 34 
percent in San Isidro.    148 
TABLE 1. Socio-demographic Data of the Affected Colonias of Chalco Valley  
and Chalco  
Source: SCINCE (Sistema para la Consulta de Información Censal), INEGI, 2008. 
 
                                                 
29Minimum wage, salario mínimo, is the minimum wage an employer is legally obliged to pay to a worker per 
day for his/her work. In the State of Mexico in 2000, the minimum wage was 32.70 Mexican pesos (MX) (1US 
dollar equalled 10 Mexican pesos in 2000). The national average for the year 2000 was 35.12 MX. In Mexico, 
the minimum wage is set  by the Comisión Nacional de Salarios Mínimos, National Commission of Minimum 
Wages.(www.conasami.gob.mx, accessed in 13/05/08). 
  
Socio-demographic data  El Triunfo  Avándaro  U. Guadalupe  San Isidro 
Total population  1,631  1,960  2,190  8,160 
Male population  809  976  1,075  4,046 
Female population  822  984  1115  4,114 
Population in male-headed 
households 
1,335  1,536  1,794  6,580 
Population in female-headed 
households 
256  319  264  1,388 
Ratio of male/female-headed 
households 
84/16  83/17  87/13  83/17 
Economically active 
population 
617  732  730  2,963 
Economically inactive 
population 
512  600  742  2,593 
Ratio of economic 
active/inactive population 
55/45  54/46  50/50  53/47 
Non-working population  8  15  19  48 
Working population without 
income 
32  36  27  134 
Working population with 
less than one minimum wage 
53  54  62  320 
Working population  with 
1–2 minimum wages 
264  307  320  1,239 
Working population  with 
1–2 minimum wages (%) 
43  42  44  42 
Percentage of working 
population earning up to 2 
min. wages
29 per day 
58  55  56  58 
Working population with 
2–5 minimum wages  
213  258  246  1,006 
Working population with 
2–5 minimum wages (%) 
34  35  34  34 
Percentage of working 
population earning between 
2 and 5 min. wages per day 
42  45  44  42 
Working population with 
more than 5 minimum wages  
12  35  28  115 
Percentage of working 
population earning more 
than 5 min. wages per day 
2  5  4  4   149 
Also drawing from SCINCE, Table 2 compares the housing characteristics of the affected 
colonias considering house materials, piped water and sanitation, and number of residents per 
household.  
As was discussed in section 2.3 of this chapter, PRONASOL became a very important 
policy in meeting collective needs such as water and sanitation during the urbanisation of the 
Chalco  Valley-Solidarity  and  Chalco  municipalities.  This  is  reflected  in  the  number  of 
houses with sewage system and piped water as reported by SCINCE. In total, nearly 100 
percent of houses have access to water service regardless its quality –as analysed previously 
in  section  2.3.  Regarding  housing  materials  of  roofs  and  walls,  in  general  two types  of 
materials were reported to be found: ‗temporary and permanent‘. Houses with temporary 
materials  are  built  with  asbestos  or  cardboard  roofs,  whereas  houses  with  permanent 
materials are built with concrete or brick walls, 
 
TABLE 2. Data of housing, water provision and sanitation in the affected Colonias of the 
Chalco Valley and Chalco municipalities 
 
Socio-demographic 
Data 
Avándaro  El Triunfo  San Isidro  U. Guadalupe 
Number of houses  412  355  1,766  454 
Average number of 
residents per house 
4.67  4.57  4.61  4.59 
Average number of 
residents per room 
1.81  1.9  1.93  2.15 
Inhabited houses  419  358  1749  481 
Inhabited owned houses  397  348  1,701  448 
Owned houses with light or 
temporary material roofs 
139(35%)  134(38%)  540(31%)  167(37%) 
Owned  houses  with 
concrete or brick roofs 
255(65%)  212(62%)  1,156(69%)  278(63%) 
Owned houses with light or 
temporary material walls 
  4  25  6 
Owned  houses  with 
concrete or brick walls 
392(na)  343(98%)  1,670(98%)  439(98%) 
Owned houses with sewage 
piped to the public network 
(%) 
360 (90%)  337(96%)  1,617(75%)  428(95%) 
Owned  houses  with  piped 
water inside the house(%) 
149(62%)  65(79%)  380(76%)  63(84%) 
Owned  houses  with  piped 
water inside the property 
243(37%)  277(19%)  1,290(22%)  377(14%) 
Source: SCINCE (Sistema para la Consulta de Información Censal), INEGI, 2008. 
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Having  briefly  described  some  socio-economic  features, I  move  on  to  explain,  in 
qualitative terms, the ‗unsafe conditions‘ that characterise people‘s vulnerability that resulted 
in floods impact in Chalco Valley in 2000:  
   
I.  Physical  environment:  Unsafe  housing  and  risk-prone  location,  and  erosion  or 
damage of house materials.    
II.  Fragile  economy:  Capital,  assets  and  savings  lost  or  damaged,  jeopardising 
livelihoods, and job losses or unpaid. 
III. Policy responses: Unequal distribution of emergency aid and goods according to 
damage; increase of insecurity and social protection mechanisms; inadequate warning 
and claim making of affected people. 
 
The  information analysed derives  from  interviews conducted during the  first semester of 
2003 and is also drawn from on-site field observation and secondary sources such as INEGI 
geo-statistics data of INEGI, policy reports, and newspapers. 
 
I.   Physical environment 
 
Two physical aspects were identified as common characteristics of housing in the previously 
mentioned four colonias: a) unsafe housing and location, and b) house materials that can be 
easily eroded or damaged. The impact of 2000 floods caused houses and other assets to be 
lost or damaged in varying degrees ranging from contamination of rooms with wastewaters 
and  inundation  with  mud  to  complete  erosion  of  house  walls,  floors,  and  roofs,  which 
rendered these unsuitable for living (see Photos 5 and 6, later).    151 
PHOTOS 5 and 6 Colonia Avándaro in the aftermath of the floods of June 2000 
 
 
   
Source: CENAPRED, 2000 
 
Avándaro is adjacent to LCC; thus, it is exposed to groundwater up-filtering and to 
constant canal overflowing,  mainly during rainy seasons. The  vast  majority of  houses  in 
Avándaro are one-storey houses that were completely inundated; wastewaters rose up to a 
height of more than two meters, eroding house walls. Residents had either to temporarily 
move out or to stay on the roofs of their houses while awaiting assistance. A few two-storey 
houses coped better with the flooding; thus, some of these residents could stay on second 
floor during the entire emergency period. El Triunfo is exposed to canal over spilling because 
it is located immediately in front of the LCC and across the México-Puebla highway in the   152 
lowlands where the Tlapacoya hill slope ends (see PHOTO 4). Different types of houses are 
found.  The  poorest  houses  made  of  cardboard were  washed  away  by  the  currents;  these 
inhabitants lost everything. Two-storey houses were more resistant, and in the aftermath, as 
in the case of Avándaro, affected people preferred to remain on the second floor than move to 
the  shelters.  Due  to  the  ground-sinking  process,  a  large  number  of  houses  have  drains 
connected to the sewage system above the house‘s floor level. This situation makes them 
more prone to flooding. In addition, the piped water is of poor quality; therefore, residents 
need to purchase water that is carried in tanks or sold in bottles. This represents a huge 
economic burden, as discussed previously in section 2.3. Housing materials were damaged 
by  the  wastewaters  that  filtered  through  the  walls,  to  the  extent  that  some  rooms  were 
unsuitable  for  future  living.  Very  crowded  rooms  were  found  in  some  households,  for 
instance, nine people distributed in two small bedrooms (average size, 9 sq. meters).  
  Like El Triunfo, San Isidro is located immediately in front of the Canal and across the 
México-Puebla highway in the lowlands where the Tlapacoya hill slope ends (see PHOTO 
4). San Isidro is a flood-prone site due to the following three reasons: 1) It is exposed to 
canal overspilling; 2) the underground-water layer is very shallow (one meter in depth), and 
3)  the  sewage  system  does  not  work  properly.  This  means  that  frequently,  wastewaters 
stagnate for several days a week. One-storey houses are commonly found in San Isidro and 
are less resistant in this particular hazardous environment. During the rainy season, domestic 
wastewaters spring up through the drains, and it is common for houses to become flooded. 
Sometimes water pumps are not operating, and wastewaters flow back to the houses through 
the sewage system. Additionally, as it is in the case of El Triunfo, houses are below the 
sewage and drains level.  
  Although piped water is very expensive, its quality is very poor; thus, residents are 
required to purchase bottled water, which is also not of good quality.  The secondary sewage 
tube that is connected to the house is very narrow (30 cm) in relation to the volume it was 
meant to carry. There are no water meters; regardless of water consumption and number of 
residents, every household is charged the same amount, i.e. MX$ 750 per year per household 
(1$US dollar equalled $10 MX, Mexican pesos  in 2000). Household composition ranges 
between five and seven members who live in one or two rooms, as in the case in El Triunfo.  
  Unión de Guadalupe belongs to Chalco municipality and is located southeast of El 
Triunfo.  Its  boundaries  are  the  following:  to  the  north,  Zaragoza  Street;  to  the  west,   153 
Solidaridad Avenue; to the east, colonia Nueva San Isidro, and to the south, colonia Tres 
Marías (see PHOTO 4). Unión de Guadalupe was the least affected of the four colonias and 
inundations were provoked by the malfunctioning of the sewage system. Wastewaters sprung 
up through the drains and underground water filtered up through the soil. Floods level barely 
reached more than 50 centimetres. in houses nearest to El Triunfo, i.e., between Dr. Barragán 
and Oriente 35 Streets. One-storey houses are also commonly found in Unión de Guadalupe, 
but some families could afford to build a second floor. Additionally, as in the cases of El 
Triunfo and San Isidro, houses are below sewage and drains levels. Unlike in Avándaro and 
El Triunfo, some roads are paved. Although piped water is very expensive, its quality is very 
poor; thus, people are required to purchase bottled water, which is also of poor quality.   
 
II.  Fragile economy 
 
The  fragile  economy  of  the  Colonias  of  Chalco  Valley  at  the  time  the  fieldwork  was 
undertaken depended on capital, assets, and savings that can be easily lost or damaged, thus 
jeopardising the livelihoods of the households. This is also determined by the chance that the 
worker had during the time the emergency and the post-emergency phase of the disaster, of 
losing his/her job or of not being paid due to being unable to be at the workplace. Avándaro 
and El Triunfo were the worst affected colonias. In Avándaro and El Triunfo, people lost all 
their goods including furniture, electrical appliances, and food stocks such as rice, beans, and 
milk. The worst affected residents were unable to remain at their houses, and were obliged to 
incur unanticipated expenditures for renting rooms elsewhere temporarily (for periods of up 
to  3  months).  This  represented  a  huge  economic  burden  because  people  spent  a  high 
percentage of their income (up to 45 percent) to cover these rent amounts. In addition, during 
the  interviews  they  mentioned  not  having  food  stocks  and  savings  to  cope  with  the 
emergency. This situation made them more vulnerable to future floods impact.  
  Despite the important losses in capital and goods, at Colonia El Triunfo there were 
families who were able to rescue certain articles, such as refrigerators and sofas, because they 
could carry these items up to the second floor, thus avoiding their being flooded. Moreover, 
some  interviewees  reported  having  suffered  psychological  disorders  and  illness.  This 
prevented  them  from  going  to  work;  consequently,  they  were  dismissed  from  their 
employments. Also, some residents were afraid of losing their household goods; these people   154 
remained on the roofs of their houses and were thus prevented from going to their places of 
employment. As a result, they were not paid for the days on which they were absent from 
work. 
  Unlike Avándaro and El Triunfo, not all areas of San Isidro were inundated as a result 
of the incident. Houses were flooded up to 1.5 meters by the wastewaters. People living in 
one-storey houses lost nearly all of their household possessions, such as furniture, stoves, and 
clothing.  In  some  cases,  residents  were  required to  spend  their  money  on  renting  rooms 
elsewhere. Some landlords took advantage of the situation and charged these people very 
high rents (up to MX$1,000 pesos per month). Because Unión de Guadalupe is south of El 
Triunfo,  it took several  hours  for the wastewater  floods to arrive. This time-lag allowed 
people more time to carry their belongings up to the roof or second floor, and to place sand-
bag barricades at the doors, especially those who fortuitously had construction materials at 
home. However, some female-headed households were more vulnerable because the women 
are physically weaker and were unable to carry heavy items up to the roof.  
Additionally, this vulnerable situation was amplified by the fact that these women had 
to  work  and  also  look  after  the  house.  Goods  and  furniture  were  damaged  and  became 
useless. Wastewaters filtered through walls and floors. Affected people were unable to go to 
work, in some cases were not paid for days they were absent, and some lost their jobs, as had 
occurred in Avándaro, El Triunfo, and San Isidro colonias. There are some people who work 
at home  in their own workshops, such as  electrical and  mechanical; thus, they  lost their 
capital. Some unattended households were burglarised.  Blankets and other goods that were 
meant to be distributed to all affected people at the La Providencia Church were sold three 
months later at the Ignacio de Loyola Church located in Unión de Guadalupe. 
 
III.  Policy responses and affected people‘s coping strategies 
 
I include in this section affected people‘s interpretations of government responses prior to 
and after the inundations. Vulnerability also depends on how the government and NGOs 
allocate  emergency  aid  to the  affected  people,  that  is,  whether  aid  is  distributed  equally 
according to damage and needs. In other words, I analyse to what extent the aid provided 
helped households not only to endure and resist floods impact, but also to become better 
prepared to cope with future hazards. This also leads to examination of the elements of social   155 
protection on which vulnerable people could rely for tackling daily life only in the aftermath 
of the inundations.  
In Avándaro, some inhabitants were evicted and re-settled in the Colonia Los Cuatro 
Vientos up-stream of LCC and near San Marcos Huixtoco village. They were offered new 
houses under the Instituto Nacional de Fomento a la Vivienda de los Trabajadores del Estado 
(INFONAVIT)
30 , which is a publicly funded housing programme to assist poor people to 
acquire inexpensive credit to buy affordable houses. The eviction of tens of residents brought 
as a consequence that fewer people remained in Avándaro. Those who remained expressed a 
feeling of insecurity and loneliness. Insecurity is an important issue, and impact of floods and 
the policy is assessed by residents in terms of neighbourhood disruption, which is expressed 
in the relation <fewer neighbours = more insecurity>. In addition, they mentioned having no 
extra money to pay policemen to patrol the zone; this has been the ´normal´ practice in Chalco 
Valley.  
Inhabitants who remained were threatened by local authorities regarding that water 
and energy  supplies would be suspended  if these people did not move out of Avándaro. 
Several affected families were reluctant to leave the zone; thus, they continued to be exposed 
to the chronic inundations. Affected people had few coping strategies with respect to future 
floods.  Canal  inspection  was  carried  out  by  the  residents  themselves.  They  developed  a 
rudimentary early-warning system regarding canal overspilling. There is also a security alarm 
to warn the neighbours who remained of the presence of potential burglars. All families kept 
several dogs to provide protection against burglars.  
It is noteworthy that not all households coped in the same manner. There was the case 
of  a  man  who  was  a  local  politician  in  the  Chalco  Valley-Solidarity
31  municipality who 
mobilized and channelled resources and information from the outside Chalco Valley to his 
own benefit, thus avoiding the floods. He owned a house in Avándaro, but also another in 
Los Cuatro Vientos, allowing him to reduce the impact of the fl oods in his own case. As 
described at the beginning of this, section income levels are very low, making it difficult for 
people to recover fully. Female -headed households  –as  also  described  previously–  were 
found to experience greater difficulty in recovering, because they were required to work and 
engage in the housekeeping as well. Inhabitants who moved into a housing complex provided 
                                                 
30 Institute of the Housing National Fund for the State Workers. 
31 Information drawn from an interview with a male resident of San Isidro in March 2003.   156 
by the State (in Colonia Cuatro Vientos) found it easier to reconstruct their livelihoods, even 
though  they  contracted  a  credit  scheme.  In  foreseeing  future  inundations,  families  who 
remained  built  a  second  floor.  Some  inhabitants  with  political  relations  received  more 
benefits when they moved out. There is the case of one resident who received four houses as 
a trade-off.  
 To this  point,  in  all  cases  but  in  the  case  of  people  who  were  evicted,  self-help 
reconstruction of houses had taken place by the time the fieldwork ended –March–May 2003. 
Authorities denied relief aid to current residents and excluded them from future emergency 
aid  because of their reluctance to re-settle  in Los Cuatro Vientos. At El Triunfo, several 
coping strategies before, during and after the floods were reported to have been developed. 
Prior to the floods, organised groups activated a domestic early-warning alarm with regard to 
the LCC situation. Inhabitants from the neighbouring Colonias of San Isidro and Unión de 
Guadalupe joined together and participated in the reinforcement of canal walls. Immediately 
after the floods, the affected residents organised a ‗commission‘ for permanent overseeing of 
the canal and warning residents of the potential increase of the water level.  
The ‗commission‘ reports to the Delegado,
32who in turn reports to the municipality 
President.  It  was  found  that  the  commission  was  not  functioning  as  expected;  it  rarely 
convenes. In addition, commission members have no power to enforce authorities to respond. 
Local authorities coordinated inundations drills only twice, and as expressed by El Triunfo 
interviewees, such practices were useless. During the floods, in general, emergency aid was 
provided to mitigate material losses. Family and neighbour networks provided help during 
the emergency stage by sheltering affected people in their own unaffected houses.  
Residents of the Alfredo del Mazo Colonia helped in cooking food for the El Triunfo 
residents. The poorest inhabitants were unable to afford house modifications for coping with 
future inundations; they became more vulnerable. Since the floods, several households have 
built  second-floor  rooms  in  foreseeing  future  inundations.  A  compensation  scheme  of 
MX$10,000 per affected household was implemented; therefore, affected people were meant 
to receive these funds. It was reported that in some cases, affected people did not receive the 
money,  whereas  non-affected  people  did  receive  it.  This  was  both  reported  in  some 
newspapers and was found during interviews with affected residents. The Catholic Church 
was involved in distributing aid in the form of blankets, clothing, etc.  
                                                 
32 A Delegado is the person who is a representative of several households of the same blocks within a colonia.    157 
In  San  Isidro,  some  affected  people  who  were  able  to  move  to  their  relatives‘ 
unaffected houses, either in the same colonia or in other places. Aid in the form of food was 
not equally distributed; distribution of foodstuffs and goods was carried out by the Catholic 
Church, which kept some and sold some. Affected people received help-in-kind from friends 
and relatives. Shelters provided accommodation for a few days for some people, who moved 
once  they  found  friends  with  whom  to  stay.  The  same  compensation  scheme  was 
implemented. Some continued to construct a second floor and had already moved all their 
furniture  and  additional  household  items  to the  second  levels.  One  can  assume  that  this 
implicitly means that they foresee similar upcoming inundations.  
  Because Unión de Guadalupe is located south of El Triunfo, it took several hours for 
the floods to reach there. This time-lag permitted people more time to carry their belongings 
up to the roof or to the second floor, and to place sand-bag barricades at the doors, especially 
those who fortuitously had construction material at the home. However, some female-headed 
households  were  more  vulnerable  because  their  members  were  unable  to  carry  heavy 
belongings up to the roof, in addition to their being required to work and also to do the 
housework.   
 Household response varied according to the origin, trajectory, and magnitude of the 
inundations. Some affected residents were sheltered at the La Providencia Church, and others 
moved  to  relatives‘  homes,  and  other  places,  such  as  the  bordering  Nezahualcóyotl 
Municipality and Mexico City, where they stayed for over a week or more. Some affected 
people coped better with the floods because they were less dependent on external aid. People 
who worked or those supported by the company that employed them could afford to buy the 
items  that  they  needed  on  their  own.  Thus,  networks  of  family  and  friends  were  of 
fundamental importance. Unemployed women depended solely on external aid.  
Floods drill and contingency plans for evacuation were put into practice by affected 
residents but with the passing of time, interest faded, along with participation. In interviews 
with  local  residents,  information  emerged  that  people  did  not  trust  the  authorities  while 
implementing the plan.  According to affected people, drill and planning coordinators are 
useless individuals without experience. In Unión de Guadalupe, residents are aware of future 
events; therefore, they coordinate to respond at the moment of the emergency. As in the case 
of other colonias, aid in the form of food was not equally distributed; the distribution of   158 
foodstuffs and goods was in the charge of the Catholic Church, which kept some of these and 
sold some.  
A reconstruction scheme was implemented by the Federal Government: Ten thousand 
MX  were  handed  out  by  SEDESOL  (this  is  the  same  compensation  payment  previously 
referred  in  pages  154-5)  per  household  to  affected  households,  and  furniture  was  also 
distributed  to  those  that  lost  theirs.  By  the  time  of  the  fieldwork,  some  people  were 
constructing a second floor and had already moved all their furniture and other household 
items to the second level of their homes. This might mean implicitly that they foresee similar 
upcoming  inundations.  Affected residents have addressed their claims to local authorities 
with regard to the Canal situation and sewage-system malfunctioning. Their main concern 
was the lack of maintenance of LCC. In any case, according to interviewees no action by the 
government has been taken. There is a common idea among El Triunfo residents that the best 
way to solve the problem definitively is to pipe the canal. Each year before the rainy season, 
inhabitants ask local authorities to dredge and clean the canal. One year, before the floods of 
2000,  Avándaro‘s  residents  addressed  complaints  to  the  Municipal  President  in  order  to 
provide maintenance (dredging) for LCC. As a result of this request, CNA provided a water 
pump to discharge floodwaters into LCC. 
   San  Isidro  interviewees  mentioned  that  they  addressed  claims  to  local  water 
authorities on LCC conditions, lack of maintenance, and the likelihood of breaking from the 
beginning  of  the  1980s.  When  maintenance  is  performed,  it  is  carried  out  at  dates 
approximating  the  rainy  season.  Claims  making  has  not  been  a  collective  activity;  some 
people have been involved more than others. It is said that lack of leadership impedes the 
organizing and forming of committees for taking action. A few days after the floods of 2000, 
affected and non-affected residents from various colonias including Avándaro, El Triunfo, 
San Isidro, and Unión de Guadalupe gathered at the highway and manifested their desire to 
close the highway. The reason: aid had been halted, and compensation money was not given 
to all of the affected individuals; instead, unaffected people did receive these monies. Mob 
organizers  were  threatened  by  authorities.  Claims  had  been  addressed  to  local  water 
authorities concerning LCC, lack of maintenance, and the likelihood of its breaking since the 
beginning  of  the  1980s.  An  episode  occurred  when  the  canal  fractured  and  claims  were 
addressed to the then Municipal President, but no action was taken.    159 
Figure 3 shows the chain of causation that resulted in the Chalco Valley floods in 
2000.  It  is  important  to  mention  that  the  PAR  model  applied  has  been  criticised  in  the 
literature because it is difficult to identify linkages between root causes and unsafe conditions 
and also because interior drivers for vulnerability are downplayed. Nevertheless the chain of 
causation  is  presented  here  to  explain  how  root  causes  might  have  evolved  into  unsafe 
conditions that  interacted with the  hazards.  The figure summarizes the  process explained 
through previous sections of this chapter.  
The analysis of water-related vulnerability in this chapter aims to contribute to the 
already  existing  knowledge  on  the  topic  in  the  sense  that  the  explanation  of  flood 
vulnerability as a socio-historical process emphasises  issues of environmental  justice and 
human rights (Restrepo, 1995), citizen´s rights (Castro, 2004) and the need to acknowledge 
climate change adaptation as a policy choice (Landa et al, 2008)    
Concerning water access as a citizen‘s right, Castro (2004) has justified the need to 
explain  water-management  problems  not  only  in  terms  of  the  technical  solutions  but 
considering also the social ones for the Mexico City context.  An explanation of issues such 
as water scarcity requires an understanding of how natural and social processes intertwine, as 
often they  cannot be explained away solely  by  reference to climatic or hydro-geological 
constraints.  The  socioeconomic  and  political  inequalities  that  determine  the  exclusion  of 
large sectors of the population from full access to water and sanitation services have to be 
integrated into water and sanitation policies. Castro states that unfortunately, the incursions 
of social science that have informed mainstream water policies since the 1980s have largely 
overlooked the centrality of the water-related conflicts as part of a social process involving 
the exercise of substantive citizenship rights and the governance of public affairs such as the 
provision of water services. This chapter´s findings contribute to the understanding of the 
social dimensions of water vulnerability by discussing the socio-economic processes that put 
people at flood risk and informing disaster prevention and water and sanitation policy.   
Regarding the issue of climate change adaptation, Landa et al (2008) emphasise the 
need to develop an integral risk weather management at policy level. In order to do so, it is of 
paramount  importance  to  produce  knowledge  on  climate  dangers,  vulnerability  and  the 
various examples of water resources conservation. In this sense, the analysis of this chapter 
provides  concrete  inputs  on  how  to  establish  linkages  between  urbanisation  and  poor 
people‘s  exposure  to  water-related  hazards.  It  can  be  argued,  then,  that  climate  change   160 
adaptation measures should be placed into the development context of cities and regions and 
by  consider  the  processes  whereby  vulnerable  people  respond  to  chronic  water-related 
hazards.                             
 
  
  161 
 
 
   ROOT CAUSES                    DYNAMIC            UNSAFE                                   DISASTER                      HAZARDS 
               PRESSURES            CONDITIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deforestation in Sierra 
Nevada triggered soil 
erosion which decreased 
rivers and Chalco Lake’s  
productivity. Paper mills 
contributed to deforestation. 
 
End of XIX and beginning of 
XX Century Rural power 
structure favoured Spanish 
landlord elites over poor.  
 
Spanish  Haciendas  
promoted commercial 
agriculture taking control of 
natural resources and 
water. Dessication of 
Chalco Lake favored this.  
 
Mexican Revolution re-
distributed land to local 
peasants. Low productivity 
of land contributed to 
emigration to cities. 
 
Since the end of 70s  
immigration and illegal 
urbanisation in floods-prone 
areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low income means poor 
self-protection; livelihood is 
in dangerous place; few 
assets so less able to 
recover. 
 
PRONASOL in Valley  of 
Chalco legalized  and 
furthered urbanisation in 
ecologically fragile areas.  
 
Inappropriate protection 
measures create floods risk 
for many.  
 
Lack of government control 
and land use planning for 
the poor. Disasters policies 
socially insensitive. 
 
Poor could not afford 
increase in housing and 
rental prices in Mexico City 
and Neza and thus 
migrated and settled in peri-
urban areas.  
 
Poor population pressure 
and subdivision of the 
former ejido land.  
Corrupted system of 
clandestine plotting allowed 
by the local government 
 
Lack of democratic  
governance impedes 
inhabitants to voice their 
claims regarding floods 
prevention 
   
   
Large number squatting in 
flood-prone places, adjacent 
or very close to La Compania 
Canal 
 
Poor self-protection. House on 
lowland and on a lower level 
than sewage. House materials 
easily eroded or damaged.  
 
House restoration and 
protection for future floods 
unaffordable by the poor.  
Populous households depend 
on few members’ wages. Low 
or zero food stocks and 
savings.  
 
Income levels very low for 
most inhabitants, difficult to 
recover after the flood thus 
becoming more vulnerable to 
future floods Unable to 
replace assets. 
 
Malfunctioning sewage 
system and terrain sinking 
make difficult to dispose waste 
waters into La Compania 
Canal. 
 
Inadequate maintenance of  
La Compania Canal make it 
prone to fractures. Early 
warning system not working 
yet. No insurance scheme  
provided by State 
House and other assets 
lost or damaged. 
 
Capital and savings lost; 
livelihoods jeopardized. 
Loss of local businesses. 
 
Many became more 
vulnerable and exposed to 
future floods. 
 
Job losses or unpaid for not 
going to work. 
 
Unequal distribution of aid 
and goods prevented all 
affected from receiving fair 
compensation according to 
damage. 
 
Illness or injury preventing 
livelihood recovery. 
 
Increase of insecurity and 
lack of social protection 
 
 
 
 
Heavy rainfalls, 
flooding on former 
lakebed. 
 
Wastewaters 
overspilling of La 
Compania Canal 
 
Wastewaters 
discharges due to 
canal walls 
breakage. 
 
Sewage system 
malfunctioning so 
domestic waste 
waters stagnate and  
inundate streets and  
houses. 
 
.  
FIGURE 3. CHAIN OF CAUSATION THAT RESULTED IN CHALCO VALLEY‟S FLOODS  
IN JUNE 2000  
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Conclusions 
This  chapter  puts  floods  into  a  socio-historical  perspective,  provides  elements  to 
explain both the nature and dynamics of the peri-urban interface
33 in time and space 
and emphasises the social dimension of  disaster. Human agency,  institutions and 
policies are a central part of the social dimension of flood analysis. The focus here is on 
the dynamic relationship be tween hazard generation and vulnerability construction, 
where institutions and social actors played a key role. Natural hazards are not only 
caused by natural phenomena but also the outcome of socio -environmental changes 
over time such as urbanisation, mig ration and capitalist development. The material 
essence and meanings of hazards have changed over time and depend on the projects 
and policies implemented. Natural resources can become a threat to human populations 
and can be shaped by the impact humans make on ecosystems and man-made systems. 
Great moments of social change provoked radical transformations between 
society and the environment, which in turn paved the road to risk construction. This is 
illustrated by the transformations driven during the Spanish Conquest and the Mexican 
Revolution. Migration and urbanisation in the peri-urban interface should be taken into 
consideration  when  analysing  floods  because  rural -urban  dynamic  pressures  have 
produced unsafe conditions where poor people currently live.  Policies designed and 
implemented to address basic collective needs can be conditioning factors for hazard 
creation and risk exposure in the long run. PRONASOL promoted the legalisation and 
consolidation of illegal settlements in a flood-prone area in the Chalco valley and that 
made poor residents more vulnerable to hazards produced by La Compañía Canal and 
the sewage system. Prevailing explanations for floods that are based on La Compañía 
Canal as the most important source of risk conceal other forms of hazards that are also 
relevant, such as the malfunctioning of the sewage system and ground water up -
filtering. Differing conceptualisations of hazards and floods either highlight or hide 
causes of disaster, their impact and what or who is to blame. This has  been illustrated 
by the various interpretations of the people affected and of policy makers with regard 
to inundations in general and La Compañía Canal in particular. 
                                                 
33 ―The peri-urban interface can be characterised as a heterogeneous mosaic of natural, agro and urban 
ecosystems  affected  by  the  material  and  energy  flows  demanded  by  urban  and  rural  systems.  In 
socioeconomic terms the PUI is the place where a continuous but uneven process of urbanisation takes 
place accompanied, generally, by land speculation, informal and illegal activities. The social composition 
of  the  PUI  is  highly  heterogeneous  and  subject  to  change  over  time,  where  weak  and  fragmented 
institutional arrangements co-exist‖ (Allen, 2003).  
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CHAPTER FIVE. THE DISASTER POLICY CONTEXT IN MEXICO  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter Four, I presented the case of Chalco Valley floods of June 2000 in order to 
understand, among other issues, how governmental responses were put into place to 
cope with floods impact. I concluded that ‗preventive‘ programmes and actions were 
not designed to tackle people‘s  vulnerability  in  the  face of  flooding  hazards, while 
emergency responses proved to be adequate temporarily to halt the wastewaters of LCC 
from flooding the colonias and to prevent people from contracting contagious diseases.  
This research seeks to explain the relation between ‗natural‘ disaster framings 
and  institutional responses at the policy  level to understand that the Chalco Valley 
floods were socially constructed. It is necessary, then, to understand how the arguments 
and discourses of disaster causality and the institutional responses were constructed by 
the main subjects involved, namely, scientists, policy makers, implementers, and local 
operators. Thus, I sought to examine in depth the policy context, that is, the public 
sectors and institutions involved in disaster prevention and civil protection in Mexico. 
Therefore, the  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  analyse  both  the  National  System  of  Civil 
Protection of Mexico (SINAPROC) and the Civil Protection System of the State of 
Mexico (CPSM), their institutional organisation, and functions.  
In  section  1  of  this  chapter,  I  briefly  review  the  historical  evolution  and 
conceptual origins of SINAPROC; focus is placed on the ‗Systemic-Cybernetic‘ model 
that  underpins  SINAPROC,  and  I  seek  to  explain  how  this  model  determined  the 
conceptual structure of disaster at the policy level in Mexico. In addition, I review the 
nature  of  the  institutional  responses  deployed  during  the  administrations  of  former 
Mexican President Vicente Fox and State of Mexico governor Arturo Montiel (2000–
2006 and 1999–2005, respectively), and I delimit the current scope of SINAPROC and 
the CPSM. Because  it  is assumed that  institutional discourses are embedded  in the 
various  policy  artefacts,  in  section  2,  I  discuss  civil  protection  programmes  at  the 
federal and State of Mexico levels. I focus in particular on the programmes designed 
during the previously mentioned administrations because it was prior to and during that 
period that the Chalco Valley floods occurred.  
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1. Historical background, conceptual origins and the foundational framework of 
the National System of Civil Protection in Mexico  
 
In Mexico, concepts and policies related to natural disaster have emerged from within 
the realm of civil protection. A brief historical review shows that the development of 
civil protection has been an issue of governmental concern dating to second half of the 
XIX Century. Garza (2001) noted that the first attempts to protect populations from 
calamities began in the XVIII Century, when a group of civil servants called serenos 
inspected streets and alerted inhabitants in the case of fire. Serenos were replaced in 
1890 by policemen. However, it was not until President Benito Juarez‘s administration 
in the 1870s that the first ‗programmes‘ and fire-fighter groups were created to protect 
the population from fires, floods, and earthquakes. An example of this is the  Junta 
General de Socorros that was conformed to assist the people affected by the floods in 
1888 in several states of the country in co-participation with the Army. Some years 
later,  under  the  ruling  of  President  Porfirio  Díaz,  the  Fire  fighting  Service  was 
institutionalised and the Mexican Red Cross was created.   
The international geo-political context played an important role in the origins of 
civil protection. Gelman (1996) notes that the origins of civil protection are rooted in 
the idea that Mexico could need protection from enemy air bombings during the time of 
World War II.  Thus, in many nations such as Mexico, the Army is in charge of the 
coordination of the emergency assistance to the affected and ‗wounded‘ and the setting 
up of refugee shelters.  To Garza (2001) and Gelman (1996), one of the most significant 
moments that shaped the civil protection system in Mexico as we know it today was 
when  the  federal  government  installed  the  ‗civil  protection  service‘  in  1942  for 
protecting the population against air attacks  from Germany, Japan, and Italy  during 
World War II. The service convened inhabitants and the participation of the ministries 
of the Army, Navy, Communications, Public Works, Public Health, Public Assistance, 
Department of the Federal District (Mexico City administration), and the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs the latter performing  as coordinator of all of these.   
Although  the  civil  protection  service  ‗faded  away‘  as  a  ‗institutionalised‘ 
service,  since  that  time  disaster  have  been  an  important  concern  for  the  Mexican 
government, to the extent that within the National Plan of Development (2000–2006; 
2007–2012), there has been an explicit federal government commitment to investment 
in emergency, restoration, and relief plans and to mainstreaming risk reduction into  
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development policies and planning; examples of this policy situation is the creation and 
implementation of the Fund for Natural Disasters (FONDEN) and the Fund for Natural 
Disasters  Prevention  (FOPREDEN)  respectively  during  the  1990´s.  By  the  1940s, 
disaster were conceived of as a type of air raid, and this conception exerted a significant 
influence  on  the  types  of  responses  deployed  and  therefore,  on  the  current 
conceptualisation of the SINAPROC.  
           In this regard, it is worth mentioning that emergency actions and assistance to 
affected people and restoration to ‗original‘ conditions have been activities coordinated 
by the Mexican Army through the already created Plan DN-III in 1966. Plan DN-III 
continues to be considered the most important (and visible) aid response deployed by 
the Mexican government in the aftermath of disaster. The objective of the Plan DN III-
E is to implement emergency actions to assist people affected by disaster by rescuing, 
evacuating,  providing  medical  assistance,  protecting,  maintaining  social  order,  and 
preventing future calamities by monitoring risks (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, 
PLAN DN-III).  
Experts  agree  that  the  most  significant  moment  that  finally  determined  the 
creation of a ‗Policy System‘ at both the Mexico City and  national  levels occurred 
when the Mexico City earthquakes took place on September 19 and 20, 1985.
34 This is 
considered the turning point regarding  disaster policies. At that time, the Mexico City 
and Federal governments were not prepared to cope with such terrible consequences, 
including over 10 thousand deaths according to gov ernment reports, huge damages to 
the infrastructure, the interruption of basic services, and the inability to create social 
conditions for the reconstruction of many zones.  Thus, the  former President  de la 
Madrid (1982-1988)  and the Federal Government -at-large came to realise that an 
institutional framework was necessary to coordinate action and tackle  disaster impact. 
As  a  result  of  this  and  in  the  aftermath  of  the  1985  earthquakes,  the  Federal 
Government responded in October 1985 by installing the Nation al Commission of 
Reconstruction  (Comisión  Nacional  de  Reconstrucción),
35  (CNR)  whose  main 
objectives were the following:  
                                                 
34 Two previous disasters caught the attention of the entire Mexican society: the eruption of Chichonal 
Volcano (1982), and the explosion of chemical plants in San Juan Ixhuatepec, State of Mexico (1984), but 
these were not of the magnitude of the Mexico City earthquakes in 1985. They can be seen as part of the 
entire awareness process that the society developed; this reached its peak with the 1985 earthquakes. 
35  The  National Commission of Reconstruction, through its technical secretariat, formed nine sub -
committees that elaborated the BI: 1) Research on civil protection; 2) Identification and detection of  
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―1) to co-ordinate assistance for affected people, and  
2)  to  set  up  the  basis  for  establishing  mechanisms, 
systems,  and  organisations  to  assist  population  better  in 
future  disaster,  incorporating  the  experiences  of  public, 
social, and private institutions, the scientific community, 
and the population‖;  
(Comisión Nacional de Reconstrucción, 1986: 13) 
 
To  achieve  the  second  objective,  the  CNR  (1986)  elaborated  the  document 
entitled  ―Basis  for  the  Implementation  of  the  National  System  of  Civil  Protection‖ 
(BI),
36 which contains the rationale, justification, contents, and institutional framework 
of a national policy necessary to cope with  disaster. According to BI, the goal of the 
national  civil  protection  policy  had  been  conceived  to  ―protect  citizens  against  the 
dangers and risks resulting from the eventuality of disaster‖. Within the context of the 
whole  National  Plan  of  Development  (1983–1988),  a  National  System  of  Civil 
Protection (SINAPROC) needed to be created to express the State‘s responsibility and 
to  respond  to  the  challenges  of  Mexico‘s  development  in  joint  fashion  with  the 
participation of the society. This policy was established to channel governmental efforts 
and to provide the means to preserve the population‘s lives, goods, and services in the 
face of vicissitudes and risks and therefore, to contribute to the progress of Mexico.  
Since its inception in 1986, SINAPROC was said to be a ‗functional system‘ 
composed of three main components (CNR, 1986, Gelman 2003,
37 and Gelman, 1996): 
1) an institutional structure; 2) a conceptual and planning framework, and 3) methods 
and procedures. The institutional structure included government ministries of different 
kinds,  such  as  ‗normative‘  and  ‗operative‘  ministries  such  as  the  Army,  the  Navy, 
Urban Development and Ecology, Health, Communications and Transportation, Public 
Education, Trade and Industrial Development, PEMEX, and the National Commission 
of Electricity and the specific bodies of civil protection (at federal, state, and municipal 
levels)  and  sought  to  integrate  the  private  and  social  sectors  as  well.  The  civil 
protection bodies would operate within the existing institutional structure, and this was 
thought to be the platform on which ‗new‘ policy orientations would take place. In this 
                                                                                                                                          
catastrophes; 3) Technological development; 4) Social organisation and participation; 5) Education and 
capacity building; 6) Law framework; 7) Planning, organisation, and execution of immediate action; 8) 
articulation between the Federation and State and municipal governments in civil protection matters, and  
9) Social communication. 
36 This was published in the Official Newspaper of the Federation, May 1986. 
37 Interview with Gelman, May 2003.  
  168 
regard and as stated in BI, public administration would ‗learn‘ how to add ‗new values‘ 
of civil protection to its existing functions. 
 With  respect  to  the  conceptual  basis,  BI  took  note  of  the  fact  that  a 
‗systematic‘,  ‗objective‘,  and  ‗rational‘  model  was  necessary  to  approach  ‗civil 
protection and disaster problems‘ with the participation of science, technology, and 
public  administration.  BI  included,  among  other  sections,  a  ‗diagnosis‘  that  was 
intended to examine the level at which knowledge of the disaster and civil protection 
situation  was  at the  time  in  Mexico. This  would  establish  the  base  for  prospective 
thought on the critical problems that would be solved in the future. This ‗diagnosis‘ 
included three dimensions: a temporal; a spatial, and a demographic one (this latter 
referred as the ‗social‘ component) (CNR, 1986). But, what is important to refer in this 
thesis  is  to  understand  the  manner  in  which  ‗natural  disaster‘  was  framed  in  this 
diagnosis.  
My  analysis  of  the  diagnosis  shows  that  there  is  a  significant  physical 
geographic  determination  of  disaster  framing,  although  human‘s  actions  were 
recognised as a relevant component. Disaster was defined in terms of natural agents 
(geology,  volcanism,  environment,  hydro-meteorology,  climatology)  that  exert  a 
disturbing  character  on  human  populations.  These  were  labelled  as  the  disturbing 
agents (DA). It was argued that society can contribute to avoid or diminish calamities 
by  tackling  DA  through  normative  actions  such  as  land  use  planning  and  legal 
frameworks.   
The second component comprises the ‗affectable‘/‗affected‘ agents (AA). These 
are populations, goods, services, and infrastructure. Population density and distribution 
in  the  Mexican  territory  are  ‗the  social‘  aspects  considered  in  the  conceptual 
framework. Populations could face risk when DA occurs in a specific area (Gelman, 
1996). Highly dense risk zones are prone to disaster; thus, preventive actions should be 
undertaken  in these geographic regions. And the third component is the ‗regulatory 
agents‘  (RA),  which  are  regulations,  norms,  actions,  and  works  oriented  toward 
protecting  the  AA  and  controlling  and  preventing  DA  from  generating  destructive 
events. RA can be the legal, political, and administrative frameworks, the financial and 
material resources, and the monitoring and forecasting systems of natural threats. It was 
thought that scientific and technical knowledge of the physical processes is sufficient to 
identify causes and consequences of natural disaster and their impact on populations.  
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Therefore, disaster conceptual structure was constructed as a linear simple equation that 
comprised the previously mentioned three substantive parts as follows:  
Disaster = (DA* AA) – RA. 
At this time, it is important to mention that this conceptual basis was elaborated 
not in a vacuum,  but  in a specific  institutional  setting, and  it was the result of the 
application  of  a  ‗model‘  proposed  from  within  the  Institute  of  Engineering  of  the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). The theoretical underpinnings 
of  the  foundational  framework  are  rooted  in  the  ‗Systemic  and  Cybernetic‘  model 
developed  by  Gelman
38  in  the  mid -1980s  (1996,  s.f.)  as  part  o f  the  programme 
denominated Investigación Interdisciplinaria sobre Desastres, IID
39 (Interdisciplinary 
Research  on  Disaster),  which  aimed  to  study,  forecast,  and  control  disaster  in  an 
interdisciplinary manner.  
According to Gelman (1996: 14), the model is ‗systemic‘ because it provides 
the  means to understand the relations among all components, and  it  is ‗cybernetic‘ 
because it allows us to view the control mechanisms that govern the organisational 
structures and the management and planning processes. The three main assumptions of 
the ‗Systemic and Cybernetic‘ model are the following: a) Disaster can be framed as 
systems; b) Intervention can be carried out in the system, and c) Steering and control 
functions of all subsystems are important for either impeding or diminishing disaster 
occurrence or for decreasing disaster impact. Figure 4 (later) is a representation of the 
framework. Gelman labels this the ‗Fundamental Paradigm of Disaster‘, upon which 
the entire SINAPROC was conceived. 
                                                 
38  Interview with Gelman, May 2003. 
39 For Gelman, to date, the IID has made relevant contributions in the establishment and development of 
crucial institutions such as CENAPRED and SINAPROC itself.  
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Figure 4. „Fundamental Paradigm of Disaster‟ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gelman (date n.a.), modified by F. Aragón (2004). 
 
In Chapter One, I mentioned that Prince‘s concept of disaster had an impact on 
further  theoretical  developments.  It  appears  that  this  ‗Systemic  Cybernetic‘  model 
shares  Prince‘s  main  assumptions.  One  can  observe  how  the  concept  of  disaster 
employed in BI resembles that of Prince. Thus, disaster in BI is defined as follows: 
―(…) the event concentrated in time and space, in which either 
society or part of it suffers severe damages and losses, to such an 
extent that social structure misadjusts and impedes society from 
developing its essential activities, affecting its vital functioning‖ 
(CNR, 1986: 70)‖.  
 
  And, the following is the objective of the National System of Civil Protection as 
stated in the CNR: 
 
Normative 
parameters 
Regulatory system 
Legal frameworks, land use planning, civil protection 
programmes) 
Disturbing system 
(Calamities, natural or 
man-made hazards) 
Affectable system 
(populations, infrastructure) 
Conducting system  
  171 
―To protect the person and society in the eventuality of a 
disaster  provoked  by  natural  or  human  agents,  by 
undertaking actions to reduce or eliminate human losses, 
the  destruction  of  material  goods,  and  the  damage  of 
nature  and  the  interruption  of  society‘s  essential 
functions‖.  
(Ibid: 111). 
Thus far, I have reviewed key elements upon which the national policy of civil 
protection was founded, because it was important to trace the institutional background 
and  the  conceptual  underpinnings  that  served  as  the  basis  for  the  further  policy 
developments that finally became the basis of the current SINAPROC. Next, the most 
recent versions of SINAPROC and CPSM are discussed with the aim of delimiting the 
policy system, as this thesis focuses in particular on its programmes and laws.  
 
2. The National System of Civil Protection and the Public Institutions.  
 
The National System of Civil Protection (SINAPROC) is the public policy system in 
charge of civil protection and disaster prevention issues in Mexico. Its main goal is to 
protect the lives of Mexican citizens. According to SEGOB:  
 
―The SINAPROC is an organic and articulated set of 
structures,  relations,  methods  and  procedures 
established by public institutions with the participation 
of several volunteer, social and private groups along 
with the authorities of the States, Federal District and 
municipalities, aimed at protecting population against 
dangers and risk in the likelihood of a disaster‖.  
(SEGOB, a 2001: 23).  
 
SINAPROC is composed by the following sectors (see Figure 5): 
  
2.1 Ministry of Internal Affairs (SEGOB) is the federal head and the main ministry 
responsible  for  civil  protection.  SINAPROC  is  headed  by  the  Minister  of  Internal 
Affairs, who reports directly to the President of the Republic. SEGOB is responsible for 
guaranteeing  order,  peace,  and  safety  to  all  Mexican  citizens.    In  terms  of  civil 
protection, SINAPROC coordinates all public institutions‘ actions when a disaster takes 
place and channels foreign aid (with the participation of the Ministry of International  
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Relations) into the Mexican territory. In the light of a potential emergency situation, 
governors request that SEGOB issue a ‗disaster declaration‘ (declaratoria de desastre) 
in order to receive federal funds from the Natural Disaster Fund (FONDEN). Only the 
Minister,  along  with  the  President  of  the  Republic,  is  legally  entitled  to  determine 
whether a situation can be officially and legally considered either an emergency or a 
disaster. 
 
2.2  General  Coordination  of  Civil  Protection  (GCCP)  belongs  to  the  Ministry  of 
Internal Affairs and is the central office that coordinates the SINAPROC. This General 
Coordination  promotes  the  implementation  of  the  NPCP,  the  elaboration  of 
programmes at the federal, state and municipal levels, the coordination of emergency 
responses  and  the  FONDEN,  and  the  promotion  of  a  civil  protection  ‗culture‘  and 
communication.  It  is  entitled  to  announce  emergency  and  disaster  situations 
declarations and to channel FONDEN economic resources to assist  disaster-affected 
people  and  affected  regions.  It  delegates  specific  functions  in  its  three  general 
directions:  FONDEN;  CENAPRED,  and  the  General  Direction  of  Civil  Protection 
(GCP). 
 
2.3 General Direction of Civil Protection (GCP) is charged with designing, formulating, 
and  evaluating  policies  and  programmes  oriented  toward  preventing  disaster  and 
protecting populations. It provides advice to ministries and other public institutions on 
the matter and coordinates these when prevention, assistance, and restoration activities 
are required in case of disaster. It is the ‗operational arm‘ of the General Coordination. 
It may also be involved in advising CENAPRED on risk diagnosis. It is the ‗operative 
arm‘ of SINAPROC because it coordinates emergency aid and disaster mitigation. 
 
2.4  Fund  for  Natural  Disaster  (FONDEN)  was  created  in  1998  to  provide 
complementary funds to Mexican States and municipalities when disaster consequences 
are of such a high magnitude that the existing responses of the States and their financial 
sources are insufficient. It assesses and determines the allocation of funds to Ministries 
and State governments, and provides advice to state and  municipal  governments to 
constitute Trusts to cope better with natural disaster. It also proposes regulatory criteria 
for  the  adequate  operation  of  FONDEN.  Funds  are  mainly  targeted  to  vulnerable  
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groups: children; women: elderly and handicapped people, and less favoured groups in 
terms of low income.
40   
 
2.5  National  Centre  for  Disaster  Prevention  (CENAPRED)  is  a  scientific  and 
technologic  research  centre  founded  in  1990  whose  objectives  comprise  the 
development of knowledge  and the promotion and application of technologies to 
prevent and mitigate disaster. Its mandate is also to provide professional training and to 
communicate preparedness and auto-protective measures to people exposed to disaster 
contingencies. It provides technical guidelines for policy formulation. CENAPRED 
elaborated  and  edited  the  Special  Programme  of  Disaster  Risk  Prevention  and 
Mitigation 2001–2006  (DRP),  in  which  60  projects  for  preventing  and  mitigating 
disaster risk are proposed within the Civil Protection Programmes (2001–2006; 2007–
2012).  
 
2.6 State System of Civil Protection is made up of the State unit and the State council 
of civil protection. The former represents the operative and normative body, and the 
latter is the advisory body in which public, private, social, and academic sectors ideally 
participate. The general director of civil protection of the State government is the head 
of the State system. There are 32 systems, one for each State. One of its mandates is to 
elaborate and promote the implementation of the State Programme of Civil Protection. 
The State System of Civil Protection coordinates emergency aid in all municipalities 
under its jurisdiction. The Governor of the State is entitled by law to request extra aid 
and funds from the GCCP.   
  The Civil Protection System of the State of Mexico (CPSM), whose origins can 
be traced to the Mexiquense Solidarity Committee (Comité de Solidaridad Mexiquense) 
created in April 1986 as a consequence of the 1985 earthquakes, is integrated by the 
State Council of Civil Protection, the General Direction of Civil Protection of the State 
of  Mexico  (belonging  to  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  of  the  State  of  Mexico),  and 
several other ministries of the State of Mexico‘s government and social and private 
organisations  and  institutions.  According  to  the  Civil  Protection  Programme  of  the 
State of Mexico 1999–2005, the CPSM has addressed a number of ‗calamities‘ with 
                                                 
40  Funds  have  already  been  applied  to  promote  temporal  employment  programmes  oriented  toward 
restoring productivity and infrastructure, i.e., zones affected in the State of Yucatán by Hurricane Isidore 
in 2003.  
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success (the San Juan Ixhuatepec explosions, Popocatépetl volcano eruptions, forest 
fires between 1998 and 2000, to mention some), protecting people‘s lives, goods, and 
the environment with the aid of the information technology systems, the transportation 
and communication infrastructure, and different groups such as the Fire-fighters of the 
State of Mexico, volunteer groups of different kinds, and NGO´s.  
 
2.7 Municipal System of Civil Protection is compounded of the municipal unit and the 
municipal council of civil protection. The former represents the operative body, and the 
latter, the advisory body in which ideally public, private, social, and academic sectors 
participate. The Fire fighting Department is usually attached to this system and operates 
under the municipal director‘s orders.  To date, civil protection system has not been 
installed in all municipalities. According to the General Coordinator of Civil Protection 
in 2003, 80 percent of the 2,446 municipalities in Mexico had civil protection units. 
 
2.8 Institutional Structure is made up of various Ministries such as Social Development, 
Environment  and  Natural  Resources,  Transportation  and  Communications,  Public 
Health,  the  Army,  the  Navy,  and  decentralised  state-owned  companies  such  as  the 
Mexican Oil Company (PEMEX) and the Electricity Federal Commission (CFE). It 
coordinates activities and emergency responses to cope with disaster consequences. The 
Ministries  take  part  in  the  damage  evaluation  process  as  well.  For  example,  the 
Ministry of Public Health coordinates and guarantees the provision of medical services 
to the affected population to avoid the spreading of contagious diseases such as cholera. 
 
2.9 Population refers to the population-at-large,  that is, all people  living within the 
limits of the Mexican territory. Population is said to be the main civil protection policy 
target. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  175 
 
Figure 5. National System of Civil Protection (SINAPROC) 
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Source: Segob, 2001:36, modified by 
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3. Civil Protection Programmes  
 
3.1 National Programme of Civil Protection 2000–2006 
 
In Mexico, the National Plan of Development (NPD) is the national strategic planning 
aimed  at  fostering  a  ‗sustainable  human  development‘.  By  law,  once  the  elected 
president takes over office, he along with his ministers are obliged to design the NPD 
for a period of six years to coincide with the 6-year Presidential term of office. One of 
the  five  axes  of  the  NPD  is  ‗Governance  and  Security‘  (Estado  de  Derecho  y  
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Seguridad), which establishes the need to promote both a reactive and preventive civil 
protection system. It is said that this can be achieved through the implementation of the 
National Programme of Civil Protection (NPCP). 
NPCP is the main policy instrument that seeks to enhance people‘s awareness of 
the risks posed by natural, technological, and environmental dangers and to strengthen 
the  commitment  of  the  policy  sectors to  reduce  risk  that  may  affect  infrastructure, 
natural resources, and people‘s livelihoods. NPCP is also oriented toward promoting 
civil participation in order to build more resilient communities in the light of future 
hazards, and toward mitigating and reducing the economic and social losses caused by 
disaster (SEGOB, a 2001).  NPCP has four general objectives: 
1.  To transform  the  SINAPROC  into  a  preventive  system,  strengthening  social 
participation,  and  enhancing  the  mitigation  of  natural  and  anthropogenic 
disaster.  
2.  To  articulate  policies  and  actions  involving  the  ministries,  institutions,  and 
organisations  that  integrate  the  SINAPROC  in  order  to  prevent  and  assist 
affected populations in case of emergencies. 
3.  To  develop  mechanisms  to  detect  and  forecast  natural  hazards  and  to 
communicate such information to populations and to the SINAPROC-at-large. 
4.  To generate a self-protection culture and a responsible attitude on populations 
exposed to disturbing phenomena.  
(SEGOB, 2001 a: 69). 
 
NPCP contains the objectives, means, strategies, and lines of action to regulate 
and coordinate SINAPROC activities. It is linked to a group of normative frameworks 
such as the Civil Protection Law of each Mexican state
41, and several agreements and 
decrees that frame the involvement of the participation  of national and international 
organisations of various kinds and roles. The NPCP (SEGOB, 2001 a, 2007) states that 
the  main  challenge  SINAPROC  faces  is  to  conform  a  ‗preventive‘  civil  protection 
system that could integrate federal, state, and municipal levels, population, and social 
and private sectors. The basic underlying assumption is that disaster can be prevented 
through the participation of the whole society. Ideally, SINAPROC should achieve a 
                                                 
41 There are 31 States and one Federal District (Mexico City) in the Mexican Republic.  
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‗preventive character‘ and not only a reactive one, as the case has been up to date (April 
2008).  
According to the NPCP, Civil Protection policy goals should then be oriented: 
  To raise people‘s awareness on the risks posed by natural, technological, and 
environmental hazards. 
  To reaffirm the commitment of public authorities to reduce risks that affect 
people‘s sustenance, socio-economic infrastructures, and natural resources. 
  To promote citizen participation to enable them to resist disaster. 
  To reduce economic and social losses caused by disaster. 
  To further research, capacity-building, and resources allocation to contribute to 
preventing or reducing the most striking risk effects on vulnerable people. 
 
To accomplish all this, risk reduction must be mainstreamed into the actions and 
programmes  of  the  different  development  sectors  of  public  administration. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  not  clear  as  to  how  this  can  take  place  within  the  actual 
organisational  structure  and  policy  system.  In  this  regard,  efforts  were  made  in  an 
attempt to ascertain the main obstacles to be addresses in order to ‗infuse‘ ‗preventive 
values‘ into civil protection policies. In this vein, during the Fox administration (2000–
2006), recommendations and conclusions were drawn by SEGOB and CENAPRED in 
the search for a ‗real‘ disaster prevention system (SEGOB, 2001, a). The following is a 
review  of  the  main  assumptions  and  arguments  set  forward  by  SEGOB  and 
CENAPRED  that  reflect  the  SINAPROC  view  of  a  disaster  prevention  policy  and 
possible solutions proposed: 
 
  Lack of information and a ´culture of prevention´ among populations.  
 
It is believed that the dissemination of the scientific information of threats and disaster 
is the key element to develop a ‗culture of prevention‘. The underlying assumption is 
that people‘s response to avoid risk exposure is determined to a certain degree by the 
physical  characterisation  of  hazards  and  how  this  can  influence  attitudinal  and 
behavioural changes, therefore triggering ‗the expected actions‘ Thus, it is thought that 
a  ‗scientifically  informed‘  society  is  better  able  to  cope  with  disaster  than  a 
scientifically illiterate one. It is also assumed that all populations find scientific and  
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technical  information  meaningful  to  act  and  respond,  regardless  of  their  differing 
positions and roles in society. The institutional response desiring to tackle this problem 
should be able to generate more and better scientific information regarding disaster risk. 
For instance, evaluation of hazards at the local level for the construction of Risk Atlas 
by state governments is a central tool to improve risk management.    
 
  Weak participation of government, population, and social and private sectors in 
disaster programmes.  
 
In the SEGOB-CENAPRED view, it is argued that strengthening the participation of all 
sectors  of  society  would  improve  the  effectiveness  of  disaster  policies  because 
everyone would know what to do and how to do it. This shortcoming, in fact, is linked 
to the way people make sense and acquire knowledge of the ‗risk situation‘. Thus, it is 
assumed  that  participation  can  be  enhanced  by  acknowledging  ‗risk  exposure‘  and 
consequently changing people‘s behaviour. Again, as this takes place with regard to 
knowledge  of  risk,  I  argue  that  participation  is  not  contextualized  in  the  subject‘s 
position in society.     
 
  SINAPROC is a reactive-oriented system that must to be changed.  
 
Up to 2008, the SINAPROC has been a system that reacts once a disaster has occurred. 
Without  denying  the  crucial  importance  of  emergency  responses,  mitigation,  and 
rehabilitation measures for restoring society‘s well-being, SEGOB and CENAPRED 
state  that  SINAPROC  needs  to  become  a  preventive-oriented  system  through  the 
implementation  of  risk  reduction  measures.  This  has  become  a  central  concern  for 
nearly all policy makers interviewed,
42 but changes to mainstreaming risk reduction 
‗values‘ into all policy sectors involved in development and disaster prevention are not 
underway at present, not is even the manner in which to  proceed.  
                                                 
42 Interviews conducted between March and May 2003 with the General Coordinator of Civil Protection, 
General Director of Civil Protection, General Director of CENAPRED, Coordinator of Capacity Building 
of CENAPRED, Coordinator of Communication of CENAPRED, and Research Director of CENAPRED.  
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  Decision-making  process  and  information  generation  are  excessively 
centralised.  
 
SEGOB  and  CENAPRED  believe  that,  as  do  other  public  policies,  that  local 
governments and populations in all municipalities are enabled and need to be entitled 
and empowered to make decisions that affect them. Since the 1990s, decentralisation of 
planning processes and administrative functions in the public policy domain have been 
a  central  concern  in  the  democratic  transition  in  Mexico.  In  this  vein,  it  is  widely 
accepted in disaster science and policy communities that, for instance, a Risk Atlas at 
state and municipal levels can become a central tool to regulate development, land use 
planning, and productive activities in order to reduce risk. To date, only some cities 
possess a Risk Atlas; Toluca City in the State of Mexico is an example. 
 
  Insufficient realisation that disaster adverse consequences impact mainly the 
poor and vulnerable groups.  
 
SEGOB and CENAPRED explicitly acknowledge that poor and vulnerable groups are 
more prone to disaster than others, but this is not actually reflected in policies. This 
must to be recognised by governments, decisions makers, and the population-at-large. 
The main targets of policies are meant to be such groups. If this is to happen, I argue 
that it must be reflected in disaster prevention and civil protection programmes through 
acquaintance with the progression of vulnerability that places such groups at risk in the 
face of potential hazards, and by knowing whether the ‗target groups‘ are those that are 
vulnerable  or  whether,  contrariwise,  these  are  not  located  under  specific  unsafe 
conditions.  It  is  thought  that  this  can  be  coupled  with  promoting  a  self-protection 
culture, with the aid of technical and financial resources (i.e., adequate application of 
FONDEN guided by a cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit approach; implementing the 
Risk Atlas that truly integrates vulnerability to hazards, etc.) 
 
  Weak articulation between scientific research and SINAPROC.  
 
According  to  SEGOB  (2001),  research  outcomes  (e.g.,  those  of  CENAPRED)  are 
required to inform policies and therefore be disseminated within the entire SINAPROC. 
It  is  generally  assumed  that  scientific  knowledge  and  the  prevailing  scientific  and 
technical knowledge of hazards are always meaningful to policy makers and people to  
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trigger the ‗expected‘ adequate responses. Thus, one of the  main goals of NPCP  is 
designed  to  address  physical  vulnerability  through  evaluating  infrastructure 
vulnerability and enforcing building regulations.  
 
  Lack of systems for monitoring natural hazards and geographical information.  
 
Despite the importance given to scientific and technical knowledge in framing disaster, it 
is  acknowledged  that  current  monitoring  and  geographical  information  systems  are 
insufficient  to  characterise  hazards  and  to  estimate  risk  throughout  the  country. 
Therefore, another important goal of the National Programme of Civil Protection is to 
strengthen applied research to develop or improve technologies for mitigating risks. The 
naturalist view of disaster risk, as discussed in Chapter One, is reinforced by calling for 
more  funds and research on  forecasting and  monitoring  natural hazards.  This policy-
technical response relies in the assumption that disaster can be known and controlled. 
 
  Few financing resources allocated to address and prevent damages.  
 
 Additional  funds  must  be  invested  in  natural  hazards  research  and  forecasting  and 
disaster impact research. It is believed that the pay-off for investing in prevention lies in 
the less negative consequences that may arise if disasters are reduced. In this respect, 
two goals are to be achieved, namely, to identify and improve knowledge on threats and 
risk  at  community  level,  and  to  strengthen  applied  research  to  develop  or  improve 
technologies  for  mitigating  risks.  A  Disaster  Prevention  Fund  (FOPREDEN)  was 
created to finance local disaster risk-reduction initiatives. 
 
  Informal sectors are not protected by the Fund for Natural Disaster.  
 
Informal sectors are defined as those that are outside legal frameworks. By 2008, illegal 
settlers  who  have  no  rights  over  land  and  housing  are  not  entitled  to  receive 
compensation  grants  from  FONDEN  once  the  disaster  has  taken  place  and  from 
FOPREDEN  to  preventive  measures.  For  less  favoured  groups,  it  is  less  likely,  or 
impossible, for reconstruction to occur. This has been recognised by SEGOB as a very 
important  issue  to  be  addressed;  thus,  FONDEN  implementation  rules  are  being 
reviewed.  
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3.2 Research on disaster and technological projects 2000–2006  
 
Because knowledge production and its relation to the policy-making process is a central 
issue in this thesis, review of the research agenda and outcomes provides insights to 
show the current orientation of disaster research on Mexico, especially in CENAPRED. 
Thus,  discussion  of  the  CENAPRED  research  agenda  for  the  2001–2006  period 
follows. This is due to three reasons. First, CENAPRED is the official research centre 
that  provides  scientific  and  technical  information  to  federal  ministries  and  State 
governments; second, it is linked to other institutional research agendas, in which it 
exerts an important influence in setting the research agenda, and third, interviews with 
policy  makers  indicated  that  the  knowledge  CENAPRED  produces  is  a  continuous 
reference upon which policy arguments are built, let alone the public funds required to 
maintain its staff and work facilities.   
Thus, the objective in this part is two-fold; to underscore the knowledge selected 
to define the agenda and projects, and to identify the key conceptual issues chosen to 
frame  disaster  as  an  object  of  ‗scientific  study‘.  It  is  important  to  mention  that 
CENAPRED  is  not  the  only  centre  that  studies  disaster,  but  it  is  indeed  the  most 
important at the national level. SEGOB affirms that ―from SINAPROC‘s origins, one 
of  its  priorities  has  been  the  production  of  knowledge  and  the  analysis  of  risk-
generating conditions as the most available way to plan and organise strategies and 
actions to protect populations‖ (SEGOB, 2001, a: 76). In this vein, the National Atlas of 
Risks was elaborated, in addition to the Diagnosis of Dangers and Risk Identification in 
Mexico.  
In relation to risks diagnosis, CENAPRED planned to increase the number and 
scope of studies covering disaster-prone zones involving academic institutions during 
the  2001–2006  period.  In  this  respect,  GCCP  and  CENAPRED  makes 
recommendations to universities to educate students in disciplines such as hydrology, 
meteorology, geophysics, seismology, vulcanology, and earth sciences with the aim of 
training,  in  the  medium  term,  human  resources  to  undertake  scientific  studies  for 
proposing solutions.  
Continuing with this effort, in 2001 CENAPRED (SEGOB, 2001, b) published 
the Special Programme of Disaster Risk Prevention and Mitigation 2001–2006 (DRP). 
Sixty research, technological development, communication, and training projects were  
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thought to be have been implemented between 2001 and 2006 to integrate the DRP,
43 
requiring the participation of several public institutions.  DRP is structured in three 
parts. The first is focused on d iagnosing the different types of natural phenomena, 
including geological, hydro -meteorological, chemical, and environmental, and their 
impact on socio-economic development. The so-called socio-organisative phenomena 
(by  civil  protection  policy  makers)  –which  refer  to  riots,  mobs,  and  very  large 
concentrations of populations–, are also mentioned, but in less detail. The second part 
lists the strategies of the National Plan of Development in Civil Protection matters and 
the cost-benefit significance of disaster prevention, and highlights the relevance of the 
new roles that technologies and basic and applied sciences play in recognising threats 
when pursuing disaster prevention and mitigating the consequences. The third part lists 
the objectives and the means to achieve these. 
According to the Research Director of CENAPRED, ‗Mexican citizens-at-large‘ 
participated  in  the  DRP  elaboration,  reminding  (us)  that  all  Mexicans  should  be 
involved in disaster prevention and disaster risk mitigation. He claimed that an open 
consultation  process  permitted  integration  of  different  social  and  private  sectors‘ 
viewpoints.  In the opinion of CENAPRED‘s Research Director, this institution has 
played  an  important  role  due  to  the  vast  scientific  experience  of  its  researchers. 
Contributions from different ministries and public institutions were also integrated as 
well,  as  those  from  international  organisms  specialized  in  the  matter  (Interview 
undertaken with the Research Director at his CENAPRED office in April 2003).  
CENAPRED notes that DRP was conceived of as the tool to develop and apply 
methods and knowledges to protect, on an equal basis, human beings from phenomena 
that cause disaster. In order to achieve its objectives, some previous conditions must be 
met,  i.e.,  all  sectors  and  populations  must  share  responsibilities,  an  accountable 
federalist system oriented toward sustainable development is also necessary, etc. The 
main DRP goal  is to reduce the effects of  natural and  anthropogenic  disaster. It is 
affirmed that, in the short term (unspecified), risks related to natural and anthropogenic 
phenomena  will  be  reduced  throughout  Mexico  if  the  DRP  is  implemented.  Its 
objectives are set to contribute to: 
                                                 
43  DRP has been elaborated as part of the National Plan for Development 2001 –2006 
(SEGOB, b 2001). 
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1.  Identify and improve knowledge concerning threats and risk at the community 
level. 
2.  Reduce  social  and  physical  vulnerability  of  populations  and  of  private  and 
public sectors. 
3.  Achieve further co-responsibility, co-ordination, and communication among the 
three governmental levels, the social and private sectors, and populations. 
4.  Strengthen applied research to develop and improve technologies for mitigating 
risks. 
5.  Implement policies and to foment a self-protection culture. 
6.  Assist the most vulnerable groups (children, women, elderly people, and the 
handicapped).  
 
A  closer  examination  of  DRP  demonstrates  that  only  three  of  the  sixty  projects 
explicitly involve populations‘ aspects: 
1.  Evaluation of the psychosocial effects caused by disaster in Mexico.  
2.  Measures to lessen disaster effects in vulnerable groups. This project is aimed at 
evaluating the socio-economic impact of disaster on poor people. 
3.  Study of the population‘s attitude in facing disaster. Attitude indicators to define 
suitable  responses  in  the  face  of  disturbing  phenomena.  Identification  of 
population‘s responses regarding gender, age, educational level.  
 
A core issue regarding many of the projects‘ outputs is that such outputs are, in fact, 
inputs for the elaboration of regulations and standards to be taken into account when 
implementing  prevention  measures.  Questions  concerning  assumptions,  framing, 
conceptualisations  of  nature,  societies  and  their  relationships,  and  the  character  of 
prevention are briefly discussed here.  
 
What are the main assumptions identified? 
 
The  main  assumptions  identified  in  the  DRP  can  be  grouped  into  two  sets  of 
components.  The  first  includes  the  functions  that  individuals,  society,  and  public 
institutions should perform for preventing disaster, while the second clusters around the 
role nature plays in causing disaster and the nature of the disaster themselves. With 
regard to the first set of components, it is assumed that individuals can be capacitated to  
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act  and  protect  themselves  against  natural  phenomena/disaster  once  the  following 
certain conditions are met: 
  They are aware of the magnitude of the natural phenomena 
  They understand and perceive such phenomena as threats 
  They are prepared to act according to the information given 
  They  are  able  to  follow  instructions  provided  by  specialised  public 
institutions that know how disaster are 
  They change their attitudes and behaviour to adopt a preventive culture. 
 
Society,  framed  as  a  homogeneous  unit,  can  develop  a  ‗prevention  culture‘, 
which  will  enhance  its  own  capacities  for  reducing  risk  and  avoiding  any  kind  of 
disaster. This can be achieved only if a ‗preventive‘ attitude is developed. Prevention is 
defined as a rational action that can be honed through the use of scientific information 
and technical tools. Thus, scientists provide accurate information to lay people. The 
latter group would be then ‗educated‘ to respond. Disaster effects can be anticipated 
and tragedies can be avoided with the aid of scientific  information. Prevention and 
mitigation  are  observed  as  cost-benefit  activities  that  could  promote  development. 
Vulnerability  is  not associated with socio-economic structures that marginalise poor 
people, exposing them to risk. It is never assumed that risk prevention might be related 
to reducing poor people‘s vulnerability. 
In relation to the second set of components, disaster is closely tied to the notion 
of nature, of nature as a force. Nature is framed separately from society in material and 
symbolic terms, and is seen as ―…a capricious entity with its own will that, over the 
centuries, has manifested its fury‖ (SEGOB, 2001, b). Following the constructionist 
approach adopted in this thesis, images and symbols not only shape reality, but also 
create it. It is interesting to note that on the DRP document‘s cover, the map of the 
Mexican Republic  is drawn and  some small  images are depicted. Photographs  of  a 
volcano, of a satellite, of a hurricane, of a building destroyed by an earthquake, and two 
photographs of a computer room are shown. Below these, the following phrase appears: 
―A safer population in the face of disturbing phenomena‖. No photos of populations or 
humans are linked to these images; thus, this might be interpreted as a manifestation of 
the naturalist bias of research and policy. 
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3.3 Civil Protection Programme of the State of Mexico 1999–2005 
 
The  Development  Plan  of  the  State  of  Mexico  1999–2005  establishes  the  need  to 
strengthen  a  ‗participatory  civil  protection  process‘  to  guarantee  the  safety  and 
protection of the State of Mexico residents. According to the Government of the State 
of  Mexico,  the  Civil  Protection  Programme  of  the  State  of  Mexico
44  1999–2005 
(CPPEM) is the main policy of the Civil Protection System of the State of Mexico 
(CPSM) and intends to follow the framework and guidelines of the SINAPROC. The 
objective of the CPPEM is ―… to turn the CPSM into a preventive-oriented system, 
strengthening social participation and mitigating the impact of natural and man-made 
disaster‖ (Gobierno del Estado de México, 2001).  
This is intended to be achieved by designing and implementing normative and 
operative frameworks in agreement with those at the national level, namely, the Federal 
Law of Civil Protection and the National Programme of Civil Protection.   Before 
analysing the main components, orientation, and scope of the CPPEM, it is noteworthy 
that the reading of the document was not easy because of the lack of proper usage of 
Spanish  grammar  and  syntax.  Ideas  and  sentences  are  unclear,  and  arguments  are 
incomplete. Nevertheless, in general it is assumed that the CPPEM is the main policy 
document meant to guide and coordinate the functioning of the CPSM.  
The CPPEM contains the following sections: 1) introduction; 2) diagnosis both 
of the civil protection public policy in the State of Mexico of the CPSM and of the risk 
conditions of the State of Mexico; 3) mission; 4) vision; 5) objective; 6) strategies; 7) 
actions, and 8) annexes. It is assumed that the implementation of the CPPEM takes 
place  through  the  operation  of  three  ‗sub-programmes‘:  Prevention;  Relief,  and 
Restoration. In fact, these ‗sub-programmes‘ have been placed in the ‗actions‘ section.  
The Prevention sub-programme includes issues of communication, capacity-building, 
the elaboration of a ‗Risk Atlas‘ and advising municipal authorities on construction of 
the municipal Risk Atlas, promotion for the founding of municipal systems of civil 
protection, promotion of a ‗civil protection culture‘, and elaboration of proposals for 
changes in civil protection rules and laws. 
Relief  sub-programme  includes  all  activities  oriented  toward  planning  and 
providing emergency aid (health services, goods provision, etc.) to affected people and 
areas in coordination with other federal ministries, and social and private organisations, 
                                                 
44 Published in November 2001 in the Official Newspaper of Mexico (Diario Oficial de la Federación).  
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operation  of  early-warning  systems  and  damage  assessment.  The  Restoration  sub-
programme  is  meant  to  plan  the  coordination  of  restoration  actions  and  the  use  of 
external  resources  targeted to the  worst  affected.  The  successful  implementation  of 
CPPEM  relies  on  three  conditions:  a)  establishment  of  municipal  units  of  civil 
protection  enabled  to  design  b)  municipal  plans  of  civil  protection  and  c)  internal 
programmes  of  civil  protection  inside  the  institutions‘  facilities  and  buildings.  In 
addition, the CPPEM underscores four groups of problems as the most important to be 
solved  if  a  preventive-oriented  system  is  to  be  achieved.  A  brief  analysis  of  these 
problems may shed light on how disaster and policy responses are framed.  The groups 
of ‗problems‘ are situated under the following issues: 1) Civil protection planning; 2) 
Financing  for  civil  protection;  3)  Education,  capacity-building,  and  training,  and  4) 
Information and communication.  
 
1)  Civil protection planning 
 
CPPEM states that it is of paramount importance to consider disaster prevention as part 
of  development  planning  to  reduce  vulnerability  and  regulate  human  settlements. 
Nevertheless,  and  despite  the  fact  that  a  civil  protection  policy  forms  part  of  the 
Development Plan of the State of Mexico, to date, nearly no municipalities have set up 
their own civil protection planning and consultation processes. Consequently, social 
participation has been low, and the ‗desired‘ targeted budgeting to civil protection has 
been barely able to be perceived. Thus, according to the General Direction of Civil 
Protection of the State of Mexico (GDCPEM), development of the CPSM has been 
disarticulated from the State of Mexico development policy.  
 
2)  Financing for civil protection 
 
As a result of the previously  mentioned occurrences, the  CPSM has over the  years 
lacked a budget to correspond to the civil protection planning process. According to the 
General  Direction  of  Civil  Protection  of  the  State  of  Mexico,  this  situation  has 
prevented  the  CPSM  from  developing  a  ‗real‘  preventive  system,  and  taken  place 
happened in ‗reality‘ is that funds are only allocated to emergency aid once disaster has 
occurred. To address this shortcoming, during the Montiel administration (1999–2005), 
former Governor Montiel drove the –the topic of civil protection for consideration in  
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on-going co-investment schemes  between the State and the  municipalities, as  it has 
been for other issues such as social development. At the same time, other investment 
schemes were studied, such as the formation of trusteeship.  
On  the  other  hand,  FOPREDEN  –as  mentioned  in  part  2.4–  is  the  national 
policy to fund risk-reduction actions. Since its inception in 2003, it has granted funds 
for  a  number  of  actions  throughout the  Mexican  territory,  such  as  improvement  of 
knowledge  of  hazards  and  risk,  promotion  of  physical  vulnerability  reduction, 
promotion  of  the  participation  of  all  development  sectors,  and  development  of 
technology  research  to  be  applied  to  mitigate  risks  and  the  promotion  of  a  self-
protection culture (FOPREDEN, 2003). The CPSM concludes that what is needed is the 
permanent allocation of financial resources to civil protection.  
 
3)  Education, capacity-building, and training. 
 
In the CPPEM, it is stated that the final aim of education is to consolidate a ´culture of 
civil protection´ which can be achieved through disaster awareness at individual and 
collective  levels.  This  requires  ‗complex‘  education  processes  that  facilitate  the 
development  of  ‗new‘  attitudes  and  capacities.  This  assumption  is  related  to  the 
‗experiential knowledge‘ that people are required to possess as a result of having been 
exposed  to  previous  disaster.  In other  words,  it  is  assumed  that the  risks  to  which 
people are exposed on a daily basis can be reduced by acquiring preventive‘ behaviour, 
for  instance,  while  driving  a  car,  adequate  use  of  electric  appliances,  public  and 
individual health promotion, and consumption of healthy food, to mention a few. This 
‗new‘ behaviour would capacitate people for protection against hazards and therefore, 
would enable them to reduce disaster risk.   
 
4)  Information and communication 
 
In the CPPEM, it is assumed that ‗useful‘ information (scientific and non-scientific) for 
civil protection complements the education process. In this, the mass media plays a 
central role by disseminating preventive messages to the public. However, this has not 
been the case to date. Previous assessments of the  messages  impact on populations 
showed that information has not been sufficiently meaningful to trigger the expected 
behavioural changes. People scarcely remember the messages‘ content‘ or are ‗unable‘  
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to ‗understand these. In addition, the information contained in the Risk Atlas both at the 
municipal and state level was communicated with the aid of pamphlets, leaflets, and 
posters, but this did not evolve into a permanent strategy. 
 
How are disaster framed in the CPPEM? 
 
 Thirteen  million  people  live  in  the  State  of  Mexico,  and  71  percent  of  these  are 
concentrated  in  municipalities  adjoining  Mexico  City,  such  as  Chalco  Valley-
Solidarity. State of Mexico residents are exposed to a broad range of hazards that range 
from  floods,  volcanic  eruption,  earthquakes,  landslides,  and  low  temperatures  to 
hazardous industrial wastes. The CPPEM contextualizes the State of Mexico‘s disaster 
problematic considering the linear causal relation between high exposure of people and 
infrastructure  to  natural  and  industrial  dangers  (labelled  as  disturbing  agents,  DA). 
Disaster are framed in terms of the disturbing agents; thus, when ‗preventive‘ actions 
are contemplated, emphasis is placed on reducing exposure via land use planning and 
law enforcement, controlling the hazard when possible through engineering works.  
 
Conclusions 
 
An analysis of the conceptual basis of the SINAPROC showed that there is a significant 
physical geographic determination with regard to disaster framing. Within SINAPROC, 
disaster is defined in terms of ‗natural‘ agents known as ‗disturbing agents‘. Human 
population  is  conceived  of  as  a  homogeneous  component  and  is  known  as  the 
affectable/affected‘agents.  This  has  had  important  policy  implications  because,  in 
Mexico, it has  been thought  that scientific and  technical knowledge of the physical 
processes is sufficient to identify ‗natural‘‘ disaster causes in order to prevent them and 
avoid human casualties.  
  In  the  next  two  chapters,  I  analyse  the  extent  to  which  the  policy 
conceptualisation  of  ‗natural‘  disaster  is  rooted  in  scientists‘  and  policy  makers‘ 
arguments and discourses. I seek to identify and explain  how this conceptualisation 
shapes  ‗natural  disaster  causality  discourses,  which  are  the  main  argumentative 
components. I address some key issues that were discussed in this chapter and in the 
previous Chapter Four, such as the different meanings of disaster among policy makers, 
scientists,  and  affected  people,  the  type  of  ‗valid‘  knowledge  identified  to  justify  
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specific policy responses, and the  manner  in which the  evidence  is constructed and 
utilized to support the knowledge claims. I also explain how scientific knowledge and 
evidence are used and transformed when it enters the policy realm at a time that policy 
decisions must be made in emergency and flooding episodes. In this vein, I seek to 
explain how ‗natural‘ disaster discourses construct risk objects, policy targets, affected 
people, and, to a lesser extent, ‗vulnerable‘ people.  
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CHAPTER  SIX.  CHALCO  VALLEY´S  FLOODS  AS  A  DISASTER  POLICY 
PROBLEM: THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION 
 
Introduction 
   
As discussed in Chapter One, disaster are usually understood and explained as a 
cause-effect relation between nature and society. The spectrum of disaster discourses 
regarding  causality  varies  from  natural  hazards  to  social  aspects  such  as  technical 
solutions,  institutional  capacities  and  vulnerability  root  factors.  The  analytical 
framework developed in Chapter Two (Figure 1) is employed here to examine ´natural´ 
disaster causality as a policy problem. The case of Chalco Valley´s floods illustrates the 
discursive  construction  of  ´natural´  disaster  in  three  social  domains:  a)  disaster 
governance, b) science and disaster management, and c) local coping responses. The 
relevance of considering these three domains was discussed in Chapter Two, section 2.  
  In this chapter I explain how disaster causality in Mexico is framed by the policy 
relevant subjects to persuade the interviewer. In other words, I examine the language 
mechanisms  and  type  of  discourses  used  to  portray  Chalco  Valley‘s  flooding  as  a 
‗natural‘  disaster.  In  particular,  I  focus  on  the  arguments  assembled  and  used  by 
scientists, policy makers, local government officials and operators to show that Chalco 
Valley flooding was hardly a `natural` disaster, as it is often asserted. Moreover, I argue 
that  the  tendency  to  define  and  explain  disaster  as  `natural`  has  several  policy 
implications, notably that of disregarding people‘s vulnerability.  
Furthermore, by doing argumentation analysis I examine three components of 
claim-making process, notably a) the claims content, b) the claim makers and c) the 
claim-making context -already explained in Chapter Two, section 3.2. This examination 
will  allow  me  to  clarify  how  and  why  arguments  to  give  account  of  the  same 
phenomenon  vary  –  depending  on  the  source,  the  nature  of  the  evidence  and  the 
warrants used to support the claims and the intended objective of the claim. Interviews 
with scientists, policy makers, implementers and operators are the main data sources 
used  in  this  chapter;  secondary  information  such  as  official  reports  issued  by  the 
CENAPRED,  CAEM,  CNA  were  also  analysed.  More  details  about  the  sources  of 
information used in this analysis are provided in the methodological Chapter Three.  
  Therefore,  the  purpose  of  this  Chapter  is  to  show  how  ‗images‘  and 
representations of causal agents, their interactions and consequences are constructed.  
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Analyses  of  interviews  will  hopefully  show  how  the  production  of  knowledge  by 
‗using‘ and ‗constructing‘ factual evidence operates. In sum, the ultimate intention of 
this Chapter is twofold, to explain and highlight the rhetorical and discursive power of 
disaster  causal  stories  in  constructing  reality  of  Chalco´s  Valley‘s  floods  and  to 
understand the inundations causality as a contested policy problem.  
 
1.  Conceptual and methodological considerations 
 
The core questions analysed here are related to the following aspects: 1) what 
happened in Chalco Valley the first of June, 2000; 2) what were the floods´ causes and 
consequences and 3) the proposed policy solutions. These questions correspond to the 
first group of questions of part VI of the fieldwork questionnaire that addresses the issue 
of Chalco Valley‘s floods and the policy makers´ interpretations. The intention of this 
part of  the  questionnaire  was  to  link  the  aforementioned  aspects  with  the  data  and 
evidence  given  by  the  interviewees  themselves.  It  was  also  set  to  understand  the 
warrants and backings that legitimise the interviewees´ claims.  
In this research I analyse  how policy  makers,  implementers and other policy 
relevant actors like local operators try to persuade the interviewer about the truthfulness 
of their accounts. For that reason I opted for the argumentation analysis approach. For 
more details about this approach see the methodological chapter. Fischer (2003, a: 181) 
states  that  ―…argumentation  is  the  form  employed  to  persuade  an  audience  that 
something ´ought´ to be the case: that is, a particular action should –or should not- take 
place, that an event should be interpreted in one way rather than another, and so on‖ so 
―(…) it is the argument that constitutes the basic unit of the real world policy analysis´.  
The analysis of the disaster causality was carried out as follows:  
1) In each interview, I identified explicit or implicit aspects related to disaster 
conceptualisation and inundations causality. Previously coding of the Spanish version of 
the interviews
45 with the aid of the qualitative analysis IN VIVO software was done to 
facilitate the organisation and handling of the information. Linguistic material was 
drawn from the answers to both theoretical and empirical questions and was then 
arranged according to the following issues of interest: a) causality claims of Chalco 
Valley´s floods, b) the types of actions and consequences, c) issues of blame and 
                                                 
45 Interviews were transcribed Verbatim  
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responsibility, and d) knowledge production of evidence and warrants. It is important to 
note that interviewees‘ answers differ in many ways; arguably because interviewees had 
different professions, job positions and interests, but notably – I should argue – because 
institutional contexts differ.  
  2) The first layer of analysis was done as follows. I deconstructed the interviews 
first by identifying the main arguments of the aforementioned issues of interest and then 
breaking them into their constituent parts. The Toulmin-Gasper model (Gasper, 2000) 
was used for this purpose because it helps organise, describe and analyse the structure 
of the arguments, in particular the main claim(s) and its connections with the argument 
components throughout the whole text of the interview. The Toulmin-Gasper model is 
presented in the form of a table that contains four to five columns which corresponds to 
the main claim(s), the claim evidence or data, warrants and backings and sometimes 
rebuttals  (The  Tables  of  deconstructed  interviews  are  presented  in  Appendix  I). 
Depending on the richness and depth of the  interviewee‘s answers,  in some cases I 
found only one central claim whereas in others more than one.   
Arguments  were  translated  from  Spanish  into  English  half  way  through  the 
deconstruction of the interviews. Such data processing allowed me to build a complete 
and detailed ‗argumentation table´ for each interview. The table was used to find as 
wide a range as possible of arguments in each interview. Mapping out the arguments 
within  the  interview  helped  me  both  to  collect  dispersed  parts  of  the  claim  in  one 
continuous text and to identify possible connections that might have been hidden in the 
text. The table was found to be also a useful tool in comparing interviews in order to 
arrive at the ´upper level´ of analysis, to the discourse. These activities, in fact, can be 
conceived as the textual practice of the discourse. The textual practice of the discourse, 
as  stated  by  Fairclough  (1992),  attends  to the  way  the  text  is  organised  and  to the 
attitude (and intention) of the agent that produces it. Table 3 is one example of the 
argumentation tables produced. 
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Table 3. Example of an argumentation table of Chalco Valley‘s floods causality 
 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
      [1] Well… in 
general…it is a 
lesson we all 
know. 
 
 
              vs. 
 
 
 
 
[2] It was a 
surprise [Floods] 
for those who 
live there and 
finally [they] 
realised that there 
is a ´living´ river. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
We, the people who live 
in Mexico City, since 
ancient times, (know) 
that this is a flooding 
zone… and we have tried 
to control [past] 
inundations by any 
means… 
 
 
 
 
 
It is nature and the fact 
that people are not aware 
of the geographical and 
natural conditions when 
settling in a place is what 
puts them at risk. 
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
[Assumption] Aguayo 
refers to the role of 
contextualized and 
experienced knowledge in 
perceiving inundations 
and shaping policy 
responses.  
 
Risk perception in 
explaining the disaster and 
the image of the affected 
people as victims of their 
own actions.  
 
[Assumption] It was a 
foreseen consequence that 
was ready to occur; the 
fate of the inhabitants that 
sooner or later would 
come.  
 
CNA had told them (to the 
affected inhabitants) that 
there was a ´living´ river 
 
They (affected people) are 
to be blamed for not 
paying attention to the 
information provided by 
CNA and not being aware 
of the risk.  
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
Settlers liked 
to be here and 
to live that 
way [being 
exposed to 
flooding risk]. 
We have 
increased [the 
population 
size] and have 
tried to 
control 
inundations 
by various 
means. 
 
We have not 
to forget that 
the natural 
condition of 
that zone is 
for the river to 
be there, it has 
always been 
there and will 
be.  
 
The river is 
old and 
[during the 
flooding 
event] it 
recognised its 
own ancient 
riverbed 
Aragón (2006) adapted from the Toulmin-Gasper model (Gasper, 2000) 
 
3)  Further  on  a  second  layer  of  analysis  followed .  I  interpreted  the  main 
arguments and key issues brought up by the interviewees. Particular attention was given 
to the institutional context and to the way warrants and backings  were assembled to 
guarantee the evidence. As part of the interpretation, rhetorical analysis was undertaken 
because it implies the analysis of the persuasive nature of the argument. To do so, I 
looked at the three main components of the rhetorical analysis: ethos, logos and pathos.  
  194 
Leach (2005) states that ethos is about the establishment of the credibility of the author 
or  speaker.  For  instance,  scientists  have  ´ethos´  to  make  stronger  claims  than  other 
authors. Pathos is another form of persuasive argument and is the appeal to emotion of 
the speaker and logos  is about how logical  arguments work to convince us of their 
validity and to shape or construct certain worldviews.  
Moreover, identifying the use of rhetorical devices – such as metaphors – and 
rendering explicit their function in making the argument persuasive and legitimate were 
central  aspects  of  the  analysis  conducted.  Yanow  (2000:43)  has  noted  that  ―often 
metaphors acquire a prescriptive aspect and they not only present new insights into the 
situation  they  describe:  they  also  suggest  possible  action  in  response  to  those 
situations.‖  For instance, I intended to make more explicit the way natural hazards were 
used as rhetorical tools to advance policy claims and governmental actions. A text for 
each interview was elaborated and served as the basis for this second level of analysis.  
This second level of analysis, in fact, corresponded to the discursive practice of 
the discourse. Martin Rojo (2003) notes that the discursive practice of the discourse 
describes the relation between the text and its context, giving meaning to social action. 
This led me to give attention to the institutional and policy contexts where disaster are 
interpreted in specific concrete disaster situation, i.e., Chalco Valley´s floods of 2000 
and the varying institutional contexts where policy makers, implementers and operators 
are placed. The discursive practice allows the realisation of other social practices such 
as judging, convincing and informing. In sum, this deconstructionist method was then 
set  to  make  evident  the  variety  of  floods  causality  claims  and  their  relation  with 
‗discourses‘ contexts‘ and ‗subject‘s identities‘ and ´interests´.  
   4) And finally, a third layer of analysis was produced by comparing previous 
findings to establish similarities and differences between and within the aforementioned 
three social domains, namely the domains of disaster governance, science and disaster 
management  and  local  coping  responses  regarding  the  causality  of  Chalco  Valley´s 
floods of 2000. Findings were contrasted with the typology of causality proposed by 
Stone (1989) (presented in Chapter Two) because ´disaster causality´ can be explained 
in  terms  of  actions  (unguided  and  purposeful)  and  consequences  (intended  and 
unintended).    This  was  done  in  order  to  group  the  varying  arguments  in  different 
causality discourses such as inadvertent, accidental and structural. Through the analysis, 
it was possible to find struggle over  disaster‘ problem claims even within the same 
interview -and between interviews of the same social and other domains. So there might  
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be  the  possibility  of  finding  a  move  in  disaster  causality  discourses  from  a  strong 
position  (accidental  or  structural  causality)  to  a  weaker  position  (inadvertent  or 
mechanical causality) as a next-best option. The outcome of this third layer of analysis 
is the written text of the following two sections of this chapter. 
Thus, this chapter is structured in two sections: 1) causality discourses of Chalco 
Valley´s floods and 2) rhetorical elements of the problem constructions. The discussion 
is  structured  around  these  two  foci  as  it  was  necessary  first to  understand  how the  
genesis of the causal  ideas of  Chalco Valley´s  floods gave rise to different disaster 
discourses at the policy level in order to, later on, identify and explain how the case of 
Chalco Valley`s floods is constructed as a policy problem. Once I had interpreted the 
disaster discourses I could identify and examine four problem constructions along with 
their rhetorical elements that arose out of the discourses.  
Therefore, Section 1, Causality Discourses of Chalco Valley´s floods contains 
the following subsections: 1.1 Discourse of Inadvertent Causality with two sub-types - 
inadvertence  by  ignorance  and  inadvertence  by  carelessness;  1.2  Discourse  of 
Accidental  Causality  and  1.3  Discourse  of  Structural  Causality.  At  the  end  of  each 
subsection a table characterises four discourse elements, namely, a) subjects, b) objects, 
c) system of meanings and d) system of statements according to Parker´s definitions 
(1992) which are the following: 
a)  Subjects. The category of subject refers to the type of people discussed and 
allowed  in the discourse and  how the text  locks them  into a certain world of 
representation. Discourses construct social identities and relationships. 
b)  Objects.  Discourses  work  to  generate  objects,  to  enforce  and  mobilise 
certain constructs of knowledge and ideology, therefore it is important to detail 
how certain objects of knowledge are built up. 
c)  System of meanings refers to how the objects and subjects ‗constructed‘ by 
the discourse are arranged together to make certain regular patterns of meaning; 
what the framework of interpretation and understanding is. A discourse comes 
with a related set of rationales and rhetorical strategies.  
d)  System of statements is about the regularised statements made within the 
discourse; how it becomes a ‗regularizing collectivity´.  
 
In  Section  2,  I  analyse  the  four  constructions  of  the  Chalco  Valley`s  floods 
problem:  2.1.  Ignorance  of  hazards  and  of  unsafe  conditions,  2.2  Failure  of  
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infrastructure  and  sanitation  system  and  inadequate  monitoring  of  risk  object,  2.3. 
Unforeseen accidents of nature and of man-made systems that disrupt human systems 
and 2.4. Exposure of vulnerable people to hazards as a consequence of socio-economic 
inequalities. The analysis takes into consideration the following five rhetorical elements 
which will be explained below in section 2: 1) type of knowledge evidence, 2) appeals 
and warrants, 3)  images of Chalco Valley  people, 4)  images of government and  5) 
images of hazards and La Compañía Canal.   
 
2. Causality Discourses of Chalco Valley´s floods  
 
This section examines the discursive construction of Chalco Valley´s floods causality. I 
argue that the different  disaster discourses  found at policy  level  are shaped by  how 
causal ideas of disaster are assembled and made persuasive in the three social domains 
of disaster and risk. Causal stories, as pointed out by Stone (1989), are important both 
for researching how specific problems reach the ´systemic agenda´ -that is the set of 
issues up  for general discussion  in a polity  and  in the  formulation and  selection of 
alternative policy responses because they locate the burdens of reform very differently.  
The deconstruction of arguments presented in Annex 2 allowed me to identify in 
the  interviews  three  different  types  of  disaster  causality  namely:  inadvertence, 
accidental and structural, already discussed in Chapter Two. These types are analysed 
below. This helped both to identify the differing systems of arguments that construct the 
causal  agents  and  their  images  including  issues  of  blame  and  responsibility.  It  is 
important to say that the three above mentioned types are rough categories with fuzzy 
boundaries so in reality it is possible to find a combination of them within the same 
interview  elements  of  other  `causalities`.  However,  each  type  may  show  clear  and 
distinctive  traits  and  components  that  prevail  in  the  argumentation  structure.    For 
analytical  reasons  the  interviewee‘s  arguments  are  grouped  under  one  of  the  three 
categories,  acknowledging  possible  connections  with  the  others,  that  is,  potential 
coalitions. The final aim is to explain how claim makers employ certain discourses to 
construct policy problems and how these are characterised empirically. This is done in 
section 3 of this Chapter.   
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2.1 Discourses of Inadvertent Causality   
 
Discourses of inadvertent causality are defined in terms of unintended consequences of 
willed  human  action  that  are  predictable  but  still  unforeseen,  consequences  that 
sometimes can  be understood as the  harmful  side-effects of well-intentioned policy. 
Stone (1989) states that in general in social policy two types of inadvertence can be 
found:  1)  inadvertence  by  ignorance  and  2)  inadvertence  by  carelessness  or 
recklessness. In inadvertence by ignorance consequences are predictable by experts but 
unappreciated by those undertaking the actions, whereas inadvertence by carelessness 
refers to those cases where  managers, technicians and/or operators are aware of the 
potential threats but do not or cannot monitor and control the system that may pose risk 
and cause damage.  
 
2.1.1 Inadvertence by „ignorance´   
 
Under this discourse, which illustrates the behavioural paradigm (discussed in Chapter 
One), disaster are constructed as a problem when people do not understand the harmful 
consequences of their wilful actions; in the case under analysis, this refers for instance 
to the unforeseen negative side-effects of urbanisation in the flooding-prone areas of 
Chalco Valley. As it was comprehensively described in the contextual Chapter Four, 
chronic flooding in the Chalco Valley was the result of a complex interaction between 
illegal  urbanisation  in  an  ex-lacustrine  area,  permanent  ecological  deterioration  and 
ground  subsidence,  poor  sanitation,  inadequate  policy  responses  and  political 
corruption. This can be seen as a case of inadvertence by ignorance despite the long 
term  nature  of  the  process  because,  as  explained  before,  the  federal  government‘s 
objective  was  to  raise  through  PRONASOL  the  living  standards  of  the  most 
impoverished by, among other things, providing drinking water and sewage systems 
without foreseeing flood risk generation over time (Aragón-Durand, 2007).  
Four interviewees tell the story of Chalco Valley`s inundations as the result of an 
education problem:  
A.  Head of the Department of Rural Programmes and Social Participation of 
the  Regional  Administration  of  the  Valley  of  Mexico  of  the  CNA 
(GRAVAMEX) of the National Commission  for Water (from  now on 
Head of RPSP),   
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B.  Coordinator of Capacity Building of CENAPRED, 
C.  Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico,  
D.  General Coordinator of SINAPROC 
 
Analysing the policy claims, I wanted to look at the kind of subjects the interviewee 
´allowed´ to appear in his/her explanation of the events and how these subjects were 
portrayed in terms of their knowledge capacities to ´understand´ the situation and to act. 
This is with the intention to explain to what extent the local inhabitant‘s ´ignorance´ vis 
à  vis  'expert`  knowledge  of  inundations  has  shaped  this  type  of  causality  regarding 
Chalco Valley`s floods. For that purpose I started examining the argumentation of the 
Head of RPSP
46 because his two opposing claims explicitly refer to the two different 
subjects found in this version of disaster causality, namely the ´experts´ and the local 
inhabitants or ´ignorants´ of the flooding risk.  
The Department of RPSP is in charge of liaising with local residents to receive 
and  respond  to  their  demands  regarding  hydraulic  works,  water  body  maintenance, 
infrastructure  provision  and  emergency  assistance.  The  two  claims  of  the  Head  of 
RPSP´s argument, which answered the question: what happened in Chalco Valley the 
first of June, 2000, are the following: 
[Claim 1]   “Well… in general…it is a lesson we all know”  
 
                                    Opposing claim 
 
 [Claim 2]  “It was a surprise [the floods] for those who live 
there  [in  Chalco]  and  finally  [they]  realised  that 
there is a ´living river´” 
 
   The  first  claim  is  a  conclusion  of  a  ´predictable  consequence´  that  the 
authorities were  somehow expecting to happen  due to past similar events. Thus, he 
frames the consequence as an (other) ´lesson´. The metaphor lesson is powerful when it 
comes to signify the inundation as a ´positive´ and empirical situation that is meaningful 
for experts and authorities. It can be inferred that he speaks from a standpoint where he 
could have foreseen the inundations in Chalco Valley, thereby reinforcing his moral 
authority to justify his position and to prove his knowledge to convince the interviewer 
to explain the flooding risk phenomenon.  
                                                 
46 Interview undertaken in April 2003  
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The Head of RPSP places himself in the group of knowledgeable people (“a 
lesson  we  all  know”).  To  him  Chalco  Valley‘s  inundations  were  not  necessarily  a 
surprising event given the fact that previous inundations actually happened before. In 
this vein, it could be assumed that inundations could be avoided through rational action 
based on the knowledge affected residents may have had of past events (―to learn the 
lesson‖). The evidence that supports this first claim is about whom the subjects are and 
how those subjects acquire knowledge to evaluate the flooding-prone characteristics of 
the Chalco Valley basin and the type of response elicited: 
 
[Evidence 1]  “We, the people who live in Mexico City, since 
ancient times, (know) that this is a flooding zone… and we have 
tried to control [past] inundations by any means…” 
 
 
  The Head of RPSP argues that by the fact of being a Mexico City citizen and 
having lived there for many years, the person can be aware of the flooding vulnerability 
of the Chalco region and therefore is capable to act adequately. By using the personal 
noun We, he distances himself from the rest of the people living outside Mexico City 
who are not seen as knowledgeable or at least not aware of this historical situation and 
hence incapable of acting. We, is a linguistic resource used to define the interviewee‘s 
discursive position before the `Others` and therefore excluding other subjects´ potential 
counter-arguments: we (know) vs. they (don‟t know). This is meaningful in terms of 
policy design and implementation because, as he claims, since the we (CNA authorities) 
know how things stand (´know the lesson´), they know what to do to cope with future 
inundations. Also from that same evidence it can be said that they are the immigrants 
who ignored the hazards and therefore populated Chalco`s Valley.  
  With the expression ´ancient times´ he highlights the time frame from past to 
present,  justifying  the  naturalness  of  the  flooding  proneness  of  the  zone  where 
immigrants  ended  up  settling.  So  this  evidence  gives  little  room  for  counter-
argumentation by employing a taken-for-granted fact of the ecological dynamics that 
has ―remained unchanged‖ for many years and that should have been known by Chalco 
Valley  migrants  and  residents.  Interestingly  by  opposition,  the  second  evidence 
reinforces  the  first  one  and  allows  the  `Other`  (they)  to  appear  as  subjects  in  the 
discourse:  
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[Evidence 2] “It is nature and the fact that people are not aware 
of the geographical and natural conditions  when settling in a 
place is what puts them at risk”. 
     
People  who  moved  to  and  settled  in  Chalco  Valley´s  region  ―ignored‖  its  unsafe 
historical-natural  conditions  and  for  that  reason  they  are  implicitly  labelled  as  the 
―ignorants‖.  
The data backing is about migrants‘ agency to move and settle in a risk zone. 
The Head of RPSP´s interpretation of the situation appears to be that the image of 
affected people as victims is the result of their own decisions. That general statement 
can be found in other interviewees‘ arguments such as those of the Structural Causality, 
i.e.  the  Coordinator  of  Capacity  Building  of  CENAPRED,  Director  of  Civil 
Protection of the State of Mexico. This is an element of discourse coalition. He asserts 
that settlers have the agency to choose where to live so they are the first groups to be 
blamed for having been affected by the historical recurring floods of Chalco Valley. 
  In  the  second  claim  he  makes  his  own  interpretation  of  affected  people‘s 
experience  of  the  floods.  He  talks  of  the  ´Others´  while  referring  to  the  affected 
residents – ―ignorants‖ – who were supposed to have expressed the claim that the local 
inhabitants were not aware of the river as a potential hazard until inundations occurred. 
The implicit meaning of this claim may be interpreted with the statement below:  
 
“(…) for the first time, the inundations made the river appear 
before local people´s eyes” 
 
 – which reinforces the claim assumption that inundations teach people. This discursive 
construction reveals the origin and nature of knowledge that supposedly is useful for 
practical purposes. So it is argued that experiential knowledge of the floods is necessary 
to perceive floods risk but not sufficient. In his view, CNA information of inundations 
helped affected people‘s perception of flooding risks:  
 
“Little by little affected inhabitants understood the explanation 
given by the CNA. As a result, people went out of their houses, 
realised  where  they  were  living  and  acquired  (technical) 
knowledge (of the danger) that they had not previously had…”  
 
  From the Head of RPSP´s claim it can be interpreted that possibly thanks to 
CNA explanations and warnings, affected people became aware of the hazardousness of  
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the river. It is by experiencing the inundations and by understanding the CNA technical 
information of the inundations‘ risk that affected people can learn and can relinquish 
their condition of ―hazards´ ignorants‖. It is expected, then, that they will be more able 
to cope with future inundations. So this discourse defines and selects the `ignorants` as 
the  policy  target  population;  in  that  way,  the  desired  action  to  achieve  inundation 
prevention should be to teach them how to perceive ― the real‖ risk in order to `avoid` 
future floods. This issue is analysed in Chapter Seven, section 7.1.  
  It is worth noting that the second claim introduces another important discursive 
object:  ´living river´. During the  interview the  Head of RPSP  never  mentioned the 
word canal or its actual name, La Compañía. He called it a ´living river´. This natural 
element, not portrayed as a hazard but as a natural resource, is used as a rhetorical tool 
to construct the claim as a neutral conclusion and possibly distracting the attention from 
the hazardousness of the canal – which is part of a man-made system over which the 
CNA has been undertaking maintenance works for several years. In a way, I can assume 
that for the Head of RPSP one political function of the ´living river´ is to avoid being 
blamed for the failures of the La Compañía Canal and the `mistakes` committed by the 
CNA (specifically by GRAVAMEX)  
So far, the analysis of the two claims explains who the subjects are, how they are 
portrayed, who might be seen as the target populations of the policy, and what that 
means when it comes to perceive (or not) an historical situation characterised by chronic 
flooding. The CNA authorities, Mexico City  inhabitants and experts can predict the 
floods  because,  as  stressed  by  the  Head  of  RPSP,  they  already  knew  the  historic 
ecological  problematic  of  that  particular  zone  that  is  prone  to  inundations  whereas 
Chalco Valley´s immigrants (who became residents) did not appreciate that situation 
when they moved there.   
   The argumentation of the General Coordinator of SINAPROC also portrays 
inundations causality as inadvertence by ignorance but introduces other element related 
to structural factors, namely, the socio-economic conditions of poor people and political 
corruption as the driving forces for illegal urbanisation. She claims that those structural 
factors that made poor people move to Chalco Valley contributed to some extent to the 
occurrence of inundations to the same extent that poor people were not aware of the 
hazards. 
Like in the Head of RPSP`s claim, the General Coordinator of SINAPROC 
elaborates the argument by contrasting two different subjects: the experts and the poor.  
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The former are capable of perceiving inundations‘ risk whereas the latter are not. She 
identifies  herself  with  the  first  group  by  implying  that  risk  avoidance  and  disaster 
prevention are a simple matter of knowing the ´real´ threats in order to act accordingly: 
“…it is very easy to realise that those places are unsuitable to live in…” 
(General Coordinator of SINAPROC, 2003) 
 
  But the argumentation of the General Coordinator of SINAPROC differs from 
that of the Head of the RPSP in the sense that inadvertence is not only about cognitive 
capacities, a product of `ignorance`, but also a collective process determined by their 
social condition (poverty) and constrained by structural forces, in particular by political 
corruption schemes that promoted urbanisation without any planning. This is backed by 
the first and second warrants:  
 
[Warrant 1] “…it is very easy to realise that those places are 
unsuitable  to  live  in;  …  even  despite  the  lack  of  sanitation 
infrastructure  and  (urban)  services  politicians  disregard  that 
fact and ´arrange´
47 social commitments with poor people and 
allow them to settle there and grant them deed titles…” 
 
[Warrant 2] “…poor people are forced to live there and they are 
not aware of risk that is why they ended up settling there...and at 
the end of the day, politicians have to accept that situation and 
tolerate those people because they are unable to evict them… 
that happens everywhere” 
 
  The evidence she uses to support this claim is a linear causal relation between 
poor people migration and the inadequate environmental conditions of Chalco`s Valley 
—  where  they  were  not  supposed  to  have  settled.  According  to  the  General 
Coordinator  of  SINAPROC,  poor  people  were  `forced`  to  settle  in  Chalco  Valley 
because they could not afford buying or renting urban land elsewhere. In this case the 
role that knowledge of hazards may play in risk perception is mediated by the social 
position of the subjects and their historical circumstances.   
Nevertheless  for  her,  perception  of  disaster‘  risk  is  a  rational,  universal  and 
objective capacity that should be acquired by all subjects regardless of their different 
historical and socio-political contexts. In terms of policy responses and following this 
                                                 
47 In Mexico, the word ´arrange´ can be understood as a trading act in which politicians get money or 
votes from people and they allow people to settle illegally in prohibited places providing deed titles and 
even urban services.  
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argument, if those `poor` migrants change their behaviour, their exposure to inundations 
risk  would  be  reduced  and  floods  prevention  measures  will  succeed.  This  could  be 
achieved  by  educating  them  in  order  to  share  the  same  common  risk  perception 
regardless of their social position and therefore avoid unsafe places.  
In  the  General  Coordinator  of  SINAPROC  `s  view,  policy  intervention  is 
mainly an education task (policy intervention is analysed in Chapter Seven, section 7.2): 
 
[Backing 1] “So that is why policy has to be designed in terms 
of convincing people to live at risk, otherwise prevention cannot 
be achieved”. 
 
Moreover, her  interpretation of risk as an objective and universal conception 
gives no room for taking into consideration the knowledge the other subjects have and 
the varying meanings that could be attached to their notions of inundation risk. This 
´objective´  notion of risk  has also  important policy  implications  in the  sense that  it 
closes potential interaction while formulating policy responses with affected people‘s 
experiential knowledge.     
  Besides, the notion of inundations risk is used by her as a key strategic weapon 
for pushing the problem of the Chalco Valley´s floods out of the realm of accident into 
the realm of inadvertence. Floods risk serves this function in two ways. First when the 
harms are seen as suffered by populations, the association of harmful outcomes with 
human  action  is  accepted  as  a  demonstration  of  a  cause-effect  relationship.  Illegal 
settlers who happened to be poor people were forced to settle in insecure places due to 
their  socioeconomic  condition;  they  disregarded  their  exposure  to  flooding  risk  and 
were affected by the Canal overspilling of waste waters.  
Second, as explained with detail in Chapter Four, corrupt public officials turned 
the blind eye to the fragile ecological conditions of Chalco Valley and benefited from 
promoting the  illegal  selling of plots where, by the end of the 1970s, there was no 
sanitation system in a context where land planning was absent. In this discourse `poor` 
migrants  are  portrayed  as  victims  of  their  own  `ignorance`  and  of  the  authorities` 
actions  and  corruption  schemes.  So,  inadvertence  by  ignorance  is  also  somehow 
determined by government authorities because illegal settlements pay them off in terms 
of political clientele gain.  
Another important issue becomes evident here:  subject‘s positionality. In this 
case, the subject‘s position is defined by the relation between the subject and the natural  
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phenomenon and knowledge about the evolution process of the phenomenon determines 
the subject‘s position. Those who are able and are also entitled to know about disaster 
emerge  as  subjects  in  this  discourse.  To the  General  Coordinator  of  SINAPROC 
subjects who possess (scientific) knowledge have the agency to act or intervene.  
On the other hand, the process of constructing natural hazards gives identity to 
the subject. It is an identity that is worthwhile investigating, by finding out how it is 
constructed and the social interaction with the so-called vulnerable or target people. The 
social nature of the hazard locates the subject in a position of advantage before others 
who cannot be constructed as subjects because they lack the scientific and politically 
legitimised and meaningful knowledge for policy purposes, stated in advance by some 
of the policy makers who are entitled to talk and make policies and also by legislation. 
  At this point it is important to remember that part of the intention of this analysis 
is also to make explicit how the choice of words and linguistic tools reveals a strategy to 
‗put things in a certain way‘ that is convenient from the interviewees` perspective. The 
way the Head of RPSP and the General Coordinator of SINAPROC make sense and 
‗tell  the  story‘  of  the  flood  is  important  because  they  construct  not only  their  own 
personal position, but that of their institution and the image of the desired policy target 
populations.  
Under this problem construction, subjects` identity depends on the knowledge 
capacities they possess to define what could be the causal factors of the inundations and 
risk  and  the  agency  they  have  to  develop  such  capacities  under  concrete  structural 
conditions. In sum, the discourse of Inadvertence Causality by ―Ignorance‖ constructs 
the following system of statements, subjects, objects and system of meanings:  
  205 
 
Box  2.  Discourse  of  Inadvertence 
Causality by  “Ignorance” 
 
System of Statements   Disaster are: 
Lessons to be learnt by `ignorants` 
Predictable consequences 
`Surprise` for migrants and residents 
 
Subjects 
 
 
Objects 
 
 
Authorities (`teachers`) vs. residents and illegal´ 
immigrants (`ignorants`) 
Target populations = ´risk ignorants´ 
´Corrupt´ authorities  
 
La Compañía is a `living` river 
Nature is a `given` static entity which rarely changes.  
Ecosystems remain unchanged over the years 
 
System of meanings  ´Living at risk´ 
 “Lesson” as a metaphor 
Disaster are events explained to distinguish the subjects 
―We‖ from the ―Others‖ 
Floods in Chalco Valley  were a ―learning experience‖ 
for the affected people 
   
 
 
2.1.2 Inadvertence by ´carelessness´ 
 
Under this discourse, disaster problem is ´constructed´ when managers and operators 
´perceive´ the hazard but do not provide full control and adequate maintenance to the 
system or device that may pose the risk. In this type of inadvertence the definition of 
disaster cause focuses  mainly on the technical aspects of  man-made systems and of 
natural hazards. Social agents and target populations remain hidden. In this case, the 
solutions  proposed  are  centred  on  the  quality  and  quantity  of  scientific-technical 
information either of the La Compañía Canal or the characteristics of the weather, heavy 
rains, increase of waste waters level, etc.  
Seven interviewees tell the story of Chalco Valley`s inundations as it was mainly 
a technical problem that was not adequately addressed and solved:  
 
E.  Head of Research on Socio-economic Impact of Disaster of CENAPRED 
( thereafter ´Head of Socio-Economic Research of CENAPRED´),   
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F.  Director of Hydraulic Infrastructure Maintenance and Inundations Risk 
Reduction of the Water Commission of the State of Mexico (thereafter 
´Director of Inundations Risk Reduction of CAEM´),  
G.  Head  Representative  of  the  State  of  Mexico  Government  in  the 
Environmental  Metropolitan  Commission  (thereafter  ´Head  of  Enviro 
Commission  Edo Mex´),  
H.  Representative of the State of Mexico Government in the Metropolitan 
Commission  of  Civil  Protection  (thereafter  ´Head  of  Civil  Protection 
Commission Edo Mex´) ,  
I.  Head of the Environmental Protection Department of PEMEX (thereafter 
´Head of Enviro PEMEX´) ,  
J.  General Director of Environmental Policy and Planning of SEMARNAT 
(thereafter ´General Director of  Environmental Policy of SEMARNAT´) 
and   
K.  Head of the Descentralised Body of Drinking Water, Sewage System and 
Sanitation  of  the  municipality  of  Chalco  Valley-Solidarity  ODAPAS 
(thereafter ´Head of ODAPAS´).  
   
  The Head of Socio-Economic Research of CENAPRED claimed that Chalco 
Valley`s  inundations  could  have  been  foreseen  by  hazards  forecasting  and  thus  the 
impact could have been avoided.  
 
[Claim 1] It is a typical case…It could have been foreseen by 
monitoring  the  [waste]  water  levels…and  how  that  could  be 
affected by forecast rainfalls and by [evaluating] the canal walls 
[its physical condition]…evidently, isn‟t it? It was simply a lack 
of precaution… 
 
  To him this was a typical case (un caso típico) that could be extrapolated to 
other disaster explanations. Implicitly is the idea of knowledge of hazards and previous 
inundations. His claim is built in terms of what could have been done and he explains 
what ―really‖ happened in terms of the impact of heavy rains on the ―vulnerable‖ walls 
of  LCC.  Thus  he  asserted  that  prevention  is  a  combination  of  monitoring  the 
functioning  of  the  water  flows  (he  never  used  the  word  canal)  and  forecasting  the  
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natural hazard that could have impacted on the canal walls. Prevention is a technical 
endeavour based on technical framings.  
   The technical framing of the floods causality is warranted by the CENAPRED 
legitimacy  for  undertaking  disaster  impact  assessments.  It  is  worth  recalling  that 
CENAPRED´s duties are on the one hand monitoring and forecasting hazards and on 
the other, evaluating damages in terms of infrastructure and economic losses. The scope 
of  CENAPRED`s  activities  delimits  in  a  linear  fashion  the  boundaries  of  the  link 
between causes and consequences. His argument is politically neutral and simplifies the 
complexity of the social-technical-natural relations - I assume - in order to portray the 
event as understandable and amenable to human intervention. Nevertheless, blaming 
and the attribution of responsibility are ambiguous and no actor or institution is clearly 
identified.  The  second  warrant  is  a  disclaimer  for  avoiding  institutional  blame  and 
responsibility:  
[Warrant  2]  “CENAPRED  is  not  in  charge  of  the  canal 
maintenance… [only of disaster impact evaluation]…” 
   
  So in his last warrant the blame is put on nature:  
[Warrant 3] ―Let‟s accept that nature manifests itself in extreme 
variations…” 
   
The backing underpins CENAPRED´s reliability on disaster impact evaluations 
and  on  the  idea  of  how  planning  and  prevention  measures  could  reduce  losses. 
Technical  framing  of  disaster  causality  by  carelessness  is  also  exemplified  by  the 
Director of Inundations Risk Reduction of CAEM.  The Director of Inundations 
Risk Reduction of CAEM elaborates on his argumentation more with two inter-related 
claims that are intended to explain in specific technical terms the chain of causation. 
The first claim emphasises the extremeness of the storm that outran the canal coping 
capacity while contributing to the deterioration of its walls which by then were already 
weakened  by  the  prevailing  ground  subsidence.  The  second  one  is  a  more  detailed 
technical explanation of the deteriorating condition of the LCC and the impact caused. 
However  in  his  argumentation,  he  makes  no  detailed  reference  to  the  social 
consequences of the floods. 
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[Claim 1]…An extraordinary storm generated a massive volume 
of water flow higher than the riverbed coping capacity of 43 
m/sec  and…  [it  took  place]  in  the  transition  zone  where  the 
terrain is sinking… 
                                              
                        
[Claim 2] …leaks in one of the (canal) walls…here… (he shows 
a drawing) the canal curves and because of the storm and the 
leaks the wall weakened and couldn‟t cope with a high hydraulic 
pressure and …the  wall failed and a lot of water spilled and 
affected many people 
 
  As  it  was  in  the  Head  of  Socio-Economic  Research  of  CENAPRED´s 
argumentation,  the  institutional  context  and  job  ´expertise´  of  the  Director  of 
Inundations Risk Reduction of CAEM determine the elements used to frame disaster. 
It  could  be  inferred  that  the  way  he  constructs  the  claim  is  related  to  his  work, 
responsibilities  and  institutional  scope  for  putting  into  place  concrete  measures.  He 
denied the possible failed intervention of CAEM in guaranteeing safe conditions of La 
Compañía Canal, therefore overruling carelessness as a causal factor.   
      
[Warrant 1] ―…the official assessment reported that…”  
 
is the premise used to legitimise technical explanations and to exclude other people‘s 
accounts  and  counter-explanations  that  might  contest  and  construct  the  problem 
causality on different grounds other than those provided by the water authority in the 
State  of  Mexico  (CAEM`s  policy  makers).  It  can  be  interpreted  as  a  way  of 
underscoring the authorities‘ knowledge as the valid one since it is supposedly built in 
neutral and uncontested terms and hence seeking for the truthful version of ´facts´. The 
second warrant shows how natural hazards can be used as a rhetorical tool to justify the 
scope of government institutional responses and the failures attributed to them.  
 
[Warrant 2] …‟It is impossible to blame someone when it comes 
to  extraordinary  hydro-meteorological  phenomena  since  many 
times  there  are  no  feasible  [technical  and  economic] 
solutions…institutional  response  capacity  for  providing 
definitive solutions is constrained by the economy”. 
 
By accepting the limits of solutions that the Water Sector (CNA and CAEM) can 
provide to prevent inundations, nature is blamed. It is as if any new responses from the  
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government would also fail to cope with natural threats despite the advancements of 
technologically-based  solutions  of  a  technologically-defined  problem  because  in  the 
end, ´nature‘s power is bigger than human coping systems´. This warrant is backed by 
appealing to the power of nature in transforming man-made systems. It is interesting to 
examine how he also identified ‗permanent solutions‘ as constrained by the economy. 
  To  justify  CNA  and  CAEM  lack  of  attention  and  precaution  responses,  the  
Director of Inundations Risk Reduction of CAEM brings to the fore the claims of 
affected people with regard to government carelessness in inspecting and eventually 
providing proper maintenance to the LCC. He  appeals to past events when  nothing 
happened, apparently in order to be excluded from any blame.  
 
[Backing 1] …It is said that in past times leaking (through the 
LCC walls) had occurred and were even noticed by local people 
but that has passed unnoticed by the authorities, nevertheless I 
can tell you that the same kind of situation had occurred and 
nothing serious happened then… 
   
  The Head of Enviro Commission Edo Mex frames the inundations as another 
example of inadvertence by carelessness, but this time he puts them in the context of the 
unequal relation between the State of Mexico and Mexico City, unveiling the socio-
economic and political imbalance. Despite the fact that he was not fully informed about 
the concrete event of Chalco Valley he went on to explain what occurred. During the 
interview he used a disclaimer by saying that he lacked technical information regarding 
the LCC infrastructure. 
 
[Claim 1] Even though I have little information about hydraulic 
infrastructure… For sure… It was a problem caused by the lack 
of  maintenance,  of  sediments  accumulation  that  reduced  the 
riverbed along with an extraordinary storm that loaded the river 
and  this  provoked  the  breakage…and  of  course  all  problems 
regarding social inequalities in that zone arose, we all know… 
 
  His  argumentation  contextualizes  the  idea  of  carelessness  (lack  of  adequate 
maintenance of the LCC) at regional level and that can be interpreted as the means (or 
even  an  excuse)  to  talk  about  the  linkages  between  Mexico  City  and  the  State  of 
Mexico. He highlights the regional impact of the inundations on the discursive context 
in the sense that flooding - once again is a process that unveils the problematic close  
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connection between the two administrative-political units, Mexico City and the State of 
Mexico. The former ecological conditions of the lake made Chalco´s Valley a flooding 
prone  region.  Urbanisation  and  settlements  disrupted  the  ´natural  balance´  and 
inhabitants  became  affected  by  the  natural  dynamics  already  by  then  radically 
transformed.  
The Head of Enviro Commission Edo Mex blames former President Salinas‘s 
administration and the national development policy that was launched in Chalco Valley 
which eventually promoted ´chaotic´ urbanisation.  Even though he is neither a scientist 
nor a technician he did not hesitate in putting the blame on the infrastructure failure and 
the fact that it rained a lot during those days.   
  The claim backings are constructed around the idea that the urban-environmental 
problems  of  the  State  of  Mexico  are  caused  by  its  relation  with  Mexico  City  in 
particular  with  regards  to  the  chain  of  causation:  migration→urbanisation→bad 
planning→services provision.  
 
[Backing  3]  A  national  policy  has,  for  a  long  time,  favoured 
Mexico  City  needs  providing  it  with  more  resources  than  the 
State of Mexico, disregarding the urban and regional dynamics 
of the neighbouring municipalities of the State of Mexico. That 
has  contributed  to  the  migration  increase  into  the  State  of 
Mexico. The State of Mexico depends on the federal government 
with regards to those problems (solutions).   
 
  With this view, Chalco Valley`s inundations represented a good opportunity to 
highlight social inequalities. He portrays the State of Mexico as a ―victim‖ of the failure 
of national development policies that is manifested in the migration patterns that have 
followed  and  in  the  impact  migration  to  the  State  of  Mexico  has  provoked  in  the 
environmental  deterioration  of  the  peri-urban  interface.  To  him,  analysis  of  the 
problematic of the whole State of Mexico, LCC included, has to integrate this kind of 
connections. 
  Like the Head of Enviro Commission Edo Mex, the Head of Civil Protection 
Commission Edo Mex constructs the claim with reference to the LCC in terms of a 
simple cause-effect relation: 
 
[Claim]  Canal  breakage  and  inundations…housing  is  built 
under  the  Canal  level,  waste  waters  and  hence  a  disaster 
occurs.  
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  But what it is important to analyse here is the evidence she puts forward to tell 
the story. She contextualizes the LCC failures within the process of urbanisation and 
service provision, putting special emphasis on the relation between two subjects: the 
government and the people. In general  she  blames the government for not properly 
inspecting and maintaining the LCC and not responding to affected people‘s complaints 
regarding the canal fissures and she also blames local people for dumping rubbish into 
the LCC and therefore reducing  its carrying  capacity. Moreover, the  Head of Civil 
Protection Commission Edo Mex goes beyond the inundations causality and raises the 
issue of the social demands and political costs and commitments that emerge between 
government and affected people as a result of the inundations.   
 
[Evidence  3]  “Government  doesn‟t  provide  services  because 
(people are) located in high risk zones. When disaster happen 
people get upset and demand housing and plots…” 
 
The Head of Enviro PEMEX elaborates on two claims which are related to the 
La  Compañía  Canal;  the  first  one  referred  to  the  causes  and  the  other  to  the 
consequences of the canal breakage 
  
[Claim  1]  Inundations´  main  cause  is  the  oversight  of  the 
canal…the  [lack]  of  a  good  management  (programme)  of  an 
open air canal… 
 
 
 
[Claim 2] … The canal brakes and floods a lot of people with 
waste  waters  with  the  high  likelihood  of  causing  health 
problems… 
  
 
The  first  claim  clearly  establishes  the  carelessness  of  an  unstated  actor  or 
institution for not having provided the adequate monitoring and maintenance. He talks 
implicitly about a culprit even though he does not label the person as such. It is worth 
noting that when asked to mention who could be blamed for the inundations he was 
reluctant to specify any person or institution. The evidence that refers to a hypothetical 
culprit points to two unnamed subjects, the government that allowed the urbanisation 
and the people who moved to the zone putting pressure over the unsafe land.   
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[Evidence  1]  Chalco  Valley  is  an  example  of  the  worst 
sanitation management of waste waters in an open canal under 
very  difficult  conditions…besides,  the  canal  is  above  (the 
ground).  
 
[Evidence 2] Trying to find the culprit is very difficult… when 
the canal was designed many years ago, there was no one living 
in Chalco Valley…what happened is the  result  of the lack of 
land use planning and uncontrolled settlement. 
 
  The claim warrant centres on the importance of risk awareness for inundations 
prevention. It is understood that risk awareness can be realised through the undertaking 
of any risk analysis of the sanitation system.  
 
[Warrant  1]  “Any  risk  analysis  would  indicate  that  a  huge 
problem  would  come  up…Risk  could  have  been  foreseen 
…Nobody cares about the high risk it may eventually pose” 
 
 
By using the qualifier any risk analysis he is assuming that it had been easy to 
estimate the danger of the sanitation system  failure;  it  is  like appealing to common 
sense. By defining the cause as a technical one the warrant is also thought to be of a 
technical nature so risk analysis of infrastructure is emptied of any concrete image of 
actor or institution. When providing evidence of the canal rupture, the cause is framed 
as  a  technical-managerial  failure  and  hence  allows  the  speaker  to  compromise  and 
prevents him  from  mentioning who to blame.  Moreover, the  image of the  so-called 
potential culprit falls on common places such as lack of land planning or the designer of 
the canal, both of them located in very past times. Calling for the past is a rhetoric 
resource  to  prevent  the  speaker  from  mentioning  a  living  culprit.  Nevertheless,  in 
another part of the interview he is clear enough about the government sector in charge 
of rivers, dams and open air canals, the CNA. He was very cautious about that fact. 
“Nobody cares about the potential risk” is a strong sentence that points to recklessness: 
people  were  aware  of  the  hazard  but  were  unwilling  to  act  in  order to  prevent the 
inundation.   
  The General Director of Environmental Policy of SEMARNAT puts forward 
his argument with two claims of a different nature which are related to each other:  
  
  213 
[Claim 1] It was a terrible misfortune… [I was driving back to 
Mexico City from Puebla City when I got stranded for six or 
seven hours and at that time I didn‟t know what was going on…] 
and then I came across information that it was this canal (LCC) 
rupture and this inundation and that the population was flooded 
by shit; it is a shame that We have rivers of shit… 
 
 
[Claim  2]  There  was  no  (LCC)  maintenance,  It  was  not  a 
natural  disaster…it  was  a  misfortune,  a  disaster  but  a  man-
made (artificial) disaster as far as I can see… 
 
  The  first  one  is  the  conclusion  of  the  personal  situation  the  policy  maker 
experienced when he got stranded in the Mexico-Puebla highway during the Chalco 
Valley‘s inundation of 2000. The second is a claim about the possible factors that could 
have caused the floods – the lack of sanitation infrastructure maintenance. In the first 
claim he summarises the happenings as a terrible misfortune not only for the population 
that got flooded but also for himself – in fact terrible disgrace is word loaded with a 
moral meaning –tremenda desgracia, in Spanish.  
  So  the  knowledge  the  General  Director  of  Environmental  Policy  of 
SEMARNAT had about the situation was not primarily expressed in policy or scientific 
terms – as it might be expected because he is an ecologist and was working as a policy 
maker at the time of the interview – but as an affected person. That is why he uses 
colloquial language to appeal to emotions and he concludes that the event was a man-
made disaster. Besides he extrapolates this crude characterisation of the river to the rest 
of  the  rivers  in  Mexico:  ―…we  have  rivers  of  shit”,  putting  the  blame  in  someone 
unspecified.  
  With  regards  to  the  claim  evidence  he  mixes  evidence  of  two  sorts:  his 
normative interpretation of the water policies in Mexico with the employment of the 
word [shit] that condenses the quality of the water that inundated the Chalco Valley‘s 
region  and  that  serves  to  provide  a  much  closer  (and  sensitive)  dimension  to  the 
misfortune. It is interesting to note that a more sophisticated explanation of the flooding 
risk of the region elaborated on ecological grounds is the warrant for asserting that the 
current state of water and sanitation policies in Mexico is – like the floods – also a 
disgrace.  
[Evidence 1] “The water and sanitation management in Mexico 
is so bad that we are going to get flooded with shit…”  
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[Evidence 2] “As far as I know it was not because of heavy rains 
because it didn‟t rain extraordinarily, nor did Mexicans make 
more shit than any other day…” 
 
A  technical  warrant  legitimises  a  mundane  evidence  for  supporting  the  claim.  The 
urbanisation put into place in Chalco in past times reinforces the idea that the ecological 
transformation that created unsafe conditions for people was driven by humans serves 
as the second warrant to define the event not as a natural but as a more complex one. 
    
[Warrant 1] “We live in an enclosed basin  which is prone to 
flooding so sooner or later it is going to get flooded…you don‟t 
have to be a genius to know it”.  
 
[Warrant 2] “Water policies in Mexico are schizophrenic”. 
 
[Warrant  3]  “A  great  city,  Chalco  that  it  is  already  a 
municipality, and all this can be traced back to past times so it 
is going to get flooded…so there is no way this zone is not going 
to get inundated”. 
 
 
Continuing with the analysis of the technical framing a closer look at local level 
also  reinforces  the  idea  that  the  nature  of  the  interviewees´  job  and  the  experience 
condition the answer. At the time of the 2000 Chalco Valley‘s inundations the Head of 
ODAPAS was a ―common citizen‖ (as he described himself during the interview) that 
participated  in  aid  emergency  activities  in  his  neighbourhood,  a  year  after,  he  was 
appointed  Head  of  ODAPAS.  During  that  time,  among  other  activities,  he  closely 
coordinated the surveillance of the LCC, especially during the rainy seasons. So his 
accounts are the result of his personal and work experience as it was with the General 
Director of Environmental Policy of SEMARNAT. 
  The  first claim of the  Head of ODAPAS  is a  detailed account (in time and 
space) of the  importance of the well  functioning of the LCC at regional  level as  a 
rainfall and waste water open sewage canal and the impact of the LCC rupture at local 
level. His second claim is an unstated conclusion about the impact of both the LCC 
walls break and the bad sewage system of Chalco Valley on the colonias. Unlike other 
interviewees that explain the inundations in terms of inadvertence by carelessness he 
constructs the warrants according to what the affected people witnessed and said.  
He gives importance to affected people‘s accounts about what `really` caused the 
floods and to the impact the floods had on organizing the local people to cope with  
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future contingencies, i.e., to an ―Inundations Contingency Plan‖. Besides, in order to go 
further  in  explaining  inundations  causality,  he  focuses  in  the  pumping  system  upon 
which several colonias of Chalco and Chalco Valley municipalities rely for evacuating 
their waste waters. This is the only evidence he uses to frame the solution even though 
while  describing  the  `facts`  he  made  reference  to  other  causal  factors  like  ground 
sinking.  What  seems  to  be  clear  is  that  in  his  argument,  framing  Chalco  Valley´s 
inundations is reduced to the issue of the `unreliable` sewage system, in particular the 
performance of the two pumps.  
 
[Evidence1] “Two pumping stations are not enough and due to 
their characteristics they cannot cope with such volume of both 
rain and waste waters…One of the pumps relies on electricity so 
when the energy is cut the diesel pump starts working… it is not 
a reliable system…Imagine if the energy is gone for two hours, 
waste waters would spring up through the house drains…” 
 
The backing underpins that evidence:  
 
[Backing 1] “Chalco Valley is a saucepan… it is a Valley like a 
kind of…saucepan and all waste and rain waters are pumped 
into the La Compañía Canal and from there to the Gran Canal 
that is why we have a lot of problems because even though the 
sewage system works…we can‟t say that it works perfectly but it 
can‟t cope with when there are also heavy rainfalls… Discharge 
fee is not covered by the households”. 
   
 
This, again, can be explained because his framings of facts and solutions are 
embedded within his personal and work experience and his own concerns on making the 
sanitation system work. In sum, the discourse of Inadvertence Causality by Carelessness 
constructs  the  following  system  of  statements,  subjects,  objects  and  system  of 
meanings:  
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Box  3.  Discourse  of  Inadvertence 
Causality by Carelessness 
 
System of Statements   Disaster are: 
Result of lack of precaution 
The final outcome of the chain of causation: migration-
urbanisation-bad planning 
Lack of maintenance of La Compañía Canal 
Oversight by operators and public officials 
Misfortune 
 
Subjects 
 
 
 
 
Objects 
 
Managers/Operators 
Government and the people (State of Mexico´s residents) 
Government allowing settlements in unsafe places and 
irresponsible´ people 
Affected and (unstated) `hidden` local people 
State of Mexico is ´victim´ of Mexico City´s bad and 
´inadequate´ development national plans in late 80´s 
 
Man-made systems/ sanitation 
La Compañía is a `canal` 
Nature is a hazard/ Heavy Rainfalls  
 
System of meanings  Natural  balance  ―disrupted‖  by  urbanisation  and  lack  of 
development planning 
Disaster causality is what the subject is able to do to control 
the natural hazard that poses the risk 
   
 
 
2.2 Discourse of Accidental Causality 
   
The  so-called  `natural‘  disaster  are  commonly  portrayed  as  accidents  of  nature. 
Accidental causality is defined when phenomena are the result of unguided actions with 
unintended consequences or when machines run amok. This is the realm of no human 
intervention or intention; it is the realm of nature. The argumentation of the following 
five interviewees can be grouped under this type of causality: 
L.  General Director of SINAPROC 
M. Former General Coordinator of SINAPROC 
N.  General  Coordinator  of  Water  Provision  and  Sanitation  Projects  of 
Mexico  Valley-CNA  (thereafter  ´General  Coordinator  of  Water  and 
Sanitation of CNA in Mexico Valley´)  
O.  General Director of Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Attention of 
CNA (IPE-CNA)(thereafter General Director of IPE-CNA) 
P.  Operations Manager of GRAVAMEX-CNA   
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The  General  Director  of  SINAPROC  argues  that  Chalco  Valley`s  floods  were  a 
natural  process.  His  claim  underlines  the  naturalness  of  the  disaster  causality:  the 
combination of the  heavy  rain  falls, the ongoing sinking process of the ground and 
unstated technical aspects.  
 
[Claim  1]  Heavy  rain  falls,  mainly  heavy  rain  falls  were  the 
causes; of course with the natural leakages, the sinking process 
the Valley has undergone for many years and also because of 
the  technical  aspects  that  are  explained  there  [in  the  official 
report]  
 
By showing and reading an ´official´ report elaborated by his office (the General 
Direction  of  Civil  Protection)  he  avoided  explaining  details  of  the  event.  His 
argumentation is quite simple and is supported by the act of reading and forcing the 
interviewer  not  to  make  any  interruption.  Even  though  he  was  asked  to  go  further 
seeking  causes-and-consequences  he  refused  to  run  the  risk  to  be  contested  by  the 
interviewer. The backings are centred on the idea that what matters is to respond by 
providing solutions to problems.  
 
[Backing 1] I think that when a natural disaster takes place and 
causes a critical situation…one has to look for solutions instead 
of  culprits.    I  don‟t  dare  to  say…I  am  not  a  researcher  nor 
would like to judge; In my work I have to provide solutions, to 
make solutions work…I don‟t seek culprits. 
 
By refusing being labelled as a researcher he intends to show a neutral position 
in case he is asked to find culprits. To him, disaster and Chalco Valley´s inundations are 
about emergency aid and civil protection. In fact his job position is about coordinating 
prompt responses to avoid casualties and  mitigate consequences. The official report 
gives  him  ´authority´  to  justify  the  claim.  This  can  be  considered  an  authoritative 
warrant and the way he talks and reads the document, the reliability of source seems to 
be presented as incontestable. 
The Former General Coordinator of SINAPROC during the time of Chalco 
Valley floods reproduces this causality discourse that gives prominence to the natural 
cause:   
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[Claim 1] Well… what I can say is that the canal couldn‟t stand 
a high volume of water flow, it broke and part of Chalco got 
flooded. 
 
Accounts  of  past  socio-ecological  characteristics  of  the  lake  constitute  the 
discursive context that serve as the evidence to conclude why the canal could not cope 
with the high water flow. By stressing the fact that Chalco Valley has always been 
naturally  prone  to  flooding,  the  happening  can  then  be  understood  as  a  natural 
consequence, hence people who moved there encountered an unsuitable ecosystem to 
settle in.  
The meaning of the claim is contextualized in a framework that accounts for the 
historic and ´natural´ ecological characteristics of the region and that context excludes 
previous or current failures of policy measures that may eventually have been used to 
explain the flooding as a man-made disaster. High volume of water flow and heavy 
rains are natural components of the ecosystem of Chalco Valley and the colonias are 
conceived as neither normal nor natural for that context.  
 
(Evidence 1) “Let us remember that Chalco is a lacustrine zone, 
it was a lake…people used to travel by ships and boats during 
the XIX and XX century then [it is still] a flooding area…”  
 
(Evidence  2)  “…it  is  a  lacustrine  zone  that  naturally  gets 
flooded…with the aid of the canal management water has been 
(rightly)  diverted  …therefore  settlements  should  have  never 
existed there… and what happened is that it got flooded there 
and many blocks inundated…”  
(Former General Coordinator of SINAPROC, 2003) 
 
It  is  worth  mentioning  that  he  never  frames  his  evidence  in  terms  of  an 
institutional-technical failure, let alone recognition of the role that CNA might have 
played as the governmental body in charge of the canal monitoring and maintenance. He 
excludes any kind of responsibility or blame. By saying “…the canal couldn‟t stand a 
high  volume  of  water  flow…”,  he  implicitly  defines  the  conclusion  considering  the 
relation between the canal and nature‘s forces that have been present in the region for 
centuries  and  that  have  determined  the  hydraulic  dynamics  of  Chalco  Valley.    The 
uncontrolled urbanisation that sprawled adjacent to the canal is an element that is also 
interpreted within that framework but as a pressing demographic force that changed the 
―balance of nature‖ therefore catalyzing the inundation.    
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According  to  the  interpretation  of  the  Former  General  Coordinator  of 
SINAPROC it could be understood that when it came to respond in the aftermath, he 
was prepared and provided adequate assistance, whereas when it came to recognising 
their  role  in  the  disaster  causality,  he  blamed  nature  and  the  infrastructure  failure 
excluding institutions and civil servants (funcionarios) in charge of risk reduction tasks 
like those of SEGOB. The inundations claim is based on his personal experience  in 
coordinating emergency responses. His accounts of the floods and how he frames the 
causality are influenced by what was done during the emergency stage in order to fix 
the mechanical problem of the canal and to cope with the seriousness of the situation.  
The General Coordinator of Water and Sanitation of CNA in Mexico Valley 
centres his argument on the changing context of  hazard awareness. LCC was  being 
monitored and no potential damage to its structure was foreseen. Even though evidence 
of the deterioration of the LCC walls due to the sinking ground was reported it was not 
thought that something serious would happen. Hazard awareness remained concealed 
before  the  inundations  thanks  to  the  implementation  of  a  normal  surveillance  of  a 
situation that was characterised as adequate. 
 
[Claim 1] No, but there was no awareness about the severity of 
the situation in certain segments (of the LCC)… these walls that 
were damaged by the sinking underground and then….suddenly 
a  failure  (fault)  occurs  eh…?  A  fault  occurs  because  the 
ground sinks, (canal walls) crack and the disaster takes place, 
no?  
 
[Claim  2]  Perhaps  it  was  not  foreseen,  nobody  could  have 
imagined that that could happen but very good emergency aid 
was  provided  and  since  then  the  follow  up  with  (prevention 
activities)… the problem was diagnosed, studied and it is (now) 
obviously clear. 
 
  Within the context of this evidence the claim framed the inundations cause as a 
sudden failure of LCC that CNA operators did not expect and for that reason he labels 
them as an accident. The warrant refers not to past causes of the inundations but to the 
current situation where hazard awareness is thought to have been raised as a result of a 
closer surveillance of the walls, monitoring of the waste waters volume and of course of 
the  floods‘  impact  both  on  the  canal  and  the  people.  By  appealing  to  scientific 
knowledge in framing the problem the General Coordinator of Water and Sanitation  
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of CNA in Mexico Valley tries to convince the interviewer that nowadays the problem 
(of the LCC) has been diagnosed, known and controlled.  
It is interesting to note that even though he assumes that after the inundations 
more hazard awareness through scientific means was raised, problem framing is still the 
same as before the floods: ground sinking due to overexploitation of the aquifer and 
growing  urbanisation  causes  the  LCC  to  move  in  the  two  axes  (vertically  and 
horizontally),  therefore  being  prone  to  breakage.  According  to  him,  disaster  causal 
problem is constructed in terms of an accidental narrative. In the same vein when it 
comes  to  proposing  solutions  the  inundations  problem  is  located  in  the  realm  of 
unguided  actions  with  unintended  consequences.  He  employs  the  metaphor  of  the 
illness (“…the ill person has got AIDS…”) to illustrate the impossibility to solve the 
structural causes that are prevailing where only mitigating actions are being carried out.   
When talking about blame, no subject is identified even though implicitly he 
blames  groundwater  over-exploitation.  But  this  version  of  accidental  causality  is 
somehow triggered by human action. This is a notable difference from the argument of 
Former General Coordinator of SINAPROC. That  is  illustrated by the  following 
claims that connect humans and nature:  
 
“...nature behaves the way we force it to do...”, “...we (humans) 
make nature behave like that...”, “...so in this sense yes, there is 
a culprit”, “and since we are over-exploiting groundwater we 
are provoking sinking and therefore the wall cracks” 
 
He refers to the government as if he does not work for it. His identity is different 
from that of the policy makers and government officials; he sees himself as a water 
technician, not a government bureaucrat. 
 The  claims  of  the  General  Director  of  Infrastructure  Protection  and 
Emergency Attention of CNA (General Director of IPE-CNA) are the result of two 
intertwined processes that are framed as natural.   
[Claim 1] “…and then an extraordinary water current of 22 m3 
arrived…The night before it rained a lot in that zone and around 
22 m3 in the river basin that includes San Francisco river and 
another  one  I  don‟t  remember  right  now…and  then  that 
created...  
 
 
[Claim 2] A big hole that had not been detected before and due 
to the heavy rain falls and the river current… the water level  
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raised very fast and it went out through the cracks and since the 
hard structure (of the canal) is above the soft clay…that created 
the breakage …it was a hole in the wall and that is why many 
measures were implemented… 
 
 
Again, as in the arguments of other policy makers (analysed above), the way the 
evidence  is  constructed  and  used  reveals  how  the  explanations  of  natural  causes  in 
technical terms tend to divert the attention from the human intervention and hence to 
exclude any kind of responsibility and blame. One key element in this is the image of 
the LCC as a ―river‖:   
 
[Evidence  1]  “What  happened  is  that  the  river  was…  full  of 
sediments; it had only 25% of its carrying capacity.  
 
[Evidence 2] “The river‟s capacity was insufficient to cope with 
the  increasing  water  flow…and  because  of  the  quality  of  the 
walls material… it (the  water) encountered a little geological 
fault that, in this case, was a fissure and that provoked the river 
damage…”  
 
[Evidence 3] “But that is quite different from saying that any 
kind of direct responsibility can be attributed to someone…of 
course not…because CNA was doing their business, inspecting 
(the LCC) once in a while, due to this problem that kind of task 
was  being  undertaken  more  often  …That  means  sometimes 
nature show us what we should have prevented, I repeat it once 
again it is a river that because of its geologic characteristics it 
is  a  complicated  river  that  has  threatened  us…It  is  a 
treacherous river”.  
 
Nevertheless  he  recognized  the  ―mistakes‖  made  by  an  (unstated)  actor  or 
institution when heightening the LCC walls with clay and then building an unstable and 
unsafe infrastructure.  
 
[Warrant  2] “A  mistake  was  committed:  the  river  walls  have 
been  heightened,  heightened  and  while  doing  that  the  walls 
become  heavier  and  cannot  hold  their  weight…  they  lack  a 
reliable structure…” 
 
But the argument was constructed upon a general backing that reinforces the 
idea of the naturalness of inundation‘s causality. 
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[Backing  2]  “In  fact  there  is  no  one  to  blame,  it  is  an 
extraordinary  event  that  nobody  could  have  foreseen…since 
many years ago no similar event had taken place” 
 
The argumentation of the Operations Manager of GRAVAMEX-CNA builds 
also an accidental narrative. In explaining the inundations causality, his claim points to 
a problem of the ´river´ La Compañía. The ultimate causal agent identified by him was 
the heavy rainfalls that provoked the  increase on the water  flow  breaking the wall. 
Attached to this  idea of causal agent  is the  extraordinary  nature of the  hazard. The 
image of La Compañía is that of a river with walls, not of a canal. The combination of 
ground sinking and the heavy rainfalls constitute the evidence.  
A new element is introduced: the adjective extraordinary to qualify the rainfalls. 
In this sense, he supposedly recurs to a pluviometric history record of the region to 
assert that for many  years  it  had not rain the way  it did when the  floods occurred; 
extraordinary also in the sense of unusual event with high volumes of water. It can be 
assumed then that there is no civil protection system capable of adequately coping with 
such extremeness. The evidence provided to support the claim is primary information of 
the changing dynamics of LCC and ground sinking generated by the CNA; they are in 
charge  of  monitoring  the  river  structure  and  behaviour  and  this  information  system 
warrants the validity of the evidence to support the claim.  
 
[Evidence 1] Mainly that (floods) happened as a consequence of 
the ground problematic in that zone and the extraordinary heavy 
rainfalls…and  that  combination  was  what  caused  the  wall  to 
break.  
 
[Evidence  2]  There  is  evidence  of  previous  assessments  (but) 
since then (after the floods of 2000) the (monitoring) system was 
set up and it detected that that (La Compañía river and adjacent 
areas) is a high risk prone zone…(and also because of the fact 
that the river is in the transition zone of two geologic structures: 
soft  –  that  of  the  clayed  ground  –  and  hard  –  that  of  the 
´Elephant hill…but yes, we have evidence…).  
 
The technical evidence is underpinned by the warrant: 
 
[Warrant 1] We (CNA) have set a monitoring system [to detect 
changes in the inclination and behaviour of the structure (of the 
LCC)], that is why we have evidence (of what happened)…the 
ground settlement is measured…to see whether the walls slope  
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or not …how walls deform… and this [is because] obviously to 
the quality of the ground and soils in that zone.  
 
The discourse of accidental causality constructs the following system of statements, 
subjects, objects and system of meanings: 
 
Box  4.  Discourse  of  Accidental 
Causality  
 
System of Statements   Disaster are: 
Accidents caused by nature 
Disruption of the `balance of nature` 
A situation that demands action/solution 
A  sudden  failure  of  La  Compañía  Canal  provokes  a 
disaster 
Unforeseen/ extraordinary event 
“Ill person” with AIDS 
 
Subjects 
 
 
Objects 
 
Nature ―behaves‖ according to man`s impact  
CNA (―We‖)   
 
 
La Compañía Canal 
Chalco Valley ground and topography 
Ecological dynamics of the region 
 
System of meanings  Floods as natural accidents 
Human devices have limits when it comes to confronting 
natural forces 
   
 
2.3 Discourse of Structural Causality 
 
Constructions of social problems that blame root causes like economic inequality and 
poverty  belong  to this  type  of  causal  discourse.  Interviews  of  the  following  can  be 
grouped into the structural causality:  
Q.  Research Director of CENAPRED 
R.  Coordinator  of  Capacity  Building  and  Training  of  CENAPRED 
(thereafter ´Coordinator of Capacity Building of CENAPRED´) 
S.  Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico 
T.  Undersecretary of Ecology of the State of Mexico 
U.  General  Director  of  Disaster  Management  and  Urban  Planning  of 
SEDESOL  (thereafter  ´General  Director  of  Disaster  Management  of 
SEDESOL´) 
V.  Director of Emergency Aid of CARITAS  
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.  
Two claims are found in the argument of the Research Director of CENAPRED: 
 [Claim 1] the weakening of the wall, water excess in the LCC. 
 
 
[Claim  2]  Finally,  we  got  an  inundation,  in  a  flooding  zone 
“known to be a flooding zone”. 
 
The first claim is related only to the canal and is elaborated in technical terms to explain 
the causes of the canal break. No data are provided to give evidence to the claim. He is 
very careful not to provide evidence regarding to what extent the weakening of the canal 
walls and the impact of the water excess is the result of illegal urbanisation in high risk 
zones; that is left as an implicit assumption. What is important to highlight in this claim 
is the warrant that gives validity to it. The report elaborated by Ramón Domínguez, an 
engineer expert on hydraulic and sanitation issues of the UNAM, in which Cenapred 
also participated, and that was provided to the CNA for explaining the canal breakage, 
serves as the warrant.  
[Warrant  1]  “...we  know  what  was  published,  what 
happened...There  is  a  report  elaborated  by  the  Institute  of 
Engineering in the UNAM, Ram￳n Domínguez (the expert)…we 
participated in the elaboration of the assessment of this…and we 
sent it to the CNA…”  
 
Warrant 1 is an affirmation that directs the attention to the importance of his 
position  at  CENAPRED  and  therefore  of  his  capacity  for  having  the  knowledge  to 
explain what went wrong. Also the warrant directs the attention to the validity of the 
source and is presented as the official report that represents the rules of the legitimate 
knowledge to give account of the floods causality. This is in great part due to the social 
and institutional authority the Institute of Engineering of the UNAM has in Mexico as 
the main official source of knowledge with regards to hydraulic infrastructure.  
  The second claim is presented as the consequence of a social process that led to 
(illegal) urbanisation in an unsafe place; and therefore it has political content.  In the 
evidence provided the authorities emerge as the subjects responsible for promoting or at 
least allowing people to settle.  
 
[Evidence 1] “Despite the fact that there was a land use plan, 
illegal settlements populated Chalco; authorities allowed this to 
happen to avoid social uprising and problems; what they do is  
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to pave roads, provide electricity; and at the end we have this 
zone inundated; it was known that Chalco was a flooding area”. 
 
Law enforcement and land use planning are invoked as the warrants for the idea 
that  corruption  and  illegal  urbanisation  in  the  form  of  urban  services  provision 
constituted part of the flooding root causes.  
 
[Warrant 2]”There are laws and regulations concerning land 
occupation that people have to obey and endorse. One serious 
negative obstacle civil protection has to face is the lack of law 
enforcement...” 
 
 
The first claim treats the canal as an isolated object from the social and political 
context the second claim details. So in the explanation of the Chalco Valley‘s floods it 
is not clear whether the problem was caused by the canal failure or other factors. In 
short,  causal  explanations  rely  on  socio-political  grounds  whereas  solutions  are 
proposed as merely technical. 
The  Coordinator  of  Capacity  Building  of  CENAPRED  responds  without 
hesitation to the question of what happened  in  Chalco Valley the 1st June 2000  by 
mislabelling  the  LCC  as  the  Bordo  de  Xochiaca  which  is  another  canal  located 
elsewhere in the State of Mexico. At first sight the main cause appears to be only a 
technical  failure  of  the  LCC.  She  focused  in  very  technical  details  though  in  an 
inaccurate way due to her lack of updated information and professional background –
she  is  an  organizational  psychologist  and  her  job  is  capacitating  civil  protection 
personnel,  she  is  not a technician or physical  scientist. No reference to damages to 
people is mentioned in her claim. 
 
[Claim 1]. “... [t]he overspilling of the Bordo de Xochiaca, It 
got damaged, it got cracks on its walls and that provoked the 
floods in a vast area of Chalco Valley, an area I don‟t remember 
how vast it was...” 
[she mistaken the name of LCC by Bordo de Xochiaca which is 
another canal not located in the Chalco region. ] 
 
  That  claim  is  supported  by  data  of  a  long  explanation  of  causal  factors 
(presented as facts) of two types: 1) a spotted and concrete problem in the physical 
features of the LCC; that means a lack of a maintenance programme considering the  
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´real´ resistance of the LCC walls for coping with wastewaters flows; according to her 
interpretation that was what ´really´ caused the inundations; and 2) tolerance (by local 
and State authorities) of large settlements adjacent or close to an hydraulic infrastructure 
that was not meant to support water peaks without having an ´adequate´ maintenance 
programme. 
  With  regards  to  the  evidence  she  presented  two  implicitly  intertwined  data 
evidence. If there had been a good maintenance programme for the LCC, it could have 
eventually withstood the impact of heavy rain falls and therefore settlements would not 
have  been  affected  by  the  waste  water  overspilling.  Inundations  would  never  have 
occurred if the ´balance´ between settlements and LCC´s resistance would have been 
achieved. Causality  is  framed as an  issue of  ―balance‖;  it means that if  hazards are 
successfully controlled, even illegal settlements were to be allowed to exist in those 
ecologically  fragile  areas, no  inundations would have ever occurred having put into 
place the adequate technical solutions.  
How did the Coordinator of Capacity Building of CENAPRED arrive to this 
claim from the information available? According to her, technical and social reports 
were drafted by official institutions after the floods, explaining on the one hand the 
reasons for the LCC walls technical failure and on the other the exceeding population 
growth occurring in that zone without land use planning — that represents a national 
phenomenon  that  can  be  identified  in  other  states  of  the  Mexican  Republic.  These 
reports are presented by the interviewee as the warrants that legitimise the explanation 
of the process of floods causality in an ongoing population growth and uncontrolled 
urbanisation.  
Two references illustrate the above. ´The case of Chalco´ is a chapter of the 
book Impacto socio-económico de los principales desastres ocurridos en la República 
Mexicana en el año de 2000
48 (CENAPRED, 2001), in which Chalco Valley´s floods 
are framed as a result of the failure of La Compañía Canal. It is a brief explanation of 
the  ´behaviour´  of  La  Compañía  Canal  and  the  engineering  works  proposed  to 
´definitively´ solve the problem.  Besides, a leaflet issued by GRAVAMEX (2001) to 
inform Chalco local residents and the public at large explains the ´problematic´ in terms 
of the effects the settlements have on the ground sinking and how they triggered the 
cracking of the canal walls. Short and medium-term solutions are presented, namely the 
                                                 
48 ―Socio-economic impact of the most important disasters occurred in the Mexican Republic during 
2000‖  
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reinforcing of the LCC walls and the construction of little dams to regulate the water 
flow of the LCC, and in the long-term the piping of the waste waters of LCC. In the 
backing she frames the main cause in terms of the relation between migration and land 
use. She affirms that what has really caused the problem was the pressure exerted by 
migrants over the peripheral land in the interface between State of Mexico and Mexico 
City   
[Unstated Backing 1]. The relation between population growth-
migration into the State of Mexico neighbouring municipalities 
and a lack of adequate policy responses. 
 
In  that  sense,  authorities  reacted  to  population  growth  by  allowing  land 
occupation in unsafe areas through corruption and lack of planning. The Coordinator 
of  Capacity  Building  of  CENAPRED  defines  this  way  of  policy  making  and 
implementation as a mending act: reactive policy responses after problems occurs – 
CNA and the State of Mexico authorities have been responding to similar problems in 
this  way  for  more  than  40  years;  so  according  to  her  interpretation,  disaster  are 
embedded  in  a  socio-political  context  and  are  the  result  of  a  way  of  doing  politics 
during the policy process. 
  In short, inundations causality in particular and disaster causality in general are 
framed by her as events that could disrupt the balance between population pressure and 
infrastructure coping capacity: This can be expressed in the relation  
       
    Population growth                     infrastructure 
                               
             Balance disrupted            
               Disaster 
 
  The Undersecretary of Ecology of the State of México did not express any 
specific claim with regards to the flood events so it is assumed that he was not well 
acquainted with the Chalco Valley´s floods. Nevertheless, he presents general evidence 
that could be used to frame other types of urban-environmental problems. The evidence 
focuses on matters of resource management and planning in a basin context and it might 
be  interpreted  that,  above  all,  disaster  occurrence  are  the  outcome  of  inadequate 
ecosystem management policies.   
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He calls for the personal interpretation of the interviewer to be recognised as a 
policy maker with authority and therefore giving validity to evidence:  “…the things 
that…you  know…were  present  for  inundations  to  take  place…”  This  also  can  be 
interpreted as a way of justifying how he uses the evidence to explain the disaster whose 
causes he ignores. The backings are of two types. The first one is about the lack of 
integration  of  ecological  constraints  into  mainstream  land  planning.  In  the  second 
backing he imagines a hypothetical situation and puts himself in the position of a local 
inhabitant.  He invents a monologue that condenses the relation of complicity between 
the  government  and  the  settler  that,  to  him,  characterises  the  political  culture  of 
clientelism that at the end was the root cause of the inundations:  
 
“…ah, let‟s see…it is an illegal settlement, isn‟t it? So I want 
you  to  provide  me  with  paved  roads,  electricity,  sewage 
system…give me deed titles. OK I vote for you but you have to 
be very good with me…” [A hypothetical local inhabitant]. 
 
  In the warrants, politicians and policy makers are the subjects that, by pursuing 
their own interest, contribute to ecological deterioration and disaster. At the time of the 
interview the Undersecretary of Ecology of the State of México was holding that post 
but due to his professional background as an ecologist he tries to present himself as a 
neutral  scientist  and  distances  himself  from  politicians  and  policymakers  whom  he 
blames.   
In  the  argumentation  of  the  General  Director  of  Disaster  Management  of 
SEDESOL, inundations causality is not circumscribed to the hazard impact. A type of 
structural causality is put forward because he frames this inundations causality as the 
historic result of socio-economic inequalities that have forced poor people to settle in 
risk prone areas. In this sense it is very difficult to point to a specific culprit. It is more 
about a complex chain of actors and institutions´ actions and programmes that along the 
years have created unsafe conditions regarding the LCC-Chalco Valley´s system. The 
concrete triggering factor that caused the floods is the LCC overspilling of wastewaters 
due to an increase in the level and magnitude of rain; however this discursive element is 
not sufficient to explain how and why inundations in Chalco Valley´s occurred.   
  His argumentation structure relies on his main assumptions about the supposed 
ecological transformation of the valley driven by human action, by the pressure over 
natural resources exerted by unidentified people and decision makers.  
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[Backing 1] ―Society can be blamed…” 
 
[Backing 2] ―But you‟ll have to find out why the LCC flooded, 
where  did  it  originate…  and  I  don‟t  only  mean  in  terms  of 
physical failures but it can be traced back to decisions made 50 
years  ago…  in  those  days  there  was  nothing…only  one  little 
stream  and  over  the  years  things  evolve  and  you  let  them 
happen…” 
 
[Backing 3] ―….Who is the direct culprit, perhaps a government 
employee who didn‟t care about it [LCC]. You can always find 
culprits  who are not  really culprits…You cannot point to the 
culprit when a water pipe  on the street gets broken…a driver 
with his car passing by and stepping over the pipeline…or the 
guy who installed the water pipe… I should say there are no 
culprits or everyone is culprit…” 
 
[Backing  4]  ―Who  is  the  culprit?  Who  knows…Who  are  the 
culprits for the world‟s problems… and I can say since Adam 
and Eve the problem mess started…” 
 
[Backing 5] “Corruption culture (as a way of doing things in 
Mexico) allowed illegal settlements in risk areas and no control 
over land market is exerted”. 
 
   Calling for past processes of change is a rhetoric move to avoid naming who or 
what to blame. It is assumed that since he was not very well acquainted with the Chalco 
Valley´s floods case – by the time of the interview, the General Director of Disaster 
Management of SEDESOL had just taken over that position – the evidence and the 
warrants to support the claim are of a general character and not clearly linked to the 
main  conclusion.  However,  it  gives  the  idea  that  regardless  of  the  severity  of  the 
causality problem, one can talk about issues not quite related to the claim but to other 
problematic that can be used to construct other arguments and problems such as the 
need  to  allocate  more  resources  to  urban  development  planning  vis  à  vis  social 
development policies.  
The  Director  of  Emergency  Aid  of  CARITAS  constructs  the  claim  as  a 
hypothetical  definition  of  disaster  that  –  according  to  his  interpretation  of  the 
inundations  he  experienced  –  was  proved  to  be  true  with  the  example  of  Chalco 
Valley‘s  inundations.  He  challenges  the  metaphor  of  spontaneous  generation  to 
ascertain that disaster in general does not spontaneously  emerge but  is a  man-made 
product. Taking advantage of the question he responds using Chalco Valley´s case study 
by listing a number of conditioning factors that led to disaster.   
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[Claim 1] [Not referring to the particular case]: “…disasters 
develop, they don‟t arise spontaneously, and they are the total 
sum of risks, vulnerabilities, threats that turn the equation…into 
a disaster, isn‟t it?” 
 
[Claim 2] Unstated conclusion [canal] walls breakage. 
 
Regardless of the concrete empirical evidence in this particular case, the check 
list of all factors are of general nature and represent almost all possible situations he 
might have remembered that could have triggered the impact. It is clear that he has 
´lived´ and ´situated´ information of the inundations impact on people since he was part 
of the personnel of the NGO CARITAS that participated in the emergency aid in the 
aftermath of Chalco Valley´s floods. In that sense, the data that support the evidence are 
worded in conditional mode.   
The Director of Emergency Aid of CARITAS talks about the inundation not in 
technical terms but in social ones. He portrays the inundation conditions in terms of 
what he assumes to have happened, and of what an ex-post evaluation of the past event 
and the conditions he thinks led to it were.  
 
[Warrant 1 unstated] Experienced knowledge of the inundations 
by the affected people appears to be the basis of the warrant.    
 
 
[Warrant 2 assumption] No regulations and adequate land use 
planning  were  put  into  place  since  the  inception  of  the 
communities in the Chalco Valley‟s region. 
 
 
The warrant gives importance and legitimacy to memories and locally situated 
knowledge about the LCC unstable material condition and the symptoms it has shown 
to  people  (walls  cracks)  over  the  last  years.  Experienced  knowledge  is  shaped  by 
hazards awareness and this in turn is used by the interviewee to guarantee the disaster 
definition  recurring  to  conditional  tense  by  using  the  word  IF  for  every  supposed 
condition  that  may  have  happened.  When  is  the  temporal  adverb  that  delimits  the 
timeframe of the backings and it appeals to past times, past events of past policy failures 
and corruption. It is assumed that there was a beginning, a middle and an end; an end 
that culminated in a disaster. So a teleological chain of processes are thought to have 
happened in which unstated actors- labelled as a bunch of culprits – are to be blamed. It  
  231 
is worth noting that these backings are general statements that could be applied to the 
construction of other urban problems. By recognising the participation of past actors, 
current and recent past authorities are excluded from the involvement of inundations 
generation.  
 
[Backing 1] This disaster that [had] developed  30 years ago 
when communities settled there,  when that infrastructure  was 
designed, when regulations were not observed/enforced or there 
were none… then the total sum of those factors resulted in [what 
we know]… current administration is not to be blamed nor the 
former  one…[this  problem  origin]  has  many  years  of 
development, negligence and a bunch of culprits that should be 
legally punished because of [no action] made them accessories 
of one thing that originated from the beginning…” 
 
The argumentation of the Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico 
shows elements pertaining to both inadvertent and structural causalities. For this reason 
I placed him at the end of the discussion. It is interesting to note that his argumentation 
appeals to the three rhetorical elements, ethos, pathos and logos when trying to convince 
the interviewer about his position, responsibilities and the truthfulness of his accounts of 
the Chalco Valley floods of 2000.  When he was asked about Chalco Valley‘s floods, he 
starts with a disclaimer:  
 
“I was not working in that position at the time the floods occurred but I had 
the information”.  
 
This disclaimer rhetorical function is to protect him from criticism and to allow 
him to keep a distance from those events that took place years before he took over that 
position (that he still held in 2008). It is like he is implicitly saying, “I am not to be 
blamed for it, but I know what really happened”. By stating ´I had the information´ he 
offers a ´preferred reading´ indicating the way the argument should be interpreted and 
how things really were. He also implies the existence of just ONE description of events, 
his. 
The argumentation of the Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico 
touches upon various issues in a sequential chain of events, all related to La Compañía 
Canal deterioration and rupture within the context of industrialisation-urbanisation of 
the State of Mexico. The claim can be split into four sub-claims. The first sub-claim 
defines the LCC as a very old canal.   
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[Claim 1] “That happened because La Compa￱ía Canal (LCC) 
is a very old canal…” (Stated conclusion)  
 
Recalling the age of the canal is a rhetoric resource to both bringing the socio-
historical and environmental context of Chalco Valley region and its connections with 
the central  basin of Mexico Valley  into the discussion and to  implicitly  justify any 
problem that may have arisen with the canal as a result of the deterioration process it 
has undergone.  He constructs and uses this sub-claim and the historical evidence that 
supports  it  to  distance  himself  from  the  inundation‘s  causes  and  therefore  to try  to 
convince the interviewer that the problem was not new and had rooted causes situated in 
the past. 
[Evidence 1] “(LCC)… is located in an ex-lacustrine  region 
where the Chalco, Zumpango and Texcoco Lakes existed… then 
at the beginning of last century (XX) the lake was drained…an  
hacienda (La Compañía) was set up and used the river (which 
turned into the LCC) to get rid of its waste waters”.  
 
In the second and third sub-claim he focuses specifically on the segment of La 
Compañía Canal that has shown cracks and leakages and in the actions taken by his 
office.  
[Claim 2] “…a section of the canal is especially problematic; it 
is 7 km. long between the Chalco Valley and Ixtapaluca area…”  
 
[Claim 3] “-…what happened is that once in a while (LLC walls 
cracks) and (wastewaters) used to leak through it…, so we have 
to constantly inspect it and if we detect one of those leakages, 
we fix it immediately…  
 
This may be with the intention of justifying the previous works undertaken by 
the  CNA  in  order  to  fix  the  walls  and  to  prevent  any  potential  breakage:  “…what 
happened is…so we…”  
So far the three claims not only depict the problem but also place the Director of 
Civil Protection of the State of Mexico in it with the aim to persuade the interviewer 
that the day the inundations occurred leakages were not previously detected. The first 
warrant “I have the information” can be interpreted as a way of imposing one reading 
of the events. This says something about the reliability and authority of the source from 
which the data are drawn. In the policy sphere it is common to find that policy makers  
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of lower ranking accept the information sources of the top official authorities as valid 
and legitimate. This can be understood as an authoritative statement which is commonly 
found in a hierarchical policy sector like the Civil Protection in Mexico. The second 
warrant explains the events in a more neutral way.  
 
[Warrant 2]”Technical reports of the topographic and ground 
sinking  process  and  the  LCC  canal  capacity  in  that  region. 
(…led to affirm that the event was the result of a combination of 
natural forces and the historic ecological deterioration of the 
zone and the low resistance of the LCC…)”    
 
 
In the third (unstated) warrant he is very cautious to make any statement because 
as he says, he was not working in the CP of the State of Mexico at that time. Since the 
canal is a riverbed administered at the federal level by the CNA, Civil Protection of the 
State of México cannot be blamed. His fourth warrant supports this statement 
 
[Warrant  4]”CNA  did  not  detect  the  leakage  and  may 
partially be blamed”. 
 
More  information  found  in  other  parts  of  the  interview  helps  situate  his 
explanation in the context of the industrial development of the State of Mexico and the 
linkages the State of Mexico has with Mexico City. Disaster explanation is shaped by 
the ´problematic´ imposed by the industrial development of the State of Mexico. He 
recalls that there are thousands of plants and industries spread along the territory of the 
State of Mexico which inhabitants have to co-exist with. This relationship is what seems 
to determine the way he frames disaster and elaborates plans and programmes to deal 
with those circumstances, so the main idea that underpins prevention measures is that of 
´living at risk´.  
Thus,  disaster  is  somehow  framed  by  the  need  to  promote  the  economic 
development of the industrial sector and at the same time to persuade residents to accept 
the costs of living in a hazardous environment. In a way he is accepting that despite the 
´unlikelihood´ (as he affirms) of future impacts of hazards, State of Mexico´s residents 
have to realise that they live in a unsafe place and they have to adapt to that situation. 
To keep on explaining why some people are exposed to risk, he recurs again to the issue 
of migration-industrialisation-urbanisation.   
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He blames Mexico City´s migrants for having settled in the State of Mexico 
exerting more pressure to land, resources and increasing the likelihood of risk exposure. 
That illustrates the ´clash´ between those two different states that has been going on for 
quite some time. In term of ecological deterioration, Mexico City causes the problems, 
´sends´ the people and dumps the pollution into the State of Mexico´s river banks and 
orchards.  
It  can  be  interpreted  that  the  Director  of  Civil  Protection  of  the  State  of 
Mexico  embodies  the  ethos  of  the  State  of  Mexico  and  portrays  himself  and  the 
´original  residents‘  as  the  victims  of  Mexico  City´s  migrants  who  are  framed  as 
responsible for the ´bads´ of Mexico State; the blame clearly is put on Mexico City and 
the environmental impact it poses on the State of Mexico. One can say that this part of 
the argumentation illustrates Chalco´s floods as a structural causality.  
But, on the other hand, he states that the lack of hazard awareness of the State of 
Mexico residents and Mexico City´s migrants of the ´real´ causes and consequences of 
environmental degradation is a determinant factor in exposing people to current risks.  
An  inadvertent  cause  very  similar  to  that  of  the  General  Coordinator  of  Civil 
Protection  (discussed  in  part  2.1 of  this  chapter)  can  be  identified  in  terms  of  not 
having foreseen the side effects of urbanisation and industrialisation and the lack of 
development planning. As seen above, according to Stone´s typology, inadvertence is 
due to ignorance; the consequences are predictable  by experts but unappreciated  by 
those taking actions; in this case, as the Director of Civil Protection of the State of 
Mexico notes, migrants are also ´ignorants´ and lack hazard awareness. 
Moreover, according to his account, the government that could not plan urban 
growth or was not willing to do so, or lacked  ´the adequate knowledge´, played an 
important role in participating in the problematic. Nevertheless, in some cases, though 
the government of the State of Mexico has realised the ´real´ causes, and despite its 
efforts to 
 ―...make  a  lot  of  things,  a  lot  of  programmes,  campaigns, 
information, research...‖ (Quoted from interview to Director of 
Civil Protection of the State of Mexico, 2003)  
 
goals are not achieved because society is ignorant and unwilling to take action.  
The discourse of Structural  Causality constructs the following system of statements, 
subjects, objects and system of meanings: 
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Box  5.  Discourse  of  Structural 
Causality  
 
System of Statements   Disaster are: 
Foreseeable events 
Issues of imbalance between nature and society. 
Result of illegal urbanisation, corruption and lack of 
law enforcement 
Socio-economic inequalities 
Issue of natural resources management  
Improvement in technical responses will help in coping 
with future extreme hazards. 
Imbalance between State of Mexico vs Mexico City. 
 
Subjects 
 
 
 
Objects 
 
Authorities responsible for allowing/promoting  
illegal urbanisation 
Corrupted politicians and policymakers 
Unnamed actors / ―bunch of culprits‖ 
 
La Compañía Canal   
Chalco Valley ground, topography and natural resources 
Ecological characteristics of the region 
 
System of meanings  Disruption of  balance between population pressure and 
infrastructure coping capacity  
   
 
In this part I showed t he utility of argumentation analysis in examining the 
different  disaster  causality discourses within the three social domains of  disaster  in 
Mexico. The way causal ideas of  disaster  are assembled evidenced how  disaster  is 
constructed. This in turn explains how policy problems are constructed. I analysed three 
general types of disaster causality, namely inadvertence, accidental and structural within 
which four different arguments about Chalco Valley`s floods problems were identified.  
In the next part of this chapter, I focus on the symbolic images contained in the 
four problem constructions. The intention here is to elaborate short narratives that best 
describe how the story is told around the main ´characters of the play´, namely, images 
of the government, Chalco Valley people, hazards and La Compañía Canal. The added 
value of this analysis is to identify the qualities of the images according to the values 
and beliefs most commonly found in the interviewee‘s claims and how these values are 
embedded in the problem construction. This part of the interpretive analysis serves as 
bridge between the discourses of this Chapter Six and the analysis of policy responses 
of Chapter Seven.   
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3. Problem constructions 
  
I have shown that discourses of Chalco Valley`s  floods  is  not uniform amongst all 
scientists, policy makers and implementers and depends on the claims content and how 
claims are assembled and used to `portray` the floods as `facts` and particularly on the 
images of causal agents and the emergence of advocacy coalitions
49. I explained how 
the four types of causality discourses can be identified and the way they differ on the 
basis of who the main subjects are, what or who is to blame for the Chalco Valley 
floods and the objects deemed to pose inundations risk or being contributory factors.  
The  four  discourses  differ  also  on  the  way  the  system  of  statements  and 
meanings interviewees used to characterise the images of the whole Chalco Valley‘s 
inundations scenario. This is a function of both the argumentation mechanisms and the 
rhetoric employed by the policy makers and implementers and of the nature, use and 
destination of the evidence. In each case the problem is labelled according to the main 
claim(s) of the interviewees grouped under the type of discourse discussed. Thus, the 
four problem constructions are the following: 
 
Box 6. Four constructions of the Chalco Valley‟s floods problem 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.  Ignorance of hazards and of unsafe conditions. 
2.  Failure of infrastructure and sanitation system and 
inadequate monitoring of risk object.  
3.  Unforeseen accidents of nature and of man-made systems 
that disrupt human systems. 
4.  Exposure of vulnerable people to hazards as a consequence 
of socio-economic inequalities.  
 
Table  4  below  summarises  five  rhetorical  elements  of  the  four  problem 
constructions of Chalco Valley‘s inundations arisen from the discourses. All but two of 
the  rhetorical  elements  considered  here  consist  of  symbolic  images  that  are  tied  to 
ontological assumptions about Chalco Valley people, the Government, the hazards and 
La Compañía Canal. These  images serve as  backing  for claims about the nature of 
Chalco Valley‘s floods and are woven into a meaningful narrative intended to persuade 
                                                 
49 According to Sabatier (1993) an advocacy coalition consists "of people from a variety of [public and 
private sector] positions . . . who share a particular belief system-that is, a set of basic values, causal 
assumptions, and problem perceptions-and who show a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over 
time."   
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and inform. Their appeals, the values they elicit and the warrants are treated together as 
rhetorical elements distinct from the images that serve as backing. Such appeals (as 
Linder (1995) notes in his example of the social construction of electromagnetic fields) 
may entail the invocation of political sympathies, social norms or moral commitments.  
In  each  instance,  their  purpose  is  to  provide  a  socially  acceptable  basis  for 
justifying  claims  about  problem  construction  and,  at the  same  time,  to  imbue  these 
claims with the proper sense of weight and legitimacy. Knowledge evidence refers to 
the different nature of data used to prove and convince the audience that the framing 
chosen  by  the  interviewee  is  the  ´real´  source  of  truth  about  ´truthful  events´.  The 
evidence  selected  by  the  interviewee  to  talk  about  Chalco  Valley‘s  floods  is  very 
important in the sense that it gives also validity and legitimacy to the claim because, as 
most of the time, the scientific and technical data used to ´explain´ the floods problem 
were on ´neutral´ grounds. 
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Table 4. Rhetorical elements of four constructions of the Chalco Valley‟s floods problem 
Causality  
Discourses  
of 
Chalco Valley´s  
floods           Inadvertence      Inadvertence                Accidental     Structural 
      by ignorance               by carelessness   
 
 
Problem Constructions 
 
Rhetorical  Ignorance of 
hazards and of 
unsafe conditions 
Failure of 
infrastructure and 
sanitation system 
and inadequate 
monitoring of risk 
object  
 
Accidents of 
nature and of man-
made systems that 
disrupt human 
systems 
 
Exposure of 
vulnerable people 
to hazards is 
consequence of 
socio-economic 
inequalities 
 
Type of 
knowledge 
evidence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
`Expert´ and 
experienced 
knowledge of 
natural, man-made 
hazards and risk. 
Data of 
infrastructure 
capabilities and 
failures; operators 
technical expertise 
as practical 
knowledge 
Scientific data of 
natural hazards, 
ecological 
dynamics and 
faulty man-made 
systems as well as 
institutional 
responses. 
Socio-economic 
and political  
processes of 
development and 
technical 
knowledge of 
ecological 
change 
Appeals and 
warrants  
Moralist 
 
 
Objectivist  Paternal  Ameliorative 
Image of Chalco 
Valley people 
 
Ignorants and 
culprits and 
sometimes 
potential victims 
Hidden subjects   Passive subjects  Vulnerable  
 
Image of the  
Government 
 
 
Image of hazards 
and La 
Compañía Canal 
 
 
Expert 
 
 
 
Threatening 
nature, `fixed` 
ecological 
dynamics  
 
Potential culprit 
when no action is 
taken 
 
Infrastructure as a 
constant danger 
 
Protector 
 
 
 
Potential natural 
and man-made 
danger `separated` 
from society 
 
Planner/ illegal, 
land promoter 
 
 
Natural and man-
made hazards 
transformed by 
and interacting 
with society 
 
 
3.1 Ignorance of hazards and of unsafe conditions 
 
The discourse constructing Chalco Valley‘s floods as a problem of  `ignorance 
of hazards and of unsafe conditions…´ gives prominence to the authority and legitimacy 
of experts and policy makers´ knowledge in determining the risk object, the causal agent 
and defining who might be considered as the `culprit`. As I discussed in the previous 
section, frequently in this discourse, policy makers blame affected people because the  
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latter are seen as `ignorants`, `incapable of measuring the real risk´ posed by nature. 
This is an issue other policy makers agree with even though their main claim regarding 
floods causality might be focused on other causal ideas like the accidental. For instance, 
according to Director of Inundations Risk Reduction of CAEM, there is  
 
“… a lack of hazard awareness in the [local]people and when it 
comes to decision making [i.e. migrating into unsafe places]they 
don`t think about the `real` risk they might be exposed to…” 
 
The  moralist appeal  characterises this story and depicts actors and events as 
good or evil and leaves little room for mixed opinion or governmental mistakes. Thus, 
affected people (victims) are responsible of their own actions, perceived as the culprits, 
and are portrayed as the evil in the narrative. Opinions of local people found no echo in 
the Municipality of Chalco Valley-Solidarity or in the CNA operators´ ears. Claims 
advanced by some affected people several years before the floods of 2000 in Chalco 
Valley are part of the evidence showing that they were aware of La Compañía Canal 
and this somehow contradict the very idea that Chalco Valley people are in fact `hazard 
unaware people`.  
 
“Since more than three years ago, residents (of Chalco Valley) 
had  addressed  their  claims  to  authorities  because  of  the 
repeated fractures of La Compañía Canal walls, part of which 
collapsed… and affected thousands of persons and hundreds of 
houses…” “Despite residents warnings… nobody did anything 
to  solve  the  problem  and  the  misfortune  arrived  at  the  early 
hours of this Thursday morning”  
(Quoted and translated from Velasco and Alvarado, 2000)  
 
Local  people  indeed  experienced  previous  inundations  but  their  accounts  are 
elaborated  on  different  epistemological  grounds  and  through  different  cognitive 
processes. Newspaper articles that collected on site declarations of affected people and 
the interviews I did with them highlight the issue of risk perception of local people and 
the difficulty they faced to advance their claims and obtain responses from the local and 
federal authorities. Two residents of colonia  Avándaro, three of  colonia El Triunfo, 
three of colonia Unión de Guadalupe expressed their concerns about living adjacent or 
nearby La Compañía Canal
50. 
                                                 
50 Interviews undertaken between April and May, 2003  
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In  that  respect  it  is  worth  mentioning  that  there  were  even  some  water 
technicians  of  the  CNA
51  who  recognised  the  fact  that  local  people  had  indeed 
expressed their concerns about the walls cracks and waste waters leaking and, as stated 
by  CNA,  the  same  CNA  responded  by  ―properly‖  monitoring  and  controlling  the 
potential source of risk perhaps with the implicit aim of concealing affected people‘s 
claims  and preventing a possible social uprising. Paradoxically I  found  in the CNA 
policy makers´ arguments
52 that scientific-technical data are used as contributory to lay 
people knowledge because these are on a par with the experiential knowledge of local 
people.  
 
“…all local people‟s demands were adequately attended…”  
(Interview to Operations Manager of GRAVAMEX-CNA, 2003) 
 
 
This is illustrated by the role supposedly played by the technical information 
provided  by  the  CNA  for  raising  hazard  awareness  in  local  people  living  close  or 
adjacent to La Compañía Canal, as it was stated by the Head of RPSP in the section of 
Inadvertence  by Ignorance, section 2 of this chapter. Drawing  from  interviews with 
affected  people  by  the  Chalco  Valley‘s  floods  of  2000,  experiential  knowledge  of 
previous inundations is useful to determine the risk object and to identify the process 
upon which people can obtain accurate information for announcing early warnings calls 
to their neighbours. A `rudimentary` early warning system was set up by El Triunfo´s 
residents. This system was meant to detect the increase of the waste waters flow in La 
Compañía Canal and when it reached its highest peak a manual alarm was triggered; 
word of mouth communication among some residents allowed them to contact local 
civil protection operators and firemen to assist them in case of emergency.  
This ´prevention´ activity is part of the Floods Prevention Programme (2001)
53 
coordinated by the Civil Protection Office of Chalco Valley -Solidarity along with 
ODAPAS. The main goal is to alert residents and to capacitate them to evacuate in case 
of waste waters level increase in LCC. Two commissions were thought to implement 
such programme:  The  Technical  Commission  ―…coordinates  prevention  actions  to 
tackle  inundations  during  rainy  season  with  the  aim  to  protect  people‘s  physical 
                                                 
51 Interview to Director of Inundations Risk Reduction of CAEM, April, 2003.    
52 Interview to Head of RPSP (March, 2003) 
53 ODAPAS (2001) Floods Prevention Programme of Chalco Valley-Solidarity.  
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integrity…‖ while the Immediate Actions Commission ―…provides emergency aid in 
case a major contingency occurs‖ (ODAPAS, 2001). 
 Having contrasted the two ways of making sense of floods risk, what I want to 
stress here is that there is apparently a selection process concerning what constitutes 
valid  and  legitimate  information  for  decision  making.  This  selection  process  is 
controlled by those who hold policy power: before policy makers` eyes, the experiential 
knowledge of lay people had no authority because – among other reasons I argue – is 
`unscientific`, whereas `experts` knowledge appears to be scientifically based and more 
―objective‖.  
This is meaningful in terms of designing socially sensitive policy objectives and 
implementation because if the causal agent supposedly were local people – not labelled 
as  ―ignorants‖  but  vulnerable  –  policy  makers  should  be  aware  of  the  fact  that 
knowledge of  floods risk  may  be  negotiated between those who approach it  from a 
technical  perspective  and  those  who  interpret  floods  risk  within  their  daily  lives 
experience. In this sense, policy objectives along with the means and tools designed to 
achieve  them  should  take  into  consideration  these  two  risk  epistemologies,  the 
―scientific‖-based, and the ―experiential‖-based. This discussion can be placed into the 
existing  literature  about  the  interaction  of  lay  and  scientific  knowledge  and  risk 
(Wynne, 1996; Garvin, 2001; Irwin, 2001, 1995).  
The rhetoric and discourse analysis of the problem construction of ―ignorance of 
hazards and of unsafe conditions‖ identified two different forms of risk knowledge -
Scientific and lay people knowledge- when framing flood causality and constructing the 
policy problem. This represents per se an important contribution to the constructionist 
analysis of risk and it is aligned to the Wynne´s discussion (1996:45) that underlies ―the 
cultural nature of science and of the implications of fundamental indeterminacies in 
knowledge‖ and that advocates to the incorporation into the risk analysis the ―excluded‖ 
lay  public  dimension.  Wynne  recognises  the  indeterminacies  and  intrinsically  local 
nature of scientific knowledge construction and proposes the recognition of the more 
substantive  intellectual  status  of  lay  knowledges  than  usually  acknowledged.  This 
chapter  is  a  contribution  to  this  epistemological  development  because  it  allows 
identifying the interaction of these knowledges when framing flood and risk and how 
the producers of risk knowledge interact. 
The method employed in the analysis of this chapter exemplified how scientific 
claims  can  be  deconstructed  in  order  to  understand  their  values  and  meanings  and  
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rhetorical power. In this vein, this is an example of what Irwin (1995) calls a ―sceptical 
approach to scientific statements and fact construction‖ and how it shows a particular 
value for our understanding of science in the environmental context. I deconstructed and 
problematised  the  claims  of  scientific  institutions  but  also  public  responses  to  this 
`information`. As Irwin suggests, I tried to ―destabilize‖ knowledge claims in order to 
assess their cultural and rhetorical underpinnings. Such an approach can also be adapted 
to the knowledge claims of  non-scientific groups- whether  local  citizens or  national 
organisations. Irwin asserts that from this perspective also, ―scientific evidence must be 
skilfully  marshalled  and  represented  to  particular  audiences  if  it  is  to  exert  any 
persuasive  power‖  (p.50).  At  the  same  time,  audiences  must  make  sense  of  these 
messages in accordance with their assumed needs and concerns.  
A  closer  examination  of  how  the  relationship  between  scientific  and  lay 
knowledge  on  risk  can  be  done  by  drawing  from  the  work  of  Garvin  (2001).  She 
examines how knowledge is constructed and employed by  the key players in risk  – 
scientists, policy makers and the public. Garvin explores the nature of scientific, policy 
and lay knowledge, in particular how evidence is recognised and validated in order to 
explicate the different  forms of rationality  employed  by the three groups: scientific, 
political and social rationality. In this thesis, with the aid of empirical information I 
could explain the rationale of scientists, policy makers and lay people when ´talking´ 
about what could have caused Chalco Valley‘s floods. I found that even though, as 
Garvin suggests, there are epistemological distances on risk construction and therefore 
the causal factors, some similarities were established according to the type of evidence 
used  to  portray  the  inundations.  This  thesis  contributes  to  understand  these 
epistemological  distances  the  key  risk  knowledge  producers  should  be  aware  of  if 
policy is thought to be socially sensitive. Policy responses‘ implication of this issue is 
further discussed in Chapter Seven, section one.  
A less radical version of this problem construction was also found in the floods 
problem. This means that other contributing factors were mentioned in the discourse for 
explaining the  floods causality, namely  socio-economic and political  factors such as 
poverty and corruption in the context of illegal urbanisation in the Chalco Valley. Due 
to their socio-economic condition, those poor people who were ―obliged‖ to migrate to 
unsafe  places  were  also  unaware  that  those  places  were  unsuitable  for  living.  In 
consequence, people will have to be used to live at risk.  This, in fact, constitutes an  
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element  of  a  discourse  coalition  between  inadvertence  by  ignorance  and  structural 
causalities. 
This idea of living at risk is shared by other policy makers and civil protection 
authorities and under that view, prevention policy has to be designed.  For instance, the 
Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico, the former General Coordinator of 
Civil Protection at federal level, and the Director of Communication of CENAPRED, 
state that the best way to deal with disaster is to accept that unavoidably people will live 
at risk and for that reason, the best policy option is to make them aware of that critical 
situation and to try to `capacitate` them to have a ―good co-existence‖ with ´natural´ and 
man-made hazards.  
 
3.2 Failure of infrastructure and sanitation system and inadequate monitoring of 
risk object  
 
The discourse of inadvertence causality by carelessness constructs the Chalco 
Valley inundations as a technical and managerial problem. The common evidence that is 
put forward is related to infrastructure capabilities and  failures, and the  information 
necessary to deal with those problems is merely technical and of a practical orientation. 
Hydraulic and civil engineers and operators of water and sanitation systems (CNA and 
CAEM) are the `experts` in charge of framing the problem. In general terms I could 
identify that both the evidence and the warrants underpinning the main claims take into 
consideration three elements: the extreme natural hazard, the sanitation infrastructure 
and the technical capabilities of operators and technicians. This can be illustrated by 
analysing reports and documents elaborated by CNA and CAEM.  
 For instance, with regards to the heavy rain falls, the climatological station of 
Chalco, State of Mexico, reported that ´extraordinary´ rainfalls took place between 29
th, 
30
th  and 
  31
st  May  of  2000,  with  40.5,  3.2  and  29.2  mm  of  rain  respectively.  By 
comparing these  figures with those of the previous historic  maximum precipitations 
(2.2, 2.6 and 2.6 mm) CENAPRED (2001) concluded that ´atypical´ and ´unpredictable´ 
rainfalls occurred. CNA agreed with this description. The communication summary –
released just after the collapse of the right wall of the LCC – of the emergency actions 
to be implemented in Chalco Valley (GRAVAMEX/CNA, 2000; CNA, 2000) pointed to 
the ―heavy rainfalls of the 31
st May as the cause of an ´extraordinary´ flow of 42m3 that  
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outran the capacity of LCC provoking the rupture of the LCC walls in the municipality 
of Chalco Valley-Solidarity‖.  
Regarding  the  sanitation  infrastructure,  several  reports  (GRAVAMEX/CNA, 
2000; CENAPRED, 2001; CNA, 2000) put emphasis on the technical failure of the LCC 
walls as a central contributing factor to the floods and on the immediate and short-term 
solutions (with high technical detail of the engineering works ) like the blockage of the 
rupture, rehabilitation and the reinforcement of the LCC walls. In addition, concerning 
the technical capabilities of operators and technicians, the ´adequate´ maintenance of the 
LCC  undertaken  by  GRAVAMEX/CNA  operators  to  decrease  the  chances  of  an 
´accident´ was mentioned by some policy makers as a permanent activity to prevent any 
potential casualty (interview with the engineer resident of CNA in the Chalco Valley 
region, 2001; interview with the former General Coordinator of Civil Protection, 2003).  
In apportioning the blame there is a shift from unknown human agent or natural 
phenomenon such as rainfall to unnamed CNA or CAEM staff, either the bad quality of 
the sanitation system, La Compañía Canal, its low resistance to the impact of heavy rain 
falls and the lack of attention and precaution responses are the elements that were used 
by the interviewees. Chalco Valley people were not mentioned and remained `hidden` in 
the  policy  maker‘s`  arguments.  Interviews  with  affected  people  may  support  the 
hypothesis that Chalco Valley´s floods were not an accident but the result of lack of 
adequate maintenance, 
 
“(The floods) took place because they (unnamed authority) did 
not  provide  maintenance  to  the  (LCC)  walls;  for  4  years  no 
maintenance  was  provided  (including  taking  out  rubbish  and 
dragging the canal bed); it was not because of nature”.  
(Two female residents of Avándaro, Chalco Valley-Solidarity, 2003) 
 
But a counter-story line was found in an affected resident‘s account of the causes. 
There is even a much more radical interpretation of the floods that contrasts with the 
―failure of infrastructure…‖ problem. A male resident of El Triunfo was convinced 
that a plot was behind the rupture of the LCC wall: 
 
“…To be honest, to me it was not because of the (high volumes 
of) water but someone with ill will…(…) The type of hole in the 
wall…only  a  bomb  could  have  done  it…”  Perhaps  someone 
from EL Molino wanted to divert the flow of  water from not  
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flooding El Molino…and for that reason (he/she) provoked the 
explosion in the right hand side wall...”  
(Male resident of El Triunfo, 2003)  
 
In the ―failure of infrastructure and sanitation system and inadequate monitoring 
of risk object…‖ problem, an objectivist appeal displaces political values altogether in 
favour of a basic shift in the presumption of sovereignty at least of technical issues. As 
it  is  in  other  studies  (Linder,  1995)  faith  in  the  capacity  of  science  to  establish 
uncontested truth and to remedy problems relegates both government politics and the 
public  to  passive,  supporting  roles.  Objectivity  is  the  main  criterion  upon  which 
technical responses are put into place. 
It is assumed that more and better scientific and technical knowledge about how 
to  cope  with  the  fragility  of  La  Compañía  Canal  is  the  best  way  to  prevent  future 
inundations and at the same time to calm down local people‘s demands and worries. As 
discussed in Chapter One, when it comes to ´preventing´ disaster engineering works to 
isolate the risk object  is the common policy response  found  in  Mexico. The  floods 
problem is reduced to its technical components, isolated from the socio-environmental 
context. With regards to this, one of the policy measures for containing future extreme 
high flows of waste waters was to construct a dam upstream LCC in the village of San 
Marcos Huixtoco to regulate the increase of the flow especially during rainy season.  
Besides, the effects of the rainfalls on the sanitation system of Chalco Valley`s 
and  La  Compañía  Canal  have  to  be  further  researched  in  order  to  improve  both 
monitoring systems and reinforcement techniques. As a result, it was announced
54 in 
2006 that the Federal government (CNA) and the State of Mexico government agreed 
on a deal to invest in a high scale project to pip e the La Compañía Canal despite 
concerns over its technical suitability in a fragile ground. 
 
3. 3 Accidents of nature and of man-made systems that disrupt human systems 
   
  This problem construction exemplifies the view of disaster where causality is 
attributed to accidents of nature that impact ecological and man-made systems. Under 
this view the impact of extreme hazards changes the `balanced` relation between nature 
                                                 
54 ―Former President Fox and the governor of the State of Mexico, Enrique Pe￱a publicly announced the 
`kick-off` of the works to build a  `tunnel` to pipe La Compa￱ía river … the estimated total cost will be  
1 423 millions of MX…it is expected the works will conclude in July 2008‖. (June 20, 2006) Ferrer, 
Gladys, Reforma.  
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and  society.  Two  notions  of  nature  are  conceived:  on  the  one  hand  nature  is  kind, 
generous and at the same time might be a potential ´victim´ of humans‘ actions and on 
the other, nature can threaten society in an unexpectedly way, sometimes as a result of 
uncontrolled  human-driven  action.  Nature  is  the  landscape  where  human  activities 
develop and from which resources can be taken. This problem framing is reduced to 
diagnosing the hazard and the potential impact. There is the assumption that knowing 
hazards is enough to trigger behavioural and attitudinal change in people in order to 
prevent  disaster.  It  has  been  analysed  above  that  interviewees`  claims  frequently 
construct  inundations  causality  in  technical  terms  either  by  describing  the  material-
structural  capacity  of  the  La  Compañía  Canal  or  by  detailing  the  ground  sinking 
problematic of the Chalco Valley region.  Here the social dimension is defined in terms 
of public reaction and organisation schemes to provide relief.   
Even though this accidental narrative, in general, avoids putting the blame on 
specific agents but only on unforeseen natural forces, there is subtle evidence (expressed 
by some interviewees, i.e. Director of Emergencies and Disaster Prevention of CNA) 
that  blame  and  responsibility  can  be  assigned  to  some  unnamed  authorities  for  the 
mistakes committed while providing inadequate maintenance to La Compañía Canal. 
This idea is somehow close to the causal narrative of inadvertence by carelessness. It is 
interesting to note that in some parts of the same response the focus of the causality 
shifts from ´accidental´ to inadvertence by carelessness.  
  Because the image of the government is that of a protector, the common appeal 
is paternalistic. Here it is worth recalling that the image of disaster prevention is widely 
framed in Mexico as civil protection. In the Mexican Constitution, the Civil Protection 
Programme at federal level (2001-2006; 2007-2012), and at state of Mexico level (2001-
2005; 2006-2012) and the Civil Protection Laws, it is stated that the Mexican State has 
the duty to provide protection to all citizens. That idea prevails in all sectors of public 
administration and for that reason the civil protection sector is seen as the one and, quite 
often,  the  only  in  charge  of  designing  and  implementing  disaster  prevention 
programmes and plans. Chalco Valley people are conceived  as passive subjects that 
receive information and directions from government mainly in emergency situations. In 
some  cases,  Chalco  Valley  people  were  alluded  to  implicitly  when  referring  to the 
impact  imposed  on  ecosystems  and  ground  water  extraction,  and  urbanisation  is  to 
blame for environmental degradation. The image of La Compañía Canal is that of a 
constant threat to residents.   
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3.4 Exposure of vulnerable people to hazards is a consequence of socio-economic 
inequalities 
 
In  this  floods  problem  construction,  the  explanation  of  the  technical  details  of  the 
sanitation  system  and  La  Compañía  Canal  failures  to  cope  with  waste  waters  and 
rainfall is put in a historical and social context.  Root causes such as socio-economic 
inequalities made poor people migrate to unsafe places where they were exposed to the 
hazards. An ameliorative appeal shifts the focus from harm to the good that might be 
done through government action. Tougher law enforcement for combating corruption in 
housing  developments,  better  land  use  planning  in  the  light  of  unequal  exposure  to 
hazards, poverty alleviation, enhancement of family self-protection strategies to reduce 
their vulnerability to cope with future threats and maintaining  household‘s assets are 
expected to be contributing processes to achieve risk reduction.  
In  all  this  the  government  is  mentioned  to  play  a  fundamental  role  through 
integrating civil protection with social, urban and environmental policies. Since causal 
factors are both technical and socio-historical, the scope of government participation to 
remedy the problem is expected to be larger and more complex than the other policy 
solutions discussed above. That might be the reason why elements from other ´problem 
constructions´ mix together with this one creating ´discourse coalitions´. I can identify 
at least three causal storylines that mix with this floods problem: 
 
  Bad socio-economic conditions make people move to unsafe places. 
  Development inequalities between State of Mexico and Mexico City.  
  Technical solutions are constrained by the economy. 
  
  Local people that were somehow ―forced‖ by circumstances to migrate and live 
in  Chalco  Valley  region  are  seen  as  vulnerable  because  of  the  unsafe  places  and 
hazards, in particular the chronic flooding. The image of the government has two faces. 
On the one hand, it is seen as a positive and necessary agent to carry out land use 
planning (by the ´good agent´, the planner) according to both the ecological aptitude of 
region and meeting people‘s needs, and control people invasions and, on the other hand, 
it is perceived as the evil in the story since thanks to past governmental corruption, 
illegal and `uncontrolled` urbanisation took place in an unsuitable, fragile ecological 
region.   
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Perhaps  the  characteristic  that  illustrates  best  this  problem  is  the  role  social 
processes play in constructing inundations in the long run. Unlike the three previous 
problems,  interviewees see  floods beyond  natural  hazards and technical  failures and 
recognise how human agency is constrained by a number of structural factors. That is 
why, perhaps, this narrative has shown strands that coalesce with the other narratives. It 
is at the interplay between nature, science, technology and society that floods causality 
can be better understood. This narrative coincides in some elements (e.g., vulnerability 
is a socio-historic outcome) with the explanation of the progression of  vulnerability 
presented throughout Chapter Four. The purpose of this narrative allows thinking about 
the chances of transforming the other three narratives towards a more socially sensitive 
policy making thanks to the actual coalition with them. It could be expected that the 
structural discourse along with the narratives that support it can gain ´policy space´ in 
the struggle of meanings and beliefs of disaster causal factors.    
 
Conclusions: multiple discourses, contested problems and discourse coalitions 
 
In this Chapter I demonstrated that the social construction of ―natural‖ disaster at policy 
level can be unpacked by analysing arguments and discourses of disaster causality. This 
was illustrated with the case of Chalco Valley‘s floods. Different disaster causal stories 
construct  policy  problems  in  different  ways.  The  discursive  approach  adopted  here 
evidenced  the  variety  of  floods  causality  claims  and  their  relation  with  discourses 
contexts, subject‘s identities and institutions. 
  I argued that the four different disaster discourses found in Mexico at policy 
level, namely inadvertence by ignorance, inadvertence by carelessness, accidental and 
structural causality, were shaped by how causal ideas of disaster were assembled and 
made persuasive. The argumentation approach allowed me to analyse the claims and 
their components. One key element in shaping the argument is the type of evidence and 
how it is used by the interviewee to support the claim and convince the author of this 
thesis. Even though it was stated by scientists, policy makers and implementers that 
Chalco Valley‘s floods were ―real facts‖, the differing manufacture and use of evidence 
–which  are  loaded  with  values,  meanings  and  contesting  beliefs  –  showed  that  the 
moment disaster causality ´enters´ the realm of policy the explanation is subject to the 
policy maker‘s own interpretation, and is context-dependent and value-laden.   
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  Evidence  to  support  and  legitimise  causality  claim  ranges  from  cognitive 
processes of local affected people by the floods, technical data of heavy rain falls, to 
more complex interactions between socio-economic aspects, illegal urbanisation and the 
lack  of  land  use  regulation.  Warrants  are  also  fundamental  in  making  arguments 
compelling and give validity to the use of evidence to support the claim. In this, the 
subject‘s  power  position  was  important  in  terms  of  justifying  why  specific  data  or 
information was chosen to be valid for ´depicting reality´.  
  By analysing the variety of claims and counterclaims I demonstrated that risk 
floods and the floods themselves were not ―objective‖ situations or events but the result 
of a complex process of claim making. In this, the construction of ―nature‖ and ―natural 
hazards‖ played a relevant role when excluding blame and responsibility from human 
action and sometimes to advance hypotheses about government actions. This was seen 
in the technically-based claims that intended to portray the floods causes as neutral or 
even more clearly in the case policy makers explain them as accidental events.   
  Different  systems  of  statements  characterise  different  discourses  and  can  be 
understood  as  the  differing  storylines  that  condenses  the  argumentation  structure  in 
order to make it intelligible to the interviewee while trying – apparently – to ―tell what 
really happened‖ and convince the author of this thesis. In the case of the discourse of 
causality by ignorance the disaster is framed in terms of what the `ignorant` can do to 
cope with future inundations, whereas in the case of causality by carelessness the role of 
operators and water institutions in providing adequate maintenance for La Compañía 
Canal is highlighted. Thus, blame is shifted from affected people (portrayed sometimes 
as victims of their own actions) to water technicians that embody the CNA and CAEM. 
In  general,  statements  of  accidental  causality  put  the  blame  on  ―nature‖  and  the 
―disrupted balance of nature‖.  
The statements that shape the discourse of structural causality are more radical 
in putting the blame and in assigning responsibility to a single actor or institution and 
construct the story  more as the outcome of  macro processes or root causes such as 
illegal  urbanisation,  political  corruption  and  ecological  degradation.  Different 
discourses  construct  problems  differently.  This  was  explained  by  doing  rhetorical 
analysis of the four constructions of the Chalco Valley‘s floods. The appeals, warrants 
and images of causal agents vary amongst the four constructions even though some 
similarities  were  found,  in  particular  with  those  related  to  natural  and  man-made 
hazards.   
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    By trying to make an argument compelling, each problem construction appeals 
to different values and these appeals  serve a similar  discursive  function of  building 
support and legitimacy for their accompanying claims; i.e. from moralist (`who was the 
evil in the story´) and objectivist (´technical assessments concluded that…´) to paternal 
(´government  protects  people…´)  and  ameliorative  appeal  (´the  problem  will  be 
solved…´). Shared characteristics of the images made it possible to classify the causal 
agents  according  to the  type  of  problem  construction.  The  government  is  perceived 
either as expert, culprit, protector or planner whereas Chalco Valley people could be 
depicted either as ignorant, vulnerable or a victim. The constant role of La Compañía 
Canal as chronic hazard was found in all problem constructions with slightly differing 
traits and weight in the floods causality.  
    Advocacy  coalitions  emerged  when  recognising  the  interaction  between 
structural causality with elements pertaining to the other causalities such as differential 
risk  exposure  due  not  only  to  inundations  but  also  to  people‘s  coping  capacities, 
regional  inequalities  and  differential  risk  exposure.  Technical  solutions  for  La 
Compañía  Canal  problematic  are  constrained  by  the  economy,  and  the  imbalance 
between Mexico City and the State of Mexico is the constant background when strands 
of one discourse merged with another one: inadvertence by ignorance with structural 
causality  and  inadvertence  by  carelessness  with  structural  causality.  The  following 
chapter deals with policy responses‘ elements of the four problem constructions. I will 
show how different problem  framings determine different policy responses,  in other 
words as suggested by  John (2002:166), I will  intend to explore  ―…the process  by 
which ideas become important in structuring outcomes…‖ 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: POLICY RESPONSES TO FOUR CONSTRUCTIONS OF 
CHALCO VALLEY‟S FLOODS PROBLEM 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
   
  In section 3.3 of Chapter Two I elaborated a framework to unpack in this chapter 
the  argumentative  construction  of  policy  responses  with  regards  to  Chalco  Valley‘s 
floods. The framework takes into consideration four policy-analytic elements: 1) policy 
objectives, 2) type of intervention, 3) policy instrument and 4) implementation. The 
main goal of this chapter  is to understand  how  floods problem constructions at the 
policy  level  shape  institutional  responses.  In  particular,  this  chapter  aims  at 
demonstrating  that  people‘s  vulnerability  is  not  a  relevant  policy  objective  to  be 
considered within the whole range of disaster policy responses in Mexico because – I 
argue  –  people‘s  vulnerability  was  not  constructed  as  a  relevant  ´problem´  within 
disaster causality discourses.  
Disaster  causality  discourses  favoured  explanations  of  natural  and  technical 
causal agents; therefore requiring technical solutions; explanations and policy solutions 
are embedded in the prevailing behavioural paradigm (BP). This could be the result –
among other reasons  – of the influence scientific-technical solutions  has  had on the 
policy process while formulating and implementing responses and to the extent disaster 
causality  has  been  framed according to the  internal  logic of the  institutions and the 
interests and beliefs of scientists, policy makers and implementers. The data for the 
analysis of this chapter come from different sources: interviews with scientists, policy 
makers,  implementers,  operators  and  affected  people;  policy  documents  and 
programmes of the SINAPROC, SEGOB, CNA, CAEM, ODAPAS, CENAPRED and 
reports  of  the  institutional  responses  deployed  before,  during  and  after  the  Chalco 
Valley‘s floods of June 2000. The interviews data were drawn from the answers to the 
following questions – which in fact addressed the thesis central question number two 
(see Chapter Three, section 4): 
  What are the goals of natural disaster policies?  
  What are the means to achieve such goals?  
  What are the main problems to be solved by those policies? Why?   
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These  questions  correspond  to  part  III  of  the  fieldwork  questionnaire  (see 
Appendix  II)  that  addresses  the  issue  of  ´natural´  disaster  policy  formulation  and 
implementation. Answers were coded with the aid of INVIVO software and then sorted 
out according to the policy elements referred to above. For the analysis I proceeded 
deconstructing the interviewee‘s arguments using the same model applied in Chapter 
Six (Toulmin-Gasper, 2000) but this time considering the four policy responses analytic 
elements. The model helped me in identifying the policy objective and outcome (main 
claim) and the type of intervention which is the evidence or data given to validate the 
claim,  in  other  words,  the  justification  of  the  policy  intervention  according  to  the 
expected outcome and objective. I also took into consideration policy beliefs and values 
as warrants for the setting up of evidence.  
Therefore the following discussion deals with how a policy problem main claim 
implies certain policy objectives and how beliefs and warrants justify and legitimise 
specific policy interventions to create the ´expected´ outcomes or at least the ´belief´ 
that the policy objective has been achieved. This chapter is structured in four sections 
that correspond to the analysis of the policy elements of each of the  four problems 
constructions  analysed  in  Chapter  Six,  namely:  1)  Ignorance  of  hazards  and  unsafe 
conditions,  2)Failure  of  infrastructure  and  inadequate  monitoring  of  risk  object, 
3)Accidents of nature and of man-made systems that disrupt ´normal´ social functioning 
and  4)  Vulnerability  is  a  consequence  of  socio-economic  inequalities  with  unequal 
distribution of opportunities and hazards (See first column on the left hand side of Table 
5). Each  section  is  made  up  of  two  subsections that  correspond to the  four  policy-
analytic elements: 1) policy objective and type of intervention and 2) policy instrument 
and implementation.  
The four policy-analytic elements were discussed in Chapter Two, section 3.3. 
Below Table 5 summarises these elements of all four problem constructions which were 
identified  and  analysed  during  the  coding  and  also  during  the  deconstruction  of 
arguments  done  in  Chapter  Six.  It  is  important  to  mention  that  the  storylines  re-
constructed by the respondents correspond to organisational surface storylines. In some 
cases, these do not represent the process whereby discourses are constructed.   
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Table 5. Policy responses elements to four discursive constructions 
of Chalco Valley‟s floods problem 
Floods causality  
policy problem 
Causal agents 
and their motives 
Policy objectives  Type of 
intervention 
Policy instrument 
and 
implementation 
 
1. Ignorance of 
hazards and 
unsafe conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
`Ignorants` 
moving into 
unsafe places and 
`corrupt` 
politicians who 
promoted 
urbanisation ; 
nature as hazard 
and ´experts´ who 
know the 
´objective´ risk 
 
 
 
 
Education of 
`ignorants` to 
enhance 
(common) risk 
perception and 
change behaviour 
to avoid hazards or 
´co-exist´ with 
risk; to finally 
achieve a civil 
protection 
´culture´   
 
 
Top-down risk 
communication 
with regulatory 
control and law 
enforcement and 
in extreme cases, 
eviction of 
affected people 
  
 
Information 
campaign, practice 
of emergency 
drills, posters and, 
guides to identify 
hazards, education 
programmes for 
promoting culture 
of civil protection  
2. Failure of 
infrastructure 
and inadequate 
monitoring of 
risk object 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Accidents of 
nature and of 
man-made 
systems that 
disrupt ´normal´ 
social functioning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Vulnerability is 
a consequence of 
socio-economic 
inequalities  
Extreme natural 
hazards, heavy 
rainfalls, La 
Compañía Canal 
and ´careless´ 
government 
technicians and 
operators  
 
 
 
 
Extreme natural 
hazards, heavy 
rainfalls, and 
ecological 
deterioration 
driven by human 
action  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extreme natural 
hazards interacting 
with people‘s 
vulnerability under 
unsafe conditions; 
government 
authorities 
allowing/ 
promoting illegal 
settlements 
Improvement of  
´natural´ hazards 
forecasting and 
monitoring of the 
sources of risk to 
reinforce 
infrastructure  
 
 
 
 
 
Emergency aid to 
save lives and 
protect people; 
evacuation of 
people from risk 
prone areas; 
mitigation of the 
damaged 
 
 
 
 
 
Socio-economic 
development and 
ecosystems 
sustainable 
conservation to 
reduce people‘s  
vulnerability 
Scientific research 
for technical 
development; 
protection of 
lifelines and the 
people; public 
works to isolate 
hazards and 
reduce risk 
exposure 
 
 
Emergency 
management:  
preparedness and 
initial recovery; to 
foster coordination 
between public 
and private  
institutions of 
SINAPROC and  
civil society to 
improve 
participation 
 
 
Mainstreaming 
disaster risk 
reduction into 
development 
policies and 
planning  
Contingency plans 
for protecting water 
and sanitation 
infrastructure.  
improvement of 
early warning 
systems and 
targeted funding for 
infrastructure 
development 
 
 
Emergency and 
´prevention´ 
programmes; 
financing for 
mitigation: 
FONDEN, and 
operation of early 
warning systems  
 
 
 
 
 
Sustainable 
environmental 
management, 
poverty reduction 
and exposure 
limits to unsafe 
conditions; 
FOPREDEN 
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1. Ignorance of hazards and unsafe conditions 
 
In this section I analyse the policy responses elements of the ―Ignorance of hazards and 
unsafe  conditions...‖  problem.  Four  types  of  causal  agents  were  identified,  namely, 
´ignorants´  –  the  supposedly  target  population  –,  government  ´experts´,  ´corrupt´ 
politicians and nature as hazard. The next discussion centres on how government policy 
makers set up a policy objective that seeks to change  floods risk perception of the 
affected people, labelled in the interviews reiteratively as ´ignorants´.  
For this type of policy problem, labelling and constructing the ´desired´ target 
population is a core issue in the establishment of the relation between policy objective 
and policy intervention. That is why, I argue, policy intervention is intended to work at 
the  individual‘s  perceptual  and  cognitive  capabilities  on  the  basis  of  a  supposed 
´objective´ risk that is communicated by ´experts´, policy makers and other government 
authorities. The analysis in this section aims at unpacking the beliefs of policy makers 
regarding  the  fact  that  top-down  floods  risk  communication  can  contribute  to 
capabilities development of the `ignorants´. I found that policy makers rely on written 
and oral messages of different sorts produced by SINAPROC, such as posters, leaflets 
and short radio clips, to supposedly raise hazard awareness of local people. It is believed 
that ´rational´ knowledge of floods risk underpins ´informed action´. Below, I analyse 
that at length.   
This section also shows how the professional background of the interviewee and 
the institutional context contribute to determining what ´should´ be the best course of 
action. Moreover I analyse policy implementation as a rhetorical act. This is because 
many arguments put forward by policy makers contain various metaphors that facilitate 
the meaning transfer from the education realm to the disaster realm. The analysis of the 
meaning transfer from the use of education language to disaster policy implementation 
is done with the aid of the Civil Protection Programme of the State of Mexico (2001-
2005) and the Family Plan of Civil Protection issued by the government of the State of 
Mexico. In particular, I focus on how three notions of the education language, namely 
´people‘s education´, ´learning´ and ´capacity building´ are transferred into the disaster 
prevention implementation language through specific strategies and actions.   
The interviewees identified for the analysis of ―Ignorance of hazards and unsafe 
conditions...‖ policy problem are the following:  the Director of Civil Protection of the  
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State of Mexico, the Head of Civil Protection Commission of the State of Mexico, the 
General  Coordinator of SINAPROC, the Director of Information  Communication of 
CENAPRED, the Head of Research of CENAPRED and the Director of Risk Atlas of 
the State of Mexico. 
 
1.1 Policy objectives and types of intervention  
 
To educate ´ignorant´ people to ´objectively´ perceive risks through top-down 
risk communication  
 
Concerning  the  problem  ―Ignorance  of  hazards  and  unsafe  conditions...‖  the  main 
objective  of  disaster  prevention  policies  is  to  ´enhance´  common  risk  perception  to 
change the behaviour of both affected people and, to a lesser extent, that of political 
authorities  to  avoid  hazards  or  reduce  disaster  risk  exposure.  The  main  policy 
intervention as a result is to educate `ignorant` people to ´objectively´ perceive risks in 
order to change their attitudes and behaviour to act either to avoid hazards or to accept 
´living at risk´.  
The  metaphor  “learning/lesson”  and  the  education  language  perform  the 
function of linking disaster policy objectives with action through a process of meaning 
transfer  (as  I  analyse  below  in  1.2.1).  This  ideally  could  be  matched  with  other 
instruments such as `adequate` land use planning that would prevent ´ignorant´ residents 
from settling in insecure places and combating political corruption associated to illegal 
urbanisation. Since structural and inadvertence by ´ignorance´ causalities appeared to 
coalesce at discursive level in this policy problem – as discussed in Chapter Six – then it 
is expected that at the level of policy responses that does also occur. Thus some other 
policy interventions are found to complement each other in specific cases such as that of 
transforming people‘s risk perception along with land use planning.  
As discussed  in Chapter Six, section 2.1.1, the prevailing assumption of this 
problem is that people can (and should) be capable of having the same risk perception 
of policy makers – who are thought to have the ―right‖ risk perception – which will 
enable them to `realise` that specific locations and situations are unsafe for living.  
 
So, the policy belief (implicit Warrant):  
Shared  perception  of  ´real´  risk  is  possible  and 
necessary  
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of the expected policy outcome (the Claim):  
that  people  have  to  develop  a  “self-protection” 
culture  in  their  household  and  neighbourhood 
contexts because they live at risk  
 
was expressed by a number of top-level policy makers such as the Director of 
Civil Protection of the State of Mexico, the Head of Civil Protection Commission of 
the State of Mexico and General Coordinator of SINAPROC, and less emphatically 
by  the  Director  of  Information  Communication  of  CENAPRED.  Now  I  shall 
proceed to compare the policy responses claims with the intention of examining the 
nuanced similarities and differences amongst them.   
When talking about her position and responsibilities, the General Coordinator 
of SINAPROC emphasised the (important) nature of her position and role within this 
institution,  stating  that  she  was  mainly  devoted  to  promoting  a  shared,  single  risk 
perception  amongst  all  people  and  the  public  sectors  involved  in  SINAPROC.  She 
reiterated that a single perception of risk is one of the main policy objectives to be 
achieved along with ´showing´ to local people that they live at risk; she phrased the 
claim as a moral obligation:  
   
{Claim A/ policy objective A} 
“We  have  to  share  the  same  risk  perception,  the  same 
information  and  besides,  we  all  (people  and  the  whole 
SINAPROC) have to know how natural phenomena develop… 
 
{Belief as warrant A/ policy intervention and outcome A} 
 
We (at SINAPROC) know how to train people and we know 
how to make them aware that, as long as they take minimum 
precautions, they will minimise the destructive impact disaster 
impose  on  them  and  their  goods…we‟ll  make  an  important 
progress  towards  preventing  disaster…That‟s  what  concerns 
us.  
(General Coordination of SINAPROC, 2003)  
 
Besides, the General Coordinator SINAPROC mentioned repeatedly the importance 
of  achieving  another  goal  which  is  of  larger  scope  and  dealing  with  the  need  to 
mainstream  disaster  prevention  and  risk  reduction  into  development  planning  and 
policies.  It  is  interesting  to  note that this  goal  is  somehow  related  to the  structural 
causality, and as a result a coalition can be derived from these two discourses leading to  
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supplementary policy objectives. She states that the current general objective of disaster 
policies should then be:  
 
  {Claim B/ policy objective B} 
“...to strengthen the framework that guarantees the protection 
of human life. So public policies should seek that under an 
 
 
{Belief as warrant B/ policy intervention B} 
  
´integral vision´ of public administration and the law ...”  
“Sharing  that  ´integral  vision´  would  mean  integrating 
preventive values in the ministries, their planning and actions, 
i.e., I will need to consider the impact of urban development in 
people‟s exposure to risk...and law regulations will frame and 
facilitate that… all development sectors ideally would pursue 
(risk reduction) mainstreaming.  
(General Coordinator SINAPROC, 2001-2004) 
 
Policy  objectives  A  and  B  put  forward  by  the  General  Coordinator 
SINAPROC are intertwined as it is believed that institutions can change people‘s risk 
perception and behaviour through the law and planning commonly called ´the culture of 
civil protection´ by disaster policy makers.  
The  claims  of  the  Head  of  Research  of  CENAPRED,  the  Director  of 
Information Communication of CENAPRED and the Director of Civil Protection 
of the State of Mexico share the general policy outcome that a ´civil protection culture´ 
is needed in order to change people‘s behaviour and values. Following the claim that 
people  have  to  develop  a  “self-protection”  culture...,  for the  Head  of  Research  of 
CENAPRED  if everybody  is aware of risk that would  lead to changes  in  attitudes 
towards  developing  a  more  preventive  culture.  He  did  not  specify  what  a  ´more 
preventive culture´ means in this context. This in fact ratifies the ambiguity of some of 
the  key  concepts  commonly  employed  by  the  ´natural´  disaster  administration  in 
Mexico.   
The  Director  of  Information  Communication  of  CENAPRED  and  the 
General Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico endorse this view but 
further elaborate the central argument by stating that it is ´rational´ knowledge based on 
´informed action´ that really shapes people‘s action. Both policy makers stated that the 
role  of  CENAPRED  and  the  General  Direction  of  Civil  Protection  of  the  State  of  
  258 
Mexico is to foster change in people‘s attitudes and behaviour in favour of, and based 
upon, more ´informed action´. Thus, I could interpret that the meaning of ´informed 
action´  would  be  a  rational  protection  action  that  is  the  outcome  of  the  transfer  of 
knowledge of risk into individuals´ behaviour. However, in practice, the Director of 
Information Communication of CENAPRED notes that at community level there are 
several  obstacles  that  need  to  be  overcome  to  reach  the  so-called  ´self-protection 
culture´:  
1) Religious beliefs, ´divine´ acts and fate prevail in people‘s understanding of 
the  world  and  this  makes  it  difficult  for  them  to  perceive  the  ´real´  risk  posed  by 
hazards,  
2)  Difficulty  to  communicate  risk  from  CENAPRED  to  ´target´  populations 
because it is hard to reach out to marginalised communities and besides it is even harder  
because some of them do not even know how to read or speak in Spanish,  
3) It is a complex and difficult task to plan a meaningful communication strategy 
that really triggers the expected ´ínformed´ action, and most importantly,  
4)  ´They  (local  people)  are  out  of  the  development  path´,  as  he  notes,  and 
therefore they are not considered as beneficiaries of ´development´ within government 
plans and programmes because they are marginalised. In other words, I argue, those 
people are not labelled as ´target populations´ of policies and that may be one factor that 
contributes to their vulnerability.   
   In  spite  of  the  obstacles  mentioned  by  the  Director  of  Information 
Communication  of  CENAPRED,  achieving  ´informed  action´  is  still  seen  as  of 
paramount importance. ´Informed action´ becomes one expected policy outcome that 
can  be  ―sown‖  in  people‘s  heads  through  different  instruments  and  actions  such  as 
practices of emergency drills and contingency plans; practical guides to help people 
identify hazards within their houses, schools, and neighbourhood; radio and TV spots 
alerting about dangers; leaflets, posters and short stories about how to evacuate during 
earthquake and fire emergencies.  
With regards to this issue, for example, the Government of the State of Mexico 
through the General Direction of Civil Protection designed a poster to inform residents 
living near streams, rivers and sewage canals about the impact of dumping rubbish into 
the water bodies (See Box 7, below). ´Informed action´ is expected to take its course 
since people – labelled as (rational) ´citizens´ – are invited to respond to the directions 
because  they  are  supposed  to  be  ´educated´  people  and  thus  able  and  willing  to  
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participate. The poster photo shows a sewage canal (perhaps it is LCC) with lots of 
plastic bags floating and other organic and inorganic wastes reducing the canal stream 
capacity. On the centre top of the image a headline reads: ―That is why we get flooded‖ 
 
Box 7. “That is why we get flooded” 
THAT IS WHY WE GET FLOODED
55 
Stop dumping rubbish in the water bodies! 
 
And on the right centre of the poster a text reads as follows: 
 
Rubbish blocks the sewage 
―Like the citizens we are, 
We have to be aware 
and choose a (proper) site 
for disposing the rubbish, 
do collaborate with authorities, 
and this will not be a problem anymore. 
By undertaking these actions 
You will make your community or municipality 
a safer one because it will not be affected 
by a sanitary risk or an inundation‖ 
Remember your family comes first! 
 
(Source: General Direction of Civil Protection, State of Mexico, 2003) 
  
The  General  Director  of  Civil  Protection  told  me  that  this  poster  was 
distributed to all municipalities of the State of Mexico and it was during the fieldwork 
in Chalco Valley that I double-checked that. In fact, I saw one of them posted on a wall 
of  the  Civil  Protection  office  in  Chalco  Valley-Solidarity.  When  I  asked  a  civil 
protection person on duty about the purpose of it, he responded by saying that that is 
one  way  to  inform  people  about  the  risk  they  are  exposed  to  and  how  they  can 
contribute to the solution.  
With regards to that, during the fieldwork I also dared asking affected people of 
Unión de Guadalupe  and El Triunfo  if they were  familiar  with that poster or other 
didactic material distributed by the government of the State of Mexico. They told me 
they  did  not  know  the  poster  and  that  was  the  first  time  someone  showed  them 
                                                 
55 The version in Spanish reads as follows: POR ESTO NOS INUNDAMOS! YA NO TIRES BASURA 
EN  LOS  CUERPOS  DE  AGUA!  La  basura  bloquea  el  drenaje.  Como  ciudadanos  debemos  tener 
conciencia y elegir un lugar para el desecho de la basura, participa con las autoridades para que esto no 
sea  un  problema.  Con  esto  evitarás  que  tu  comunidad  o  municipio  se  ven  afectados  por  un  riesgo 
Sanitario o una Inundación. Recuerda tu familia es primero!  
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´something´ related to the LCC problematic. And when I asked if they considered this 
material to be of any help they answered: 
 “…yes that could be a practical way to get information on 
how to act and when”  
(Three residents (one female and two male) of Unión de Guadalupe, 2003)  
 
So, the answer of these three residents of Unión de Guadalupe might indicate 
that  apparently  this  information  could  resonate  in  the  affected  people  to trigger  the 
´informed action´. To confirm whether this information is meaningful to affected people 
or not in order to contribute raising their hazard awareness, an evaluation of the impact 
of this didactic material is needed. However the evaluation is beyond the scope of the 
present research objectives. 
The  above  enlisted  instruments  represent  a  repertoire  of  hazards  awareness 
raising policy tools that, according to the General Director of Civil Protection of the 
State of Mexico and the Director of Information Communication of CENAPRED, 
are elaborated to promote the so-called ―civil protection culture‖ in the population. So 
far I have discussed how the policy outcome matches the policy objective in terms of 
how local people are expected to respond according to the policy maker‘s knowledge 
and  beliefs  of  the  floods  risk.  The  reluctance  of  vulnerable  people  to  move  out  of 
flooding prone places (already discussed in Chapter Six, section 2.1) is an obstacle to 
preventing  disaster  as  claimed  by  the  Director  of  Civil  Protection  of  the  State  of 
Mexico.  But  what  it  is  interesting  to  note  here  is  that  this  situation  in  fact  reflects 
differences between policy makers and vulnerable people with regards to the process of 
knowing and making sense of floods risk.  
A constructionist explanation for this can be found in the existing differences 
between three epistemological  frameworks of risk, namely, that of scientists, policy 
makers and the public (local) people (as proposed by Garvin, 2004, see Chapter Two). 
Local  people  make  sense  of  risk  from  within  their  daily-life  activities  and  risk 
perception (and hazards avoidance) is just another ´problem´ they have to face and solve 
amongst  many  others  like  going  to  work,  paying  the  commuting  fare  from  Chalco 
Valley to Mexico City, feeding and raising their children, paying the rent, etc.  
Unlike local people, policy makers and scientists attach meaning to floods risk 
from their professional background and job activities (CNA, CAEM and CENAPRED). 
They might never be affected by floods and they frame risk from within the institutions´  
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values they work for and not from within their daily-life concerns. Policy makers and 
scientists  talk  about  the  floods  risk  other  people  are  exposed  to.  Meanwhile,  local 
people  have an experiential knowledge of  floods risk  because they  already suffered 
floods impact in Chalco Valley in previous years.  
For instance, interviewed affected people by the Chalco Valley‘s floods from 
Avándaro and El Triunfo talk about the chronic floods risk they live in and how the 
floods they have experienced have changed their coping strategies and assets for many 
years  now  (see  Chapter  Four,  section  3).  Nowadays  they  see  themselves  as  better 
prepared  for  coping  with  coming  flood  events.  In  short,  floods  risk  knowledge  has 
different  meanings  according  to  the  social  domain  of  disaster,  as  it  was  discussed 
conceptually in section 2 of Chapter Two.    
Policy change is also sought within public and private institutions by trying to 
integrate civil protection ―inputs‖ into development planning; the integration of civil 
protection issues into the National Plan of Development of Mexico (PND 2001-2006; 
2007-2012) is an attempt of that.  This can be interpreted as the result of a coalition 
between inadvertence by ignorance and structural discourses. In the PND 2001-2006 
under the chapter ´Order and Respect` (Orden y Respeto), objective five is to enhance 
the capacity of the Mexican State to regulate phenomena that affect population. This can 
be achieved by transforming the orientation of the SINAPROC from a ´reactive´ to a 
´preventive´  system  with  the  participation  of  the  federal,  state  and  municipal 
administrations, the population and social and private sectors.  
For  all  this  a  number  of  tasks  are  identified  as  crucial,  ―identifying  and 
improving  the  knowledge  of  hazards  and  risks  at  community  level;  promoting  the 
reduction of physical vulnerability; fostering the co-participation and communication 
between  the  federal,  state  and  municipal  administrations  and  the  social  and  private 
sectors; implementing a self-protection policy and culture; developing technical tools 
and  raising  funds  for  mitigation  and  restoration  and  giving  the  highest  priority  to 
vulnerable populations.‖ (PND, 2001-2006:144)  
  In particular, the General Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico 
emphasises more the idea of ―living at risk‖ as a way to cope with hazards. He stated 
that what matters for him  in terms of  institutional  intervention  is to train people to 
accept risk rather than to capacitate people to know how to evacuate during emergency 
drills or dangerous situations. This represents a breakthrough in policy formulation as is 
explained below.   
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While the latter belief is the best common understanding of how the government 
has to act with regards to past events, the former is a ´recent´ normative view of how to 
deal with existing threatening hazards that may eventually disrupt ―daily life‖. ―Living 
at risk‖ is a storyline that brings the future into the present.  This is an important issue 
for him and for the Civil Protection of the State of Mexico as a whole. In other parts of 
the  General  Director  of  Civil  Protection  of  the  State  of  Mexico‘s  interview,  he 
reiterates that the main goal is to develop a good co-existence with hazards of all sorts: 
 
{Claim C/policy objective} 
“We want (…) people to learn how to live with phenomena that 
surround us in a rational way, in a healthy way…”  
(General Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico, 2003) 
 
This idea is reinforced again at the federal level by the General Coordinator of 
SINAPROC: 
{Claim D/policy objective} 
“The  ultimate  goal  of  a  disaster  public  policy  is  to  teach 
residents how to live at risk… (…) because of the geographical 
conditions of Mexico there will always be natural hazards”  
(General Coordinator of SINAPROC (2001-2004))   
 
Regarding  the  socio-geographic  context  of  ´living-at-risk´,  the  General 
Coordinator of SINAPROC‘s justification of this policy objective might be found in 
the evidence that (according to him) Mexico is one of the few countries in the world 
exposed to almost all types of natural hazards,  whereas the justification of the General 
Director  of  Civil  Protection  of  the  State  of  Mexico  might  be  sought  –  at  lower 
geographic scale – in the socio-economic development of the State of Mexico as the 
main driving force of change.  
Some other policy makers of the Government of the State of Mexico like the 
Director  of  Risk  Atlas  agree  with  and  repeatedly  mentioned  that  there  is  an 
―unbalanced‖  relation  between  Mexico  City  and  the  State  of  Mexico  in  terms  of 
population pressure and economic activities due to migration flows from Mexico City to 
the State of Mexico and to the increasing growth of the industrial sector within the State 
of  Mexico‘s  adjacent  municipalities  to  Mexico  City  such  as  Naucalpan  and 
Tlalnepantla.  The  following  statements,  used  as  evidence  to  legitimise  claim  C  and 
claim D, illustrate that:  
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´ 
{Evidence A} 
“One has to understand that calamities occur also because of 
migration...The  population  growth  of  the  State  of  Mexico 
increases (at a rate of 350) thousand people per year, out of it 
two thirds is the result of migration to the state of Mexico...”  
(General Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico, 2003) 
 
{Evidence B} 
“...there  are  municipalities  like  Neza
56  where  half  the 
population are of Oaxaca
57 origin and they have not adapted 
to the State of Mexico despite living here; many of them work 
and shop in Mexico City but demand services from the State of 
Mexico... and they have settled in risky zones, in lacust rine 
zones...”  
(General Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico, 2003)  
  
{Evidence C} 
 “In some way, industrial and population growth has created 
conditions for disaster to take place in the State of Mexico, 
mainly  in  the  neighbouring  municipalities  with  Mexico  City 
where almost all hazards are present...”  
(Director of Risk Atlas, State of Mexico, 2003)  
 
That has transformed the socio-environmental dynamics of the territory of the 
State  of  Mexico  making  it  more  prone  to  floods  risk.  According  to  the  General 
Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico the whole repertoire of natural and 
man-made hazards are likely to occur in the State of Mexico and the State of Mexico‘s 
residents have to get used to it even though they might not be aware of this reality. For 
the General Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico, the `living at risk` 
approach can be applied to explain situations when people are exposed to risk either by 
natural or man-made hazards: 1) immigrants who were allowed to settle illegally in the 
industries buffer zones (Mexico City-State of Mexico interface) are exposed to potential 
`accidents` so they have to accept that situation and 2) rural indigenous communities 
living close – since ancient times – to the Popocatépetl volcano are used to witnessing 
volcano activity because they have ´been living at risk` for centuries. 
                                                 
56 Neza is the short name that alludes to the Netzahualcoyotl municipality which is another neighbouring 
municipality of the State of Mexico to Mexico City  
57 Oaxaca is an state located in the southeast of Mexico  
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According to the interpretation of the General Director of Civil Protection of 
the State of Mexico, the Government of the State of Mexico allowed immigrants to live 
where they are now so they have to learn how to co-exist with risk:  
 
{Claim D/ policy outcome} 
 
“what we want is to learn how to co-exist with risk…”  
(General Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico, 2003) 
 
 
The two different interpretations of the same situation can be also understood by 
paying attention to the claim of the General Director of Civil Protection of the State 
of Mexico about causal agents and potential victims, i.e., social actors who should or 
should not stay in insecure places and therefore be exposed to hazards. What he may 
mean implicitly is that man-made hazards are the by-product of the industrial sector 
whose promoters and defenders can claim their right to develop their economic activity 
whereas natural hazards simply occur without any intended cause.  
 I argue that – in the argumentation of the General Director of Civil Protection 
of the State of Mexico – the social nature of ´natural´ hazards serves as a way to dilute 
potential conflicts by `neutralizing` the storyline ´living at risk´ depending on who the 
subjects involved are. He took a totally different example and used it to validate his 
argument: the Popocatépetl volcano located in La Sierra Nevada (see Chapter Four for 
an explanation of the geography of La Sierra Nevada). Popocatépetl volcano has been 
portrayed as a chronic geologic hazard whose lava eruption may pose risk in varying 
degrees to the neighbouring State of Mexico municipalities with Mexico City and even 
Mexico  City  residents.  Since  Popocatépetl  volcano  cannot  be  blamed  or  held 
accountable for any accidental cause in those rural communities where settlers near the 
Popocatépetl  volcano  are  exposed  to  eruption  risk,  in  urban  settlements  ´hazards 
generators´ can be liable for causing damage to urban residents living near industrial 
sites.  
To avoid or resolve potential conflicts between the residents and the industry 
´promoters´, the storyline ´living at risk´ is legitimised by looking at who the hazard 
generator is. It can be interpreted implicitly in the warrant of the General Director of 
Civil Protection of the State of Mexico that industrial development should face no 
obstacle in the State of Mexico territory, hence residents living near industrial facilities 
and potentially exposed to chemical hazards have to accept that situation.   
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In the interview of the General Director of Civil Protection of the State of 
Mexico, he implicitly made reference to the ´right´ of industry plants to pollute and 
generate hazardous wastes because industry plants ´arrived´ before the migrants did. 
The following warrant D of claim D illustrates this: 
{Warrant D} 
“industries  were  engulfed  by  urban  settlements...  industries 
arrived  to  the  State  of  Mexico  before  the  people  (current 
residents)”  
(General Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico, 2003) 
 
 
 According to three of the Government of the State of Mexico‘s policy makers 
(General  Director  of  Civil  Protection  of  the  State  of  Mexico,  Head  of  Civil 
Protection Commission of the State of Mexico and Director of Risk Atlas), there are 
thousands of plants and industries spread along the territory of the State of Mexico with 
which inhabitants have to co-exist with. For instance, the municipalities of Naucalpan, 
Tlalnepantla, Cuautitlán-Izcalli and Ecatepec are the most industrialized of the whole 
State  of  Mexico.  By  2000  Cuautitlán-Izcalli  housed  six  industrial  parks,  whereas 
Ecatepec, Naucalpan and Tlalnepantla one respectively. These nine parks amounted for 
almost half the industrial parks (9) in the whole bordering North-East of Mexico City 
region (a total of 21). In terms of the number of industrial plants, in Ecatepec there were 
8,000  industrial  plants,  in  Naucalpan  and  Tlalnepantla,  4,000  each,  and  Cuautitlán-
Izcalli, 1,800. (Secretaría de Economía, 2003)   
I argue that this socio-demographic contextualisation is what seems to influence 
the way the General Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico discourses and 
consequently the way he sets up and justifies the policy goal of enhancing common risk 
perception  and  change  the  behaviour  of  affected  people,  and  the  civil  protection 
programmes based on the idea of ´educating people´ to deal with that situation.  
This disaster conceptualisation and therefore policy‘s objectives are to a great 
extent determined by what the Government of the State of Mexico is doing to promote 
industrial development vis à vis mitigating hazards generation. In short, context matters.  
Regarding  this  interpretation,  another  contextual  issue  emerges:  that  of 
contrasting  Mexico  City  with  the  State  of  Mexico,  as  it  was  examined  in  the 
inadvertence  discourse  in  Chapter  Six.  This  illustrates,  in  some  way,  the  political 
struggle between those two different states that has been going on for quite some time. 
According to the General Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico in terms  
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of  ecological  deterioration,  Mexico  City  causes  State  of  Mexico‘s  problems  by 
´sending´ migrants and dumping pollution into the State of Mexico‘s river banks and 
orchards.  
My interpretation is that the General Director of Civil Protection of the State 
of Mexico appears to ´embody´ the State of Mexico‘s ´interests´ and concerns and he 
portrays state of Mexico‘s residents as the ´victims´ of Mexico City‘s migrants who are 
labelled as responsible for the State of Mexico‘s bads; the blame is put on Mexico City 
and the environmental pressure it exerts in the State of Mexico. The ´living at risk´ 
storyline synthesises the whole problematic of the State of Mexico and a way to cope 
with  hazards  within  the  context  of  increasing  risk  generation  and  economic 
development; it can be regarded as a ´realistic´ and practical way of ´managing´ risk and 
its meaning.  
This ´living at risk´ storyline can be linked to Beck‘s notion (2000) of risk and 
may explain the change in the discourse (´the breakthrough´) in the sense that what we 
might be witnessing is a transition from the industrial to the risk society, a transition 
where consequences of industrial society were seen as a ´natural´ outcome and were not 
the subject of public debate to a stage where hazards of industrial society dominate 
public, political and private debates. As Beck states,  
―...now  the  institutions  of  industrial  society  produce  and 
legitimate hazards which they cannot control.‖  
(Beck, 2000:27)   
 
 
1.2 Policy instruments and implementation 
 
Education  programmes  for  promoting  a  civil  protection  culture:  disaster 
policy implementation as a rhetorical act  
 
As  discussed  in  the  previous  sub-section  the  expected  policy  outcome  is  to 
´teach´ local people on how to live at risk and for that reason policy implementation 
means risk communication and education. In this section I analyse implementation as a 
rhetorical act. This is because I want to expose the persuasive and value-laden nature of 
the actions which were expressed by the policy makers as the interventions needed to 
achieve the objective of educating local people to ´live at risk´. To do so I focus on the 
meaning  transfer  from  the  education  realm  to  the  disaster  realm.  I  undertake  a 
metaphoric analysis of the Civil Protection Programme of the State of Mexico (CPPSM 
2001-2005) and the Family Plan of Civil Protection (issued by the Government of the  
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State of Mexico in 2002) to examine how these instruments embody metaphors and how 
metaphors operate in prescribing specific policy actions.  
The metaphor learning/lesson was found throughout the CPPSM 2001-2005 and 
in  interviews  with  policy  makers  of  the  State of  Mexico.  Below  I  explain  how the 
education language in Mexico and the characteristics of the learning/lesson notion (the 
metaphoric ―source‖ or vehicle) can be used to examine the metaphoric ´focus´, namely 
civil  protection  policy  implementation.  I  undertook  the  metaphoric  analysis  as 
suggested by Yanow (2000). Firstly, I identified implicitly the metaphor ´lesson´ as a 
repeated notion and the expressions ´training people´, ´learning´ and ´capacity building´ 
of the education language in the policy makers´ interviews (see Chapter Six, section 1 
and  Chapter  Seven,  subsection  1.1)  and  in  the  CPPEM  and  other  related  State  of 
Mexico civil protection policy tools like the Family Plan of Civil Protection (Chapter 
Five, section 3.3). Secondly, I proceeded to choose some metaphoric characteristics of 
“lesson” and its meanings in the discourse of ´inadvertence causality by ignorance´. 
Metaphoric characteristics are ―the entailments of the metaphor – the denotations and 
connotations of its source (that) must be grounded in the context (both in setting and 
time) out of which it grew.‖ (Yanow, 2000:44) 
Thirdly, I compared the metaphor characteristics with the focus of the metaphor 
which is policy implementation for floods prevention. This was with the intention of 
identifying and explaining concepts or ―labels‖ from the education language to describe 
the  strategies  and  actions  found  in  the  CPPEM  and  eventually  in  other  policy 
instruments. I focused on how those education language mechanisms reveal a particular 
construction of target populations as “ignorant people that have to be educated”. And 
fourthly, I tried to uncover how the metaphor ´learning/lesson´ links thought to action 
in the CPPEM and other policy instruments.  
Let us bear in mind that the ultimate goal of the CPPSM (2001-2005:3) is to 
induce ´adequate´ self-protection behaviour amongst all to further a ´civil protection 
culture´ in society. It is believed that this goal could be achieved with the aid of various 
technical tools  like the Risk  Atlas  at State and  municipal  level, Municipal Plans of 
Contingencies and by implementing ´Plans of Civil Protection´ in schools, public and 
private buildings to avoid casualties especially during fire and earthquake episodes  
I proceed then to analyse this view of  implementation and,  in particular, the 
descriptive  and  prescriptive  roles  of  the  metaphor  lesson/learning  with  regards  to  
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CPPSM  (2001-2005),  its  strategies  and  actions.  I  chose  the  CPPSM  as  the  policy 
instrument
58  for the following five reasons: 
 
1.  It is the most important public policy document of civil protection in the State of 
Mexico  of  a  normative  and  operative  nature.  It  is  the  reference  framework 
containing  the  main  ideas  and  arguments  that  specify  and  delimit  State  of 
Mexico‘s  government  and  society‘s  actions  in  the  matter.  It  embodies  the 
´discourse  of  inadvertence  by  ignorance´.  This  framework  is  in  fact  the 
´umbrella´ of several policy tools where educational metaphors are also found 
and thus a rhetoric analysis can be undertaken.  
2.  It reflects the government of the State of Mexico‘s view of disaster and the ideas 
policy makers have of (target) populations. It can be conceived as a ―text‖ that 
embodies  the  language  where  three  causal  agents  (´ignorant´  people,  policy 
makers and ´experts´) and their actions ´show up´ in the discourse and through 
which ´civil protection´ in the State of Mexico is viewed and communicated. (as 
discussed above in section 1.1)  
3.  It  addresses  the  issue  of  education,  information,  risk  communication  and 
capacity building that underpins the idea of ´a civil protection culture´ which is 
the  desired  course  of  action  to  solve  the  Ignorance  of  hazards  and  unsafe 
conditions policy problem.  
4.  In the CPPEM (2001-2005) floods are conceptualised both as a natural and man-
made hazard and also as a disaster policy problem. So floods have two policy 
meanings, as cause and consequence, which parallel the normative connotation 
of lesson, as means and as end. 
5.  The CPPEM frames the obligations and actions of disaster managers and policy 
makers and those of other civil protection operators.  
 
CPPEM (2001-2005) was published in November, 2001 in Toluca, the capital city 
of the State of Mexico. CPPEM‘s objective is:  
“To  consolidate  the  achievements  of  the  Civil  Protection 
System  of  the  State  of  Mexico  by  shifting  it  to  a  more 
preventive orientation, strengthening social participation and 
enhancing the mitigation of natural and anthropogenic effects”  
(Gaceta del Gobierno, Estado de México, 2001:14).  
                                                 
58 ―Policy instrument is a tool governments use to implement public policy decisions.‖ (John, 2002:205)  
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This objective explicitly highlights the component of social participation. It can 
be attained through four strategic groups of action for civil protection: 1) planning, 2) 
Financing, 3) Education and capacity building, and 4) Information and communication 
(Gobierno del Estado de México, 2001). I focus particularly on 3) and 4) because they 
encompass the policy actions ―believed‖ to be the most adequate to solve the floods 
problem, as analysed above in section 1.1. I also focus on these two strategic groups of 
action because these two groups of action embedded, in fact, the concepts of ´people ´s 
education´, ´learning´ and ´capacity building´ which are the concepts from where the 
meaning transfer originates. A thorough description of the CPPEM was done in section 
3.3 of Chapter Five.   
   As  examined  in  Chapter  Six,  section  2.1.1,  the  discourse  of  inadvertence 
causality  by  ignorance  allows the  ´emergence´  of two opposing subjects: the policy 
makers  and  authorities  (We)  and  the  affected  and  local  people  (They).  From  the 
analysis carried out in that section, I interpreted that the underlying general idea of the 
floods problem as `Ignorance of hazards and unsafe conditions...‖ implies an ´education 
problem´.  Knowledge  possession  and  ´right´  perception  of  ´real´  floods  risk  are  the 
criteria to make the distinction between those two subjects. The policymakers whose 
discourse lies in ´inadvertence causality by ignorance´ asserted that the ´knowledgeable´ 
accessed  the  ´right´  risk  perception  through  witnessing  and  reporting  previous 
inundations  with  the  aid  of  technical  information  provided  by  CNA.  In  the  case  of 
Chalco Valley‘s floods it can interpreted that ´ignorant people learnt the lesson´  by 
experiencing the floods and receiving ´the´ pertinent (scientific-technical) information 
provided by the authorities to ´really understand´ the situation.  
In  the  learning  process  the  expected  outcome  is  the  acquisition  of  new 
knowledge  of  the  situation  (enhanced  risk  perception)  and  a  changed  attitude  and 
behaviour to carry out an ´informed action´ to be better prepared (capacity building/ 
civil protection culture) to cope successfully with future events (´exams´ e.g. ´living at 
floods risk´). This particular interpretation of policy implementation as a rhetorical act 
can  be  done  by  looking  at  the  meaning  transfer  from  the  educational  realm  to  the 
disaster policy realm in Mexico. Let us now turn to examining in detail the CPPEM to 
´reveal´ how the educational language is used to prescribe action within the  disaster 
policy sphere. In the text of the CPPEM (2001-2005) I found the following concepts, 
strategies  and  actions  that  illustrate  the  education  language  and  the  channelling  of  
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meaning into policy implementation through the metaphor learning/lesson. I arranged 
them in Box 8 below. 
 
Box 8. Meaning transfer from education language to disaster  
policy implementation language in the Civil Protection Programme  
of the State of Mexico (2001-2005)  
 
Education language                  Disaster prevention implementation language 
Concepts       Strategies 
(means) 
Actions 
(ends) 
1.  Training 
people  
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Learning 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  Capacity 
building  
 
 
 
Implementation of 
programmes for civil 
protection within 
organisations, institutions 
and at home 
 
 
Developing new attitudes 
and abilities to prevent 
disaster 
Adopting `adequate´ 
behaviour 
 
 Communication of  basic 
knowledge for self-protection 
and self-care to avoid 
hazards 
 
Emergencies management 
Risk communication with the aid 
of civil protection programmes 
within organisations. 
Dissemination of a civil protection 
culture. Avoiding hazards or 
´living at risk´ 
 
Implementation of the annual 
programme of civil protection for 
capacity building and training 
 
 
 
Implementation of   
emergency plans 
Operation of early warning 
systems 
 
Evacuations of unsafe places 
before hazards impacts  
 
The  notion  of  ´training  people´  is  transferred  into  the  disaster  prevention 
language  through  the  practice  of  civil  protection  plans  within  organisations  and 
institutions.  The  meaning  of  training  people  and  its  transference  into  strategies  and 
actions implies designing and putting into practice at institutional level, programmes of 
civil  protection  inside  ministries,  public  and  private  institutions  and  buildings.  It  is 
believed that risk communication disaster prevention and emergency actions start at the 
work place and schools. In fact it can be affirmed that this is the notion of  disaster 
prevention  that  prevails  in  Mexico.  Disaster  prevention  implementation  means 
evacuation from work place and schools when the hazard is about to hit; for instance 
when an earthquake is shaking the building, people who have been trained on the matter 
are expected to leave the building and escape from any potential damage.   
  The  document  entitled  ―Guías  de  Medidas  Preventivas.  Plan  Familiar  de 
Protecci￳n Civil‖ (Booklet of Preventive Measures. Family Plan of Civil Protection) is  
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the document that tells ´families´ how to act in case of an emergency or disaster.  It is a 
set of actions all family members have to put in place, in an organised manner, before, 
during and after an emergency. This guide indicates how to elaborate a Family Plan 
according to different disturbing (hazardous) agents: earthquake, forest fire, bombs and 
floods.  
In case of floods, the document provides a list of preparedness actions to be put 
into place according to the emergency stage, whether it is before, during or after the 
floods. It is not really a preventive plan but a preparedness plan (See Box 9 below). For 
analytical purposes, the term ´preparedness´ is taken from Lavell (2000:18) and refers 
―to  educational,  organisational,  planning  and  logistical  activities  developed  in  the 
context of existing structurally determined risk scenarios that attempt to reduce possible 
loss during and after the onset of a damaging event. Preparedness contemplates a wide 
range  of  activities  including  the  development  of  emergency  operational  plans  and 
contingency  planning,  the  establishment  of  emergency  operations  centres,  public 
education schemes, stockpiling of resources, planning of evacuation routes and shelters, 
and early warning and alert systems‖.   
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Box 9. What to do in case of floods   
 
Before: 
1. Set up exit routes to unsafe safe places.  
2. Clean the streets and your houses´ drains of rubbish.  
3. Store drinking water, clean clothes and food in safe places where they cannot be reached by 
floods; have a torch at hand, a portable radio and batteries.  
4. Keep your important documents inside plastic bags to avoid deterioration.  
5. If you are informed that floods are threatening and that they can impact the place you live, 
unplug electric appliances and gas installations.  
 
During: 
1. Above all, stay calm. 
2. Be alert and tune in the radio because floods can reach places nearby. Obey all authorities´ 
warnings. 
3. Avoid being close to faulty or damaged electricity posts and cables; remember that water is a 
very good electricity conductor.  
4. If your house is made of palm leaves, reed, clay or carton, look for a safer refuge building 
like schools, churches, Municipality building when these are not in danger.  
5. Avoid crossing rivers and walking flooded areas even though the water level is low, it can 
rise suddenly which increases danger. Remember that water can drag trees, stones, vehicles and 
other things.  
6. If your vehicle gets stuck, get out of it immediately and look for a safe refuge  
 
After: 
1. Carry out a visual inspection of your house taking into account the likelihood of things falling 
down. If you have any doubts about the physical condition of your house call the authorities and 
ask for support. 
2. Do not get close to buildings and houses that appear to be threatening to fall.  
3. Do not light matches and do not turn on electric appliances until you are sure that no damage 
has been done to the facilities.  
4. Do not step over electric cables.  
5. Clean immediately flammable or toxic materials as well as hazardous materials that might 
have spilled on the floor.   
6. Stay out of flooded areas; you may be an obstacle for aid emergency actions. 
7. Do not drink water or eat any kind of food that might have been in touch with water. 
8. Do not try to move hurt people; report emergencies to authorities.  
 
Source: Civil Protection of the State of Mexico (2008)  
 
The meaning of learning  
As  the  result  of  the  transfer  of  meaning  from  the  education  domain  to  the 
disaster domain, the ´training´ metaphor has made, in the disaster prevention language 
in  Mexico, prevention to mean to ´be prepared  to tackle  hazards and withstand the 
impact´. For this reason, prevention actions include all sorts of educational means to 
learn  how  to  be  better  prepared:  to  be  informed  about  the  ´natural´  hazard,  to  be 
protected against it, to design ways of avoiding the impact, to look for safer places, to  
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minimize the danger and damage that could be caused by the impact of the hazard; in 
short, all mechanical actions to reduce floods risk exposure. All this might contribute to 
the belief that the more people – within institutions or houses – follow the steps of the 
plan and practice the actions, the more people are achieving a ´civil protection culture´. 
It is interesting to note that no reference is made with regards to the above discussed 
socio-economic  conditions  that  may  impede  or  constrain  the  implementation  of  the 
actions prescribed in both the CPPEM and the Family Plan. So, vulnerability is not 
acknowledged as a constraining condition for the successful implementation. Now the 
analysis shifts to the notion of ´learning´ which embodies two other characteristics of 
people, namely attitudes and aptitudes.  
    Transferring the concept of ´learning´ to the disaster prevention language the 
focus is put on developing new attitudes and abilities to prevent disaster. So, I suggest 
that the meaning of the concept learning can be interpreted in various ways with the aid 
of one metaphoric characteristic, namely learning as a ´positive process´. In Mexico, at 
the discursive level, one of the fundamental axes of the education praxis is the learning 
process. The Education Programme of Mexico (2001-2006 and 2007-2012) issued by 
the Ministry of Education (SEP, 2001, 2008) states that at all level of education  the 
capacity  to  learn  is  one  of  the  most  important skills  a  student  has  to  develop.  The 
´learning´  word  is  expressed  in  a  variety  of  ways  to  deploy  a  number  of  actions: 
´teaching  should  be  centred  in  learning´,  ´learning  is  a  human  activity  oriented  to 
promote the development of capacities  for  life  and work´,  ´learning  is an  education 
goal´, ´education models and knowledge production should be centred in learning´, etc. 
In short, learning is a central concept in the Mexico education system.  
    Now I will identify in the policy implementation language of disaster prevention 
the ´labels´ and meanings of the education language (enlisted above) in the strategies 
and actions of the CPPEM. The first paragraph of page 6 of CPPEM (2001-2005:6), in 
the  section  ―Education,  capacitating  and  training  for  Civil  Protection‖,  reads  as 
follows
59: 
―Generating  and  consolidating  a  civil  protection  culture  – 
understood  as  the  individual  and  collective  acquisition  of  a 
preventive conscience – should be a long-lasting task that can 
be  realized  through  integral  processes  of  education  (italics 
                                                 
59 It is important to say that in Spanish the sentence has a very bad syntax and for that reason the 
interpretation and translation was not easy to do.   
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mine) that facilitate (the development of) new aptitudes and the 
practice of new attitudes‖ 
CPPEM (2001-2005:6) 
 
It can  be  interpreted that the  meaning of  learning  is transferred  from the education 
language into strategies that target the individual to develop new attitudes and abilities 
to prevent disaster. Here, disaster prevention means an individual action that can be 
promoted when the subject experiences disaster, when the subject learns. The starting 
assumption found in the CPPEM (2001-2005:6) to explain why it is difficult to develop 
a ´civil protection culture´ is that individuals are not aware of disaster risk since few of 
them ´experience´ disaster during their life-time. The following question clearly frames 
the processes whereby  individuals can achieve a ´civil protection culture´ through a 
preventive behaviour: 
 
―It is worth asking the following question: How many times is 
a person directly affected by a disaster…that provokes a huge 
impact  in the person, his  household, goods or environment? 
For most of the people a disaster is a remote event and people 
are aware of it through mass media communication, the images 
(of  the  disaster)  get  into the  newspaper?,  of  something  that 
occurs  in  other  reality,  in  another  planet,  or  in  the  best 
scenario, in another space distinct from that of being spectator‖ 
CPPEM (2001-2005:6) 
 
Thus, it is the obligation and duty of the Government (of the State of Mexico in 
this case) to implement programmes to ´educate people´ about the matter. That is why 
the emphasis  is put on the individual‘s  learning over other actions. This  learning  is 
ultimately furthered through the different daily life activities such as health promotion, 
education, food, public security, electricity consumption, driving a car, etc. In the end, 
according to the CPPEM, a disaster preventive behaviour can be developed only when 
the person‘s attitude is preventive and acts in that way in all of the person‘s social 
relations and activities.    
The rationale behind the CPPEM is that people can acquire ´preventive´ values 
that underpin a ´self-protection´ behaviour. It is at the individual level that the whole 
protection  action  starts  either  at the  public  or  private  sphere.  With  new  ´enhanced´ 
aptitudes and attitudes the person would be better prepared to tackle disaster or avoid 
risk exposure. With regards to the person‘s learning, it is very interesting to note that the  
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General  Director  of  Civil  Protection  of  the  State  of  Mexico  is  convinced  that,  for 
instance, by  integrating a  ´module´ of civil protection at all education  levels and  in 
professional careers, education on civil protection will take a big step forward.  
And finally, capacity building means communication of ´basic´ knowledge for 
self-protection  and  self-care  to  avoid  hazards.  Regarding  the  meaning  transfer  from 
´capacity building´ to strategies and actions, disaster prevention means also emergencies 
management. This issue is linked to the notion of training people. Bearing this in mind, 
it  can  be  reinforced  that  implementation  means  education;  but  education  as  a 
mechanical action (training) oriented to manage emergencies where the operation of 
early warning systems, evacuation of buildings during earthquakes and fires, putting off 
fires, evacuation of flooding prone zones are the desired actions to be put into practice. 
Thus leaflets, posters and talks given by the General Direction of Civil Protection of the 
State of Mexico are centred on the idea of ´managing emergencies´ in living at risk and 
eventually to avoid natural and man-made hazards, if possible.  
Summing  up,  understanding  how  the  meaning  transfer  from  the  education 
domain  (with  the  aid  of  the  metaphor  lesson  and  other  education  concepts)  to  the 
disaster domain is done allows one to be aware that the characteristics and scope of the 
actions are ´logical´ and ´natural´ education tasks to prevent disaster. Implementation of 
disaster prevention actions are a set of decisions aimed at changing people‘s behaviour. 
However, it could be argued that public education is quite often the means to protect the 
status quo and fails to achieve the explicit goals of behaviour change for improving the 
quality of life of typically marginalised groups. The emphasis on education could also 
be understood as a way to portray  learning as  a tool that pretends to trigger social 
change as part of a disasters risk management process. In this sense, the changing role 
of the State in moving from paternal provider to facilitator is an important issue for 
further research. It could be argued that the effectiveness of disasters risk management 
may change according to the type of the State intervention with regards to directing 
people‘s behaviour.  
The interpretation of disasters prevention as an education policy can contribute 
to  the  discussion  of  environmental  governance  and  citizenship  by  considering  the 
participation of people in reducing disaster risk as a citizenship right. In this regard, 
Castro, Kostler and Torregrosa (2004) propose linkages between people´s participation 
and  the  governance  of  public  services  in  risk  situations, and  in  particular,  people´s 
awareness about ´fabricated uncertainties´ in a ´risk society´ (Beck, 1992) and the forms  
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citizen´s rights can take. There are some issues that can be discussed in this debate and 
that this thesis contributes to. For instance, the assumption that risk reduction depends 
on hazard awareness and that risk subjects can be defined in terms of such awareness 
and perception. Therefore, risk society  may imply the more sophisticated production 
and reproduction of social inequalities. Throughout this section it was stated that the 
´adequate´ policy response is to educate people to raise hazard awareness and then to be 
able to avoid inundations. By considering disaster risk reduction a citizen right it can 
could  be  argued  that  education  for  preventing  disasters  might  be  a  central  task  to 
mainstream in development policy.  
 
     
2.  Failure of infrastructure and inadequate monitoring of risk object  
 
In Chapter Four I developed a narrative out of the different interpretations of the causal 
agents that are believed to have provoked the floods. In various degrees and forms, all 
interpretations  of  CNA,  CAEM  and  ODAPAS´  policy  makers  and  technicians  and 
affected  people  place  the  malfunctioning  of  LCC  as  an  important  source  of  risk. 
Moreover, as analysed in Chapter Six, the discourse of ´inadvertence by carelessness´ 
constructs the policy problem of Chalco Valley‘s floods as a technical and managerial 
problem  resultant  of  the  combination  of  technical  failures  and  human  mistakes  and 
negligence; in fact, LCC, ´careless´ technicians and heavy rainfalls are the causal agents 
´showing-up´ in this discourse.  Subsection 3.2, Chapter Six, characterised the rhetorical 
elements of this policy problem and concluded that, even though it was clear that a 
physical failure of LCC ultimately contributed to the floods, the blame shifted from an 
unnamed CNA or CAEM technician for not providing proper maintenance to LCC, to 
´unpredictable´ heavy rainfalls and the ´natural´ limits of LCC to cope with extreme 
water flows.    
In  this  section  I  analyse  the  policy  responses  elements  of  the  ―Failure  of 
infrastructure  and  inadequate  monitoring  of  risk  object‖  problem.  Even  though  the 
discussion  focuses  on  how  policy  makers‘  claims  about  policy  objective  and 
intervention are constructed on technical grounds, the major interest of the analysis is to 
explain how these technical claims are justified by recurring to non-technical evidence 
and warrants such as the pre-existing solutions of institutions, the need to justify the 
existence  of  public  institutions  dealing  with  ´natural´  disaster  and  the  professional  
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background of the policy maker or technician. It is worthwhile mentioning that what is 
to be presented below is the surface story and that the dominant discourse is influenced 
by several factors and resources competition which require certain framing of policy 
agendas to gain support in this particular policy culture.  
As I discussed comprehensively in Chapter One and Two in conceptual terms 
and in Chapter Four in empirical terms, in order to solve this type of policy problem, 
policy intervention is aimed at ´isolating´ and controlling the ´natural´ and man-made 
hazard to reduce risk exposure of local people. I found that there is a belief amongst 
policy makers and technicians that disaster prevention implementation is realised once 
the  sources  of  risk  are  known,  isolated  from  its  context  and  even,  in  some  cases, 
contained. To examine how the risk object can be tackled in terms of the capacities and 
limits of the technical actions. I review the ample repertoire of technical tools proposed 
to reinforce or improve sanitation infrastructure with regards to La Compañía Canal and 
Chalco Valley problematic.   
In section one of this chapter where the policy objective was found to be more 
complex  and  detailed  in  terms  of  subjects´  perceptions  and  cognition  processes  of 
floods  risk,  in  this  section  I  found  that there  was  a  simpler  and  more  homogenous 
understanding  amongst  the  interviewees  of  what  the  policy  objective  should  be:  to 
construct and maintain in good condition La Compañía Canal and the sanitation system 
to cope with the increase of water flows that run along LCC therefore avoiding future 
floods. This situation apparently may imply consensus from the data and warrants given 
by the policy makers and technicians to back this objective‘s main claim.  
But interestingly, this is not the case as the following analysis shows. It explains 
how  different  justifications  converge  on  the  same  objective.  Hence,  I  argue  that  a 
common simple technical objective may imply evidence and warrants of different sorts 
in different ways. As in the previous section one, the analysis of this section reveals 
how  the  professional  background  of  the  interviewee,  his/her  position  within  the 
institution and the  institutional context determine what should be the best course of 
action. So, in order to refine the analysis, the technical solutions are placed in their 
discursive and institutional context. 
The  interviewees  identified  for  the  ―Failure  of  infrastructure  and  inadequate 
monitoring of risk object‖ policy problem are eight:  the Director of Inundations Risk 
Reduction of CAEM, the General Director of CENAPRED, the Research Director of 
CENAPRED,  the  General  Coordinator  of  Water  and  Sanitation  of  CNA  in  Mexico  
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Valley, the Head of Socio-Economic Research  of CENAPRED, the Head of Enviro 
Commission  Edo  Mex,  the  Head  of  Environmental  Protection  of  PEMEX  and  the 
General Director of Environmental Policies of SEMARNAT. 
 
2.1 Policy objectives and types of intervention  
 
Improvement of ´ natural´ hazards forecasting and monitoring of the sources 
of risk and reinforcement of water and sanitation infrastructure. 
 
The two objectives are: 1) the improvement of hazards forecasting and monitoring of 
the sources of risk and 2) the reinforcement of water and sanitation infrastructure. These 
objectives focus on the LCC problematic because the problem‘s main claim requiring 
solution is connected to the failures of the infrastructure sanitation that caused Chalco 
Valley‘s  inundations  and  the  government‘s  actions  oriented  to  maintain  in  good 
´physical condition´ the LCC.  
The  proposed  policy  interventions  are  of  a  local  nature  and  spatially 
circumscribed to what appeared to be the main floods cause: the failure of La Compañía 
Canal to function. The solutions proposed in this discourse exemplify the ´dominant 
view´ of disaster, discussed in Chapter One, because Chalco Valley‘s floods cause are 
believed  to  be  a  single  event  ´isolated´  from  the  socio-economic,  historical  and 
environmental  context.  In  this  sense,  the  problem  ―Failure  of  infrastructure  and 
sanitation system and inadequate monitoring of risk object‖ ´allowed´ the appearance 
and interaction of three causal agents as responsible for the floods: heavy rainfalls, La 
Compañía  Canal  ´bad´  physical  condition,  ´careless´  government  technicians  and 
operators. So consequently the policy objectives address those three causal agents in 
various ways as explained below.  
The two causal agents, heavy rainfalls and La Compañía Canal, usually appear 
interrelated in policy reports and interviewees ´claims because the commonly referred to 
explanation of the floods is based on the physical resistance of the LCC walls to the 
waste waters flows, the waste water peaks and heavy rainfalls, as shown in Chapter 
Four, section 3. For example, the introduction of the study entitled ―First stage of the 
hydro-meteorological  early  warning  system  for  the  La  Compañía  river  basin  in  the  
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municipalities of Chalco, Ixtapaluca and Reyes-La Paz, State of Mexico
60‖ emphasises 
the impact of heavy rainfalls on the current increase of the ´river´ La Compañía and the 
impact these had on the LCC walls. The document is the technical basis for designing 
and setting-up an early warning system to avoid casualties in the Chalco Valley region 
in particular in the colonias adjacent to LCC.  
It  is  interesting  to  note  throughout  this  subsection  the  way  objectives  are 
justified and therefore to what extent they are  formulated probably as an excuse  to 
discuss other related issues and therefore to advance other type of claims. For example, 
when talking about the need to have an in-depth diagnosis of extreme ´natural´ hazards 
to  ´really´  prevent  floods,  the  relationship  between  scientific  knowledge  and  policy 
making emerges as an important consideration to be discussed. This is because it was 
repeatedly stressed that policy has to be framed by rational and ´objective´ scientific 
knowledge that seeks for uncontested and truthful accounts of floods.    
The  prevailing  notion  of  ´disaster  prevention´  at  policy  level  in  Mexico,  as 
analysed in Chapters Four and Five, focuses on the human-physical systems to control 
the ´natural´ dangers. Thus, the type of policy intervention proposed here is about more 
and  ´better´  scientific  research  for  the  technical  development,  the  improvement  of 
monitoring systems of natural threats, and the construction and maintenance of public 
works to  control  extreme  hazards  to  protect  human  populations.  The  early  warning 
system  (SIAT,  stands  in  Spanish  for  Sistema  de  Alerta  Temprana)  designed  by 
CENAPRED and the Institute of Engineering of UNAM in 2003 to detect high peak 
water avenues in LCC and to alert the Chalco Valley‘s residents and the Floods Atlas of 
the State of Mexico is one of two examples of policy tools to facilitate this intervention 
(see later). 
For the analysis, I  firstly proceed with an examination of the  justification  of 
these objectives and the proposed interventions and the beliefs and warrants that support 
them by referring again to the second framework of the argumentative relation of figure 
2, section 3.3, Chapter Two. Secondly, I go on to analyse the policy instruments and 
implementation by focusing on four groups of actions implemented in Chalco Valley by 
2003: 1) scientific research for decision making, 2) technical reinforcement of public 
works  to  control  floods,  3)  contingency  plans  for  protecting  water  and  sanitation 
                                                 
60 ―Primera etapa del sistema de alerta hidro-meteorol￳gica para la cuenca del río ―La Compa￱ía‖, en los 
municipios de Chalco, Ixtapaluca y los Reyes-La Paz, Estado de México.‖(2003)  CENAPRED-Instituto 
de Ingeniería  
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infrastructure and 4) targeted funding for infrastructure development. The data sources 
are the interviews with both policy makers and scientists and people affected by the 
Chalco Valley‘s floods of 2000, and the official technical documents of CENAPRED, 
CAEM and CNA and the Institute of Engineering of UNAM.   
To begin with I selected the interview of the Director of Inundations Risk 
Reduction of CAEM who conducted the coordination of the works implemented in the 
LCC  several  years  before,  during  and  after  the  Chalco  Valley‘s  floods  (to  my 
knowledge at least up to the time the interview was done in May 2003). I looked at the 
main argument which claimed that a diagnosis of hydraulic systems is of fundamental 
importance to plan preventive actions:  
 
{Claim A}  
“I think that a public policy oriented to preventing disaster has 
to have two objectives... diagnosis and prevention... And also 
the  means  to  achieve  such  goals  is  technical  diagnosis    of 
hydraulic functioning of rivers, of sanitation infrastructure, to 
carry  out  studies…  projects…  to  draw  physics  and 
mathematics models to understand the complexity in order to 
provide (information) for prevention”  
(Director of Inundations Risk Reduction of CAEM, 2003) 
 
According  to  the  Director  of  Inundations  Risk  Reduction  of  CAEM, 
hydraulic diagnosis has to comprise studies oriented to ´anticipating´ the occurrence of 
the  floods,  that  is,  to  identify  flooding  prone  places  which  could  have  already 
´experienced´ previous inundations and how the sanitation network coped with them. 
These studies are aimed at ´feeding´ policy tools such as Floods Atlas of the State of 
Mexico with information of ´natural´ hazards and dangerous zones and to inform the 
implementation of engineering works to control high volume water avenues and heavy 
rainfalls or even fixing the malfunctioning of the sanitation system. The warrants of 
these  objectives  are  linked  to  the  duties  and  obligations  the  CAEM  has  to  water 
management and floods prevention issues in the State of Mexico:  
 
{Warrant A} 
       “We, the CAEM, are engaged in two lines of actions, due 
to the CAEM´s nature and characteristics. One line of action is 
about  diagnosis  and  monitoring  of  hazards  and  works 
planning  and  the  other  is  devoted  to  assist  the  affected 
infrastructure…” “… as it was in the Chalco Valley‟s floods  
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we had to get water pumps to evacuate the waste waters, for 
instance”  
(Director of Inundations Risk Reduction of CAEM, 2003) 
 
To  my  understanding  the  policy  intervention  proposed  here  was  directly 
conditioned by the ´experience´ of both CNA and CAEM had acquired as a result of 
Chalco Valley‘s floods. Let us remember that just in the aftermath it was necessary to 
deviate and contain future increasing volumes of water coming from upstream LCC so a 
regulatory dam was thought to be one of the permanent solutions. As a result, in 2003 a 
small-sized regulatory dam was built by CNA in coordination with CAEM upstream 
LCC in the San Marcos Huixtoco area 1.5 km away from the point where the LCC 
collapsed. The Director of Inundations Risk Reduction of CAEM acknowledged that 
the  local  population  was  aware  of  the  construction  of  the  dams  and  how  dams  are 
conceived to reduce potential high levels of waste waters floods.  
According to him, even though affected and other local people supposedly knew 
how CAEM and CNA intervened, local people were not totally convinced that that was 
the most adequate type of intervention because they did not see works being undertaken 
at the very site where the LCC collapsed. The Director of Floods Risk Reduction of 
CAEM was fully convinced that unless local people witness the piping of LCC they 
would still perceive floods risk and will not feel completely safe.  
The statement that warrant this claim relates to the ´traumatic´ consequences of 
floods  local  people  have  expressed  to  have  suffered  and  for  that  reason  they  are 
sceptical  of  the  well  functioning  of  the  dams.  So,  there  is  apparently  a  connection 
between the Director of Inundations Risk Reduction of CAEM and affected people 
in terms of the floods risk perception that the latter communicated to CAEM policy 
makers. 
 
{Warrant B} 
“Piping  the  canal  (“entubar  el  canal”)  is  the  solution  we 
want; we residents of EL Triunfo have complained on several 
occasions  and  we  are  convinced  that  piping  it  is  the  good 
solution (the safest solution)” 
(Male affected resident of EL Triunfo, March 2003) 
 
The fact that the Director of Inundations Risk Reduction of CAEM quoted affected 
people claim about the feasibility of the LCC piping project indicates the existence of a  
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discourse  coalition  between  the  domain  of  disaster  governance  and  that  of  local 
knowledge and coping practices. As established in figure 2, section 3.3, Chapter Two, a 
policy outcome may somehow condition the definition of policy objective, in this case, 
in terms of the institution‘s capacities to implement specific actions. In other words, 
institutions set up objectives beforehand according to what they have done previously, 
what they can do and how they can accomplish such objectives. That is why perhaps the 
Director of Inundations Risk Reduction of CAEM  put so much emphasis on the 
engineering works undertaken after the inundations as the feasible and desired policy 
interventions  because  that  is  what  they  have  been  doing  so  far  as  the  responsible 
government office for water and sanitation management in the State of Mexico.  
This  leads  us  to  another  issue  that  influences  the  construction  of  technical 
claims: institutional learning for floods risk management- this issue was analysed in the 
previous section 1.2 of this chapter. It could be argued that diagnosis of LCC (issued in 
2003) got ´improved´ thanks to the ´lessons´ the failure of LCC of June 2000 brought 
about. Since then, monitoring of water flow peaks inside LCC (by Civil Protection of 
Chalco  Valley-Solidarity  Municipality  and  CAEM);  dredging  of  the  LCC  bed  and 
reinforcement of LCC walls were improved, as stated by Director of Inundations Risk 
Reduction of CAEM (see later in section 2.2).  
It is interesting to note that the proposed policy intervention mentioned by the 
Director of Inundations Risk Reduction of CAEM centres on the LCC system (along 
with additional small dams that were planned to be built) and its resistance capacity to 
cope with increasing water flows and extreme heavy rainfalls. When asked about the 
main  policy  outcomes,  he  replied  by  enlisting  all  the  works  done:  1)  just  after  the 
inundations  waste  waters  were  diverted  to  intentionally  flood  ´ídle´  fields  and  this 
contributed positively to reduce the affluent flow in the LCC system; 2) the network of 
sewage drains was enlarged to avoid high volumes of waste waters concentrating in few 
points which could have caused another rupture.  
All  this,  he  notes,  fully  convinced  the  CNA  and  CAEM  that  a  permanent 
surveillance of LCC system was needed to guarantee its adequate functioning and to 
reduce uncertainty. According to him, there is still a need to do more in-depth scientific 
research  to  find  a  final  solution  to the  whole  problematic.  This  kind  of  floods  risk 
management illustrates the ´risk industry´ whose function is the management of public 
concerns over technological uncertainty. Regarding this Garvin (2001: 450) notes that 
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―this (risk) management entails three steps: 1) identifying the 
potential  risk,  2)  evaluating  the  potential  harm  and  3) 
managing  the  risk.  These  three  steps…delineate  a  pathway 
whereby  potential  problems  are  assessed  and  evaluated  by 
experts,  the  risk  is  determined  by  probabilistic  assessments, 
and the concerns of a public are  managed through effective 
risk communication‖ 
  
  The  General  Director  of  CENAPRED  shares  the  view  that  one  important 
policy objective should be ―the improvement of hazards forecasting and monitoring of 
the  sources  of  risk‖  but  he  focuses  more  on  conceptual  issues  connected  to  the 
knowledge-policy  making  relationship.  He  claims  that  decision  making  regarding 
disaster prevention has to be based in scientific knowledge of hazards because that is the 
only way to get accurate information of  what  has to be tackled and solved. To the 
General Director of CENAPRED, unlike other previous  federal administrations  in 
Mexico,  
 
―...the time when policy makers and politicians made ´reactive´ 
decisions on the basis of ´multiple information´  without having 
any reliable scientific basis of what was going on in ´reality´ is 
gone...―  
(Quoted from the General Director of CENAPRED, May, 2003)  
 
That is why, he asserts, today and thanks to CENAPRED, policy makers are 
better  prepared  and  informed  to  act  and  therefore  to  alert  and  evacuate  vulnerable 
population from areas exposed to hurricanes, for example.  This last statement and the 
next  one  seem  to  justify  CENAPRED‘s  existence  as  ´the  scientific  centre  for  the 
improvement of disaster policy making in Mexico´:  
 
{Warrant A} 
“…so, it is very good that there is a ´translator´ (that is how he 
called CENAPRED) (between scientific knowledge of natural 
hazards and policy decisions) so to speak, because those very 
important decisions cannot be made merely on the basis of a 
´political criterion´, they have to be based on ´real´ data, on 
´knowledge´ and above all on knowledge produced by experts, 
people that are devoted to the study, analysis and knowledge of 
different  phenomena…experts  are  the  most  trustworthy  to 
advise authorities” 
(General Director of CENAPRED May 2003)  
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Both the existence of CENAPRED - as an institution that ´bridges´ science with policy 
making -  and the type of knowledge it produces to inform decision making are backed 
by an example given by the General Director of CENAPRED. According to him, the 
´successful´ implementation of ´preventive´ mechanisms at state and municipal level 
proved good the use of monitoring instruments designed jointly by CENAPRED and the 
Institute  of  Engineering  of  UNAM.  He  referred  to  the  case  of  the  impact  of  two 
hurricanes that occurred in Mexico in 2002 (he did not mention the names) to illustrate 
the science-policy relationship:  
 
    {Backing A}  
All this has been very fruitful for the country (Mexico). I would 
like  to  mention  that  two  hurricanes  provoked  important 
(severe)  consequences  in  material  terms  but  human  losses 
were quite few...and this was due to the use of instruments like 
early  warning  systems,  and…  a  timely  decision  based  on 
information that alerted potentially exposed population (to the 
hurricanes) and that facilitated the evacuation of people…”  
(General Director of CENAPRED, May, 2003) 
 
Unlike the Director of Inundations Risk Reduction of CAEM, the General Director 
of CENAPRED went beyond the simple use of diagnosis studies for tackling hazards 
and emphasised the relation between science, policy instruments and policy making for 
improving preparedness actions:  
 
{Claim B} 
“We  (CENAPRED)  cannot  do  ´prevention´  unless  we  know 
what we are about to prevent, therefore the fundamental task is 
to carry out diagnosis, a diagnosis of risk. And this is very 
complex because a National Risk Atlas has to be elaborated, 
with lots of maps..., an integral information system..., a data 
bank  that  allow  us  to  know  at  state,  municipal and  colonia 
level what is the risk level according to different phenomena” 
(General Director of CENAPRED, May, 2000) 
 
As  it  was  discussed  in  this  chapter,  subsection  1.2  in  the  rhetorical  analysis  of 
implementation, ´prevention´ also means ´preparedness´. Technical diagnosis of risk, 
somehow,  reinforces  this  meaning  of  prevention  and  at  the  same  time,  is  used  for  
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establishing an accurate warning system to further hazard awareness and prepare people 
in case of evacuation from unsafe places. So technical diagnosis of risk performs two 
functions:  rhetorical  and  practical.  In  short,  preparedness  is  a  shared  meaning  of 
prevention  between  two  groups  of  policy  responses  discussed  so  far,  ―Ignorance  of 
hazards and unsafe conditions‖ and ―Failure of infrastructure and inadequate monitoring 
of risk object‖ and constitutes another argumentative coalition element, up to this point.  
Under the `Failure of infrastructure and inadequate monitoring of risk object` 
problem, policy intervention is a technical task that can be improved with more and 
better scientific research on additional aspects such as water basin ecology and climate 
dynamics,  weather  forecasting,  hydraulic  structures  and  engineering  processes  and 
materials. The above is synthesised below in the claim of the Research Director of 
CENAPRED:  
 
{Claim C} 
“Disaster risk reduction is about a simple equation…we aim at 
reducing the outcome of three multiplying factors…we cannot 
reduce hazards nor the exposure to them but we can intervene 
in  reducing  vulnerability.  So  (the  objective  is)  addressing 
physical  vulnerability  (city‟s  lifelines)  by  reinforcing 
structures, (enforcing) new construction regulations…”  
(Research Director of CENAPRED, 2003)  
 
The technical measure proposed for floods prevention is sometimes referred to a 
future time frame within an ecosystem management framework for hazards planning. 
Thus  for  the  General  Coordinator  of  Water  and  Sanitation  of  CNA  in  Mexico 
Valley, floods risk reduction can easily be achieved by considering prospective studies 
(up to 30 years) and long term forecasting of water bodies and rivers within the Water 
Basin Management Framework (WBMF). WBMF helps to identify the natural flooding 
areas within a basin and therefore the hydraulic works that need to be built. All that is 
explained in the National Hydraulic Programme (2001-2006) and it was believed to be 
implemented by the CNA at the time of the interview in April 2003. According to him, 
at CNA there is a clear understanding of what needs to be done regarding preventive 
measures and avoiding risk exposure.  
For the Head of Socio-Economic Research of CENAPRED policy intervention 
must entail mitigation works and studies of physical vulnerabilities to really understand 
where are the ´critical´ (fragile) points of the man-made systems are in order to oversee  
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them and provide good maintenance. This can be coupled with a full diagnosis of the 
flooding  prone  places  and  regions.  There  is  a  need  to  have  more  and  detailed 
information about that. It is not a difficult task, he says: 
 
{Claim D} 
“Engineers can easily and rapidly detect the deterioration of 
the  materials  of  bridges…  Risk  assessments  of  engineering 
works  are  central  in  this.  …one  of  the  obstacles  to 
implementation is the lack of sufficient funds.”  
(Head of Socio-Economic Research of CENAPRED, November, 2002)  
 
Now I shift the focus of the discussion to the second policy objective, the reinforcement 
of  water  and  sanitation  infrastructure.  CNA  water  technicians  and  operators´ 
carelessness is thought to be another contributing cause of the floods, so the second 
objective of a disaster preventive policy points to the need to guarantee at the maximum 
the  security  level  of  water  and  sanitation  infrastructure  by  enforcing  adequate 
maintenance. To analyse this second objective I proceed to analyse the interviewees of 
those who were classified under ´inadvertence by carelessness´ in Chapter Six. This is 
to verify if there is coherence between casual agent‘s blame and responsibility and the 
policy  objectives.  For  example,  the  Head  of  Socio-Economic  Research  of 
CENAPRED asserted that ―it was a lack of precaution‖ what caused the floods. Let us 
remember his claim I already analysed in Chapter Six, section 1.1.2:  
 
[Claim 1] 
“ It is a typical case…It could have been foreseen in advance by 
monitoring  the  [waste]  water  levels…and  how  that  could  be 
affected  with  forecast  rainfalls  and  by  [evaluating]  the  canal 
walls [its physical condition]…evidently, isn‟t it? It was simply a 
lack of precaution…”  
(Head of Socio-Economic Research of CENAPRED, 2001) 
 
He  privileged  a  technical  failure  explanation  when  framing  Chalco  Valley‘s  floods 
along with human carelessness, so it was expected, in a certain way, to find a policy 
objective  related  to  that  causal  claim.  However  when  he  was  asked  to  answer  the 
question, what are the goals of natural disaster policies? Surprisingly he recurred to the 
concept of social vulnerability and put it in a larger socio-economic context, in rather 
vague terms:  
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{Claim A}   
“The first objective is to save human lives and then to avoid 
vulnerable groups (elderly people, kids, etc) being impacted by 
disaster”.  
 
{Claim B}   
“So, at (policy level) within the poverty alleviation programme 
there should be a connection with disaster attention…it has to 
address  life  conditions  mainly  housing  (physical  conditions) 
and also it has to be coupled with an ecological conservation 
programme”.  
 
 
{Evidence A} 
Because (in this case) there is a causal relationship between 
poverty  and  environmental  degradation…  this  makes  heavy 
rainfalls to be much more violent…” 
(Head of Socio-Economic Research of CENAPRED, 2001) 
 
So there is no apparent connection between the disaster policy problem he put forward 
in Claim 1 and the policy objectives of Claim A and B
61. On the one hand, the Head of 
Socio-Economic  Research  of  CENAPRED  was  convinced  that  lack  of  precaution 
could  have  caused  Chalco  Valley‘s  floods:  on  the  other  hand,  to  him,  the  policy 
objective  has  to  do  with  larger  socio-economic  processes.  Perhaps  this  apparent 
disconnection has to do with how the questionnaire was formulated. When the question 
is phrased in general terms so is the answer, whereas when the question alludes to a 
concrete and known fact by the respondent, the answer may be characterised by detailed 
explanations  with  the  aid  of  empirical  evidence,  perhaps  in  order  to  prove  to  the 
interviewer  that  ´he  knows  what  he  is  talking  about´.  I  found  somehow  the  same 
situation with the next interviewee. Head of Enviro Commission Edo Mex framed 
inundations as causality of inadvertence by carelessness but proposed policy solutions 
pointing to other objectives. 
 
  {Claim B} 
“The policy objectives would be on the one hand to address the 
(improvement) of people‟s quality of life and on the other to 
prevent disaster to avoid wasting money in reconstruction... It 
is  said  that  prevention  pays-off,  it  is  cost-effective;  if  you 
prevent disaster you will have economic benefits. It is said that 
                                                 
61 To differentiate the Chapter Six claims from the Chapter Seven claims I used numbers for Chapter Six 
and letters to Chapter Seven.   
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the ratio of prevention investment-economic benefits is 1$US-
5$US, this means that if you invest one dollar in prevention 
you would reduce losses equivalent to 5 dollars.”  
 (Head of Enviro Commission Edo Mex, 2003) 
 
The  Head  of  Enviro  Commission  Edo  Mex  justifies  the  first  policy  objective  by 
stating that since he is a social psychologist he gives a lot of importance to human life 
issues. 
{Warrant B} 
 “How I see things depends on my professional background” 
(Head of Enviro Commission Edo Mex, 2003) 
 
  There  are  some  interviewees  who  locate  the  policy  objective  within  his 
responsibilities and that of the institution he/she works for. For instance the Head of 
the Environmental Protection Department of PEMEX,  
 
 
{Claim C} 
 
“Our  first  goal  is  to  guarantee  people‟s  safety  in  the 
surrounding environment of PEMEX”  
 
{Evidence C}  
 
“PEMEX  handles  high  risk  products,  oil,  gas,  chemical 
products that could harm society if not properly handled, if we 
do not implement cautionary measures…the last barrier there 
is between our facilities and society are the emergency plans 
that indicate us how to evacuate and protect people living near 
PEMEX facilities…” 
 
{Warrant C} 
 
“We take advantage of our capabilities and expertise to help 
(local)  people  in  case  of  natural  disaster…  we  support 
society…”  
(Head of the Environmental Protection Department of PEMEX, 2003)  
 
 
Placing the policy objective within the institution‘s functions can also be applied 
to  the  argumentation  of  the  General  Director  of  Environmental  Policy  of 
SEMARNAT´.  He  mentioned  that  the  goal  of  disaster  policy  is  to  implement  an 
integral ecological watershed management that will help preventing floods downstream.  
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 {Warrant D} 
“…you must have seen that… SEMARNAT has just launched a 
programme to manage forest, water, soil and biodiversity by 
taking into account a watershed approach…the very regional 
and environmental and you could connect a series of objectives 
that will benefit populations… I don‟t know if I am being too 
much of a demagogue…”  
(General Director of Environmental Policy of SEMARNAT, 2003) 
 
With regards to the issue of inadvertence by carelessness, no references were made in 
policy  makers  and  managers‘  interviews  regarding  the  professional  performance  of 
technicians and operators when it came to attributing responsibility and blame for the 
non-action taken or carelessness. Thus no single policy objective was openly mentioned 
that  related  to  the  abilities  and  responsibilities  of  technicians  and  operators  in  the 
mismanagement  of  the  sanitation  system  of  LCC,  as  it  was  voiced  in  the  causality 
discourses analysed under section 1.1.2 in this chapter.  
Nevertheless,  as  could  have  been  expected,  the  issue  of  policy  makers´ 
carelessness was repeatedly mentioned by the affected people. Affected people were 
eager to put the blame on ´water authorities´ for the inundations. Because, according to 
the affected people interviewed, when they brought their claims to the authorities the 
latter did not do anything to prevent the disaster. Here are three affected people‘s claims 
that illustrate this argument: 
 
“As far as I know… before the floods (of June 2000)… eight 
days before there was someone who realised that there was a 
little fissure right on the point where the wall collapsed… and 
then some residents of my colonia addressed the problem to 
the municipality (of Chalco Valley) but we‟ve got  no response 
from them…” 
(Female resident of El Triunfo, April, 2003)  
 
“…before the floods, several letters were drafted and sent to 
the  governor  (of  the  State  of  Mexico)  asking  for  responses 
regarding the canal (LCC)…I knew about colonia El Molino 
residents  that  they  put  pressure  on  the  federal  and  state 
governments  claiming  that  works  were  needed  to  be  done 
beyond cleaning and dredging the canal bed…” 
(Male resident of El Triunfo, April, 2003)  
 
“… that year (2000) I heard that no maintenance to the LCC 
was provided unlike previous years when we saw ´machines´ 
working…”   
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(Male resident of colonia San Isidro, April, 2003) 
 
The  following  part  2.2  analyses  how  policy  instruments  and 
implementation address the previously discussed objectives. 
 
 
2.2 Policy instrument and implementation  
 
Scientific research for decision making, early warning system, contingency plans 
for  protecting  hydraulic  infrastructure  and  emergency  attention,  and  targeted 
funding for infrastructure development 
 
The  second  framework  of  Chapter  Two  that  establishes  the  argumentative  relation 
between  policy  objective  and  intervention  is  used  again,  but  this  time  to  examine 
implementation according to the two objectives  analysed  above: 1)  improvement of 
hazards forecasting and monitoring of the sources of risk and 2) reinforcement of water 
and  sanitation  infrastructure.  These  objectives  are  said  to  be  achieved  through  four 
policy responses, namely 1) Scientific research for decision making, 2) improvement of 
early  warning  systems,  3)  contingency  plans  for  protecting  water  and  sanitation 
infrastructure and 4) targeted funding for infrastructure development. The following is 
an  examination  of  the  programmes,  works,  and  projects  that  have  been  grouped 
according to these policy responses. 
 
2.2.1 Scientific research for decision making: Floods Atlas of the State of Mexico 
 
The  Floods  Atlas  of  the  State  of  Mexico  is  a  policy  instrument  aimed  at 
describing the places that are chronically flooded as a consequence of the rainy season. 
It is meant to provide scientific information to reduce floods risk in vulnerable areas of 
the State of Mexico. Floods Atlas  is also a guideline to elaborate Risk Atlas at the 
municipal  level.  The  Atlas  focuses  both  on  damages  caused  by  extreme  hydro-
meteorological phenomena and on the actions state and municipal governments have to 
put into place to prevent future inundations. The ultimate goal is to contribute to the 
improvement of water and sanitation infrastructure.  
  The Floods Atlas consists of a series of topographic maps of urban and rural 
settlements  in  which  flooding  areas  are  identified  on  the  basis  of  information  from 
previous  years.  Floods  causes  are  framed  in  terms  of  poor  or  lack  of  sanitation  
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infrastructure to cope with heavy rainfalls. Therefore, (emergency) actions are targeted 
at providing good maintenance or doing supplementary works such as paving roads, 
constructing or cleaning drains, etc. ´Vulnerable population´ is mentioned only as part 
of the number of residents that are affected (see Table 6). These actions reinforce the 
argument that, on the one  hand, technical  solutions are  constructed as  the adequate 
policy actions and on the other hand that people‘s vulnerability is reduced to numbers of 
affected people and vulnerable people are not described in terms of the wider socio-
economic processes or sites of social identity.  
 
Table  6.  Floods  recurrence  in  Rainy  Season  2002-2006  in  Chalco  Valley 
Municipality and number of affected people 
 
    Number of affected population 
 
   
Colonia  Event  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  Recurrence  Maximum 
population 
accounted 
San Miguel 
Xico 1a, 2a, 
3a y 4a. 
Sección 
Urban 
inundation 
1050  1050  220  0  400  4  1050 
San Isidro  Street 
ponding 
0  1050  0  0  1050  3  1050 
San Martín 
Xico La 
Laguna 
Urban 
inundation 
12  0  550  0  200  3  550 
San Isidro  Urban 
inundation 
30  0  120  435  0  3  435 
María Isabel  Street 
ponding 
0  0  0  0  0  3  0 
Darío 
Martínez 
Urban 
inundation 
0  700  0  0  0  1  700 
El Triunfo  Urban 
inundation 
0  0  0  10  0  1  10 
Darío 
Martínez 
Street 
ponding 
0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Providencia  Street 
ponding 
0  0  0  0  0  1  0 
TOTAL    1092  2800  890  445  1650    3795 
Source: Floods Atlas, version 2008. Government of the State of Mexico, CAEM.   
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2.2.2 La Compañía Canal early warning system 
 
According to CENAPRED and the Institute of Engineering of UNAM, previous water 
over spilling of LCC and flooding in Chalco Valley region for the 1975-1990 period 
indicated that inundations have been a chronic event reaching a critical point in June 1
st 
2000. So in the likelihood occurrence of more water over spillings of LCC due from 
future extreme storms in the area of the San Rafael and San Francisco rivers, an early 
warning  system  was  thought  to  be  a  useful  information  tool  for  decision  taking. 
Therefore, CENAPRED and the Institute of Engineering of UNAM designed in 2003 a 
hydro-meteorological early warning system (SIAT) for La Compañía River Basin
62 that 
comprises  three  municipalities:  Chalco,  Ixtapaluca  and  Los  Reyes -La  Paz 
(CENAPRED, 2003).  SIAT‘s objective  is to provide a technical tool  for  measuring 
rainfall, water levels and water peaks of San Francisco, San Rafael and La Compañía 
Canal to trigger a warning alarm in case there is a risk of overspilling and a consequent 
inundation.  
  SIAT‘s implementation is planned to take place in three stages: the first stage is 
oriented to  identifying  hydro-meteorological  phenomena  that  may  strike  populations 
within  a  two  days  period.  That  is  done  with  the  support  of  satellite  images  and 
forecasting information provided by the National Meteorological  Service of Mexico. 
The  second  stage  is  activated  when  radar  and  satellite  images  show  that  extreme 
rainfalls will impact populations in less than 24 hours. And the third stage is triggered 
when  rainfalls  are  actually  occurring  and  may  cause  damage  within  the  next  few 
minutes. This is considered a sensitive system because it detects how the water level 
increases  upstream  so  municipality  authorities  can  handle  reliable  and  ´accurate´ 
information to make decisions and, should this be the case, evacuate populations from 
potentially flooding zones. 
 
2.2.3 Contingency plans for protecting hydraulic infrastructure and emergency 
attention. 
 
 
The Management Department for Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Attention of 
CNA  (IPE-CNA)  is  in  charge  of  the  protection  of  hydraulic  infrastructure  and 
emergency attention to infrastructure. It delivers emergency plans (EPs) that comprise 
                                                 
62 CNA called the La Compañía Canal a river instead of a sewage canal.  
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the  strategies  and  actions  in  case  a  hydro-meteorological  phenomenon  such  as 
hurricanes, extreme rainfalls increase the water level of rivers, lakes or dams. The focus 
of  attention  is  put  on  managing  contingency  events  to  avoid  human  casualties  and 
infrastructure damage. EPs are handed to the civil protection operators and authorities 
for them to know how to act in case of floods. There are 10 centres and 32 brigades (one 
for each state) for emergency attention located throughout the Mexican territory. These 
centres are equipped with water pumps, water treatment plants to supply drinking water 
to flooded people. The brigades carry out diagnosis of the physical condition of the 
hydraulic infrastructure and, when needed, restoration works and protection. Protection 
is done by the Army because these are vital lifelines for society.  
  Similar in approach to risk management, as the one referred to above, the EP 
consists  of  forecasting  and  monitoring  of  hurricanes,  evacuation  strategies  and 
emergency aid. It is interesting to note that here again prevention means preparedness. 
Even though the target of this response is the hydraulic infrastructure and the people 
that live close to rivers and canals, this Department acts like it were a civil protection 
agency specialised in hydro-meteorological phenomena. 
 
“We
63 ´follow´ the hurricane trajectory at least 72 hours in 
advance  and  deliver  this  information  to  SENAPROC...  They 
(SINAPROC) know how well we are prepared in terms of exit 
routes, damages that could be caused by this disturbing agent, 
the  most  vulnerable  parts  such  as  electric  installations, 
drinking water provision, etc...”  
 (General Manager of IPE- CNA May 2003) 
 
With the aid of EP, IPE-CNA warns inhabitants about the danger of being exposed to 
and living in flooding-prone sites close to rivers and open canals. What matters to IPE-
CNA are the things that may constitute an obstacle for the well functioning of rivers and 
water bodies. According to the federal water law, nearby federal zones no population is 
allowed  to  settle  near  such  zones.  Besides,  all  hydraulic  infrastructures  are  insured 
against vandalism and ´natural´ accidents. To him, insurance is very important against 
disaster as a means to prevent them and restore people, lifelines and business to their 
original conditions. To him this rationale should be applied to all collective equipment 
and infrastructure in Mexico. 
                                                 
63 The General Manager of the Department for Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Attention of 
CNA used the personal pronoun We to refer to the water sector in particular the National Meteorological 
Service that belongs to CNA.    
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   According to the General Manager of the IPE-CNA, EP has been effective in 
monitoring  hurricanes,  evacuating  people  and  protecting  water  infrastructure.  He 
claimed that,  
“Even though extreme heavy rainfalls occurred in the states of 
Tamaulipas,  Veracruz  and  Tabasco  in  1999,  rate  mortality 
decreased...we could monitor in advance and that allowed us 
to  trigger  the  warning  system  and  evacuate 
people...concerning material losses I cannot tell you but as far 
as  human  lives  losses  is  concerned  (mortality)  has  been 
decreasing luckily”  
(General Manager of IPE- CNA May 2003) 
And  he  kept  on  highlighting  the  ´prevention´  lines  of  action  they  implement.  The 
following  claim,  again,  warrants  the  idea  that  CNA  functions  as  a  civil  protection 
agency for hydro-meteorological hazards.  
 
“It  is  about  prevention  issues...we  implement  structural  and 
non-structural actions, the former are the actions that can be 
seen like water infrastructure facilities and the latter are the 
emergency plans, civil protection plans, and the meetings we 
had with people to inform them on how to proceed, and the 
regulations and laws”  
(ibid)  
 
IPE-CNA elaborates and implements EP for the most important rivers and canals of 
Mexico. A general reference framework is used for all EP
64. This framework establishes 
the actions that CNA has to implement before, during and after an emergency with the 
intention  of  reducing  floods  risk  and  minimising  the  impact.  Actions  are  framed 
according the three stages cycle: before, during and after the event or emergency. The 
´before´ stage  is the  ´prevention´ stage and  includes actions such as analysis of the 
hydro-meteorological  conditions,  up-to-date  diagnosis  of  the  river  water  flows  and 
levels  as  well  as  information  regarding  dams´  capacity  and  exit  routes  for  the 
surrounding  human  settlements,  organisation  and  communication  schemes  between 
CNA and Civil Protection of the State and municipalities of the State, materials such as 
sandbags and other equipment and vehicles to provide assistance. This set of actions is 
in fact preparedness or warning actions. When a hurricane is approaching an alert is 
communicated to population and all public and private institutions and organisations.  
                                                 
64 The information used to describe this part is taken from the ―Emergency Plan for the Celio river‖ 
(Michoacán State) published by IPE-CNA in 2002 (CNA, 2002). As confirmed by the General Manager 
of  IPE-CNA  this  reference  framework  is  used  for  all  rivers  and  has  proved  well  for  attending 
emergencies.    
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  The ´during´ stage includes actions such as inspection of the water flows and 
level of the river and of the basic hydraulic infrastructure by giving more attention to the 
critical points where chances of overspilling are much greater. Alongside these actions a 
permanent monitoring of hurricanes and extreme rainfalls is undertaken by the National 
Meteorological  Service.  Populations  are  called  to  evacuate  and  move  to  temporary 
shelters,  Emergency  works  (reinforcement  and  construction  of  containing  walls)  are 
undertaken at the critical points. Permanent communication concerning zones prone to 
be affected  is  established  between IPE-CNA and the State Unit of Civil Protection. 
IPE_CNA´s role is also to install water treatment plants to supply drinking water.  
  The ´after´ stage comprises the following actions: supplying drinking water and 
chlorination, evaluation of the damaged infrastructure, pumping water out of the flooded 
areas, checking the hydraulic and sanitation infrastructure. Comprehensive evaluation of 
the sources of drinking water is also done.  The implementation of the EP is aided by 
the Manual para la Atención de Emergencias, Manual for Emergency Attention, which 
is  the  document  that  establishes  guidelines,  methodology  and  procedures  to  attend 
emergency situations. This Manual is the document that details how responses groups 
and  institutions  (that  of  SINAPROC)  have  to  be  organised  and  the  procedures  to 
accomplish for the follow-up of actions. The General Manager of IPE-CNA claims 
that EP has been effective in ´preventing´ floods by evacuating people. That is why they 
consider themselves as having a ´preventive´ approach to inundations. Again prevention 
means preparedness.  
 
―We are ´preventive´ because we have managed to evacuate 
people on time before floods occur and besides we act during 
the emergency stage, and see that the action plans are put into 
place the moment we get at the flooded area‖  
(General Manager of IPE-CNA, 2003) 
 
2.2.4 Targeted funding for technical reinforcement 
 
CNA has started building a pipeline for La Compañía Canal; the project amounts to 
$1,423 millions of Mexican pesos and it was expected to be ready in July 2008. It is  
6.7km  long,  5  meters  in  diameter  and  20  meters  deep.  It  runs  from  Talpacoya  hill 
(where the LCC broke in June 2000) to Rio Los Remedios. Former President Fox and 
the current governor of the State of Mexico declared that this is the final solution to this  
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chronic problem and will provide benefits for the residents of the three municipalities: 
Chalco Valley, Chalco and Ixtapaluca. It is worth mentioning that this solution has been 
all  along  the  residents´  and  affected  people‘s  demand.  Besides,  CNA,  CAEM  and 
ODAPAS participated in the implementation of the following works aimed at solving 
various problems of La Compañía Canal
65 in the segment that crosses the Municipality 
of Chalco Valley- Solidarity. It is worth mentioning that in all projects vulnerability is 
defined in terms of the number of persons exposed to inundations in a specific surface 
affected.  
 
Table 7. La Compañía Canal and technical responses 
Problem description  Causes  Vulnerability  Emergency 
Works and 
actions 
Necessary works 
and actions to 
eradicate the 
problem 
1.  Blockage of LCC 
with branches, domestic 
rubbish and canal 
sediments 
(colonia D. Martinez) 
Lack of 
maintenance 
(It was reported 
by CAEM that 
since April 1997 
wall fissures were 
observed) 
Land affected 
(92 has.) 
Population 
exposed (0) 
Reinforcement 
of  the  south 
wall  with 
sandbags 
LCC walls cover 
2.  Extraordinary heavy 
rainfalls that generate 
the overspilling of LCC 
and lack of water pumps  
(colonia M Isabel) 
Insufficient 
hydraulic 
infrastructure; 
lack of 
maintenance and 
Extraordinary 
heavy rainfalls 
Land affected 
(423 has.) 
Population 
exposed (0) 
Reinforcement 
in both walls 
with sandbags; 
fixing the 
pumping 
stations 1 and 2 
Cleaning and 
dragging of the 
General Canal
66; 
heighten both walls; 
fixing pumps 1, 2, 3 
and 8 
3.  Frequent flooding 
because of low pumping 
capacity of pump No 16 
(colonia San Isidro) 
Insufficient 
hydraulic 
infrastructure  
Land affected 
(423 has.) 
Population 
exposed (0) 
Emergency 
pumping  to 
dump into LCC 
exceeding 
water 
Fixing pump No 16 
and construction of 
two collecting 
stations  
4.  Extraordinary 
uncommon heavy 
rainfalls provoked waste 
water overspilling in 
LCC; illegal 
settlements; unevenness 
of the canal bed 
provoked wall fissures 
(colonias Avándaro, El 
Triunfo and  San Isidro) 
Unevenness 
sedimentation of 
the canal bed; 
Extraordinary 
uncommon heavy 
rainfalls; illegal 
settlements 
Land affected 
(282 has.) 
Population 
exposed 
(3,850) 
Reinforcement 
in both walls 
with sandbags; 
fixing breakage 
in the affected 
area; 
construction of 
a collecting 
station; canal 
bed soil 
dragging and 
cleaning 
Heighten both walls; 
reinforcement of 
south wall in the 
Tlapacoya point with 
steel columns.  
(It is worth noting 
that at the time this 
report was prepared, 
31-05-01, CNA was 
already elaborating 
projects to solve 
ongoing LCC 
infrastructure 
problematic).  
                                                 
65 Data sources: Government of the State of Mexico(n.d.) Gerencia Operativa de la CAEM, Municipality 
of Chalco Valley- Solidarity 
66 The General Canal is the largest waste waters canal where the waste waters of La Compañía Canal 
flows. It discharges into the Rio Tula basin in the State of Hidalgo.   
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5.  Ground filtration in 
colonia Xico; canal wall 
at pumping station No 5 
is low 
Insufficient 
hydraulic 
infrastructure; 
Unevenness 
sedimentation of 
the canal bed 
Land affected 
(80 has.) 
Population 
exposed 
(1,050) 
Emergency 
pumping to dump 
into LCC 
exceeding water; 
fixing pump 10; 
Heighten 1 mt. 
both walls with 
sandbags 
Integral project for 
the whole zone; to 
level canal wall at the 
pumping station No 
5; fixing pump No 5   
 
Another project is the ―Project to control the rising of the water flows of La Compañía 
River‖. At the time I did my fieldwork in April 2003, ―La Gasera‖ dam was already 
working. It is located in San Marcos Huixtoco, Chalco Municipality. The objective is to 
regulate the water volume peaks coming from both San Rafael River and San Francisco 
River.  
  CNA implements the ―Programme for Protecting the Population Centres‖
67 that 
aims  at  reducing  risk  and  mitigating  the  consequences  provoked  by  floods  in  the 
population centres. This programme targets those settlements that are prone to flooding 
risk either by the accumulation of rainfalls and water flows over spilling. The type of 
works included in this programme are: a) elaboration of project, b) construction of dams 
for controlling  high  flows of water, c) construction of canal walls, d) deviations of 
streams and rivers, e) construction and restoration of the above mentioned works and f) 
maintenance,  conservation  and  rehabilitation  of  the  above  mentioned  works.  This 
programme, in fact, frames the solution presented above. 
  CNA  runs  the  National  Meteorological  System  (SMN)  that  is  in  charge  of 
generating and providing weather information about the state and evolution of cyclones, 
hurricanes and rainfalls to communicate to the Mexican peoples. This policy is coupled 
with  the  Programme  referred  to  above  and  with  the  following  ones:  a)  insurance 
programme for protecting infrastructure both of populations and of federal, state and 
municipal  domains;  b)  Early  Warning  System  to  inform  the  potentially  affected 
populations  about  the  natural  phenomena  in  order  to  evacuate  risk  zones  and  c) 
participation in the organisation when emergency situations arise.    
 
 
 
                                                 
67 Chapter V, article 83 of the National Waters Law entitles CNA ―to coordinate, construct and operate 
works  for  controlling  water  avenues  and  rivers  and  protecting  populations  from  flooding.  CNA 
determines and classifies the flooding risk zones and issues norms and recommendations along with 
setting operations, control and follow-up measures and financing contingencies‖ (CNA, (2000) ―National 
Waters Law‖  
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3. Accidents of nature and of man-made systems that disrupt human systems 
 
The  narrative  of  Chalco  Valley‘s  floods  elaborated  in  Chapter  Four  showed  the 
existence of different competing explanations of the floods causality – some of them 
expressed just in the aftermath of the disaster. The ´official´ evaluation done by CNA 
established  that  what  happened  was  an  ´accident  of  nature´  due  to  the  impact  of 
´unforeseen´ extreme heavy rainfalls on the LCC. Nature was blamed for the tragedy. 
High profile politicians such as the Minister of Social Development, the governor of the 
State  of  Mexico  and  even  the  then  President  of  the  Republic  Ernesto  Zedillo  also 
claimed that Chalco Valley‘s floods were a ´natural´ accident.  Explanations of this type 
can  be  located  in the discourse of accidental causality  and  are the  starting point to 
analyse the following policy responses.      
Therefore, in this section I examine the policy responses elements of ―Accidents 
of nature and of man-made systems that disrupt human systems‖ problem. As it was 
discussed  in  Chapter  Six,  this  floods  policy  problem  is  constructed  with  scientific 
information  of  ´natural´  hazards  such  as  heavy  rainfalls,  faulty  man-made  systems 
(LCC) and the socio-economic impact of disaster. It clearly illustrates the Behavioural 
Paradigm because it focuses on people‘s reactions to hazards and disaster which are 
conceived  as  unintended  and  unforeseen  events.  That  is  why  three  groups  of 
interventions  are  commonly  deployed:  1)  early  warning  mechanisms  to  alert 
populations to evacuate chronic-flooding places (already discussed in section 2 of this 
chapter),  2)  emergency  plans  that  comprise  engineering  works  to  contain  the  waste 
water  floods  and  disaster  preparedness  and  3)  mitigation  schemes  to  restore  to  the 
´original´ functioning of the community. Here I focus on disaster preparedness, early 
response and relief and mitigation; the first three lie under the concept of ´emergency 
management´. Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, I take UNISDR´s definitions of 
´emergency management´ and ´mitigation´ 
´Emergency management´ is the ―organisation and management of resources and 
responsibilities  for addressing all aspects of emergencies,  in particular preparedness, 
response  and  initial  recovery  steps.  Emergency  management  involves  plans  and 
institutional  arrangements  to  engage  and  guide  the  efforts  of  government,  non-
government, voluntary and private agencies in comprehensive and coordinated ways to 
respond to the entire spectrum of emergency needs‖. And ´mitigation´ is the ―lessening 
or limitation of the adverse impacts of hazards and related disaster. The adverse impacts  
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of  hazards  often  cannot  be  prevented  fully,  but  their  scale  or  severity  can  be 
substantially lessened by various strategies and actions.‖ (UNISDR, 2009: 5, 8)   
Public  policy  is  not  designed  to  control  accidents  because  potential  causal 
triggering factors like heavy rainfalls, storms, hurricanes and earthquakes are beyond 
human  control. They occur unexpectedly and sometimes suddenly. However, public 
policy  can guide  human actions to address what is collectively conceived as  ´social 
problems´. Thus, in this way, the government, organisations and people in general are 
thought to be able to intervene ´before´, ´during´ and ´after´ hazards impact. So disaster 
policy responses can either contribute to prepare people and organise reactions to lessen 
or  avoid  fatal  damages  or  they  can  mitigate  the  effects  of  the  floods.  That  is  why 
emergency management actions and mitigation measures are seen as the ´correct´ and 
´desired´ interventions for tackling this policy problem. It is worth mentioning that, in 
general, these responses are the most commonly known responses in the public domain 
that the Mexican government  has provided since  disaster attention  became  a public 
policy concern (See Chapter Five).  
This disaster response fits into the precautionary principle frame, developed in 
environmental  debate  the  last  40  years  and  that  is  one  of  the  core  principles  of 
ecological  modernisation  discourse,  because  it  relies  on  action  under  uncertain 
conditions that may be caused by the likelihood of  hazards impact. I argue that the 
internalisation of the idea of environmental care and the precautionary principle may 
have  influenced  policy  making  strategies  for  coping  with  residual  risk  and  mitigate 
disaster consequences  in  Mexico. Regarding the design of policy objectives and the 
implementation of measures what seems to matter are actions to support government 
responses to lessen damages on affected people and provide social control. Capacity 
building  policy  responses  target  people  in  order  to  enable  them  to  react  in  critical 
uncertain situations where assistance provided by the government is limited.          
Therefore, as it was done in the two previous sections of this chapter, in this 
section  I  first  proceed  with  the  analysis  of  the  claims  and  evidence  that  justify 
objectives and interventions and the beliefs and warrants that support and legitimise 
them. Thereafter, I focus on policy instruments and implementation namely emergency 
plans and  mitigation schemes, particularly  FONDEN. This  is,  among other reasons, 
because  during  Chalco  Valley‘s  floods  of  2000,  FONDEN  was  implemented  to 
contribute to the alleviation of the damages befallen on the affected people.    
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  I explain how three policy objectives revolve around emergency aid, evacuation 
from  floods-prone  areas  and  mitigation.  I  found  in  the  interviews  that  the  type  of 
intervention  implies  preparedness,  the  fostering  of  coordination  between  public  and 
private institutions of SINAPROC and civil society to improve participation. I examine, 
then, the arguments´ main claims of the emergency plans implemented in Chalco Valley 
by CNA, CAEM and ODAPAS, the civil protection programmes and FONDEN.  
Nine interviewees were identified for these types of policy problem responses: 
the  General  Director  of  SINAPROC,  the  Former  General  Coordinator  of 
SINAPROC, The Research Director of CENAPRED, the Director of Emergency 
Aid of CARITAS, The Under-attorney of Natural Resources of SEMARNAT, The 
Head  of  Enviro  PEMEX,  the  General  Coordinator  of  Water  and  Sanitation  of 
CNA in Mexico Valley´, General Manager of the Department for Infrastructure 
Protection  and  Emergency  Attention  of  CNA  and  the  Operations  Manager  of 
GRAVAMEX-CNA  
  
3.1  Policy objectives and types of intervention  
 
Emergency aid to affected people, evacuation from floods-prone places, and 
mitigation of the damaged   
 
 
To initiate the analysis I refer to the organisational dimension of the emergency phase 
because the ´lack of coordination´ was continuously referred to by the policy makers as 
a  vital  obstacle  to  overcome  to  truly  engage  organisations  and  institutions  in  the 
provision of effective emergency aid:  
 
The Director of Emergency Aid of CARITAS states that disaster policy goal  
{Claim A} 
“...should  be  to  set  up  a  legal framework  that  specifies  the 
basis for society‟s participation to prevent destructive events. 
In case destructive events occur, one has to clearly establish 
the  basis  for  efficiently  organising  teams  to  cope  with 
emergencies”.  
(Director of Emergency Aid of CARITAS, 2003) 
 
In the interview with the Director of Emergency Aid of CARITAS I detected 
that one of  his  main concerns was to prevent  ´chaos´ when providing  assistance to 
damaged populations in the aftermath of a disaster. His experience, he remarks, has  
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allowed  him  to  realise  that  the  emergence  and  participation  of  ´unprepared´ 
volunteering groups becomes a serious obstacle that may even worsen the situation. 
There  have  been  times  –  he  recalled  Mexico  City‘s  earthquakes  in  1985-  when 
volunteer groups instead of assisting affected people become the ´assisted´. For him, 
stronger regulations and real law enforcement are needed to improve preparedness and 
mitigation  when  it  comes  to  channel  efficiently  the  participation  of  NGOs  and 
volunteering groups. The evidence that support claim A is the following: 
 
{Evidence A} 
“… with regards to volunteer groups, since 1985 (as a result 
of  the  Mexico  City  earthquake)  a  bunch  of  volunteer 
´specialized´ groups have emerged to ´tackle´ emergencies or 
disaster and they are not well prepared; the opposite (occurs), 
they hinder the expert groups´ aid and become the ´assisted 
ones´ because they lack equipment, training, they don‟t even 
know the operation of the national plan of disaster…” 
(Director of Emergency Aid of CARITAS, 2003) 
In order to rule society‘s participation, according to him, there are some intermediate 
objectives that should be met: 
{Claim B} 
 “Unprepared  volunteer  groups  have  to  be  capacitated  and 
well  equipped  to  let  them  intervene  (during  emergencies); 
identifying them, controlling them and setting up standards to 
capacitate them”            (Ibid) 
Claim B is warranted by the knowledge and perception the Director of Emergency Aid 
of CARITAS has acquired over the years regarding volunteer groups  
 
{Evidence B} 
“They  (´unprepared´  volunteer  groups)  do  not  know  the 
structure of SINAPROC nor the National Programme of Civil 
Protection; information on how to act according to the type of 
emergency,  the  (adequate)  type  of  equipment  to  handle  the 
situation…” 
(Ibidem)  
 
Evidence B is warranted by the General Law of Civil Protection (GLCP) in the sense 
that it rules volunteer groups‘ participation. Article 25 of GLCP states that:  
 
―People willing to participate in rescue and aid activities 
should be organised as volunteer groups in order to receive  
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information and capacity building to be able to undertake 
coordinated actions to protect populations‖  
 
The explanation given by the Director of Emergency Aid of CARITAS alludes to the 
incorporation of volunteer groups by the state as an act of efficiency but it can also be 
seen as an act of political control. In the aftermath of the Mexico City earthquake in 
1985 many NGO‘s and volunteer groups ´emerged´ with the explicit aim of supporting 
the government in the reconstruction of the damaged areas. However, the lack of an 
institutional framework to coordinate their participation created chaos and in some cases 
made things worse because political conflicts arose surrounding other urban needs other 
than housing provision. So the Mexico City government felt the need to control these 
civil  organisations.  Besides  some  of  these  organisations  gained  political  power  by 
channelling other types of demands and needs from victims and non-victims.  
In  relation  to  the  organisational  dimension,  the  Research  Director  of 
CENAPRED also points out the institutional level when setting up the disaster policy 
objective. For him, it is the improvement of the coordination among all ministries and 
public  institutes  belonging  to  the  SINAPROC  that  should  be  the  main  target  of  a 
disaster  policy.  He  assumes  that  once  coordination  at  federal  level  is  realised,  the 
likelihood of  fostering the top-down participation  from  state to municipal  level  will 
increase and  improve. Under that  institutional arrangement, ´prevention´ would take 
place and would make responses more effective and efficient. Ideally this arrangement 
might be replicated at state and municipal level. That would make SINAPROC a ´real´ 
civil protection system with a preventive orientation, he asserts.  
Both the Research Director of CENAPRED and the Director of Emergency 
Aid of CARITAS share the  belief that coordination of actors and  institutions  is of 
paramount importance when it comes to improving the participation of volunteering 
groups,  on  the  one  hand,  and  that  of  the  ministries  and  institutions,  on  the  other. 
Volunteering  groups´  participation  has  to  be  organised  right  in  the  aftermath  of  a 
disaster on the basis of strong enforcement of a national policy (GLCP) whereas at the 
institutional  level,  organisation  implies  the  coordination  of  preventive  and  reactive 
responses  of  all  SINAPROC‘s  institutions  and  government  offices  in  a  long-term 
period.  
What this might be telling – I argue- is that the adscription to and position of the 
scientist or NGO member within a different social domain and their experiences and  
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duties condition the way he/she values a specific type and level of coordination - the 
former belonging to the social domain of science and disaster management and the latter 
to the social domain of local coping practices. So, it can be interpreted that there is a 
´practical´ coordination that takes place on the ground and a ´normative´ coordination 
that is put into place within institutions and between institutions and volunteer groups. 
These two meanings of coordination are then policy values to be mainstreamed in the 
emergency stage, especially during the initial recovery steps, throughout SINAPROC at 
all levels.    
A similar line of argumentation that values the institutional coordination is that 
of  the  General  Coordinator  of  SINAPROC.  The  General  Coordinator  of 
SINAPROC gives importance to the institutional coordination and also emphasises the 
need to strengthen the legal framework that protects human life; that process can be 
triggered  if  public  policies  are  assembled  under  a  ´integral  vision´  considering  the 
different competences of the various ministries involved.  
 
{Claim C} 
“The  main  policy  objective  is  to  strengthen  the  legal 
framework that protects human life, at the end of the day that 
is what we have to be worried about”   
(General Coordinator of SINAPROC, 2003) 
 
The legal framework she alludes to is the General Law of Civil Protection that 
limits  the  rights  and  obligations  of  public  institutions  within  the  SINAPROC  (see 
Chapter Five) I assume that because she was the General Coordinator of SINAPROC 
at federal level her main concern was to raise the level of ´disaster risk awareness´ of 
the participant institutions of the whole of SINAPROC to mainstream civil protection 
measures into their programmes and actions. Moreover I assume that her professional 
background, a lawyer specialised in public security and a former deputy, made her to 
think about disaster policy objective in legal terms mainly. The following claim backs 
this statement. 
 
{Claim D} 
“I  am  in  charge  of  providing  support  to  populations,  the 
priority  is  to  protect  human  life,  in  this  context  it  is  of 
paramount  importance  to  let  the  rest  of  the  SINAPROC 
institutions  know  that  I  know  what  they  have  to  do…that  I  
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understand when They should participate…under an organised 
and coordinated scheme of participation…”  
(General Coordinator of SINAPROC) 
 
  The Under-Attorney of Natural Resources of SEMARNAT also shares the 
view of institutional coordination and puts emphasis on two phases: 1) diagnosis to 
prevent  disaster  and  2)  emergency  responses  which  can  be  implemented  through 
judicial, economic and organisational means within the existing government‘s structure 
of SINAPROC. A  more programmatic approach  is claimed  by the  Head of Enviro 
PEMEX. To him, the main disaster policy objective has to be SINAPROC‘s objective 
which is,  
{Claim E} 
“to protect the person and society against natural and man-
made  hazards  through  the  implementation  of  plans, 
programmes and actions oriented to avoid or  mitigate their 
effects.”  
 
The Head of Enviro PEMEX grounds his claim E by using PEMEX example 
on how to deal with hazards and risk  
 
{Evidence E} 
“(What) We want (PEMEX) is to guarantee people‟s safety for 
those who live close to PEMEX facilities… to be safe and they 
have  to  know  how  to  handle  hazardous  products  and  to 
implement  cautionary  measures  and  after  all  to  provide 
emergency aid or to evacuate people”  
(Head of Enviro PEMEX, April, 2003) 
 
During  the  emergency  phase,  coordination  at  household  and  community  level  was 
raised again as an important factor to ´prevent´ disaster. Thus the development of self-
protection mechanisms within households as the basis for preventing disaster is what 
the General Director of Civil Protection of SEGOB considered to be the means to 
achieve the policy objective. The establishment of ´Self-help Committees´ (Comités de 
Ayuda Mutua) with their internal rules to support populations can be a way to enhance 
local responses with the aid of government‘s orientation. In his words: 
{Claim C} 
“The ultimate objective is to enable people to make decisions 
to prevent themselves and make them aware of how to act in a  
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risk situation; people have to know how to respond in the first 
place and then…”  
(General Director of Civil Protection of SEGOB, 2003) 
 
 
This policy objective is a preliminary step towards demanding the participation of the 
State and other institutions. So, this claim leads to the next one: 
{Claim D}   
 “… to ask for support from public and private institutions to 
succeed in coping with risk situations. That is the way security 
increases; but it has to be everyone‟s culture.”  
(General Director of Civil Protection of SEGOB, April, 2003)  
 
Both claims C and D of the General Director of Civil Protection of SEGOB 
link two levels of coordination, between people and institutions that will result in better 
preparedness schemes. In other words, it is asserted that the government should provide 
an  enabling  policy  system  for  institutions  and  people  (at  household  level)  to  get 
prepared to act. So, in terms of  disaster  management and policy, the  basic unit  for 
coordination is the household. That is why the value of ´self-protection´ is central to 
´preventing´ disaster, and bearing this in mind, policy tools are elaborated taking into 
consideration the ´household´ as the policy target.   
There is the belief among some policy makers like General Director of Civil 
Protection of SEGOB that civil protection should start at household level and that the 
government‘s role is to provide training and to set up a legal framework to channel the 
participation  of  households´  members.  With  regard  to  training,  a  number  of 
communication materials are issued containing, for example, information on how to act 
to avoid or mitigate damages ´before´, ´during´ and ´after´ floods or an earthquake hits a 
house.  As a result, the ―Family Plan of Civil Protection‖ (FP) (CENAPRED, 1996) is a 
document (in leaflet version) issued jointly by SEGOB and CENAPRED to provide 
basic information for the family to elaborate its own emergency and civil protection 
plan taking into account risk conditions inside the house and its surroundings. FP is 
integrated by the following objective and steps (see Box 10 below):  
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Box 10. Family Plan in case of floods 
Objective: All family members knowing what do inside the house before, 
during and after a ´disaster´ situation through preparation and self-
protection basic measures. Family Plan (FP) should set up four steps:  
1
st step: assessment of house, hazards and risks. FP should be a 
guide to assess the physical conditions of the house, electric, water and 
sanitation facilities. FP should also contain a sketch specifying the risks 
inside the house and its environs and the recommendations to reduce 
them. 
2
nd step: design of cleared exits and evacuation routes to step 
away from high risk zones in case the best action is to get out of the 
house and evacuate the affected zone  
3
rd step: Preparation of family members to take the most adequate 
decisions to face the disaster, to stay ´calm´ and to know how to act 
according to the on-going event. 
4
th step: to carry out periodically emergency drills; an emergency 
drill is a rehearsal of how to proceed in case of an emergency. An 
emergency drill allows family members to evaluate and calibrate the 
efficiency of actions to improve future actions
68.  
  Source: CENAPRED (1996) 
 
So far, it has been discussed that ´coordination´ is central to the improvement of 
both preparedness and emergency aid at household and institutional level. This is both a 
policy objective and a policy intervention the policy makers emphasised as the way to 
further a ´preventive civil protection system´. In the following sub-section I analyse 
what  ´coordination´  means  and  how  it  is  enacted  in  policy  tools  for  emergency 
implementation. To perform this, I selected the ´Family Plan of Civil Protection´ (FP) 
and  ´Emergency  Plan´  of  CNA  (EP-CNA)  that  is  implemented  to  protect  hydraulic 
infrastructure and populations.  
I argue that there is a parallelism between these in terms of objectives, steps and 
tasks; what seems to differ is the scale of intervention, the scope in terms of resources, 
means and beneficiaries of the actions. Eventually this comparison may provide inputs 
                                                 
68 CENAPRED (1996) states that an emergency drill is a way to train family members on: allocation of 
responsibilities to family members, warning alarm; disconnection of electric appliances; to follow the 
evacuation  routes;  to  stay  calm  and  not  to  run,  shout  or  push;  get  to  the  meeting  point  and  assess 
procedures, outcomes; adjust times and movements.  
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to  improve  preparedness  both  at  household  and  institutional  level  because  some 
synergies between these two can be found to improve implementation. This comparison 
may also explain why it is believed that ´disaster prevention´ should be – above all – a 
´self-protection activity´. I now examine the meanings that underpin ´coordination´ both 
in the FP and in the EP-CNA. First, I take the four steps of the FP and then I place the 
EP-CNA into the frame of the FP.  I utilise the information of the water sector provided 
by CNA (data from  interviews to CNA policy  makers and EP information) and the 
information provided by CENAPRED.  
   
3.2  Policy instruments and implementation  
 
3.2.1 The meaning of ´coordination´ in emergency implementation.  
 
´Coordination´ was expressed by some policy makers (see above 3.1) both as a final 
policy objective and as a necessary intervention to promote effective participation of 
people and organisations within a normative-legal framework. In Mexico, CNA designs 
and  implements the water policy at  federal  level through the Regional Management 
Offices. One of the  main objectives of the National  Water Programme (2001-2006; 
2007-2012) is ―to prevent meteorological and hydro-meteorological risks and to tackle 
their effects‖ (CNA, 2008:27).  
In  this  regard,  basic  activity  Nº  10  of  the  Regional  Management  Offices  of 
CNA
69 ―…is to prevent risk and tackle damages provoked by inundations‖. And the 
objective  is  ―…to  implement  strategies  and  actions  oriented  to  the  prevention  and 
attendance to damages provoked by heavy rainfalls and water bodies over spilling with 
the aim of reducing impact on population and productive areas‖ (CNA, 2002: 60) 
The Emergency Plan of CNA (EP-CNA) is a policy instrument that is part of a 
series  of  tasks  aimed  at  achieving  the  above  mentioned  objective.    EP-CNA  is 
elaborated  and  handed  to  state  governments  by  the  Management  Department  for 
                                                 
69 There are 13 Regional Management Offices throughout the country:  I. Peninsula de Baja California 
(Mexicali, Baja California); II. Noroeste (Hermosillo, Sonora); III. Pacífico Norte (Culiacán, Sinaloa); 
IV. Balsas (Cuernavaca, Morelos); V. Pacífico Sur (Oaxaca, Oaxaca); VI. Río Bravo (Monterrey, Nuevo 
León);  VII.  Cuencas  Centrales  del  Norte  (Torreón,  Coahuila);  VIII.  Lerma  Santiago  Pacífico 
(Guadalajara,  Jalisco);  IX.  Golfo  Norte  (Ciudad  Victoria,  Tamaulipas);  X.  Golfo  Centro  (Jalapa, 
Veracruz); XI. Frontera Sur (Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas); XII. Península de Yucatán (Mérida, Yucatán) 
and XIII. Aguas del Valle de México y Sistema Cutzamala (México, Distrito Federal) which is the region 
where  this  thesis´case  occurs.  The  Direction  of  Infrastructure  Protection  and  Emergencies  Attention 
(PIAE) coordinates emergency activities in 10 Centres of Emergency Attention throughout the country 
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Infrastructure Protection and Emergency  Attention of CNA (IPE-CNA) whose  main 
functions – as mentioned earlier – are to provide physical protection and security to 
hydraulic infrastructure and populations. Specifically EP-CNA is for the management of 
water  bodies,  dams  and  rivers  and  the  maintenance  and  fixing  of  hydraulic 
infrastructure  to  prevent  floods  and  damages.  It  is  considered  as  the  guideline  to 
respond to emergencies with the coordination of State and municipal governments.  
The  EP-CNA  contains  the  following  aspects:  geographic  and  hydrologic 
features; hydrometric scheme; parameters for warning; description of water flows in 
critical  zones;  planning  and  basic  recommendations  to  population;  organization  to 
tackle  contingencies;  a  list  of  potential  affected  areas  and  settlements,  and  shelter 
information. According to the General Manager of IPE-CNA, up to (April 2003, time of 
the interview) 73 emergency plans for the ´most problematic rivers´ of the country had 
been elaborated and handed to the state governments. 
However, an examination of EP-CNA cannot be done unless it is placed in the 
context of a series of tasks aimed at ―preventing and attending damages provoked by 
heavy rainfalls and water bodies over spilling‖.  In the following Box (Nº 11) I compare 
a FP with the series of emergency actions oriented ―to prevent risk and tackle damages 
provoked by inundations‖. These emergency actions are one of the 12 groups of basic 
tasks of the Regional Management Offices of CNA (CNA, 2002). Thereafter I analyse 
the policy makers‘ main claims relating to the issue of EP putting emphasis on the LCC 
case and that of coordination.    
. 
Box 11. Comparison between Family Responses of Civil Protection  
and Emergency Response of CNA 
 
Family Plan of Civil 
Protection 1. 
Emergency Responses of CNA 2. 
1. Assessment of 
physical characteristics 
of house and all water 
and electric facilities; 
identification of 
potential hazards and 
risks inside the house 
and the environs.  
1.  Identification of flood prone areas 
2.  Identification of illegal settlements in flood prone areas and 
planning 
3.  Design and setting up of the hydro-meteorological early warning 
system 
4.  Follow up and inspection of populations that were re-settled in 
safer areas 
5.  Monitoring of the extreme hydro meteorological phenomenon 
6.  Delivery of hydro-meteorological early warning system 
7.  Monitoring of water bodies, rivers and hydraulic infrastructure 
works 
8.  Analysis of hydraulic and water assessment of rivers, etc  
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2.  Design of cleared exits 
and evacuation routes. 
Non Applicable  
3.  Preparation to take 
the most adequate 
decisions to face the 
disaster 
9.  Setting up the civil protection team 
10.  Warning population 
4.  To carry out 
periodically 
emergency drills 
11.  Training local civil protection authorities and operators 
12.  Integration of the Planning and Logistics team 
5.  Family Plan ready   13.  Delivery of emergency plans to local civil protection operators 
14.  Elaboration of the working plan to tackle emergencies 
15.  Elaboration of emergency programs in case of infrastructure 
failure 
16.  Social, economic and environmental assessment of planned 
projects  
6.  Ideally family 
members´ action 
coincides with 
institutional 
emergency 
responses1. 
                     
17.  Installation of Operative centres  
18.  Drafting of press bulletins and mass media attention   
19.  Emergency supply of drinking water to flooded areas and 
affected population 
20.  Sanitation and outbreaks prevention actions  
21.  Rehabilitation of damaged hydraulic infrastructure 
22.  Technical advice to SEGOB on natural disaster declaration  
23.  Fund raising for implementing agreed actions  
24.  Construction of infrastructure    
1. Source: CENAPRED (1996) 
2. Source: CNA (2002) 
 
The first stage is known as the ´risk assessment stage´ where the identification of 
hazards that may threaten populations, houses and infrastructure can give indication of 
the risk-prone zones. The  information collected at household  level during this stage 
constitute a type of ´early warning system´ because it indicates the manner in which a 
hazard  may  impact  the  house  and  therefore  how  family  members  can  respond 
accordingly. House physical conditions and hydraulic infrastructure are target points to 
provide  adequate  maintenance.  Second  stage  is  framed  by  the  design  of  evacuation 
routes  within  the  house  in  case  floods  occur. This  is  an  important  stage  because  it 
connects the ´inner´ environment of the house with the ´outer´ environment of public 
infrastructure  such  as  the  waste  water  canals.  As  the  case  study  of  this  thesis 
demonstrated in Chapter Four, it is not sufficient to provide adequate maintenance to 
sewage canals but also to set up cleared routes for residents to evacuate the flooded area 
and temporarily stay in safer places.  
Stage three is about team organisation to foster preparedness. It can be assumed 
that if communication between CNA authorities and risk-prone families takes place the 
preparedness  can  be  better  organised  between  these  two  levels  of  organisation. 
Communication  may  mean warning people to raise  hazard awareness. Stage  four  is 
about emergency drills in houses and the integration of planning and response teams of  
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CNA. This stage is about team training in order to get prepared to act in case it is 
needed.  Stage  five  is  about  the  elaboration  of  Plans  and  can  be  considered  as  the 
moment to match both levels of intervention. the ´private´ and the ´public´. This is the 
stage where communication between CNA operators and populations should be at its 
best. And finally, stage six takes place immediately after the hazard strikes. It is when 
the coordination between affected populations, CNA operators and authorities should be 
effective to start the relief moment.  
 
 
3.2.2 Financing for mitigation: Fund for Natural Disaster (FONDEN) 
 
Besides  emergency  plans,  in  1996  the  Mexican  federal  government  through 
SEGOB created the Fund for Natural Disaster (FONDEN) as a major source of federal 
financing for the reconstruction of public infrastructure, restoration of protected areas, 
purchase of emergency response equipment and disaster relief. It provides incremental 
funding  for  disaster  reconstruction  directly  to  federal  agencies  and  municipal 
governments  through  state  trust  funds  (fideicomisos  mixtos  estatales)  FONDEN  has 
special  provisions  to  assist  poor  and  low-income  households  to  re-build  their 
communities and re-establish their incomes in the event of a ´natural´ disaster. ´Natural´ 
disaster have varied over time with drought being dominant in 1996, hurricanes in 1997, 
floods in 1998, earthquakes and floods in 1999, and lately hurricanes and floods in 2007 
and 2008.  
Evaluations of the implementation of FONDEN (Graizbord, 2007, 2006, 2005) 
indicate that the majority of submitted and approved projects fall into the following 
categories: 1) attention to affected people by providing basic goods, food and clothes  2) 
monitoring  and  forecasting  ‗natural‘  hazards  of  a  meteorological  nature,  such  as  
hurricanes, floods, and extreme rainfalls;  3) construction of protection works to counter  
the impact of  ‗natural‘  hazards and 4) reinforcement of buildings and infrastructure to 
withstand potential  ‗natural‘  hazards impacts and to mitigate  ‗natural‘  disaster.  
FONDEN was implemented in Chalco Valley after the floods in 2000 (Table 8, 
below). A total amount of MX$ 178,841  million were channelled  into a number of 
mitigation tasks: 1) SEDESOL implemented a compensation scheme that handed ten 
thousand pesos to each of the affected households; 2) SEDESOL provided food, clothes 
and other basic goods to affected households to cope with losses, basic furniture was 
also distributed; 3) the Ministry of Public Health implemented a sanitation programme  
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to avoid epidemic outbreaks and the spread of contagious diseases; 4) SCT rebuilt the 
segment  of  the  Mex-Puebla  highway,  5)  SEP  organised  temporary  shelters  in  the 
unaffected schools, 6) CNA blocked LCC wall hole and repaired the damaged wall and 
also dredged LCC bed and heightened and reinforced the two canal walls. CNA cleaned 
and  disinfected  houses,  schools  and  streets  and  also  restored  the  ´drinking´  water 
provision. Along with the Army, mud and rubble were removed from streets and roads.  
 Table 8. Implementation of FONDEN in Chalco Valley in 2000 
 
Source: CENAPRED (2001),  
Units are in thousand of Mexican pesos 
 
 
At this point, it is important to recall the claims about FONDEN implementation of the 
then  General  Coordinator  of  Civil  Protection  of  SEGOB  when  floods  occurred  in 
Chalco  Valley.    It  gives  an  indication  of  how  FONDEN  was  conceived  and 
implemented  in  Chalco  Valley.  It  is  important  to  mention  that  the  socio-economic 
impact assessment of FONDEN in Chalco Valley elaborated by CENAPRED (2001) 
does not make any mention of how FONDEN was implemented and to what extent it 
helped mitigating the floods impact. It only proposes the works to be undertaken to 
reduce flooding and LCC over spilling. According  to  former  General  Coordinator  of 
Civil Protection of SEGOB, FONDEN is, above all, an economic instrument to mitigate 
impacts and to safeguard local people‘s life and assets. 
“Well...  a  very  important  policy  instrument  was  created: 
FONDEN.  It  is  very  important...FONDEN  considers  the 
allocation of resources that is, after all, an economic insurance 
Ministry  FONDEN  Temporal 
Employment 
Programme 
(PET) 
Addition  State 
resources 
Total of 
resources 
Social 
Development 
(SEDESOL) 
8,480  4,183  12,663  10,118  22,781 
Communications 
and Transport 
(SCT) 
2,802    2,802  962  3,764 
Public Education 
(SEP) 
2,713    2,713  2,967  5,679 
Public Health 
(SSA) 
6.450    6.450    6,450 
CNA  137,565    137,565    137,565 
CNA-CAEM  2,603    2,603    2,603 
SUBTOTAL  160,611  4,183  164.794  14,047  178,841  
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to attend disaster  (impact), then FONDEN  was  an excellent 
initiative of the federal government” 
(General Coordinator of Civil Protection of SEGOB in 2000)  
 
 
 
4. Exposure of vulnerable people to hazards is a consequence of socio-economic 
inequalities. 
 
This problem construction differs from the previous three in the sense that vulnerability 
is considered to be a contributing factor of inundations. In this discourse, vulnerability 
appears to be the outcome of social and political processes, so objectives and responses 
implementation should ideally be directed towards addressing ´unsafe conditions´ and 
society‘s  structural  causes.  In  this  section,  I  analyse  how  policy  objectives  and 
implementation are designed to address people‘s vulnerability to floods and therefore to 
´prevent´ disaster.  
People‘s  vulnerability  to  floods  in  Chalco  Valley  is  understood,  as  it  was 
discussed in Chapter Four section 3.2, in terms of three unsafe conditions´ groups: 1) 
Physical environment  (Unsafe housing and risk-prone location, and erosion or damage 
of house materials) 2) Fragile economy (Capital, assets and savings lost or damaged, 
jeopardising livelihoods, and job losses or unpaid) and 3) Policy responses (Unequal 
distribution of emergency aid and goods according to damage, increase of insecurity 
and social protection mechanisms, inadequate warning and claim making of affected 
people)  
In the following analysis I intend to identify which components of these ´unsafe 
conditions´ are present in the policy maker‘s claims and which policy responses are 
proposed  as  solutions.  The  analysis  indicates  to  what  extent these  policy  solutions´ 
claims ´really´ tackle people‘s vulnerability to flooding. It is important to mention that I 
do not expect to find in the policy makers´ arguments all components of the ´unsafe 
conditions´  but  only  some  of  them;  the  central  ones.  At  the  discursive  level,  this 
situation may indicate whether disaster policy is in the process of changing some of its 
elements related or not to the relationship between causal agents and policy responses 
by recognising socio-economic and political processes of disaster. Three policy makers 
mentioned ´poverty´, ´marginality´ or ´inequality´ as causal factors of disaster or floods 
or the possible connection between vulnerability and development:  the Undersecretary 
of Ecology of the State of Mexico, the General Director of Environmental Policy  
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and  Planning  of  SEMARNAT,  General  Director  of  Disaster  Management  of 
SEDESOL 
For  analytical  purposes  the  policy  makers´  arguments  were  grouped  in  two 
separate  issues  while  recognising  inter-connections  between  them:  1)  Ecological 
management and natural resources conservation as the framework for integrating risk 
reduction;  and  2)  Urban  and  land  use  planning  to  contribute  to  the  promotion  of 
regional development and the reduction of inequalities and marginalisation. Again, as in 
sections 1, 2 and 3 of this chapter, I deconstruct the policy makers´ arguments with 
regards to policy objectives, type of intervention, instruments and implementation by 
employing  once  more  the  Toulmin-Gasper  model  (2000)  .Unlike  the  previous  three 
sections where I discussed the argumentative construction in separate sub-sections by 
objective, intervention, instruments and implementation, in this last section I develop 
the  analysis  issue  by  issue,  unpacking  the  policy  responses  elements.  I  decided  to 
proceed  this  way  because  each  issue  can  be  analysed  as  a  distinct  type  of  policy 
intervention on its own right. 
 
4.1. Ecological management and natural resources conservation as the framework 
for integrating risk reduction into development planning  
   
4.1.1 Policy objectives and types of intervention 
 
The Undersecretary of Ecology of the State of Mexico and the General Director of 
Environmental  Policy  and  Planning  of  SEMARNAT  advocate  this  view  of 
´structural  causality´.  The  Undersecretary  of  Ecology  of  the  State  of  Mexico 
answered to the author of this thesis in two ways when it came to refer to who was 
doing  the  action  and  proposing  solutions  to  the  disaster  policy  problem.  When  he 
referred  to  the  things  that  ´have  to  be  done´  he  talked  in  the  first  person  singular 
whereas when he referred to the way the Ministry of Ecology of the State of Mexico 
(SESM) has being conceiving disaster issues he spoke in the third person singular. This 
can be interpreted as a way of distancing himself from the view of SESM about disaster 
by  implicitly  stating  that,  up  to  now,  SESM  has  failed  in  integrating  ´disaster 
prevention´ into its policy values and programmes. For him, so far, disaster attention 
has not been conceived as a problem closely connected to the ecological management of 
land; the way ´it has to be´.  
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According to the Undersecretary of Ecology of the State of Mexico the policy 
objective should then be:  
{Claim 1} 
―...to decrease the number of disaster and to minimise their impact 
on populations‖.  
He supports this claim by stressing the importance of developing three strategic 
actions:  ´ecological  land  planning´,  ´technological  component´  and  a  ´normative 
component´. These actions are in fact the warrants of Claim 1 and can be conceived as 
the policy interventions needed to ´decrease the number of disaster´. He truly believes 
that  ecological  criteria  are  the  ultimate  set  of  values  that  should  constrain  human 
activities to reduce disaster risk. Warrant 1 stresses this: 
  {Warrant 1}  
  ―An ecological land planning (in Spanish, ordenamiento ecológico 
del territorio) that would constitute the main framework to define 
land uses‖. 
 
Warrant  1  is  supported  by  backing  1  and  2  through  to  technical  and  normative 
interventions that firms and populations have to endorse 
 
  {Backing 1} 
  ―...a technological component which means that firms rely on 
technology,  infrastructure  and  facilities  that  allow  them  to 
decrease disaster´ occurrence‖ 
   
  {Backing 2} 
  ― A normative component, what is commonly called ´the rule 
of law´ there have to be a law, norms, regulations and institutions 
to make  that (ecological management ) happen...‖ 
 
And when asked about other political and socio-economic elements that may play a role 
in the decision making process, the Undersecretary of Ecology of the State of Mexico 
appeals for a transformation of the bureaucratic culture that hinders the construction of a 
democratic  and  participatory  planning  that  would  really  trigger  a  change  towards 
´reducing disaster´:  
 
  {Evidence 1}  
  The ´bureaucratic culture´ that still prevails in Mexico is that 
of authoritarianism ... decisions are made on a ´top-down´ fashion  
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full of vices... (…)  low and middle rank public servants do not 
dare voice their opinions...and  besides… (…) the  ´law of  least 
effort´,  
―If it occurred to me to have an idea perhaps I will have to work 
more  and  that  is  not  convenient  for  me...‖  (...)  high  rank 
authorities are not allowed to fail or err... (...) and being a high 
rank policy maker, like a minister,  ―I will try to show that I am 
the one who knows everything...‖; and that  is  why there  is  no 
collaboration between high rank policy makers...‖ 
  
On the other hand, according to the Undersecretary of Ecology of the State of 
Mexico, SESM views disaster as ´unforeseen´ and  ´accidental´  events that suddenly 
happen without an ´apparent´ or ´known cause´. This view clearly contrasts with his 
claim  that  ´disaster  are  the  outcome  of  socio-economic,  ecological  and  political 
processes´. He criticises the SESM´s view and also blames the Ministry of the Interior 
of the State of Mexico for neglecting the importance of environmental planning and the 
´rational´ use of natural resources when trying to prevent disaster. That is reflected in 
the fact that the Ministry of the Environment is called forth to intervene in the aftermath 
of disaster just as a  ´supporting´ public  institution. SESM does not take part in the 
design  of  disaster  policies  and  this  has  to  change.  Disaster  policies  have  to  be 
´environmentally-sound´.  
Thus, according to the Undersecretary of Ecology of the State of Mexico an 
important  objective  of  the  ´environmental  sector´  would  be  to  promote  the 
mainstreaming  of  ´ecological  aptitudes´  of  the  ecosystem  into  civil  protection  and 
disaster prevention planning. That is why he put forward the following three problems 
(which in fact constitute policy beliefs) that cause the disaster. Policy interventions, 
then, have to address these problems: 
a)  ´Institutional problem´. He makes reference to the political power the civil 
protection sector lacks within the development planning system of Mexico. 
Civil  protection  is  not taken  into  consideration  when  designing  ´integral´ 
development policies. So ´preventive policy values´ are not integrated into 
development planning. 
b)  ´Human resources problem´. In Mexico there is no a single policy oriented 
towards capacitating people in civil protection issues. People who happen to 
hold  a  civil  protection  position  in  the  public  administration  are  not 
professionally qualified to perform their duties; they are ‗improvisers‘ (son 
improvisados).   
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c)  ´Culture  and  education  problem´.  There  is  a  lack  of  a  ´culture  of  civil 
protection´; to support this claim he refers to the individual‘s irresponsibility 
for not integrating risk into the individual‘s daily decision making; he speaks 
in the second person plural.  ―We do not contract a life insurance plan, we 
are not worried about attending the doctor once in a while for preventing 
illness…  we  drive  without  fastening  a  seat  belt  and….  It‘s  part  of  the 
Mexican culture…‖ 
 
           For  the  General  Director  of  Environmental  Policy  and  Planning  of 
SEMARNAT, the objective of a disaster policy is to set up an ´integral´ management of 
natural resources and ecosystems (for instance through a reforestation programme) that 
will  provide  environmental  goods,  services  and  benefits  to  society.  For  instance, 
reforestation will prevent downstream settlements  from  flooding  by  catching run-off 
water.  He  claims  that  ´ecologically  sound  use  of  ecosystems´  through  soil  and 
vegetation conservation and sustainable water consumption would increase resilience 
and would enhance household‘s coping capacities ahead of future hazards impact. 
  The  General  Director  of  Environmental  Policy  and  Planning  of 
SEMARNAT argues that an ´integral basin management framework´ is the ´adequate´ 
planning tool to reach a prevention stage of public policies. Within this framework it is 
absolutely  necessary  to  develop  a  ´strategic  planning´  that  should  comprise  1)  the 
setting up of priorities based on ´rational´ knowledge, 2) the use of technical knowledge 
for decision making, 3) monitoring, evaluation and follow-up of the outcomes to get to 
know the suitability of the project or programme. He justifies that claim on the basis of 
a recognition of the need to achieve ´objectivity´ as a central value for decision-making. 
He criticises the fact that, according to him, decisions and solutions are made upon 
´subjectivities´. ´Subjectivities´ are connected to group interests and power relations. 
So, according to these two policymakers, ecological management and natural resources 
conservation are the essential components of the framework where ´disaster prevention´ 
has to take place.  
The General Director of Disaster Management of SEDESOL claims that the 
main objective of a disaster policy  is to prevent disaster through ´rational´  land use 
planning and housing and urban infrastructure development. He refers to mainstreaming 
disaster prevention into urban planning. He argues that by the ´connecting institutional 
´efforts  of  SEMARNAT,  CONAPO  and  SEDESOL,  a  ´preventive  system´  will  be  
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consolidated. He is convinced that disaster are socially constructed phenomena and that 
a preventive policy would mean tackling those factors that create social conditions for 
the reduction of poverty; this is a structural argument; in short, the ´poor are the most at 
risk´, for several reasons: poor people settle in risk prone places such as near river beds, 
lake beds, etc; they cannot afford to build good quality houses. Therefore, he claims 
that: 
{Claim 1}  
―Avoiding disaster would mean recognising first, the ´poor´ social 
conditions under which many people live/‖ 
 
He  supports  Claim  1  by  referring  to  ´commonplaces´  such  as  the  relation  between 
material welfare and people‘s capacities to have access and use of more reliable housing 
materials in the face of hazards 
 
  {Evidence 1} 
 
―So when  you see the  disaster that have already taken place (in 
Mexico)  you  realise  that  the  poor  are  the  most  affected  groups 
…disaster occur always in poor communities and that is because 
despite  hurricanes,  or  inundations,  storms  striking  in  rich 
communities,  they  are  not  affected  thanks  to  the  good  housing 
materials, and rich people‘s houses resist and those (of the poor) 
are o bad quality and therefore very vulnerable…‖ 
 
So he states that something can be done regarding housing and its resistance qualities to 
natural hazards. However he does not elaborate more on the ´social conditions of the 
poor´ and he reinforces the prevailing idea that points out to the engineering works for 
coping with hazards. For instance, he stresses that floods can be prevented by building 
dams, providing good maintenance to river beds. This policy intervention is similar to 
the technical solutions proposed in section 2. ―Failure of infrastructure and inadequate 
monitoring  of  risk  object‖  and  indicates  that  hydraulic  engineering  solutions  (that 
characterise  policy  responses  in  section  2  and  3)  prevail  in  policy  makers´ 
understanding of what have to be done. This illustrates the fact found in this research 
that a policy maker´ discourse may be made up of different elements pertaining to other 
´causalities´ 
    When  it  comes  to  talk  about  obstacles  to  policy  implementation  under  the 
principle  that  ´preventing  disaster  starts  by  reducing  risk  exposure´,  the  General 
Director of Disaster Management of SEDESOL brings to the fore three obstacles that  
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have to be overcome. Interestingly these obstacles are the similar to the ones expressed 
above by the Undersecretary of Ecology of the State of Mexico:  
1)  Institutional  barriers,  but  in  this  case  referred  to  as  the  ´lack  of  institutional 
awareness´ with regards to the need to mainstream disaster risk reduction into their 
policies and programmes. 
2)  Lack of ´well-trained public servants´ of various sorts to carry out scientific risk 
assessments. 
3)  Political problems in the sense that civil protection is not a policy value within the 
different ministries and public organisations.   
 
4.1.2 Policy tools and implementation  
 
Programme of Soil Restoration of La Compañía River Basin.   
 
The ´Programme of Soil Restoration in the La Compañía River Basin´ (Gobierno del 
Estado de México, (2003) was designed and implemented by the Ministry of Ecology of 
the  State  of  Mexico.  It  can  be  considered  as  an  attempt  to  develop  an  ´integral´ 
ecological management framework to contribute to the reduction of floods risk. The 
main goal is to create sustainable ecological conditions for the conservation of the La 
Compañía  ´river´  basin.  It  comprises  the  following  four  specific  objectives:  1) 
reforestation of the basin to contribute to improving the air quality of the Metropolitan 
Zone of Mexico City, 2) to reduce siltation in the water bodies and rivers, 3) to increase 
the recharging capacity of the  Chalco Valley region‘s  aquifer  and 4) to control the 
increase  of  the  water  flows  that  are  generated  up-stream  LCC.    One  of  the  most 
important expected benefits (by the end of 2003) was to reduce the accumulation of 
mud and other organic materials in the LCC bed to prevent over spillage.  
  According to the Ministry of Ecology of the State of Mexico, this set of strategic 
actions can contribute to a decrease in the Aeolian erosion in the Metropolitan Zone of 
Mexico  City  (MZMC).  It  was  expected  this  programme  would  also  contribute  to 
improving the air quality of MZMC by increasing the forested areas of Chalco Valley‘s 
region. Moreover it will contribute to the creation of improved microclimate conditions 
and recharge the aquifer of the region and reduce the rate of siltation in LCC and Chalco 
Valley‘s sewage system. During the delivery of the First Stage of the Programme for 
Soil Restoration in the Sub-basin of Río La Compañía, the Minister of Ecology outlined  
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the achievements of the programme: construction of 500 km of terrace, 4 500 km of 
subsoil and 50 km of breaches, construction of 200 000 trenches, construction of 300 
dams to control azoic production, transport and planting of 4 million trees. The positive 
effects of the programme included (by 2003): reduction of azoic by 62 000 cubic metres 
per year, retention of 14. 9 million cubic metres of rainwater drainage, and mitigation of 
the generation per year of 170 tonnes of suspended particles PM10. With a four year 
duration, the project will benefit an estimated population of 300, 000 in the region.  
  Unlike  the  other  policy  responses  discussed  in  sections  1-3  of  this  chapter, 
ecological management of the basin constitutes an integral´ system of strategic planning 
that intends to solve not only the deforestation problems of the LCC basin but also air 
quality of ZMMC.   
 
4.2  Urban  land  use  planning  to  contribute  promoting  development  and  reduce 
poverty.  
 
4.2.1 Policy objectives and types of intervention 
  According to the Director of Disaster Management of SEDESOL, disaster 
prevention at neighbourhood level (a nivel de barrio) is the policy objective. For him, 
disaster  prevention  means  ―to  reduce  damages‖  in  ´specific  and  ´concrete´ 
neighbourhoods through land use planning. He argues that prevention cannot be realised 
at city level but at a micro level. For him, the HABITAT Programme intends to ´make 
aware´ and ´educate´ families living in barrios about the need to prevent disaster. He 
asserts that, 
 
―It is easier to educate, let‘s say, 500 families than 100 million people‖.  
(Director of Disaster Management of SEDESOL) 
When defining disaster prevention he alludes to ´unsafe housing of poor people´ 
and ´risk-prone location´. However, regarding floods prevention measures he refers to 
hydraulic works like dams. He has recourse to technical solutions already referred in 
section  2  of  this  chapter.  This  again  may  indicate  the  manner  in  which  technical 
remedies ultimately are conceived as the last option to ´reduce floods risk´. He appeals 
to the development of a ´culture of prevention´ as the social change needed to raise risk 
awareness and prevent disaster. He claims that, ―We are not used to insuring our own 
house, our car...‖ Besides he refers to ´mitigation works´, for example, reinforcing canal 
walls, hillsides and eviction actions to safer places. Through the implementation of the  
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HABITAT  Programme,  he  affirms,  poor  and  marginalised  people  can  be  better 
integrated into the urban development. It is also assumed that poor communities can 
define the risk they are exposed to. Another assumption is that risk reduction can be 
achieved through up-grading urban neighbourhood and providing urban services. The 
next warrant backs this claim.  
 
―We can have piped water and sewage system in a barrio but if 
floods  ´arrive´,  these  will  damage  urban  infrastructure  and   
...fruitless efforts put into place‖. 
(Director of Disaster Management of SEDESOL) 
 
4.2.2 Policy tools and implementation 
 
HABITAT Programme  
 
The  General  Direction  of  Disaster  Management  of  SEDESOL  is  in  charge  of 
implementing the ´HABITAT Programme´. This Programme is aimed at tackling urban 
poverty  and  development  through  the  implementation  of  an  ´action  model´  that 
combines the improvement of infrastructure and collective equipment in marginalised 
urban zones with vulnerability reduction of households to ´natural´ hazards. Its main 
objective is to fight urban poverty, improve the ´popular´ habitat, and to make cities and 
neighbourhoods  safer  and  liveable.  ´HABITAT  Programme´,  coordinated  by 
SEDESOL,  is  a  policy  intervention  aimed  at  promoting  ´spaces´  of  social  identity, 
orderly  management  of  urban  development,  the  connection  of  marginalised 
neighbourhoods  (´barrios´)  and  ´misery  belts´  with  the  legal  city,  and  therefore 
improving the quality of life of city‘s inhabitants. It is a complementary instrument to 
those implemented by the State government in the matter.  
´HABITAT Programme´ comprises six groups of action, namely, 1) Fighting 
urban poverty which is designed to improve capacities and opportunities of households´ 
members living in marginalised urban zones; 2) Supporting female headed households 
which is oriented to support poor women through actions that promote the development 
of capacities to allow poor women to enter the work market and improve their work 
performance; 3) Physical improving of ´barrios´ which introduces basic infrastructure 
and services  in  marginalised urban zones to integrate them  into the city  in order to 
improve the quality of life of its inhabitants; 4) Giving access to reserve land, which  
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supports cities to have access to urban land for settlements of poor people; 5) Land 
planning which is oriented to reduce vulnerability to natural hazards of poor people 
living  in  marginalised  zones,  and  6)  Establishing  Habitat  Development  Agencies  to 
promote the interaction of all agents of urban development for the furtherance of local 
development and the implementation of strategic projects (DOF, 25 March, 2003).  
One  of  the  specific  objectives  is  to  strengthen  actions  to  prevent  disaster  in 
marginalised urban zones through actions oriented to reducing settlements´ vulnerability 
to natural threats. In this regard, the Federal government through SEDESOL provides 
resources to: for land use planning and the  elaboration of Risk Maps; to capacitate 
people  living  in  marginalised  urban  zones  to  tackle  risk  and  disaster;  to  undertake 
disaster  risk  mitigation  works  towards  reducing  settlements  vulnerability  to  natural 
hazards; for the re-settlement of poor households to safer places in order to avoid non-
mitigated disaster (SEDESOL, 2009) 
  Under the umbrella of this Programme, the Undersecretary of Urban Development 
and Planning of SEDESOL issued the Methodological Guide to Elaborate the Atlas of 
Natural Hazards (´Guía Metodológica para la Elaboración de Atlas de Peligros Naturales 
a  Nivel  Ciudad´)  that  sets  up  the  basic  principles  to  provide  information  of  natural 
hazards and related risks that affect urban zones. It is expected that the  information 
contained in the Guide will supply important inputs to prevent disaster and to develop 
strategies of self- protection aimed at reducing economic and social costs as well as 
losses incurred from the impact of ´natural´ disaster. (SEDESOL, 2004:5).  
  It is expected that by using the Guide, one would be able to identify the ´natural´ 
hazards  in  urban  zones  that  the  urban  infrastructure,  services  and  populations  are 
exposed to with the aim of reducing risk exposure. Zoning is the method employed to 
analyse risk with regard to a certain level of affectation. Thus, there can be zones within 
a city where exposure to natural hazards can be reduced (mitigated risk)  whereas  in 
other zones this cannot be and evacuation is the only policy response. So, two types of 
zones are delimited: mitigated risk zones and non-mitigated risk zones. Under this view, 
disaster prevention means disrupting the connection between the ´disturbing´ agent and 
the  exposed  system  with  the  aim  of  reducing  or  avoiding  the  impact  of  the  natural 
hazard.   
  The  Guide  takes  into  consideration  hydro-meteorological  hazards  such  as 
´extraordinary´ rainfalls, floods, hurricanes, tropical cyclones, blizzards, hails, drought 
and extreme temperatures.  After having identified the natural hazard, urban zoning of  
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hazards  follows  at  neighbourhood  level.  Zoning  depends  on  the  type  of  hydro-
meteorological phenomena. Once zoning is done, mitigation measures and actions are 
taken highlighting the precise location.   
 
Fund for Natural Disaster Prevention (FOPREDEN)  
 
By  the  time  the  fieldwork  took  place  (January-May,  2003)  I  got  information  that 
FOPREDEN  was  not  implemented  in  Chalco  Valley.  However  it  is  important  to 
mention  in  this  thesis  FOPREDEN´s  characteristics  to  acknowledge  the  manner  in 
which financing schemes for prevention can be allocated to ´prevent´ disaster. This may 
explain how the federal government is understanding ´prevention´ and toward which 
direction  policy  implementation  is  slowly  shifting.  FOPREDEN  was  created  in 
October2003  by  the  Federal  Government  and  its  implementation  is  coordinated  by 
SEGOB  through  the  General  Coordination  of  Civil  Protection.  Its  main  goal  is  to 
provide resources to the Ministries of Federal Public Administration and to the states to 
undertake actions oriented to reduce risk and to avoid or lessen the impact of ´natural´ 
hazards  on  populations,  public  infrastructure,  services  and  the  environment.  (DOF, 
2006; SEGOB
70) 
FOPREDEN is conceived as a complementary financial mechanism because 
State and Municipality governments are supposed to allocate resources to prevent 
disaster. The set of ´preventive´ actions feasible to get funded by FOPREDEN are those 
oriented: 1) To identifying risk; 2) To reduce or mitigate risk and 3)  To promoting a 
´culture for civil protection´ before ´natural´ disaster. In particular, projects are funded if 
they fall in the following lines of action:  
  Improving the functioning of SINAPROC 
  Develop scientific knowledge of ´natural´ hazards and risks.  
  Contribute to reducing physical vulnerability.  
  Strengthening  coordination  and  communication  among  the  three  levels  of 
government, social and private sectors and population.  
  Strengthening applied research to develop and improve technology to mitigate 
risks.  
  Implement policy and culture for ´self-protection´  
                                                 
70 http://www.proteccioncivil.gob.mx/Portal/PtMain.php?nIdHeader=2&nIdPanel=136&nIdFooter=22  
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It is argued that one of FOPREDEN‘s goals is to contribute to make SINAPROC a 
´preventive-oriented policy system´. Evaluation of the FOPREDEN‘s implementation 
(Puente,  2006)  concludes  that  there  are  important  barriers  to  its  successful 
implementation such as lack of information and communication about FOPREDEN‘s 
objectives and scope, lack of a ´culture for prevention´, weak coordination between the 
three levels of government and private and social sectors; the concentration of decision-
making, the need to improve ´natural´ hazards monitoring systems and few options for 
prevention  financing.    The  existence  of  FOPREDEN  as  a  policy  tool  to  further 
prevention is an important issue regarding how disaster prevention implementation is 
being conceived in Mexico.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Under  the  ―Ignorance  of  hazards  and  unsafe  conditions‖  a  culture  for  civil 
protection above all is the ultimate objective to be achieved by a policy that intends to 
prevent  disaster.  This  can  be  realised  through  changes  at  individual,  structural  and 
institutional level. The basic assumption of policy makers is that all affected people can 
contribute  to  prevent  disaster  regardless  their  socio-economic  condition  and  their 
vulnerability to floods. There is the belief that prevention starts at individual level by 
changing the attitudes and behaviour of those who are prone to floods risk.  
Intermediate objectives were found to promote a civil protection culture, namely 
the  education  of  affected  people  (labelled  as  ´ignorant´)  to  change  their  floods  risk 
perception to accept ´living at risk´. To do so, enabling conditions have to be created or 
fostered to facilitate the achievement of these objectives. At the structural level, there 
has to be a shift in the prevailing discourse storyline of both policy makers and the 
residents  of  the  state  of  Mexico  surrounding  municipalities  of  Mexico  City:  from 
´evacuation of unsafe places´ to the acceptance of ´living at risk´.  
Somehow  this  discursive  shift  may  be  the  result  of  the  ´unbalanced´ 
demographic and economic relation between the State of Mexico and Mexico City due 
to  continuous  and  permanent  migration  from  Mexico  City  to  the  industrial 
municipalities  of  the  State  of  Mexico  where  ´natural´  and  man-made  hazards  are 
generated therefore distributing risks unequally.  At institutional level, it is believed that 
by  integrating  ´civil  protection  inputs´  into development planning the  change  in the  
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behaviour  of  affected  people  would  be  facilitated  since  institutions  would  finally 
accomplish a ´real´ preventive policy system. 
The  links  between  risk  perception,  behavioural  change  and  the  enabling 
structural and institutional conditions could be established thanks to existing coalitions 
between the ´inadvertence by ignorance´ and ´structural´ disaster causality discourses. 
By attending to these coalitions elements for policy change can be suggested. Because 
the  policy  objective  targets  individuals´  risk  perception  and  behaviour,  ´disaster 
prevention  implementation´  relies  on  human  action  and  means  ´to  get  prepared  to 
evacuate´  or  ´to  live  at  risk´.  This  example  illustrates  the  prevailing  meaning  of 
´prevention´ amongst many policy makers that has been ´translated´ into prescriptive 
actions found in policy tools like the CPPEM. To prevent is to be prepared just before a 
´natural´ hazard hits. So the word ´disaster preparedness´ frames all actions that have to 
be adopted in the ´before´ stage.   
Finally, the rhetorical analysis of disaster policy implementation provided inputs 
to explain the compelling power the education language has in the disaster prevention 
language. Section of the CPPEM and the Family Plan of Civil Protection embody the 
transference  of  meaning  between  these  two  languages  and  prescribe  actions  of  risk 
communication, dissemination of civil protection culture, implementation of emergency 
plans, operation of early warning system and evacuation from unsafe places on the basis 
of training, learning and capacity building processes.      
  Under the ―Failure of infrastructure and inadequate monitoring of risk object‖ 
even though the  claims that construct the objectives  highlighted technical  solutions, 
evidence and warrants of the claims are not necessarily of a technical nature and are 
determined by institutional learning and the policy makers‘ professional position. This 
fact demonstrates the argumentative and social dimension of policy responses whereby 
the interviewee‘s ethos is important in making the argument compelling. Thus, policy 
responses are not only technical remedies.  
  Common policy objectives like the improvement of ´natural´ hazards forecasting 
and monitoring of the sources of risk are backed by different warrants and beliefs. On 
the  one  hand,  previous  experiences  of  floods  made  CAEM  aware  of  the  need  to 
construct regulatory small-sized dams to control the increase of water avenues of LCC. 
This in some way can be seen as a response to affected people‘s claims about the need 
to have a definitive final solution to the permanent failure in the risk management of  
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LCC. It is an example of the risk management that plans, among other things, and that 
also serves to manage public concerns over technological uncertainty. 
  The belief that more scientific research is necessary to finally control ´natural´ 
and man-made hazards brings to the fore the discussion about the interface between 
science  and  policy  making  because  the  policy  makers  that  endorse  these  policy 
responses truly believe that it is the scientific characterisation of threats that indicate 
how  institutions  and  society  at  large  should  act  in  terms  of  building  resilient 
infrastructure to control hazards. This  issue  is,  in  fact, one component of a  broader 
discussion  about  the  social  construction  of  floods  risk  where  different  knowledge 
evidence  may  contest  in  providing  the  most  urgent  solutions.  The  improvement  of 
´natural´ hazards forecasting and monitoring the sources of risk is an indication of the 
extent  to  which  institutions  and  policy  makers  can  also  get  better  prepared.  This 
institutional learning depends on how the scientific information is ´applied´ in risky and 
emergency situations.  
The conception of floods as an accidental narrative underpin emergency as the 
desired policy objective.  ´Emergency  management´  is therefore the  intervention that 
contributes both to prepare people and organisations during contingencies and to set up 
emergency actions in the aftermath of floods.  The main policy objective is centred on 
the issue of coordination because according to policymakers, society‘s organisations do 
not  comply  with  law  in  terms  of  how  to  coordinate  with  local,  state  and  federal 
governments. It was found that there are parallelisms between the Family Plan for civil 
protection and the Emergency Plan of CNA in terms of the objective of risk assessment, 
preparedness stage, delivery of plans and communication.    
  Regarding policy responses that attend ´structural causality´, even though the 
policy objective was phrased in very general terms, policy intervention is related to 
ecological land planning as the policy tool and ´ecological aptitudes´ of the land as the 
central value to be mainstreamed into disaster policy responses. This is coupled with 
complementary  interventions  already  expressed  in the previous sections 1-3 such as 
´promoting a culture for prevention´ and hydraulic engineering works. In short, it was 
interesting to note that ecological management of land and urban land use are related to 
floods  policy  implementation.  This  was  exemplified  with  three  Programmes  being 
implemented,  at  regional  and  micro-urban  level.  FOPREDEN  was  mentioned  by 
Director of Disaster Management of SEDESOL as a very important financial source for  
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disaster  prevention,  and  the  need  to  spread  its  implementation  in  cases  like  Chalco 
Valley‘s floods.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
This thesis developed a social constructionist analysis of ´natural´ disaster at the policy 
level for Mexico by focusing on arguments and discourses. The interpretivist analysis of 
disaster  policies  carried  out  in  this  thesis  highlighted  the  importance  of  taking  into 
consideration  the  existence  of  different,  and  often  contested,  policy  values  which 
underpin different policy responses. It explained the rhetorical and discursive power of 
´disaster causal´ stories in constructing reality of Chalco Valley‘s floods and provided a 
method to examine the inundations causality as a policy problem.  
In this research, disaster causality discourses established, in particular, concrete 
framings for discussing  the value of four ways of talking about Chalco Valley‘s floods,  
and in general, the main causal stories that can be found in the disaster policy context in 
Mexico. The analysis of arguments and discourses of disaster provided novel ways to 
explain how ´disaster causality´ were framed by the policy-relevant subjects and how 
these framings shape institutional responses. I demonstrated that ´natural´ disaster is a 
concept shaped by a complex combination of subjects´ interpretation of causal factors, 
their  images and relationships. By  focusing on the arguments of  disaster causality I 
could explain how knowledge claims and evidence were constructed and used to depict 
flooding of Chalco Valley in terms of four different causal stories, namely ´inadvertence 
by ´ignorance´´, ´inadvertence by ´carelessness´´, ´accidental´ and ´structural´.  
  Evidence and warrants of policy claims are loaded with meanings and beliefs 
and  this  explained  the  value-laden  nature  of  the  interpretations  of  Chalco  Valley‘s 
floods  by  the  policy-relevant  subjects.  Even  though  the  floods  of  waste  water  that 
occurred  in  Chalco  Valley  in  2000  were  ´real  facts´,  policy-relevant  subjects‘ 
interpretations  differed  substantially  not only  in  terms  of  the  claim  content  and  the 
claim-making context, but also on the claim maker‘s ethos and pathos.   
The difference of interpretations was also due to other factors that pertain to the 
institutional  level:  the  professional  background  and  position  the  policy  maker  holds 
within an institution and the institutional context from where the policy-relevant subject 
is perceiving the floods and talking about these. In general, evidence and claims ranged 
from risk perception of local affected people by the floods, technical data of heavy rain 
falls  and  the  impact  on  La  Compañía  Canal  to  more  complex  interactions  between 
socio-economic, ecological aspects of urbanisation  in Chalco Valley and  floods risk  
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generation. By analysing the four causal discourses of Chalco Valley‘s floods I could 
explain how different systems of statements construct different objects and subjects in 
various ways. This was examined in detail by attending to the variety of claims and 
evidence found within each argument.   
I explored what objects the four disaster causality discourses alluded to. The 
discourse of ´inadvertence causality by ´ignorance´´ constructs ´natural´ objects which 
are portrayed as unchanged ´natural´ elements of Chalco Valley such as La Compañía 
´river´  and  ex-lacustrine  ecosystems.  These  objects  are  placed  in  the  narrative 
background where ´active´ subjects perform a play of ´risk ignorants´ versus ´experts´ 
and ´illegal migrants´ versus ´residents´. It was found that the subject, that is allowed to 
talk in this discourse, is an ´authorised´ voice of the policy maker who characterise both 
the ´supposed´ cognitive features of the affected people to be aware of risk and the 
´experts´ capabilities to foresee  future floods. Education as a policy response  is the 
means to capacitate vulnerable people about the flooding chronic risk either to avoid or 
accept ´living at risk´. This can be observed as an attempt to shift the political discourse 
to  the  search  for  ‗acceptable  risk‘  and  in  this  sense,  it  can  be  discussed  that  risk 
produces both danger and opportunity, as Fischer (2003, b) states.  In sum, this type of 
discourse is more about people than objects and the discussion revolved around who is 
politically entitled to talk about floods. 
The  discourse  of  ´inadvertence  causality  by  carelessness´  constructs 
predominantly man-made objects such as sanitation system, and La Compañía Canal. 
For this reason, the subjects that emerge in this discourse are the ones related to the 
functioning and maintenance of these objects, namely water and sanitation operators 
and managers. Floods risk management is defined in terms of technical capabilities of 
the sanitation operators and the efficiency of the engineering works implemented to 
cope with the floods. This discourse is both about government managers and operators 
and  technical  remedies.  The  rationale  behind  this  discourse  is  the  containment  of 
chronic hazards and the faith on technical interventions to contain them and the trust on 
operator‘s  abilities.  This  disaster  discourse  can  be  placed  in  the  ecological 
modernisation  debate  which  generally  states  that  there  will  always  be  ―technical 
solutions for the most potentially apocalyptic of natural issues, and where crucially, the 
instrumental social sciences are harnessed as a key for ´optimising´ societal responses to 
the  environmental  costs  and  benefits  in  an  intensifying  commodification  of  nature‖ 
(Szerszynski  et  al.  1996)  and  that  ―  no  tough  choices  need  to  be  made  between  
  329 
economic growth and environmental protection, or between present and the long-term 
future‖  (Dryzek,  1997)  in  order  to  guarantee  society´s  development.  In  this  regard, 
Hajer (1996) the technical capabilities of the state for coping with risk and damages are 
central to overcome ecological deterioration and to further industrial innovation. Even 
though  it  recognises  the  social  roots  of  environmental  problems,  it  focuses  on  the 
pragmatic legal-administrative response of the state. The rhetorical influence ecological 
modernisation can have on disaster discourse analysis is that disaster can be read as a 
course of events and therefore disaster prevention policy can be interpreted as a process 
of  institutional  learning  and  societal  convergence.  Dominant  institutions  such  as 
CENAPRED,  SEGOB  and  CNA  can  learn  and  that  their  learning  can  produce 
meaningful change on society. Around this learning disaster policy is to be developed 
with  the  aim,  among  others,  of  manufacturing  physical  measures  to  withstand  the 
impact  of  hazards.  This  discussion  also  has  connections  with  the  discourse  of 
´inadvertence by ignorance´ in the sense that it relies on the state´s faith of promoting 
change by educating people on risk awareness and that as long as people become more 
´educated´ on their exposure to hazards, policy implementation will achieve its goal of 
changing risk perception and enabling change.   
The  discourse  of  ´accidental  causality´  constructs  objects  as  unexpected  and 
unforeseen ´natural´ forces and man-made haphazard causes. Because the blame is put 
beyond human agency - floods are natural accidents- and this causal story places human 
intervention  in  terms  of  reactive  actions,  preparedness  and  mitigation  to  minimise 
damages. Human capabilities are subordinated to the ´natural´ forces. Unlike the two 
previous discourses where floods risk can be perceived by the subjects, in this discourse 
floods risk is not perceived as a policy problem and therefore it does not underpin any 
kind of response. Emergency plans both at household and institutional level were found 
to be the means to promote a behavioural change to either avoid hazards or tackle floods 
damages. Mitigation schemes such as FONDEN proved to be an important financing 
source for recovery and lessen the floods impact on vulnerable people. The ´accidental´ 
causality  discourse  connects  with  the  ´inadvertence´  by  carelessness  because  floods 
prone people and institutions are supposed to be aware of technical issues.  
The discourse of ´structural causality´ constructs ´natural´ objects such as the 
ecological  characteristics  of  Chalco  Valley  and  their  transformation.  Environmental 
changes  created  floods  risk  prone  conditions  in  the  XX  century.  These  have  been 
directly caused by authorities, policy makers and ´corrupted´ politicians. This discourse  
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constitutes a more radical interpretation of floods because the blame is put on specific 
political  actors  who  ´appeared´  to  have  made  ´wrong´  decisions.  This  discourse 
integrates  other  elements  that  pertain  to  structural  aspects  such  as  regional  socio-
economic inequalities between Mexico City and Chalco Valley, the imbalance between 
the State of Mexico and Mexico City in terms of ecological costs and benefits. Few 
´preventive´  programmes  were  elaborated  and  put  into  place  to  revert  ecological 
degradation and poverty. It may be interpreted that the existence of these elements can 
be  regarded  as  claims  that  underpin  a  shift  in  the  discourse  by  trying  to  integrate 
political and social aspects of floods causality.          
  The  metaphors  and  representations  the  discourses  paint  of  a  reality  can  be 
distilled into statements about that reality. This supports the assertion that a discourse is 
a system of statements. The statements in a discourse can be grouped, and given certain 
coherence, insofar as they refer to the same topic. In this thesis, different systems of 
statements regarding disaster causality, in general, and floods, in particular, were found 
and analysed and these characterise the four discourses differently. Therefore it can be 
said  that  the  four  floods  discourses  are  embodied  in  the  following  statements:  a) 
´lessons  for  affected  people´,  b)  the  ´lack  of  precaution  and  maintenance  of  La 
Compañía Canal´, c) ´accidents of nature´ and d) ´social and political processes that are 
the outcome of urbanisation, corruption and lack of land use law enforcement´.        
I  analysed  rhetorical  elements  of  the  four  constructions  of  Chalco  Valley‘s 
problem,  namely  1)  Ignorance  of  hazards  and  of  unsafe  conditions,  2)  Failure  of 
infrastructure  and  sanitation  system  and  inadequate  monitoring  of  risk  object,  3) 
Unforeseen accidents of nature and of man-made systems that disrupt human systems, 
and 4) Exposure of  vulnerable people to hazards  is consequence of  socio-economic 
inequalities.  Rhetorical  analysis  provided  detailed  information  of  images  of  Chalco 
Valley  people,  the  Government,  hazards  and  La  Compañía  Canal  to  understand  the 
compelling nature of arguments and the construction of meaningful narratives intended 
to persuade and inform. The analysis also provided explanations of how the images 
served as backing for claims about the nature of Chalco Valley‘s floods. The appeals 
and values the images elicited were important to analyse because this provided socially 
acceptable basis for justifying the claims about the different four problem constructions 
and to imbue these claims with proper sense of weight and legitimacy.      
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Findings of the rhetorical analysis are important for policy making because they 
make us aware of whether the intended target populations are discursively constructed 
by  the  policy-relevant  subjects  or  not  and  how.  In  this  case,  awareness  of  Chalco 
Valley´s vulnerable people through their images can be of paramount importance when 
policy change is sought to really integrate people´s vulnerability on policy design and 
implementation. This somehow was found on the ´Exposure of vulnerable people to 
hazards  is  consequence  of  socio-economic  inequalities´  problem  and  the  policy 
interventions proposed because target people are constructed as vulnerable, deserving 
special attention. Vulnerability reduction goes beyond technical issues and attends to 
political factors. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that ´vulnerability´ that comprises 
´unsafe conditions´ and ´root causes´ is not that relevant within the prevalent policy 
making system in terms of eliciting policy responses that are oriented to reduce floods 
risk.  
At  the  same  time,  by  knowing  how  the  images  of  ´the  Government´  are 
constructed  by  the  same  Government  officials  and  policy  makers,  it  is  possible  to 
propose ways to improve floods risk communication because policy-relevant subjects 
will be in the position to understand that not all of these are equally perceived by the 
others. This step can be useful for making them aware about the position they hold 
within the different floods causality discourses. The analysis of knowledge claims of 
floods causality carried out in this research can also provide inputs to characterise the 
three social domains of disaster. The discourse of ´Inadvertence by ignorance´ is based 
on  the  belief  that  all  people,  regardless  their  socio-economic  status  and  cognitive 
abilities, can prevent floods by being aware of floods risk. The evidence used to support 
the claim that ´exposure to floods risk can be avoided or minimised, indicates that there 
is ´objective´ knowledge of the risk situation that everyone should have. This invokes 
the  ´universality´  of  knowledge  claims  of  floods  risk  and  its  prescriptive  role  for 
decision making in terms of educating the ´risk ignorants´.  
The universal value of floods risk knowledge found in this discourse in fact can 
be seen as an element that shapes the ´domain of disaster governance´ because it reflects 
political  motivations  regarding  the  legitimisation  of  policy  makers´  knowledge  for 
taking actions. The domain of disaster governance is also nurtured by this discourse in 
terms of what and how the policy target populations should be in ideal scenarios of 
´good planning´. It was also found that this domain integrates elements of the ´structural 
causality´ discourse in the sense that part of the explanation regarding flooding is based  
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on ´dynamic pressures´ such as illegal urbanisation due to migration of poor people who 
are unaware of floods risk.  
The discourse of ´inadvertence by carelessness´ clearly constructs objects that 
characterise the domain of science and disaster management because the claims alluded 
to  the  geophysical  processes  of  disaster  and  the  development  of  technology  for 
monitoring and tackling the ´natural´ hazards impact on hydraulic infrastructure. The 
evidence  used  to  support  the  claims  comes  from  scientific  and  technical  studies 
elaborated by CENAPRED and CNA. There is the belief that technology for hydraulic 
infrastructure will ultimately solve the ´inundations problem´. According to the policy 
makers´  claims,  the  intention  of  disaster  management  is  to  control  hazards  through 
rational planning and engineering measures.  
This type of knowledge of ´natural´ hazards is also used for the elaboration of 
disaster plans and emergency responses as the means for governing disaster. In this 
way, the discourse of ´accidental causality´ clearly characterises the domain of science 
and disaster management since it is expected that government institutions and families 
should act according the instructions CENAPRED and SEGOB provide on the basis of 
the  magnitude  and  likelihood  occurrence  of  heavy  rain  falls  and  inundations.  This 
discourse is also linked to the central assumption that states that local people can cope 
with emergencies, maximising their own capacities, resources, and social networks.  
The discourse of ´structural causality´ can be identified with the assumptions 
found  in  the  domain  of  disaster  governance  because  disaster  prevention  is  more  a 
political and social endeavour than a technical practice. The evidence used to back the 
claim that `disaster risk reduction can be realised by reducing poverty and ecological 
deterioration and political corruption´ points to the corruption in land use occupation as 
one of the central factors that drove illegal urbanisation and hence increased floods risk. 
The research also showed that there are no ´pure´ domains in terms of floods causal 
narratives but a mixture of argumentative and rhetorical elements that in fact erase the 
theoretical boundaries between all three domains regarding the evidence use and how it 
supports causality claims.    
The framework for analysing the discursive construction of ‗Floods Causality as 
a Policy Problem‘ in the social domains of disaster is a useful framework for carrying 
out  interpretive  analyses  of  causal  events  that  are  arguably  constructed  as  social 
problems. This is important because it gives analytical tools to explaining how different 
policy-relevant  subjects  value  and  assign  different  meanings  and  beliefs  to  social  
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problems. This framework also allows understanding the relationships between policy-
relevant  subjects´  claims  and  this  situation  can  become  the  ground  for  shared 
understandings for common definition and resolution of what is stated as ´a the most 
relevant problem´ to be solved.   
  This framework is a clear example of how an interpretive analytical tool can be 
developed and applied to policy analysis because it details the elements that a researcher 
can focuses on when seeking for explanations of how a discourse can be supported and 
legitimised  and  why.  Moreover,  by  highlighting  the  position  of  the  policy-relevant 
subject within an institution, this framework gives conceptual inputs to relate the main 
claims to institutions´ identities and the processes by which claims can be contested by 
other institutions. The examination of knowledge claims of disaster causality and the 
origin and use of evidence proved to be a practical way to unpack discourses and the 
discursive  ´proximity´  and  ´remoteness´  of  the  subjects  involved  in  a  particular 
argumentation situation. Thus, with the use of this interpretive tool one can seek to 
analyse  other  social  problems  where  usually  different  policy-relevant  subjects  are 
engaged  in  problems´  construction  and  transformation.  Therefore, the  reader  of  this 
thesis can get a theoretical frame and methodology to practice interpretive analysis of 
causal events.         
The  reading  of  Chapter  Six  ´Chalco  Valley´s  Floods  as  a  Disaster  Policy 
Problem:  The  Discursive  Construction´  can  be  important  for  analysts  and  academic 
researchers who seek examples of causal discourses at the policy level. This is relevant 
because the reader can gain an appreciation of how concrete argumentation can give rise 
to specific discourses. The explanation of how a problem is defined and legitimised 
through an argumentative process supports the idea that language matters at the policy 
sphere  and  that  ´reality´  is  discursively  constructed  with  regards  to  empirical 
information within an specific institutional arrangement like that of SINAPROC.     
The  framework  for  the  analysis  of  policy  responses  proves  to  be  useful  for 
explaining how policy problems shape policy responses. This is because this framework 
provides concrete argumentative means to unpack the logos, ethos, and pathos of the 
proposed interventions which are seen as right courses of action to solve specific social 
problems  such  as  Chalco  Valley‘s  floods  problem.  Moreover,  it  provides  ways  to 
undertake  interpretive  analysis  of  policy  implementation  and  can  be  regarded  as  an 
example  of  a  constructionist  reading  of  human  intervention  within  the  scope  of  an 
institutional  policy  system.  The  analysis  of  Chapter  Seven  exemplifies  how  an  
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interpretive policy analysis can expose the technical rationality of responses and how 
these operate in prescribing courses of action by neglecting, in almost all cases, the 
social factors of vulnerability and risk. This analysis also explains to what extent the 
Behavioural Paradigm is embedded in policy responses claims and how and why policy 
implementation  may  fail  by  not  recognising  vulnerable  people  as  the  policy  target 
population. This is important to consider for the policy-making process because it can 
give valuable information as to what can be done to change policy implementation, by 
identifying the political drivers and axiological assumptions of responses.    
 
Theoretical  and  methodological  contribution  of  the  thesis  and  areas  for  further 
research 
        
   This thesis contributes to the epistemological analysis of ´natural´ disaster by 
specifying the manner in which knowledge claims of disaster causality are constructed. 
It relates knowledge to its social producers and users which reflects the interest and 
culture of the disaster policy-relevant actors that conform the SINAPROC in Mexico. It 
contributes  to  the  existing  constructionist  knowledge  of  the  environment  because  it 
details the various ways ´nature´ and ´natural´ disaster is socially constructed through 
arguments and discourses. This thesis contributes to the existing debate on social nature 
by ´denaturalising´ ´natural´ disaster and establishing them as specific social products. 
This was done  by setting  forth  four components of the  process of construction that 
served as the basis for the development of the two analytical frameworks. This thesis 
enriches the constructionist epistemology of the social nature debate because it proposes 
research of ´natural´ disaster at the policy level by acknowledging how ´nature´ plays a 
role as social actors in disaster causality framing  and how ´nature´ has a rhetorical 
place in the politics of natural disaster discourses at the policy level in Mexico.   
This thesis also contributes to the growing body of knowledge of the interpretive 
policy analysis because it establishes concrete ways to develop a methodology that can 
be used to focus on meanings, beliefs and metaphors of policy arguments of causal 
events which are typical in the policy and politics arenas. This thesis also contributes to 
the sociology of the environment because it details how floods risk in Chalco Valley is 
the result of a claim making process, the claim themselves and the conceptual structure 
of  the  social  definition  of  floods  risk.  This  thesis  also  contributes  to  the  existing 
literature on water vulnerability and adaptation in Mexico because the description of the  
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situation  of  vulnerability  in  Chalco  Valley  highlights  the  need  to  recognise  flood 
vulnerability as a historic and socio-economic and political process in which solutions 
should be sought in social and political factors such as poverty and political corruption 
reduction and environmental rights and governance.    
The  two  analytical  frameworks  developed  in  this  thesis  contribute  to  the 
literature on post-structural understanding of the shaping of disaster and development 
discourse and how these links to policy choices and action. These represent new areas 
of  research  that  the  two  frameworks  open  when  seeking  to  establish  the  relation 
between policy subjects, institutions and policy measures. And finally, this thesis is a 
contribution to the understanding and analysis of ´natural´ disaster as social process in 
terms of their argumentative and discourse construction. Throughout this research  it 
became clear that, even though ´natural´ disaster are the result of physical and material 
changes  and  provokes  great  damages,  disaster  can  be  viewed  and  analysed  as  the 
product  of  the  interaction  between  language,  discourses,  arguments,  collective 
representations and interests. This thesis achieved the objective stated in Chapter One in 
terms of contributing to the understanding of disaster, risk and policy as social products.  
The  findings  of  this  research  might  be  of  interest  to  both  scientists,  policy 
makers, and other policy-relevant subjects because it explains how and why knowledge 
of  disaster  risk  and  disaster  differs  and  sometimes  conveys  in  the  policy  process. 
Making these subjects aware of this epistemological complexity might result in better 
understandings  regarding  disagreements  over  disaster  risk  problem  and  potential 
changes for resolving them.   
There  are  several  areas  for  the  development  of  further  research.  This  thesis 
characterised a landscape of discourses but provided only an exploratory explanation of 
how they were constructed. A major element for further research can be the analysis of 
how discourse come to exist through social interaction. In the field of disaster policy, 
more research work could be undertaken to provide an in-depth explanation of how 
people affected by disasters make sense of policy responses over a certain period of 
time when hazards hit vulnerable populations on a regular basis. This understanding 
might help overcoming communication and action barriers between policy makers and 
vulnerable  groups  when  designing  policy.  More  information  on  vulnerable  people‘s 
interpretations of risk and disaster might be useful for policy makers to re-frame the 
way  they  define  disaster  and  implement  responses.  A  comparative  study  between 
Chalco Valley‘s floods case and other cases of similar scale might also allow one to find  
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similarities  and  differences  regarding  the  use  of  evidence  for  constructing  disaster 
framings and justifying solutions.  Finally, the discussion of the interaction between lay 
policy and scientific knowledge could be further developed in terms of identifying the 
processes that shape common and different claims, establishing common points where 
policy change can be driven. This could contribute to the understanding of the dynamics 
on knowledge production on disaster risk and policy implications.  
 
Limitations of this Research 
    
One of the main limitations of this thesis revolves around the fact that the framework 
adopted may restrict the analysis by presenting discourse as a rational set of ideas that 
lead policy-making, bounding the research so that it may fall short of analysing the 
processes that shape discourses. Regarding the relationship between the discourse and 
its translation into policy and material change, for instance, the tensions between actor 
and structure in bureaucracies, learning as a top-down process of paternalistic control 
are not fully developed and represent a limitation to be addressed by future research. 
The  methodology  only  allows  for  the  reporting  of  respondents  views  and  these  are 
derived from formal interview and documentary review. In this sense, the discourses 
may be understood as surface stories rather than more complicated sub-text that drive 
policy. Nevertheless, this would require  a different  methodology and  more  in-depth 
interviewing or participant observation. In these two ways the framing of the research 
problem  limits  analysis  to  a  detailed  description  and  juxtaposition  of  dominant 
bureaucratic  discourses  rather  than  an  examination  of  the  power  asymmetries  and 
cultural contexts that shape surface and hidden discourses and the relation to policy, 
resistance and material action. These concerns can be addressed through future research 
and publications. 
  Moreover, there are some important themes that are just touched upon and could 
be further elaborated in future work. In this research I refer to ‗institutional learning‘ in 
passing but it should be highlighted that this is an important element of the shaping of 
discourses and it would be useful to expand this in further research with examples of 
learning or blocked learning; ideally learning leading to a change in institutions rather 
than technical procedures and tools being updated. For example, this thesis mentions 
CENAPRED as a  bridge  between science and policy and  it would  be  interesting to 
further explore what facilitates or hinders this role and how it shapes discourse and  
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policy.    In  addition,  the  notion  of  ‗self-protection‘  explained  in  Chapter  Seven  is 
identified  as  a  key  element  of  dominant  discourse  and  it  would  be  interesting  to 
acknowledge the implications for the social distribution of costs to adapt to risk and 
how this notion fits within the context of a paternalistic State. These among others are 
issues to be researched for future publications.    
The Chalco Valley‘s floods case proved to be an interesting one to document to 
unpack the construction of ´natural´ disaster at the policy level. To my knowledge no 
works  have  examined  the  argumentative  and  discursive  construction  of  disaster 
causality  let  alone  how  this  operates  for  Mexico.  This  thesis  hopefully  provided  a 
complete picture of this social process.  Certainly, collecting data of different nature and 
the  integration  of  a  case  study  proved  to  be  a  challenging  and  enriching  exercise, 
through which I hope to contribute to diverse strands of literature and themes, and more 
particularly  to  the  field  of  disaster  studies  and  the  social  constructionism  at  large. 
Although  the  realities  of  fieldwork  constrained  data  collection,  interviews  provided 
sufficient reliable evidence to complete the objectives that I set myself when initiating 
this  research.  However,  as  mentioned  earlier,  the  social  constructionism  perspective 
focuses on understanding and explaining how ´things´ come to ´exist´ through social 
interaction, so substantial findings are only applicable to the case of Chalco Valley‘s, 
though general statements and the frameworks constructed and the methodology used 
can applied to other settings.       
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
DECONSTRUCTION OF INTERVIEWEE´S ARGUMENTS OF CHALCO 
VALLEY´S FLOODS CAUSALITY 
 
1. Disaster Governance  
 
a.  Water Sector  
 
National Commission of Water (CNA) 
 
Figure 1. The structure of Miguel Aguayo‘s claims about Chalco Valley‘s floods causality 
 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
       
[1] Well… in general…it is 
a lesson we all know. 
 
 
              vs. 
 
 
 
 
[2] It was a surprise 
[Floods] for those who live 
there and finally [they] 
realised that there is a 
´living´ river 
 
 
 
 
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
We, the people who 
live in Mexico City, 
since ancient times, 
(know) that this is a 
flooding zone… and 
we have tried to 
control [past] 
inundations by any 
means… 
 
 
 
 
 
It is nature and the fact 
that people are not 
aware of the 
geographical and 
natural conditions 
when settling in a 
place is what puts them 
at risk. 
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
[Assumption] Aguayo 
recurs to the role of 
contextualized and 
experienced knowledge in 
perceiving inundations 
and shaping policy 
responses.  
 
Risk perception in 
explaining the disaster and 
the image of the affected 
people as victims of their 
own actions.  
 
[Assumption] It was a 
foreseen consequence that 
was ready to occur; the 
fate of the inhabitants that 
sooner or later would 
come.  
 
CNA had told them (to the 
affected inhabitants) that 
there was a ´living´ river 
 
They (affected people) are 
to be blamed for not 
paying attention to the 
information provided by 
CNA and not being aware 
of the risk.  
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
 Settlers liked to 
be here and to 
live that way 
[being exposed to 
flooding risk]. 
We have 
increased [the 
population size] 
and have tried to 
control 
inundations by 
various means. 
 
We have not to 
forget that the 
natural condition 
of that zone is for 
the river to be 
there, it has 
always been there 
and will be.  
 
 
The river is old 
and [during the 
flooding event] it 
recognised its 
own ancient 
riverbed 
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Figure 1. The structure of Davila Capiterucho´ s claims about Valley Chalco´s floods 
causality 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
[1] ―…and then an 
extraordinary water current 
of 22 m3 arrived…The night 
before it rain a lot in that zone 
and around 22 m3 in the river 
basin that includes San 
Francisco river and another 
one I don‘t remember right 
now…and then that created  
 
[2] A big hole that had not 
been detected before and due 
to the heavy rainfalls and the 
river current… the water level 
raised very fast and it went 
out through the cracks and 
since the hard structure (of 
the canal) is above the soft 
clay…that created the 
breakage …it was a hole in 
the wall and that is why many 
measures were 
implemented… 
 
 
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
 ―What happened is that the river 
was… full of sediments; it had 
only 25% of its carrying 
capacity.  
 
 
―The river‘s capacity was 
insufficient to cope with the 
increasing water flow…and 
because of the quality of the 
walls material (bordo) … (the 
water) it encountered a little 
geologic fault that, in this case, 
was a fissure and that provoked 
the river damage…‖  
 
But that is quite different from 
saying that any kind of direct 
responsibility can be attributed 
to someone…of course 
not…because CNA was doing 
their business, inspecting (the 
LCC) once in a while due to this 
problem that kind of task was 
being undertaken more often … 
 
 
…That means  sometimes nature 
show us what we should  had 
prevented, I repeat it once again  
it is a river that because of its 
geologic characteristics it is a 
complicated river that has 
threaten us… after June 2000 
there have been leakages with 
any rainfall, luckily  thanks to 
the integral  rehabilitation works 
and …we have explained to the 
local population that they have 
to learn how to live in constant 
anxiety because there will 
always be leakages because the 
river material is very, very 
treacherous …  
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
That was the 
information 
handled 
 
 
 
A mistake was 
committed: the river 
walls have been 
heightened, 
heightened and while 
doing that the walls 
become heavier and 
cannot hold their 
weight… they lack of 
a reliable structure… 
 
 
They committed a 
mistake…they built a 
rigid structure (a new 
wall) over a flexible 
structure (river walls), 
any engineer knows 
that you cannot seal the 
ground with cement…  
 
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
The river used to 
be ´glued´ to the 
(Elephant) hill 
flowing along its 
natural stream but 
over the years the 
river was diverted 
and (because of 
that) it has 
exhibited vertical 
and horizontal 
twists…it 
twists… 
 
 
 
 
In fact there is no 
one to blame, it is 
an extraordinary 
event that nobody 
could have 
foreseen…since 
many years ago 
no similar event 
had taken place  
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Figure 1. The structure of Francisco Patiño´ claims about Valley Chalco´s floods 
causality 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
[1] There was a problem on 
the left riverside of the La 
Compa￱ía river…the left 
wall collapsed and created 
a hole on the left riverside 
that caused…, obviously, 
the water…the water flow 
generated by the heavy 
rainfalls broke the 
wall…along 20 mts…and 
that flooded the colonias 
because they are adjacent 
and below the riverbed and 
the water reached 2mts and 
a half…  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
Mainly that happened as 
a consequence of the 
ground problematic in 
that zone and the 
extraordinary heavy 
rainfalls…and that 
combination  was what 
caused the wall breakage  
 
 
There is evidence of 
previous assessments 
(but) since then (after the 
floods of 2000) the 
(monitoring) system was 
set up and it detected that 
that (La Compañía river 
and adjacent areas) is a 
high risk prone zone… 
(and also because of the 
fact that the river is in the 
transition zone of two 
geologic structures: soft 
–that of the clayed 
ground- and hard –that of 
the ´Elephant hill…but 
yes, we have evidence…  
 
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We (CNA) have set a 
monitoring system [to 
detect changes in the 
inclination and behaviour 
of the structure (of the 
LCC), that is why we have 
evidence (of what 
happened)…the ground 
settlement is 
measured…to see whether 
the walls slope 
or not …how walls 
deform… and this [is 
because] obviously to the 
quality of the ground and 
soils in that zone.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
That is because 
extraordinary 
heavy rainfalls 
that never had 
happened in 
that way (never 
in the history of 
the region)  
 
 
 
…and that 
happens because, 
as we already 
mentioned, there 
are illegal 
(human) 
settlements close 
to the 
riverbed…illegal 
settlements that 
´arise´ without 
any planning and 
they end up 
putting pressure 
to the 
municipality 
authorities and 
sometimes to 
those of the state 
government so 
(local population) 
is allowed to 
dump waters  
into the 
riverbed…but in 
an uncontrolled 
way…and in 
consequence non 
authorized water 
discharges are 
permitted… and 
that happens in 
other places in 
Mexico 
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Figure 1. The structure of Gustavo Paz Soldán´ claims about Valley Chalco´s floods 
causality 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
[1] No, but there was no 
awareness about the severity 
of the situation in certain 
segments (of the LCC)… 
these walls that were 
damaged by the sinking 
underground and 
then….suddenly a failure 
(fault) occurs eh…? A fault 
occurs because the ground 
sinks, (canal walls) crack and 
the disaster takes place, no?  
 
 
Perhaps it was not foreseen, 
nobody could have imagined 
that that could happen but 
very good emergency aid was 
provided and since then the 
follow up with (prevention 
activities)… the problem was 
diagnosed, studied and it is 
(now) obviously clear. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
Yes, indeed…for so 
many years, that‘s why I 
started mentioning…,  
the great problematic of 
the Mexico Valley 
underground [sinking 
process] created adverse 
conditions for 
discharging those high 
water volumes coming 
from this zone of the 
City (eastern area of 
Mexico City) that has 
grown a lot…one 
solution was envisaged… 
population kept on 
growing a lot and a lot of 
people discharging their 
wastewaters…and the 
ground was sinking 
creating a differential 
structural 
situation…before the 
disaster normal 
inspection was carried 
out… 
 
 
… 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
(Undoubtedly we know) 
scientifically what the 
problem is…what is 
going on…we have 
detected it and therefore 
controlled it… 
 
The problem is that the 
ground is sinking very 
fast in that zone and that 
create cracks on the 
walls that could 
eventually generate a 
(big hole) crack…and 
of course for solving 
that the walls were 
reinforced and 
monitoring since the 
accident because it was 
not a disaster …we are 
trying to control the 
illness…the ill person 
has got aids…so illness 
cannot be eradicated…  
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REBUTTALS 
[It was said] that 
affected people 
got flooded with 
waste waters, but 
those were not 
completely 
wastewaters 
(aguas negras) 
because it was 
raining (they 
mixed with rain 
water) Thus, the 
water that 
polluted was not 
entirely waste 
water but mixed 
with rain water 
but obviously it 
was polluted and 
provoked the 
disaster… 
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Water Commission of the State of Mexico (CAEM) 
 
 
Figure 1. The structure of Edgardo Castañeda´ claims about Valley Chalco´s floods causality 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
 
 
[1]…An extraordinary storm 
generated a massive volume 
of water flow higher than the 
riverbed coping capacity of 
43 m/sec and… [it took 
place] in the transition zone 
where the terrain is sinking… 
 
 
 
[2] …leaks in one of the 
(canal) walls…here… (he 
shows a drawing) the canal 
curves and because of the 
storm and the leaks the wall 
weakened and couldn‘t cope 
with a high hydraulic 
pressure and …the wall 
failed and a lot of water 
spilled and affected many 
people 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
―-…and since the 
ground is sinking 
between 40 and 60 cms 
per year for the last 
years, the [canal] walls 
had to be heighten and 
the heightening of the 
walls has generated 
leaks or any other 
situation that is not 
monitored… 
 
 
 
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
 
 
―the official assessment 
reported that…‖   
 
 
…It is impossible to 
blame someone when it 
comes to extraordinary 
hydro-meteorological 
phenomena since many 
times the are no feasible 
[technical and economic] 
solutions…institutional 
response capacity for 
providing definitive 
solutions is constrained 
by the economy 
 
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Well… I think that 
it is very difficult 
to put the blame on 
someone when it 
comes to nature…  
 
 
 
 
 
…It is said that in 
past times leaking 
had occurred and 
were noticed by 
local people but 
that has passed 
unnoticed by 
authorities, 
nevertheless I can 
tell you that the 
same kind of 
situation had 
occurred and 
nothing serious 
happened by 
then… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  360 
Descentralised Body of Drinking Water and, Sewage System  
and Sanitation of Chalco Valley (ODAPAS) 
 
Figure 1. The structure of Óscar Zavala´ claims about Valley Chalco´s floods causality 
 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
[1] In that time May 30 to 
June 1
st La Compañía Canal 
fractured which is a very 
important canal that collects 
waste and rain waters flowing 
down from San Martín 
Huixtoco, San Rafael, Chalco 
and the human settlements of 
the region; the LCC was 
loaded and since it fractured it 
flooded the colonias San 
Isidro, Avándaro, El Triunfo 
a to a lesser extent La 
Providencia.   
 
[2] Unstated conclusion 
Due to the topographic 
conditions and the fact that 
the Canal  is above ground 
level the sewage system of 
Chalco Valley cannot cope 
with rainfall water and the 
waster waters dumped by the 
growing population settled in 
the different colonias of the 
Valley 
 
 
 
 
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two pumping stations 
are not enough and due 
to their characteristics 
they cannot cope with 
such volume of both rain 
and waste waters…One 
of the pumps relies on 
electricity so when the 
energy is cut the diesel 
pump starts working… it 
is not a reliable system… 
Imagine if the energy is 
gone for two hours, 
waster waters would 
spring up through the 
house drains…in 
 
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
 The local inhabitants 
witnessed and were 
affected by the LCC 
fracture, according to 
them the canal broke 
and it didn‘t spill over 
as some other people 
(like politicians) 
affirmed. 
 
 
―(LCC) It fractured that 
is why we designed our 
Contingency Plan…‖ 
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
 Chalco Valley is 
a saucepan… it is 
a Valley like a 
kind 
of…saucepan 
and all waste and 
rain waters are 
pumped into the 
La Compañía 
Canal and from 
there to the Gran 
Canal that is why 
we have a lot of 
problems because 
even tough the 
sewage system 
works…we can‘t 
say that it works 
perfectly but it 
can‘t cope with 
when heavy 
rainfalls 
 
 
 
 
 
Discharge fee is 
not covered by 
the households 
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1.2 Civil Protection Sector 
 
General Director of Civil Protection of the State of Mexico 
Figure 1. The structure of 
Arturo Vilchis´ claims 
about Valley Chalco´s 
floods causality I propose 
that 
 
CLAIM 
 
 
[1] ―That happened because 
La Compañía Canal (LCC) is 
a very old canal…‖ Stated 
conclusion (SC) 
 
 
 
[2] ―…a section of the canal 
is especially problematic; it is 
7 km. long between the 
Chalco  Valley and Ixtapaluca 
area…‖  
 
[3] ―-…what happened is that 
once in a while (LLC walls 
cracks) and (wastewaters) leaked 
through it…, so we have to 
permanently inspect it and if we 
detect one of those leakages, we 
fix it immediately…  
 
[4] ―…but that day (1
st June 
2000)  the leakage was not  
detected and in a matter of few 
hours water filtrations increased 
and created a huge hole through 
which the water flowed out and 
the water volume increased 
[flooding the area]‖ 
given that  
 
DATA 
 
 
―(LCC)… is located in 
an ex-lacustrine  region 
where the Chalco, 
Zumpango and Texcoco 
Lakes existed… then at 
the beginning of last 
century (XX) the lake 
was drained…an  
hacienda (La Compañía) 
was set up and used the 
river (which turned into 
the LCC) to get rid of its 
waste waters‖  
 
 
 
 
―…because that is a ex-
lacustrine zone I referred 
to and due to the nature 
of its soils it sinks 
unevenly and [because of 
that] LCC ´moves´ and 
even though it never 
reached its carrying 
capacity (35 m3 /sec), its 
historical peak was 27 
m3/sec…, anyway it 
carries a lot of water and 
LCC moves all the 
time… [it is a natural 
open sewage canal, not a 
man-made canal]…   
 
 
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
WARRANTS 
 
[assumption] From the 
outset the statement: “I 
have the information” 
functions as the warrant to 
justify the claim from data 
provided.  
 
 
 
Technical reports of the 
topographic and ground 
sinking process and the 
LCC canal capacity in that 
region.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Vilchis, 
CNA did not detect the 
leakage and may partially 
be blamed.  
 
 
BACKINGS  
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Director of the Risk Atlas, State of Mexico  
 
Figure 1. The structure of Mario Alvarez´ claims about Valley Chalco´s floods causality 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
 
[1] Ah, in the river...It was 
a big hole [in the LCC 
walls] and they tried to 
block it...that situation 
blew...and the highway got 
flooded as well as the 
colonias in both sides of 
the highway 
 
 
[2] What provoked the 
inundations was… that the 
LCC couldn‘t cope with 
the exceeding volume of 
water (exceeded by 9m3 
sec) …in part because that 
prior to the floods in a 
segment of the canal 
rectification works were 
being undertaken and were 
not properly done… 
 
 
[3] This time the canal over 
spilled because of the 
heavy rainfalls that 
provoked the increase in 
the waste waters flow and 
also because the rubbish 
dumped reduces the canal 
channel 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…what happens is that 
due to its design and 
infrastructure [condition] 
the LCC is outdated and 
couldn‘t cope with all the 
increasing water flow 
that comes down from 
many upstream 
colonias...  
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
 
We participated in the 
evaluation of the damages 
that is why we have the 
information…  
 
 
State of Mexico makes 
also recommendations for 
avoiding further damages 
(That is what they call risk 
evaluation. The 
recommendation is based 
on topographic 
considerations, mainly)  
 
 
People who live (In 
Chalco´s Valley near the 
canal) are to be blamed 
for dumping rubbish and 
also the LCC is blamed 
for carrying increasing 
volumes of waters…  
 
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
 
…because all are 
discharging their 
wastewaters into 
the LCC and 
nowadays is 
insufficient... and 
along the years the 
LCC walls were 
´lifted´ that made 
the canal more 
fragile to the 
flows… 
 
…and because all 
the maintenance 
works never are on 
time...and those are 
only corrective 
works instead of 
being 
preventive...CNA 
is not doing their 
job the way they 
should (inspecting 
the LCC)  and 
CNA doesn‘t give 
us notice of what is 
going on ...LCC 
just reached its 
limits and there 
was a potential 
danger of 
overspilling 
 
CNA is not 
working well 
And the 
municipality 
government for 
allowing 
settlements... there 
is no control for 
people for settling 
in flood prone 
terrains. 
Poor people ended 
up settling in the 
river margins and 
get the plot in a 
clandestine way;   
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Metropolitan Civil Protection Commission, representative of the State of Mexico 
Government.    
 
Figure 1. The structure of Mireya Mercado´s claims about Valley Chalco´s floods causality 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
 
[1] Canal breakage and 
inundations…housing is 
built under the Canal level, 
waste waters and hence it 
occurred a disaster. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
 
LCC infrastructure was not 
the adequate ...lack of 
adequate maintenance for 
coping with 
rainfalls…besides people 
lack of education and they 
dump rubbish into the canal 
so it gets blocked… 
 
Chalco Valley is bad 
designed…there are zones 
without drainage 
system…Government 
doesn‘t provide services 
because (people are) 
located in high risk zones. 
When disaster occur people 
get upset and demand 
housing and plots…. 
 
Government was informed 
but they didn‘t do anything 
People expected help from 
government but to what 
extent is the government 
obliged to respond and 
provide services to people 
settled in risk zones?  
Social and political costs 
are high. People land 
(paracaidas) and then it is 
quite difficult (to evict 
them)  
 
CNA , the Canal was not in 
good conditions the way it 
should be…so many things 
converge…  
 
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
I am not aware 
whether the 
people bought the 
plots at low cost 
knowing the risk 
and their needs.  
Some people take 
advantage of the 
situation and get 
4 or 5 plots even 
if they don‘t live 
there 
Whereas there are 
others who are 
poor and don‘t 
have where to 
go… it is about 
extreme poverty 
conditions.  
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General Director of Civil Protection of the Federal Government  
Figure 1. The structure of Oswaldo Flores´ claims about Valley Chalco´s floods causality 
 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
 
[C1] Heavy rainfalls,  
mainly heavy rainfalls 
were the causes; of 
course with the natural 
escurrimientos, the 
sinking process the 
Valley has undergone for 
many years and also 
because of the technical 
aspects that are explained 
there [in the official 
report]  
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
 
Unstated evidence that 
the interviewee assumes 
the interviewer already 
possesses. Flores refers 
to the official reports in 
order to avoid discussion 
about responsibility and 
blame.  
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
  
The official report gives 
to the Flores legitimacy 
to justify the claim. This 
can be considered an 
authoritative warrant 
and therefore an 
argument since [it can 
be assumed by the way 
he talks and read the 
document] the 
reliability of source is 
warranted and 
uncontested…  
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
 
I think that when 
a natural disaster 
takes place and 
causes a critical 
situation…one 
has to look for 
solutions instead 
of culprits  I 
don‘t dare to say 
…I am not a 
researcher  nor 
would like to 
judge; In my 
work I have to 
provide solutions, 
to make solutions 
work…I don‘t 
seek culprits… 
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General Coordinator of Civil Protection 
 
Figure 1. The structure of Carmen Segura´ claims about Valley Chalco´s floods causality 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
[1] ―Chalco´s floods were a 
disaster…‖ Unstated 
conclusion (SC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
―...yes, that‘s what 
happens when 
populations settle in 
unsuitable places to live‖  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
―…it is very easy to 
realise that those places 
are unsuitable to live in; 
… even despite the lack of 
sanitation infrastructure 
and (urban) services 
politicians disregard that 
fact and arrange ´social´ 
commitments with poor 
people and allow them to 
settle there and grant them 
deed titles…‖ 
 
―…poor people are forced 
to live there and they are 
not aware of risk that is 
why they ended up 
settling there...and at the 
end of the day, politicians 
have to accept that 
situation and tolerate 
those people because they 
are unable to evict them… 
that happens everywhere‖  
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So that is why 
policy has to be 
designed in terms 
of convincing 
people to live at 
risk, otherwise 
prevention cannot 
be achieved. 
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Former General Coordinator of Civil Protection 
 
Figure 1. The structure of claims of Oscar Navarro about Valley Chalco´s floods causality 
 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
 [C1] Well… what I can say 
is that the canal couldn‘t 
stand a high volume of 
water flow, it broke and 
part of Chalco got flooded.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
Let us remember that 
Chalco is a lacustrine zone, 
it was a lake…people used 
to travel by ships and boats 
during the XIX and XX 
century then [it is still] a 
flooding area…  
 
…and if you jump on the 
other side of the Canal you 
encounter an urban zone 
that is below the canal 
level…  
 
it is a lacustrine zone that 
naturally gets 
flooded…with the aid of 
the canal management 
water has been (rightly) 
diverted …therefore 
settlements would have 
never existed there… and 
what happened is that it got 
flooded there and many 
blocks inundated  
 
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
The inundations claim is 
based on his personal 
experience. At the time of 
the inundations he was the 
General Coordinator of 
Civil Protection at Federal 
level and that allowed him 
to coordinate emergency 
responses. His accounts of 
the floods and how he 
frames the causality are 
influence by what was 
done during the 
emergency stage in order 
to fix the mechanical 
problem of the canal and 
to cope with the serious 
situation.  
 
 
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
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1.3 Environmental Sector 
 
 
Undersecretary of Ecology, State of Mexico 
 
Figure 1. The structure of Adolfo Mejía´ claims about Valley Chalco´s floods causality 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
[1] Unstated conclusion 
that is left to the reader‘s 
interpretation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
In Chalco many things 
mixed together…urban 
planning without 
environmental 
criteria…authorities 
allowed illegal 
settlements in risk zones 
and of course a deficient 
policy regarding natural 
resources management 
that contributed to basin 
deterioration, 
deforestation, wind and  
water erosion causing 
canal 
sedimentation…and the 
(conditioning) things 
that, you know, were 
present for inundations to 
take place…  
 
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
 Politicians and policy 
makers pursue their own 
interests without 
protecting the common 
goods  
 
The authoritarian political 
culture…it is a top-down 
decision making where no 
other opinion is allowed 
but only that of the boss. 
 
[unstated assumption] 
Ecological planning of 
urban settlements has to 
be mainstreamed in land 
use planning  
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
(It was because) 
a complete lack 
of planning 
(environmental 
aspects were not 
considered) only 
urban issues 
mattered… 
  
 
People settled 
where they were 
allowed so they 
voted for the 
politicians that 
provided the 
plots…within the 
vicious Mexican 
system  
And all political 
parties behave 
like that (PRI, 
PAN, PRD) 
because that is 
the political 
culture Because 
we all grew up 
like that ...PAN 
followers are also 
like them… 
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Environmental Metropolitan Commission, representative of the State of Mexico 
 
Figure 1. The structure of César Reyna´ claims about Valley Chalco´s floods causality 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
[1] Even though I have 
little information about 
hydraulic infrastructure… 
…For sure… It was a 
problem caused by the lack 
of maintenance, of 
sediments accumulation 
that reduced the riverbed 
along with an extraordinary 
storm that loaded the river 
and this provoked the 
breakage…and of course 
all problems regarding 
social inequalities in that 
zone arose we all know… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
In that zone, out of the 
blue (during Carlos 
Salinas‘s administration) 
that area -Chalco Valley 
settlements- didn‘t exist 
and let‘s say it is a 
stream, a natural lake and 
in the moment that there 
is a breakage it simple 
flows to its natural 
riverbed and that leads us 
to problems… 
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
 The uses a disclaimer 
by saying that he 
lacks of technical 
information regarding 
the LCC 
infrastructure. 
 
Immigration to that 
region increased 
notoriously and 
government couldn‘t 
provide adequate and 
sufficient 
infrastructure. 
 
LCC analysis has to 
integrate the national 
dimension of urban 
and regional policies 
since immigration is a 
conditioning factor of 
disaster risk 
construction.  
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
People settled 
where they can. 
 
Mexico City has 
always attracted 
many immigrants 
from all parts of 
the Republic and 
thereafter during 
the 70´s the 
neighbouring 
municipalities of 
the State of 
Mexico received 
many immigrants 
because Mexico 
City couldn‘t 
afford to welcome 
them.  
A national policy 
has, since long time 
ago, favored 
Mexico City needs 
providing more 
resources than to 
the State of Mexico 
disregarding the 
urban and regional 
dynamics of the 
neighbouring 
municipalities of 
the State of Mexico. 
That has 
contributed to 
immigration 
increase into the 
State of Mexico. 
State of Mexico 
depends on the 
federal government 
with regards to 
those problems.    
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General Director of Environmental Policy and Planning, SEMARNAT. 
Figure 1. The structure of Luis Bojóquez´ claims about Valley Chalco´s floods causality 
 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
[1] It was a terrible 
misfortune… [I was driving 
back to Mexico City from 
Puebla City when I got 
stranded for six or seven 
hours and at that time I didn‘t 
know what was going on…] 
and then I came across 
information that it was this 
canal (LCC) rupture and this 
inundation and population 
was flooded by shit, it is a 
shame that We have rivers of 
shit… 
 
 
[2] There was not (LCC) 
maintenance, It was not a 
natural disaster…it was a 
misfortune, a disaster but a 
man-made (artificial) disaster 
as far as I can see… 
 
 
 
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
The water and sanitation 
management in Mexico 
is so bad that we are 
going to get flooded with 
shit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As far as I know it was 
not because of heavy 
rains because it didn‘t 
rain extraordinarily, nor 
Mexicans didn‘t take 
more shit than any other 
day 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
 We live in an endorreic 
basin which is prone to 
flooding so sooner or 
later it is going to get 
flooded…you don‘t 
have to be a genius to 
know it  
 
Water policies in 
Mexico are 
schizophrenic  
 
 
 
A great city, Chalco that 
it is already a 
municipality and all this 
can be traced back to 
past times so it is going 
to get flooded…so there 
is no way this zone is 
not getting inundated 
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
 
 
 
Because basic 
needs have not 
been met namely 
we don‘t treat 
wastewaters in 
the source and 
besides that being 
an inundations 
problem because 
you loose your 
belongings is also 
a serious problem 
of public 
health…of 
illnesses…everyt
hing gets 
mixed… imagine 
what those canals 
carry 
 
 
And that 
happened 
because there are 
many public 
official, 
bureaucrats who 
are not doing 
their job 
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 1.4 Urban Development and Planning Sector 
 
Figure 1. The structure of Alejandro Rodríguez´ claims about Valley Chalco´s floods causality 
 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
 
[1] The river spilled 
over…yes…unexpectedly…I 
should say it was a problem 
of waste waters discharges or 
something like that… I am 
not pretty sure of what 
happened but several colonias 
got flooded   
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
 
I guess…rainfall, rainfall 
I don‘t remember. Heavy 
rainfalls increased the 
river flow and since it 
was a wastewaters 
canal…that spilled 
over…   
 
 
 
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
 
Newspapers accounts are 
the information sources of 
Rodríguez.  
 
 
 
 
[Assumption] 
Official scientific-
technical reports are not 
enough for adequate 
explanations in disaster 
causality in an unequal 
society where there are no 
real choices for avoiding 
risk exposure. Those 
reports are commonly 
used to explain causes and 
consequences of disaster 
and isolate the damaged 
area.  
 
 
[Unstated assumption] 
There is no point for 
understanding what 
happened in the LCC if 
there is no other 
information regarding the 
socio-economic roots 
causes that made people to 
live in a risk environment.  
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
Society can be 
blamed… 
 
But you‘ll have to 
find out why the 
LCC flooded, 
where did it 
originate… and I 
don‘t only mean in 
terms of physical 
failures but it can 
be traced back to 
decisions made 50 
years ago… in 
those days there 
was nothing…only 
one little stream 
and over the years 
things evolve and 
you let them 
happen… 
 
….Who is the 
direct culprit, 
perhaps a 
government 
employee who 
didn‘t care about it 
[LCC] You can 
always find 
culprits who are 
not really 
culprits…You 
cannot point to the 
culprit when a 
water pipe  on the 
street gets 
broken…a driver 
with his car 
passing by and 
stepping over the 
pipeline…or the 
guy who installed 
the water pipe… I 
should say there 
are no culprits or 
everyone is culprit 
 
Who is the culprit? 
Who knows…Who  
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are the culprits for 
world‘s 
problems… and I 
can say since 
Adam and Eve the 
problem mess 
started… 
 
Corruption culture 
(as a way of doing 
things in Mexico) 
allowed illegal 
settlements in risk 
areas and no 
control over land 
market is exerted. 
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1.5 Mexican Oil Company (PEMEX)  
 
Figure 1. The structure of Rafael Fernández´ claims about Valley Chalco´s floods causality 
 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
[1] Inundations´ main 
cause is the oversight of 
the canal…the [lack] of a 
good management 
(programme) of an open air 
canal… 
 
 
 
[2] … The canal brakes and 
floods a lot of people with 
waste waters with the high 
likelihood of causing 
health problems  
 
 
 
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
Chalco Valley‘s is an 
example of the worst 
sanitation management 
of waste waters in an 
open canal under very 
difficult 
conditions…besides, the 
canal is above (the 
ground)  
 
 
Trying to find the culprit 
is very difficult… when 
the canal was designed 
many years ago, there 
was no one living in 
Chalco Valley…what 
happened is the result of 
the lack of land use 
planning and 
uncontrolled settlement  
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
 Any risk analysis 
would indicate that a 
huge problem would 
come up…Risk could 
have been foreseen  
…Nobody cares about 
the potential risk it may 
potentially pose  
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
Because there is 
no (land use) 
planning…people 
got there and 
settled…since the 
beginning of the 
settlement people 
has been exposed 
to risk and the 
living conditions 
were very bad 
because there is 
no urban 
planning and 
people settle 
where they can 
instead of settling 
where they 
should… 
 
…For me the 
main cause is the 
lack of 
planning… (that) 
triggered an 
anarchical urban 
growth and 
nobody cares 
about the 
potential risk it 
poses… 
 
In Mexico the 
lack of waste 
waters treatment 
in situ makes it to 
be carried away 
from the 
sources… there is 
no point in 
´transporting´ 
waste waters…  
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2. Science and Disaster Management 
2.1 National Centre of Disaster Prevention 
 
Director of Research 
Figure 1. The structure of Sergio Alcocer´s claims about Valley Chalco´s floods causality 
 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
[1] the weakening of the wall, 
water excess in the LCC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[2] Finally, we got an 
inundation, in a flooding zone 
that it was known that it was 
a flooding zone… 
 
 
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite the fact that 
there was a land use 
plan, illegal settlements 
populated Chalco; 
authorities allowed this 
to happen to avoid social 
uprising and problems; 
what they do are to pave 
roads, provide electricity; 
and at the end we have 
this zone inundated; it 
was known that Chalco 
was a flooding area. 
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
―...we know what was 
published, what 
happened...There is a 
report elaborated by the 
Institute of Engineering in 
the UNAM, Ramón 
Domínguez…we 
participated in the 
elaboration of the 
assessment of this…and 
we sent it to the CNA…‖  
 
 
...There are laws and 
regulations concerning the 
land occupation people 
have to obey and endorse. 
One serious negative 
obstacle civil protection 
has to face is the lack of 
law enforcement...‖ 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
―... in Mexico is 
illegal to live in 
high risk zones 
but due to 
impunity and 
corruption illegal 
settlements 
occupy those 
zones...‖ 
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Researcher of Social Issues 
Figure 1. The structure of Daniel Bitrán´ claims about Chalco´s Valley floods causality 
 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
[1] It is a typical case…It 
could have been foreseen in 
advance by monitoring the 
[waste] water levels…and 
how that could be affected 
with forecasted rainfalls and 
by [evaluating] the canal 
walls [physical 
condition]…evidently, isn‘t 
it? It was simply a lack of 
precaution… 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
[That happened] 
because of the increase 
in the volume waters 
that ´found´ a 
vulnerable exit and kept 
on undermining [the 
canal wall] until it 
broke it…how many 
years have passed…[it 
was not known] in what 
condition it was (the 
canal wall) 
 
 
 
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
 Cenapred carry out 
evaluations of the 
event to explain what 
could have caused the 
floods and in 
particular about the 
impact of heavy 
rainfalls in the canal.  
 
Cenapred is not in 
charge of the canal 
maintenance…[only of 
disaster impact 
evaluation] 
 
Let‘s accept that nature 
manifest in extreme 
variations… 
 
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
 …There is no 
planning in the long 
run and that happens 
quite frequently; if 
one thinks in the long 
run one has to carry 
out prevention 
[measures ] 
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Coordinator of Capacity Building and Training of CENAPRED 
Figure 1. The structure of Gloria Ortiz Espejel´ claims about Valley Chalco´s floods causality 
 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
[1]. ―... [t]he overspilling of 
the Bordo de Xochiaca, It got 
damaged, it got crackings on 
its walls and that provoked 
the floods in a vast area of 
Chalco Valley, an area I don‘t 
remember how vast it was...‖ 
[she mistaken the name of 
LCC by Bordo de Xochiaca 
which is another canal not 
located in the Chalco region ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
It is a long explanation of 
causal factors of two 
types:  
1) an spotted and very 
concrete problem in the 
physical features of the 
LCC and  
2) allowance (by local 
authorities) large 
settlements adjacent or 
close to a hydraulic 
infrastructure that was 
not meant to support 
water peaks without 
having a maintenance 
programme.  
       
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
According to Gloria 
Espejel, technical and 
social issues reports were 
drafted intended to 
explain the happenings.  
 
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
The relation 
between 
population 
growth-migration 
into the State of 
Mexico 
neighbouring 
municipalities 
and a lack of 
adequate policy 
responses.  
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3. Local knowledge and coping practices  
 
NGO Caritas 
Figure 1. The structure of Alejandro Hoyos´ claims about Valley Chalco´s floods causality 
 
I propose that 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
[1] [Not referring to the 
particular case]: ―…disaster 
develop, they don‘t arise 
spontaneously, and they are 
the total sum of risks, 
vulnerabilities, threats that 
turn the equation…into a 
disaster, isn‘t it? 
 
[2] Unstated conclusion 
[canal] walls breakage 
 
given that  
 
 
DATA 
 
IF you set up 
communities in plains, IF 
you do it without 
adequate sanitation and 
rain drainage, IF… you 
put people close to the 
canal of those 
dimensions without 
providing proper 
maintenance, IF you lack 
of a monitoring system 
to warn people about the 
canal flow 
behaviour…IF you sum 
up all these factors that 
trigger a disaster and… I 
think all that led to 
[canal] walls breakage 
and caused this disaster 
 
 
And since the 
rule/principle that   
 
WARRANTS 
 
Experienced knowledge 
of the inundations by the 
affected people appears to 
be the basis of the 
warrant.    
 
[assumption] No 
regulations and adequate 
land use planning were 
put into place since the 
inception of the 
communities in the 
Chalco Valley‘s region  
 
 
 
BACKINGS 
 
This disaster that 
[had] developed 
30 years ago 
when 
communities 
settled there, 
when that 
infrastructure was 
designed, when 
regulations were 
not 
observed/enforced 
or there were 
none… then the 
total sum of those 
factors resulted on 
[what we 
know]… current 
administration is 
not to be blamed 
nor the former 
one…[this 
problem origin] 
has many years of 
development, 
negligence and a 
bunch of culprits 
that should be 
legally punished 
because of [no 
action] made 
them accessories 
of one thing that 
originated from 
the beginning…‖ 
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                 APPENDIX II 
FINAL FIELDWORK QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
Questionnaire for policy makers and governmental officials 
 
 
0.  My presentation 
 
I am Fernando Aragón, a PhD student of the University of London, England. I am 
doing a research about natural disaster within the Mexico policy system. The 
objective of the interview is to know your view and opinion about them. The 
information you provide is very important for my research and will be used only for 
academic purposes. I thank you very much for your collaboration. 
 
A.  General information about the interviewee.  
 
1.  What is your name?  
2.  What is your academic background? 
3.  Could you please provide details about your position?  
4.  What is your job about? 
5.  What are the main functions of your institution/office/organisation? 
6.    Since when have you worked in this institution?   
 
B. Conceptualisation  of  natural  disaster  and 
environmental risk  
 
1.  How do you define natural disaster? 
2.  How do/would you approach/study natural disaster? (It depends on whether the 
interviewee  works  in  the  ―disaster  policies‖  sector or  in  the  ―other  policies‖ 
sector) 
3.  Why?  
4.  How do you define environmental risk? 
5.  What makes people be exposed to environmental risk? 
6.  Do  you  think  that  there  are  some  groups  who  are    more  exposed  to 
environmental risk than others? 
7.  If yes, why?  
8.  Do you think that certain groups in society are more vulnerable to and affected 
by natural disaster?  
9.  If yes, why?  
10. What  is  your  opinion  about  the  difference  between  environmental  risk  and 
environmental vulnerability? 
 
III. Natural disaster policy system: formulation and implementation 
 
A.  Policies formulation  
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1.  Could you identify the policies that are directly and indirectly relevant to the 
prevention of natural disaster?  
2.  Which policies within your institution deal directly or indirectly with natural 
disaster?  
3.  What are  the goals of such policies? 
4.  What are the means to achieve such goals? 
5.  What are the main problems to be solved by those policies? 
6.  Why? 
7.  What kind of knowledge is used in the formulation of  those policies? 
8.  What  is  the  importance  of  scientific-technical  knowledge  for  formulating 
those policies? 
9.  Do you know which other  institutions/agencies/community of experts are 
involved in formulating natural disaster policies?  
10. Is there a relationship between those institutions and yours? 
11. How is the relationship between those institutions and yours when it comes 
to formulating natural disaster policies? 
12. Which other institutions/agencies/community of experts should be involved 
in formulating natural disaster policies? 
13. Why? 
 
 
B. Policies implementation 
 
1.  Which  institutions/agencies  are  involved  in  implementing  natural  disaster 
policies? 
2.  What are the main outcomes/actions of natural disaster policies? 
3.  Who are the main beneficiaries of natural disaster policies? 
4.  Who should be the main beneficiaries of natural disaster policies? 
5.  Why? 
6.  Which  other  institutions/agencies,  you  think,  should  be  involved  in 
implementing natural disaster policies? 
7.  Why? 
8.  What  other  measures  and/or  policies  should  be  adopted to  deal  with  natural 
disaster? 
9.  Why? 
 
IV.  Evaluation of natural disaster policies  
 
1.  What is your opinion about the policies you have already referred to?  
2.  Do you think they are adequate/inadequate for dealing with natural disaster?  
3.  Why? 
4.  How do the policies you already mentioned affect the intended beneficiaries?  
 
V.  Chalco´s floods and policy makers´ interpretations 
 
1.  What happened in Chalco on the 1
st June 2000?  
2.  In your opinion, what caused the floods?  
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3.  Could you provide concrete evidence for explaining the event?  
4.  Is there someone to blame for?  
5.  Who?   
6.  Why? 
7.  What should  be done concerning the La Compañía Canal and Valley of Chalco? 
8.  Why? 
9.  What kind of policy measure would be adequate for dealing with this problem? 
10. Why? 
 
Questionnaire for Valley of Chalco, Chalco and Ixtapaluca people 
 
0. My presentation 
 
I am Fernando Aragón, a student of the University of London, England. I am doing a 
research about the inundations of June, 2000 that took place in Valle of Chalco. The 
objective of the interview is to know your experience and opinion about them. The 
information you provide is very important for my research and will be used only for 
academic purposes. I thank you very much for your collaboration. Your identity will 
remind confidential is you wish so. 
I. General information about the interviewee. Local people‘s perception/interpretation 
about their colonia, dwelling and household.  
 
A General characteristics of the interviewee and his/her household. 
 
6.  What is your name?  
7.  Your age?  
8.  Your occupation?  
9.  How many people live in the house?  
10. Who are your relatives?  
11. How many of them work? 
12. Who takes the decisions about how the money is spent?  
13. Where were you born?  
14. Are you a nahua? An otomí? Or…?  
15. From which other indigenous group are you? 
16. Where did you live before coming toValle de Chalco? 
17. Why did you move to Valle de Chalco? 
18. For how long have you been living here?  
19. Are you the owner of the house?  
20. Are you the owner of the plot? 
21. Is there piped water inside the house? 
22. Is there a sewage system? 
23. How does it work?  
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B. Physical setting  
 
1.  How do you find your colonia?  
2.  Do you like it?  
3.  Why?  
4.  What do you dislike of your colonia?  
5.  Why? 
6.  What changes would you make it?  
7.  Why? 
 
II. Valle of Chalco´s floods and environmental risk: local people‘s interpretations and 
beliefs. 
 
A. Disaster 
 
11. What happened in your neighbourhood on the 1
st June 2000?  
12. In your opinion, what caused the floods?  
13. Is there someone to blame for?  
14. Who?   
15. Why? 
16. To you, what is a disaster?  
17. Why do you think disaster/ or tragedies occur?  
 
B. Disaster impact and affected people 
 
1.  Were you and other members of your household affected?  
2.  How?  
3.  Were the family members relations affected?  
4.  How? 
5.  Do you know other people in the colonia who were also affected?  
6.  How were they affected? 
7.  Why? 
8.  How do you feel living near the La Compañía Canal?  
9.  Did you ever think that the La Compañía Canal would break and would provoke 
such floods? 
10. Why? 
11. How long before the incident? 
 
 
III. Relationship between local people and the government 
 
B.  Institutional  responses  for  assisting  affected  people  and  local  people 
organisations 
 
1.  Can you tell me, what did the municipality do in the aftermath of the disaster?  
2.  Where? 
3.  Were their actions/activities adequate/inadequate?    
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4.  Why?      
5.  Who else participated in assisting the affected people?  
6.  Where? 
7.  Were their actions/activities adequate/inadequate?   
8.  Why? 
9.  Do you know if some local groups participated in assisting the affected people?   
10. Who?  
11. Where?  
12. How? 
13. Did  you receive support or assistance  from relatives,  friends or non affected 
people?  
14. How was it? 
B. Claim making process and authorities´ responses 
 
1.  Did  you  know  about  claims  addressed  by  people  to  authorities  before  the 
tragedy?  
2.  To whom were they addressed? 
3.  Who made them? 
4.  How were the claims?  
5.  Did you address claims to public authorities?  
6.  Did you make it by yourself or along with someone else/ group of people?  
7.  How? 
8.  What were the authorities´ responses/actions? 
9.  Did these responses fulfill your expectations?  
10. Why?  
11. Why do you think they responded the way they did?  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
C. Disaster prevention and mitigation activities 
 
1.  What has the municipality done about the Canal since the floods? 
2.  Were their actions/activities adequate/inadequate?   
3.  Why?      
4.  What has the municipality done for preventing future disaster? 
5.  Are their actions/activities adequate/inadequate? 
6.  Why? 
7.  Do you or your neighbours participate in activities for preventing disaster?  
8.  Why? 
9.  What have you done inside your house to face future floods?  
10. Do you think the Canal will break again?  
11. Why? 
12. Is there something you would like to add?  
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APPENDIX III  
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
   
A. FINAL FIELDWORK. 
 
I.  ENVIRONMENT  
 
Nombre  Institution  Dependencia 
Sergio Sánchez  SEMARNAT  General Director of Air Quality 
and Pollution Management 
Diana Ponce  SEMARNAT  Underattorney of Natural 
Resources  
Luis Bojórquez 
 
SEMARNAT  General Director of Ecological 
Planning  
César Reyna  State of Mexico  Comisión Ambiental 
Metropolitana 
Adolfo Mejía  State of Mexico  Subsecretaría de Ecología del 
Estado de México 
 Gustavo Reséndiz  SEMARNAT  Delegate of SEMARNAT in the 
State of Mexico  
Ricardo Sánchez Rubio  State of Mexico  General Director of Prevention 
and Control of water and air 
pollution 
 
 
II.  WATER 
 
Jorge Malagón. 
 
CNA 
Mexico Valley Region 
(GRAVAMEX) 
General Manager  
Francisco Patiño  CNA 
Mexico Valley Region 
(GRAVAMEX) 
Operations director 
 Gustavo Paz Soldán  CNA 
Mexico Valley Project 
Coordinator 
Antonio Dávila Capiterucho  CNA 
Infrastructure Protection 
and Emergencies  
General Manager 
Enrique González Isunza  Water Commission of the 
State of Mexico (CAEM) 
Project Assistant 
Ing. Edgardo Castañeda  Water Commission of the 
State of Mexico (CAEM) 
Projects Manager 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  383 
III.  CIVIL PROTECTION AND DISASTER PREVENTION 
 
Carmen Segura  General 
Coordination of 
SINAPROC 
General Coordinator  
Oswaldo Flores  General Direction of 
SINAPROC 
General Director  
Roberto Quass  CENAPRED  General Director  
Gloria Luz Ortíz Espejel  CENAPRED  Coordinator of Capacity Building 
Tomás Sánchez  CENAPRED  Coordinator of Communication 
Óscar Navarro   General 
Coordination of 
SINAPROC 
Former General Director  
Arturo Vilchis  General Direction of 
Civil Protection of 
the State of Mexico 
General Director  
 Mario Álvarez Sierra  General Direction of 
Civil Protection of 
the State of Mexico 
Director of Risk Atlas. Secretary 
Executive of the Civil Protection 
Metropolitan Commission  
Mireya Mercado Sánchez  General Direction of 
Civil Protection of 
the State of Mexico 
Representative of the State fo Mexico 
in the Civil Protection Metropolitan 
Commission 
Mr. Rodolfo Díaz Mena  Municipality of 
Ixtapaluca 
General Director. Civil Protection 
Agency and Firemen Department 
 Alejandro de Hoyos  ONG: Cáritas  Responsible for the Emergencies 
Programme 
 
 
IV.  URBAN AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Jesús Aguiluz León  General Direction of 
Urban Management 
General Director  
Alejandro Rodríguez 
 
General Direction of 
Urban and 
Ecological Planning 
General Director  
 
 
V.  MEXICAN PETROL COMPANY (PEMEX) 
 
Rafael Fernández de la Garza  Direction of Corporative 
Security and 
Environmental 
Protection (PEMEX) 
General Director 
 
VI.  ACADEMIC EXPERTS 
 
Ing. Osvei Gelmann   Centre of Applied Sciences 
and Technological 
development UNAM 
Researcher and disaster 
Expert  
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Ing Roberto Meli  Institute of Engineering 
UANM 
Researcher and expert on 
Eartquakes 
Virginia García Acosta  Centre of Social 
Anthropology Research 
(CIESAS) 
Historian and disaster expert 
 
 
Affected people from Avándaro, El Triunfo, San Isidro and Unión de Guadalupe 
 
Name  Colonia  Municipality 
Alfonso Martínez Galván  Avándaro  Chalco Valley Solidarity 
Marilu Reyes Vázquez  Avándaro  Chalco Valley Solidarity 
Martha Arriaga  Avándaro  Chalco Valley Solidarity 
     
Agustin Noyola  El Triunfo  Chalco Valley Solidarity 
Antonio Rivadeneira  El Triunfo  Chalco Valley Solidarity 
Carmen Otelo  El Triunfo  Chalco Valley Solidarity 
Francisca Hernández  El Triunfo  Chalco Valley Solidarity 
José Meneses  El Triunfo  Chalco Valley Solidarity 
     
Norberto Robles  San Isidro  Chalco Valley Solidarity 
Agripino Ruiz  San Isidro  Chalco Valley Solidarity 
Alberto Rojas  San Isidro  Chalco Valley Solidarity 
Juan Tepo  San Isidro  Chalco Valley Solidarity 
     
Beatriz Gaspar  Unión de Guadalupe  Chalco 
           César Gaspar  Unión de Guadalupe  Chalco 
Consuelo Sánchez  Unión de Guadalupe  Chalco 
Cristóbal Elvira  Unión de Guadalupe  Chalco 
Isabel Rosas  Unión de Guadalupe  Chalco 
José Luis Robles  Unión de Guadalupe  Chalco 
Matilde Mercado  Unión de Guadalupe  Chalco 
Patricia Jiménez  Unión de Guadalupe  Chalco 
Victor Huitrón  Unión de Guadalupe  Chalco 
           Victoria Guzmén  Unión de Guadalupe  Chalco 
Juanita Robles  Unión de Guadalupe  Chalco 
 
 
B: PRELIMINARY FIELDWORK 
Interviewed Policy-Relevant Subjects 
 
Name  Institution  Post 
1.  Luis 
Wintergerst 
Civil Protection Agency of 
Mexico City 
General Director 
Civil engineer  
2.  Adolfo Mejia  Ministry of Ecology- State of 
Mexico 
Under-minister of Ecology. Doctor in 
Biology  
3.  Miguel  Angel 
Carmona 
Sewage Systems- DGCOH  Under-director 
4.   Octavio  López 
Maya 
Hydraulic Engineering. DGCOH  Under-director 
5.   Arturo Vilchis  Civil Protection Agency of the 
State of Mexico 
General Director  
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6.  Rodolfo  Diaz 
Mena 
Civil Protection Agency and 
Firemen Department/ 
Municipality of Ixtapaluca/State 
of Mexico 
General Director 
7.  Benito  Vázquez 
Lara 
Firemen Department/ 
Municipality of Ixtapaluca 
Head 
8.  Miguel  Angel 
Aguayo 
Department of Rural Programmes 
and Social Participation of the 
Regional Administration of the 
Valley of Mexico (Gravamex)/ 
National Commission of Water 
 
Chief  
CNA official responsible of 
establishing links between the National 
Commission of Water and the 
community affected. 
9.  Dr.  Sergio 
Alcocer Mtez de 
Castro 
National Centre for Disaster 
Prevention/ Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (Cenapred) 
Director of Research 
10.  Dr.  Daniel 
Bitran 
National Centre for Disaster 
Prevention/ Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (Cenapred) 
Responsible of economics evaluation 
of disaster. 
11.  Samuel  Hdez. 
Lastiri. 
Regional Administration of the 
Valley of Mexico (Gravamex)/ 
National Commission of Water, 
CNA 
General Resident East Zone 
(Canal of La Compañía)  
Head of the East Zone Group and 
responsible of the Canal La Compañía  
Civil Engineer 
12.  Jaime Noyola  Office of cultural affairs of the 
municipality of Valley Of Chalco-
Solidaridad. 
Head 
13.  Oscar Zavala  Descentralised Body of Drinking 
Water, Sewage and Sanitation of 
the municipality of Valley Of 
Chalco-Solidaridad (ODAPAS? 
General Director 
14.  Antonio Dovalí  Hydraulic Construction and 
Operation- Mexico City 
General Director 
 
Interviewed People from Chalco Valley-Solidarity 
 
1.  Ms.Aurora  Municipio Valle de  
Chalco-Solidaridad 
Colonia Darío Martínez-II 
Calle Justo Sierra 
Inhabitant of Valley Of  
Chalco-Solidaridad. 
2.  Ms. Leticia  
         (Aurora‘s daughter) 
Municipio Valle de Chalco-Solidaridad 
Colonia Darío Martínez-II 
Calle Justo Sierra 
Inhabitant of Valley Of  
Chalco-Solidaridad. 
3.  Ms. Sara  
         Villanueva Ramírez 
Municipio Valle de Chalco-Solidaridad 
Colonia Darío Martínez-IICalle Justo Sierra 
Inhabitant of Valley Of  
Chalco-Solidaridad. 
 
 
 